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THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR



CAPT. H.M. HOZIER.

КОНСТАНТИНОПОЛЬ



МОСКВА





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GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS.



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T H E
RUSSO-TURKISH WAR:

INCLUDING AN ACCOUNT OF THE
RISE AND DECLINE OF THE OTTOMAN POWER,

AND THE

History of the Eastern Question.

EDITED BY

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
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ERIN P. P. A.



Portrait of Abdul Kerim Pasha

ABDUL KERIM PASHA.



VIEW OF THE BARRACKS AND DOCKYARD AT CALCUTTA



Prague from the South





TURKEY IN ASIA.

Scale of English Miles

Chief Towns of the Empire or Governments
Railways

Longitude East 38 from Greenwich

took a different aspect. Some well-directed rounds sent into the midst of the Bashi-bazouks decided the battle. A sudden panic struck those barbarians, who fled in wild disorder, throwing the Turkish army into utter confusion, and causing a general rout. Such was the battle of Nezib. The Turkish army left on the field more than a hundred guns, besides the camp, baggage, and ammunition. The Sultan's army was practically dispersed, a mere demoralized rabble having accompanied Hafiz Pasha in his flight to Marash. Sultan Mahmoud did not live to learn the issue of his great struggle with his formidable vassal. Five days after the battle of Nezib, and several days before the news of the disaster reached Constantinople, he breathed his last.

Equally fatal to the Sultan were the events of which the Mediterranean was the theatre. The Ottoman fleet, which had been fitted out at great cost, had been intrusted to the command of Achmed Fevzi, Capitan Pasha, or High-admiral of the Turkish fleet. This disreputable officer disgraced his high position by secretly intriguing with his master's enemy, and deserting to Mehemet Ali, carrying with him the whole Turkish fleet. So desperate did the fortunes of the Sultan after this event appear, that Husreff Pasha, the Turkish Prime Minister, actually wrote to the Capitan Pasha to say, that if he would return with the fleet to Constantinople, no notice would be taken of his late defection, and that a full pardon and oblivion of the past would be accorded. To this the Capitan Pasha replied, that he had not been, and did not intend to be, disloyal to his sovereign; and that what he had done had been for the interest of the Sultan and of the Turkish Empire, as it removed the fleet out of the power of the intrigues of Husreff Pasha. At this supreme moment the interference of the European Powers saved the Ottoman Empire from destruction. In September, 1839, Baron Brunhoff, the Russian ambassador, proceeded to London, and had several long interviews with Lord Palmerston. He was commissioned to declare that the Russian Government had witnessed with great satisfaction what they considered to be evidences of greater confidence on the part of the British Government in the sincerity and good faith of Russia with regard to the affairs of Turkey; that the Emperor considered the Sultan entitled to support, and that he re-

garded Mehemet Ali as a revolted subject; that he concurred with Great Britain in thinking that the best arrangement would be to confer upon Mehemet Ali the hereditary Pashalik of Egypt, and restore the rest of the territory in the occupation of the Pasha to the Sultan. Russia further approved of the British proposal to blockade the ports of Egypt and Syria, and proposed a division of labour, so that the operations in Syria and Egypt should be undertaken by England, Austria, and France, while those within the Straits and in Asia Minor should be executed by Russia. The British Government acquiesced in this arrangement with the exception of one point. It could not permit the passage of Russian ships through the Dardanelles. This being referred to the Emperor's Cabinet, the latter gave up the point; and after much negotiation a treaty "for the pacification of the Levant" was signed in London on the 15th July, 1840, by all the Powers save France, who did not agree with the other great Powers, but was highly indignant at being excluded.

This instrument conferred the Pashalik of Egypt on Mehemet Ali, with the right of transmitting to his descendants the administration of that province, but with the full recognition of the sovereignty of the Sultan. Mehemet Ali, on his part, was to evacuate Syria and Candia, and to restore the fleet to the Sultan; but to retain for his life the government of South Syria and the fortress of Acre, with the title of Pasha of Acre. As may be imagined, the victorious and ambitious Viceroy was by no means pleased with this decision. He endeavoured by every means to obtain permission to retain Syria, but to no purpose. The British Foreign Secretary was not to be trifled with. Mehemet having talked of his "rights," Lord Palmerston thus sternly admonished him through Colonel Hodges, the British Consul in Egypt—"I have to instruct you on the next occasion on which Mehemet Ali shall speak to you of his rights, to say to His Highness that you are instructed by your Government to remind him that he has no rights except such as the Sultan has conferred upon him; that the only legitimate authority which he possesses is the authority which has been delegated to him by the Sultan, over a portion of the Sultan's dominions, and which has been intrusted to him for the sole purpose of being used in the interest, and in

obedience to the orders of the Sultan; that the Sultan is entitled to take away that which he has given; that the Sultan may probably do so; and that if, in such a case, the Sultan should not have the means of self-defence, the Sultan has allies who may possibly lend him those means. You may also suggest to the mind of Mehemet Ali that—to a garrison which capitulates in time, honourable conditions are granted; but that a garrison which insists on being stormed must take the chance of war.”

This was a most unpalatable morsel for the self-love of Mehemet Ali to digest, and the exasperation which it produced induced him against all sober judgment to take the chance alluded to. He therefore made the most active preparations for resistance, relying to some extent on the possibility of an alliance with France, the Government of which, having been outwitted by the Treaty of London, was supposed to wish for war between Egypt and Turkey, on the chance of securing some additional territory on the shores of the Mediterranean. Mehemet's refusal of terms led to the threatened intervention. On the 27th September, 1840, Sidon was bombarded by a British squadron under Commodore Napier, and was occupied by the English and Turkish forces. On the 10th October the Egyptians were totally defeated at Beyrout, with a loss of 7000 men and twenty pieces of cannon, by a combined attack of the English, Austrian, and Turkish naval and military forces. Acre suffered the same fate as Sidon and Beyrout, being taken by storm on the 3rd November by the Allied fleet, under the command of the British admiral, Sir Robert Stopford. The Egyptians here lost 2000 men in killed and wounded, and 3000 prisoners. After these severe lessons Mehemet Ali, who had received no succour from France, and was threatened with a revolution at home, retired from Syria, and was glad to accept terms of peace not much more humiliating than had been offered him in July. The Sultan wished to depose him, but this England would not allow. By thus supporting Mehemet in the retention of his Pashalik as a hereditary fief the British Government was reconciled to that of France, and secured at the same time a friendly feeling on the part of Mehemet, that proved useful in establishing that overland route to India *viâ* Suez that has proved of so much benefit to the people of England. With

the young Sultan, Abdul-Medjid, British influence was greater than ever, for British arms had contributed most to the recovery of Syria and the subjection of a haughty and rebellious vassal. Russian interest in Constantinople declined, and Sir Stratford Canning, the English ambassador, was for many years all-powerful there.

Space will not permit to give here any detailed account of the pacification of the Lebanon district in 1860. A special interest attaches to that work of sound policy, as it might well serve for a pattern for the tranquillization and good administration of any of the Turkish provinces when in a state of revolt arising from religious animosities. In the middle of 1860 a sanguinary quarrel broke out between the rival sects inhabiting the mountains of Libanus—the Druses and the Maronites. The former, a warlike people, derive their origin from a fanatical Mahometan sect which arose in Egypt about 996, and fled to Palestine to avoid persecution. They now retain hardly any of the religion of their ancestors; they eat pork and drink wine; they neither pray nor fast nor practise circumcision. The Maronites are the followers of one Maron, a Christian of the fifth century, and they are said to hold the errors of the Jacobites, the Nestorians, and the Monothelites. In the twelfth century they were supposed to number forty thousand souls, and rendered good service to the Crusader Kings of Jerusalem. Not long afterwards they were reconciled to the Church of Rome. Both parties were to blame in the dispute that arose in the summer of 1860, but the Maronites were the principal sufferers. The Druses attacked their villages, and massacred the inhabitants without regard to age or sex: 151 Christian villages were destroyed, and 3000 persons killed. Vast numbers were rendered homeless and destitute. Peace was made in July, but in the meantime a religious fury seized the Mahometan population of the neighbouring cities, and a general massacre of the Christians took place. Among the more enlightened Moslems who endeavoured to stop these atrocities and rescue the victims was the Emir Abd-el-Kader from Algeria, who was then residing in Damascus.

At the instigation of France and England, prompt steps were taken by the Sultan's Government to suppress this dreadful insurrection. On the 20th of August Fuad Pasha arrived at Damascus with a body of Turkish troops, and surrounding the guilty district, commenced a

searching inquiry into the details of the tragedy. Two days later, 4000 French soldiers, under the command of General Hautpoul, landed on the coast and marched to the scene of action. There was no evading of justice now. It was sternly carried out by the execution of 167 Mahometans of all ranks, who were implicated in the massacres. Among those who paid the last penalty of the law was the Governor of Damascus: 11,000 participators in the insurrection were made soldiers. The wild Druses, finding their mountain haunts surrounded, laid down their arms, and fourteen Emirs surrendered in January, 1861. The country was pacified. The British Government having sent a Commissioner in the person of Lord Dufferin, a scheme of administration was drawn out, establishing the principle of self-government among these mixed populations. Taking for basis the broad distinction of Christian and Mahometan, it was settled that there should be a local council in each district under the presidency of a governor; that the members of the council should be appointed in accordance with the number of Christians and Mahometans respectively in the district, so that where the former predominated their co-religionists should prevail in the council, and *vice versa* when the Moslem element was most numerous. The appointment of the governor was to follow the same rule. The scheme has been in practice for sixteen years, and combined with the severe lesson given by Fuad Pasha, has sufficed to keep the once turbulent region of the Lebanon in peace. The French withdrew from the occupation of the country in June, 1861, according to their promise, but contrary to the expectations, loudly expressed, of English alarmists of the period.

It will be sufficient to add here that the next serious disturbance the Ottoman Porte had to encounter in one of its subject provinces, was an insurrection of the Christian inhabitants of Crete against their Moslem rulers. This occurred in 1867, at the instigation, it was supposed, and certainly with the encouragement, of the people and Government of Greece. The movement was discountenanced by the Great Powers, and was suppressed by the Sultan's forces without much trouble and with no little severity.

It is more agreeable to record the peaceful achievements of science, destined to facilitate the communication of widely separated families of

mankind and to promote the beneficent workings of industry and commerce. For this purpose it is necessary to return once more to the land of ancient renown so long and so ably governed by Mehemet Ali. That prince, after ruling Egypt for the long period of forty years, and bringing it under conditions of Western civilization as far as could then be done with an Oriental people, abdicated his vice-regal throne in September, 1848, and died eleven months later. The humiliation of the Treaty of London was too much for him. When in 1846 he had visited his new Suzerain, the Sultan Abdul Medjid, at Constantinople, the once formidable foe of the Porte was a broken down old man. For his health's sake he went in 1848 to Malta, and thence to Naples; but returning to Cairo, he died there on the 2nd August, 1849, in the eightieth year of his age, having been born in 1769, the birth year of Napoleon I. and Wellington. His warrior son, Ibrahim Pasha, predeceased him in November, 1848. Abbas, the son of Ibrahim, was Viceroy for six years, and died the 14th July, 1854. He was succeeded by Said Pasha, the most enduring monument of whose reign is the place now known as Port Said. Before his reign the importance of Egypt as offering a practicable short route from Europe to India had been demonstrated. Lieutenant Waghorn had devoted a large part of his life in an endeavour to connect India with England by an overland route, that should quicken the despatch of mails and obviate the necessity for passengers of sailing round the Cape of Good Hope. In 1845 he carried the mail of the 1st October from Bombay to London in thirty days, arriving in London on the 31st of the month. His despatches reached Suez on the 19th, and on the 20th arrived at Alexandria, whence he proceeded by steamboat to a place twelve miles nearer London than Trieste. He hurried through Austria, Baden, Bavaria, Prussia, and Belgium, and reached London at half-past four in the morning of the 31st. The authorities of the different countries through which he passed eagerly facilitated his movements. But the spirit of competition enabled the overland mail from Bombay in the following month (1st December, 1845) to reach London, *via* Marseilles and Paris, by the 30th of the month. The French Government exerted itself to the utmost to accomplish this feat, in order to show that the route through France was shorter and

better than any other. Lieutenant Waghorn published a letter, in which he stated that in a couple of years he would bring the Bombay mail to London in twenty-one days. But before he achieved that purpose his career was cut short by death in 1850.

It is to the enterprise of a Frenchman, M. de Lesseps, warmly supported by many of his countrymen, that is due the great undertaking of modern times for uniting Europe with India and Australia by means of a sea canal cut through the Isthmus of Suez. The French have long had a hankering after Egypt. In the reign of Louis XIV. the philosophic politician Leibnitz drew up a paper recommending to the king a conquest of Egypt, from which he anticipated immense benefits to mankind, and especially to France. The memoir was seen by few, but doubtless was known to Napoleon I., who carefully studied it, and endeavoured to put it in practice. His disappointment at the ultimate failure of his plan of conquest is said to have drawn from him the complaint that his life was *une carrière manquée*, a wasted career. The prevailing idea of Leibnitz was that the introduction of a European administration into Egypt would produce more effect in securing the civilization of the East than any other possible proceeding. The reason why the Christian Crusades produced no lasting result in the East is that they obtained no permanent footing in those regions, nor established any system of government there. Both Philip Augustus of France and Richard Cœur de Lion had striven to capture and retain Damietta, but in vain. Cardinal Ximenes originated a league between Castile, Portugal, and England for the conquest of Egypt; and Michaud, the French historian, believes that the saintly King Louis IX. meant to colonize the Egyptian territories. He at least established a protectorate over the Latin Christians in Syria that has never yet been absolutely disregarded, and which had no small influence in producing the Crimean War.

Canal communication is supposed to have existed from sea to sea, at all events since the time of Abraham, throughout the greater part of the eventful history of Egypt. There is, indeed, a tradition that it was opened by the Pharaoh of that day in order to gratify the patriarch and Sarah his wife, who certainly possessed court influence in Egypt. It is rather singular that Suez Canals have been much connected with the history of

distinguished women, for Cleopatra relied on the Canal, which was navigable through the Isthmus during her reign, as her last resource after the battle of Actium, and meditated a flight with her galleys into the Red Sea from the Mediterranean in company with her Roman lover, when her designs were cut short by the failure of the Nile water, on which it depended for its supplies. Canal communication was continued during all intervening periods till the Roman Empire began to decline, when it fell into disuse; but was again opened by the Saracens, and afterwards closed by one of the caliphs of the line of the Abassides (Aboo-Jafar-el-Mansoor) for political reasons.

At no period was it believed in any European country, except England, that the making of the Canal by M. de Lesseps was impracticable; and it now appears most extraordinary that such an impression should have prevailed, when we look at the previous course of history. It appears even stranger that Stephenson, the great railway engineer, should have pronounced so emphatically as he did against the project; but it ought to be borne in mind that he was a great railway engineer, and that his authority was not the highest on subjects connected with canals. Nor is it an unimportant circumstance that it was only ascertained after the expression of his opinion, that there is no material difference of level between the Mediterranean and the Red Seas. A great difference was supposed to exist, and it was anticipated that a strong current would have constantly rushed from one to the other on a channel being opened, which must render it extremely difficult to preserve the works from gradual destruction. Napoleon I. at one time planned the establishment of a canal communication from sea to sea through the Isthmus of Suez, and Napoleon III. made a favourite study of kindred schemes for cutting through the Isthmus of Panama. The importance given by the latter to any scheme tending to the improvement of Egypt may be gathered from the striking description given by him of Mediterranean prosperity in his "Life of Cæsar" (vol. i. p. 163). This concise description of the countries bordering on the Mediterranean, he says, 200 or 300 years before our era, shows sufficiently the state of prosperity of the different peoples who inhabited them. The remembrance of such greatness inspires a very natural wish, namely, that henceforth the jealousy of the great Powers may no

longer prevent the East from shaking off the dust of twenty centuries, and from being born again to life and civilization.

M. de Lesseps has himself given an account of the conception and execution of the great work which will immortalize his name. From 1849 to 1854, he says, I studied everything connected with the trade between the West and the East. I discovered that the traffic doubled every ten years, and that the time had arrived at which the formation of a company for the construction of the Suez Canal could develop that traffic in a marvellous manner. In 1862, when my studies were completed, and I found before me the alternative either of enlisting in my cause a Viceroy of Egypt absorbed in pleasure, or of applying to Constantinople, I took the latter course, and obtained for answer that the solution of the question in no wise concerned the Porte. When Egypt took the initiative in the Canal, England, which had, without the intervention of the Divan, obtained the construction of the railway between Alexandria and Suez, remonstrated with the Porte in the name of its ignored rights. I then kept back my scheme, and devoted my attention to my cattle and my farm. One day while on the roof of a house I was building, in the midst of scaffolding and carpenters, I received a newspaper which announced the death of the Pasha, and the accession of Mohammed Saïd, son of Mehemet Ali. While residing as the French agent accredited to Mehemet Ali, that great prince had shown me much affection on account of the memory of my father, who, when representing France in Egypt after the peace of Amiens, had contributed to the elevation of the Bimbashée Mehemet Ali Aga, who had recently arrived from Macedonia with a contingent of a thousand men. The First Consul, Bonaparte, and the Prince de Talleyrand, Minister of Foreign Affairs, had instructed their agent to seek among the Turkish militia for a bold and intelligent man to be named from Constantinople Pasha of Cairo, a title almost nominal. He was to be a man that would strive to break down the power of the Mamelukes, then so hostile to French policy. One of my father's Janissaries brought to him one day Mehemet Ali Aga, who at that period could neither read nor write. He had left Cavalla with his little band, and sometimes boasted of coming from the same country as Alexander. Thirty years later, when

the consular corps came to Alexandria to compliment Mehemet Ali Pasha on the victories of his son Ibrahim Pasha in Syria, the Viceroy of Egypt, turning towards me, said to my colleague : "The father of this young man was a great personage when I was a very small one. He had one day invited me to dinner. The next day I learnt that some silver had been stolen from his table, and as I was the only person who could be suspected of the theft, I dared not return to the house of the French agent, who was obliged to send for me and reassure me." This was very fine from the lips of a triumphant man, avowing that he might plausibly have been accused of theft.

Such was the origin of my relations with Egypt and the family of Mehemet Ali, and consequently of my friendship with Saïd Pasha. His father was an extremely severe man, and was annoyed at seeing him grow fat to a formidable extent. In order to prevent obesity in a child he loved, he sent him to climb the masts of ships for two hours a day, to skip with a rope, to row, and to walk round the walls of the city. I was at that time the only person authorized to receive him. When he came to me, he would throw himself on my sofa quite worn out. He had come to an understanding with my servants, as he confessed to me later, to give him secretly meals of macaroni to make up for the fasting imposed on him. The Prince was brought up in French ideas, with an impetuous head, and great sincerity of character. When Saïd Pasha succeeded to power it was my first care to congratulate him. Two years before he had been accused of conspiracy. Having been ill-treated by the Viceroy, who had exiled his family, the discontented had gathered round him, and he had been obliged to escape as he could. He came to Paris, and lived at an hotel in the Rue de Richelieu, where I visited him. The welcome I gave him under these circumstances, and the recollections of his childhood, established between us from that moment a truly brotherly friendship. Not long afterwards he returned to Egypt, and when in 1854 he was called to succeed Abbas Pasha, he appointed to meet me at Alexandria in November, 1854. I went there. He gave me one of his palaces as a residence, and invited me to accompany him to Cairo, to which he went across the Libyan desert with a little army of 11,000 men. The Viceroy pitched his camp on the ruins of Marea, beyond Lake Marcotis. I went to join

him. I had always carried my project in my head, but I awaited the favourable moment to speak of it; for I wished first to acquaint the Prince with the system, new to him, of limited financial associations, which can bring capital to a sovereign, and assist him to increase his power by means intended to advance the public prosperity. It was further essential to conciliate the goodwill of the Viceroy's intimate associates, consisting principally of the old councillors of his father, who were more skilful in the exercise of the horse than of the brain. I used to ride with them in the desert, my talent for riding having conquered their esteem. Intimate with Saïd's old companion from childhood, his minister, Zulfikar Pasha, who had been brought up in the French school, and could thus understand everything, I initiated him into my project, and it was agreed that he should acquaint me when the day arrived which he thought opportune for me to speak on the subject to his master.

On the day named, the 30th of November, 1854, I presented myself at the tent of the Viceroy, placed on an eminence surrounded by a wall of rough stones, forming a little fortification with embrasures for cannon. I had remarked that there was a place where one could leap with a horse over the parapet, there being a terrace outside on which the horse had the chance of a footing. The Viceroy welcomed my project, and requested me to go to my tent to prepare a report for him, which he permitted me to bring him. His councillors and generals were around him. I vaulted on my horse, which leaped the parapet, galloped down the slope, and then brought me back to the inclosure when I had taken the time necessary to draw up the report, which had been ready for several years. The whole question was clearly set forth in a page and a half; and when the Prince himself had read it to his followers, accompanying it with a translation in Turkish, and had asked their advice, he received the unanimous answer that the proposal of the guest, whose friendship for the family of Mehemet Ali was known, could not be otherwise than favourable, and that it was desirable to accept it. The concession was immediately granted. The word of Mohammed Saïd was as good as a contract. On arriving at Cairo he received, in front of the citadel, the representatives of the different Governments, who came to congratulate him on his

accession to the Viceroyalty. He said to the Consul-general of America: "I shall queen the pawn against you Americans. The Isthmus of Suez will be pierced before yours." He then continued to speak of the project. The Consul-general of England seemed agitated. Being present at the audience, and on a sign of the Prince, I remarked that the enterprise, as then conceived, ought to offend no one; that all countries would contribute to it equally if they desired, by a public subscription; and that if I were charged with the formation of a financial company for carrying it out, it was not as a Frenchman, but as a friend of Egypt and the Viceroy.

Each Consul-general hastened to transmit the news to his Government, and the answer was the despatch to Mohammed Saïd of the Grand Cross of the Orders of nearly all the sovereigns. An excursion was decided on for the exploration of the Isthmus. The Viceroy associated with me three French engineers in his service—Messrs. Mougel Bey, Linant Bey, and Aivas. Four persons required at least sixty camels, of which twenty-five were loaded with water, to cross a desert now peopled with 40,000 inhabitants. We left Cairo; we crossed the Isthmus from north to south, studying the nature of the land, examining the possibility of a fresh track—for from the most remote periods attention had been directed only to an inland canal from the Nile to the Red Sea, and never to a canal without locks dug directly from sea to sea. The scheme of a fluvial and not a maritime canal was that adopted by Father Enfantin, to whom we owe the studies of 1847, and the recognition of the even level of the two seas. Former projects, including that of M. Lepère, the engineer-in-chief of the French expedition to Egypt, had employed the water of the Nile for the navigation of the canal by means of channels and sluices. This was a mistake, and this will make it impossible for the American plans for the cutting of the Isthmus of Panama to succeed, until they find a means of simply piercing the Isthmus from sea to sea. No one will ever succeed in making a maritime canal by bringing water from an inland river to the sea. Moreover, for a passage which will shorten the journey by 3000 miles, a time will necessarily arrive when the canal will need to float perhaps one hundred vessels a day. The passage for each will require at least half-an-hour, and there are not a hundred half-

hours in the day. Then the locks are a human work, which must be kept up and repaired. Hence forced delays, a large consumption of water, and no absolute certainty.

There is no difference between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean except such as is caused by the tides. We passed five years in the desert, and there made all the preliminary studies before appealing for capital; and we only formed the company to carry them out after receiving the verdict of European science. The Suez Canal was made, thanks to the co-operation of the superior and competent men whom we called in. Science carried the day on every point. Our first exploration was long and difficult, and the final result was that to which my instinct had led me—that is to say, that we were not to make use of the water of the Nile for the navigation of the Suez Canal. During our journey the feet of our camels trampled on the salt crusts of the Bitter Lakes. The lakes are forty leagues in circumference, and are evidently the ancient Gulf of Hieroöpolis. It was through this desert, converted into an inland sea, that on the day of inauguration, on the 17th of November, 1869, a fleet passed—the *Aigle* at the head. This basin now contains 2,000,000,000 mètres of water (440,000,000,000 gallons). In 1854 a caravan of camels had to cross it, carrying our water, our victuals, sheep, and fowls. Beyond these animals there was not even a fly in this hideous desert. At night we opened the cages of our fowls, full of confidence, for we were sure that the next morning beasts would come round us not to be abandoned in those desolate places, where solitude is death. When we struck our camp of a morning, if at the moment of departure a hen had lurked behind picking at the foot of a tamarisk shrub, quick she would jump up frightened on the back of a camel to regain her cage. The fellahs whom I had brought were in constant anxiety, for the inhabitants of the borders of the Nile have the greatest fear of the desert. Well, it is this desert that we explored in every direction for two months—in December, 1854, and January, 1855. We experienced storms, but I must say that these sands of the desert do not produce the serious inconveniences attributed to them. They are less annoying than the rain and hail which in our climate surprise us in our walks. I have traversed the deserts of Africa nearly to the equator; I have travelled 350 leagues, mounted

on a dromedary, in the season of the south winds; and I have never been stopped by these winds, said to be so violent, even when they blew straight in my face. We are constantly threatened with the invasion of the sands in the Canal, and the impossibility of freeing ourselves from them. This prejudice is so deeply rooted in the public mind, that every day it is alleged as a formidable obstacle to the maintenance of the Canal. After the passage of 130 vessels during the fêtes of inauguration, no deposit of sand, no slip, was reported. Since that period two, three, four, and five ships have passed daily, and the Canal is as intact as before the inauguration.—This highly characteristic account of the lively Frenchman is no doubt substantially correct. The engineering and financial difficulties he had to encounter were met with undaunted courage and perseverance.

A congress of learned men was convoked by M. de Lesseps to meet at his residence in Paris on a third story in the Rue Richepance. Most of the engineers were unacquainted with each other. They were the most competent men to be found, who together presented the greatest amount of practical knowledge. They had left their business, the direction of their works, with remarkable disinterestedness, to form the era of a new civilization. On the day fixed, at eight o'clock in the morning, they were all punctual, arriving by railway from Madrid, Amsterdam, Berlin, Vienna, and London. They named a sub-committee, charged with the study of the land in Egypt, and composed of five members, which achieved its task, in the midst of every difficulty, with indefatigable zeal and devotion.

It speaks highly in favour of both the judgment and prescience of M. de Lesseps that he should have selected the Suez Canal scheme as the pursuit to which he chose to devote himself, when by reason of his retirement from his profession of diplomatist he became free to consult his own ideas exclusively. He retired from the service in 1849 when he was in Rome, being unable to agree with M. de Tocqueville, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as to the policy of the French occupation of that city. The substitution of mechanical for forced human labour is one of the most decisive triumphs of the administrative ability of M. de Lesseps. The forced labour of Egyptian fellahs (or peasants), which the Viceroy bound himself by the terms of his agreement with the Canal

Company to supply them, was withdrawn, very much in consequence of diplomatic representations made by England to the Sultan at Constantinople, and to the Viceroy himself. A large pecuniary recompense was adjudged by arbitration to be made to the Company by the Viceroy for the loss thus caused to them. To supply the want of this forced labour the Company had recourse to mechanical means for performing the operations necessary for the construction of the Canal. The most remarkable work was the excavation by machinery, as performed by the *drague à long couloir*, a dredging-machine, such as is to be seen at many British sea-ports, but fitted up with a spout half as long again as the column in the Place Vendôme in Paris. By a pump kept on board the lighter, on which the apparatus was mounted, water was mixed with the earth brought up by the dredge, and the semi-fluid mass was discharged through this long pipe on whatever spot was selected. Banks were thus formed with the requisite inclination, as the semi-fluid mass grew dry by degrees, and more or less was thrown on any point indicated.

The bringing together of adequate means to finish the Canal when the compulsory labour of the peasants was withdrawn was no easy task, and the large number of machines to be employed required time for their construction. The workmen, skilled and unskilled, some 30,000 in number, consisted of persons from a vast variety of nations; men from almost every country in Europe, except England. The wages were not high enough to tempt English navvies from home. All was done by task-work, and little difference was found between the amount done by the strong and vigorous native of Calabria, the subtle and intellectual Greek, and the Egyptian peasant. All were well and regularly paid; and places of worship were provided, according to the rites of the Roman Catholic Church, the Greek Orthodox Church, and the Mahometan religion. Medical attendance and magisterial supervision were there, so that on the whole a very effective civilizing process formed a feature in the labours of the Company. The Canal is 260 feet broad; and the largest ship canal to be found elsewhere is said to be between Rotterdam and the Hague, which in one place is 130 feet in breadth. The Suez Canal is of almost exactly the same dimensions throughout its entire length, from Suez in the Red Sea to Port Saïd in the Mediter-

anean. In some places the water at its surface is as much as 268 feet in breadth, in order to allow a more horizontal slope to the banks under water, where the nature of the ground renders this advisable. Throughout the entire distance the width at the bottom is about 44 feet; the depth 26 feet.

Grand as the Suez Canal is in its dimensions, in the conceptions in which it originated, and in the ultimate results which, there can be no doubt, it is destined to achieve, the character of the operations performed in constructing it were more simple than many people expected. The main excavation had to be effected through a country never rising into hills, and consisting of sand or clay. This uniformity in the nature of the operations was varied in particular cases, chiefly at Chalouf, near Suez, where about two miles of rock had to be cut through by manual labour and blasting with gunpowder; at El Gisir, near Ismailia, in the middle of the Isthmus, a plateau where sand had to be taken away to the depth (on the average) of fifty feet for a distance of about two miles; and in the Lake Menzaleh, where special measures were successfully adopted to prevent the soft mud lying at the bottom of that lake from filling up the channel of the Canal. It does not detract from the merits of M. de Lesseps in overcoming difficulty, that he received from the first all the aid that could be derived from the highest Imperial circles in France, with which he was personally connected by ties of relationship and friendship. In addition to the assistance of statesmen, financiers, and engineers, he enjoyed the countenance of the Emperor and Empress of the French, who both felt the warmest interest in his success. The Emperor appreciated better than any one the commercial and political advantages that might accrue to France from the opening of the Canal. The Empress was fully alive to its importance, and by setting the fashion in France in favour of supporting the Suez Canal, she personally contributed to the taking up of the shares. When M. de Lesseps at first was met by doubters with the objection, that being neither a financier nor an engineer, it was unreasonable to hope for success, he used to reply, "Yes, but I have an idea; it possesses its own inherent strength." The world has heard more than once of the force which may belong to an idea; and the experience acquired from the history of this Canal shows

that the idea of M. de Lesseps had force enough to pierce the Isthmus of Suez. The idea of making a salt-water canal through the Isthmus which should be, as much as possible, a strait of the sea, belongs to M. de Lesseps himself. Napoleon I., and all the great men who in former times either projected or carried out a canal through the Isthmus, only thought of fresh water canals. The salt water Canal, now completed, is on a much larger scale, and is more direct in its course, than any of those that previously existed or were at any time seriously thought of. The position of Port Saïd, where the Canal enters the Mediterranean, was chiefly determined by the greater facility there than elsewhere for finding a sufficient depth of water. The harbour is formed by two jetties running nearly parallel to each other, and in the direction, in the main, of north and south. The site of Port Saïd being fixed, and the other extremity (Suez) being likewise fixed, all that remained was to lay down the line for the Canal between these two points as directly as might be, making slight sinuosities in various places, as seemed advisable, in order to take advantage of the levels and nature of the ground.

Under direction of the engineers Borel and Lavalley, and the aid of their gigantic inventions, the works were pressed on with an activity which has hardly a precedent in the history of industry. The dredging-machines carried off from 2000 to 3000 cubic mètres a day; and as they were sixty in number, the monthly output was about two million cubic mètres (about 2,763,000 cubic yards), a quantity of which few persons can form an exact idea, unless they form a comparison with the Pyramids. It took four months for the 400,000 cubic mètres of the Trocadero, while at the Canal were dug out 2,000,000 in one month. The Canal was opened on the 17th November, with great ceremony, but not without difficulty, not without terrible emotions, said M. de Lesseps, who never had seen so clearly how near failure is to triumph. The Emperor of Austria and Eugénie, Empress of the French, accompanied the enterprising designer of the Canal on this occasion, when the success of his scheme was made triumphantly apparent spite of dangerous impediments. Fifteen days before the inauguration of the Canal the engineers discovered between two soundings, taken at distances of 150 mètres by

means of square shafts, holding twelve men, a hard rock, which broke the buckets of the dredgers. At this sad news, says M. de Lesseps, I hasten to the place pointed out. There we found a boulder rising five mètres above the bottom of the Canal, and leaving only three mètres of water. What was to be done? Every one began by declaring that there was nothing to be done. In the first place I cried, "Go and get powder at Cairo—powder in masses—and then, if we cannot blow up the rock, we will blow up ourselves." The Sovereigns were on their way to the rendez-vous, all the fleets of the world had been bidden, and were about to arrive. It was necessary at any price to be in a position to receive them. The intelligence and energy of our workmen saved us. Not a minute was lost, and all the ships were able to pass.

On the evening of the 16th November everything seemed ready for the opening ceremony, when at midnight news was brought that an Egyptian frigate had run aground some thirty miles distant from Port Saïd, and was barring the passage of the Canal. A steamer was despatched with men and appliances to try and move the frigate, but at half-past two in the morning it was found their labour was vain. At three o'clock the Viceroy, Ismail Pasha (the successor of Saïd Pasha), who had left for Ismailia to receive the Sovereigns and Princes, heard of the disaster, and returned in all haste. He sent for Lesseps, who would not risk the bad effect that would be produced on the Stock Exchanges by a postponement of the ceremony. A thousand seamen were sent forward. It was agreed that there were two methods to be employed—to bring the frigate back into the stream, to fix her to the bank; or, if these two fail, there was a third. "We look into each other's eyes," continues the lively narrator. "'Blow it up!'" cried the Prince. 'Yes, yes, that's it; it will be magnificent.' And I embraced him. 'But at least,' added the Khedive, smiling, 'you will wait till I have taken away my frigate.' I would not even grant him this respite." Fortunately the frigate righted, and the assembled fleet, on passing Kantara, the scene of the accident, was charmed with the attention that had placed a large ship, with colours flying, on the passage ready to salute with her guns the admiring visitors. Thus the passage was effected with perfect success. One

hundred and thirty ships inaugurated the opening of the Canal, and since that day there has been no serious interruption to the traffic.

The following illustration of the benefits conferred by the Canal was given by M. de Lesseps in his Lecture before the Société des Gens de Lettres at Paris in 1870 :—The English steamer *Brazilian*, sailing from Bombay, arrived at Liverpool, carrying in its hold 13,000 bales of cotton and 2500 bales of wool, equal to 4000 tons. And again—and this is an admirable example of the encouragement given by England to commerce—another vessel, sailing from Bombay, passes the Canal, and leaves its cargo of cotton on the quays of Liverpool. The cotton, immediately sent to Manchester, is manufactured; and nine days later, the ship, with its former cargo in a manufactured state, again sets sail, and returns to India by the Canal. Thus it has been found possible in seventy days to bring the raw cotton from India, to unload in England, and to send it back manufactured to India. I wish to contrast this example of devouring activity with the desert once so arid which now is peopled, and where three not unimportant towns have come into existence.

In forming the original company — “The Universal Company of the Maritime Suez Canal” — care was taken to guard against the appropriation of the new route by any one nation in particular. This may be seen in the terms of the concession given by the Viceroy on January 5, 1856, where it is laid down :—

Article 14. We solemnly declare, for ourselves and successors, subject to the ratification of his Imperial Majesty the Sultan, the Grand Maritime Canal from Suez to Pelusium and the ports dependent thereon always open, as a neutral passage, to every commercial vessel crossing from one sea to the other, without any distinction, exclusion, or preference of persons or nationalities. . . .

Article 15 says—In consequence of the principle laid down in the preceding article, the Universal Concessionary Company cannot, in any case, grant to any ship, company, or person, any advantages or power not granted to other ships, &c., &c.

In the statute it is stipulated :—

Article 7. The share certificates are to be printed in Turkish, German, English, French, and Italian.

Article 8. The shares are to be subscribed and

paid for at Alexandria, Amsterdam, Constantinople, London, New York, Paris, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Genoa, Barcelona, &c.

By Article 24, a Council of Administration is formed, composed of twenty-one members, representing the principal nationalities interested in the undertaking.

But while no doubt the opposition of Lord Palmerston was unfortunate, it was to some extent justified by circumstances that have ceased to exist. The grants of land given up to a French company, governed by French laws, and having its seat at Paris, did point to a permanent French territorial settlement in Egypt, inconsistent with a real neutrality, and likely to lead to grave political difficulty; while the opinion of Mr. Stephenson, given openly in Parliament, cast doubts on the commercial prospects of the enterprise. The latter opposition is now controverted by facts, while an arrangement entered into previously to the opening of the Canal did away with the former apprehensions.

The language of Lord Palmerston was very clear, and was uttered in the House of Commons in answer to Mr. H. Berkeley, July 7, 1857. “The obvious political tendency of the undertaking is to render more easy the separation of Egypt from Turkey. It is founded also on remote speculations with regard to easier access to our Indian possessions, which I need not more distinctly shadow forth, because they will be obvious to everybody who pays any attention to the subject. I can only express my surprise that M. de Lesseps should have reckoned so much on the credulity of English capitalists, as to think that by his progress through the different commercial towns in this country he should succeed in obtaining English money for the promotion of a scheme which is every way so adverse and hostile to British interests. That scheme was launched, I believe, about fifteen years ago, as a rival to the railway at Alexandria by Cairo to Suez, which being infinitely more practicable, and likely to be more useful, obtained the pre-eminence. M. de Lesseps is a very persevering gentleman, and may have great engineering skill at his command; at all events, he pursues his scheme very steadily, though I am disposed to think that probably the object he and some others of the promoters have in view will be accomplished, even if the whole of the undertaking should not be ear-

ried into execution. If my honourable friend the member for Bristol and his friends will take my advice, they will have nothing to do with the scheme in question." Ten days later Lord Palmerston in another speech said—"I therefore think I am not much out of the way in stating this to be one of the bubble schemes which are often set on foot to induce English capitalists to embark their money upon enterprises which, in the end, will only leave them poorer, whoever else they may make richer."

In disposing of the shares of his Company M. de Lesseps exhibited the frugal mind of a true economist. When asked by the firm of Rothschild five per cent for selling the shares, he exclaimed: "Five per cent on 200,000,000 francs (£8,000,000); why, that makes 10,000,000 (£400,000)! I shall hire a place for 1200 francs, and do my own business equally well." The Grand Central Railway had just left the Place Vendôme, and there he established his offices, and thither capital flowed in abundance. By the advice of the Viceroy, he had reserved for foreign powers a portion of the shares. But France alone took of the whole amount 220,000, the equivalent of 110,000,000 francs. In 1876 the Government of Mr. Disraeli made the startling announcement that it had just purchased from the Khedive of Egypt his large number of shares in the Suez Canal Company (176,602) for the considerable sum of £4,000,000. This bold act of the British Government, remarks Sir H. D. Wolff, seems to pave the way to a realization of M. de Lesseps' original idea, by giving England a *locus standi* in any future international negotiation. There is one question

consequent on the purchase of the shares by our Government, which will require serious and early consideration. This is the necessity of further expenditure, for the purpose of rendering more easy and more rapid the passage of the Canal. England will now have to take a new attitude in the discussion of this problem. Hitherto she had been only a customer, now she has become a partner. The progress of the traffic through the Canal since the opening will be seen at a glance from the following table:—

Year.	No. of Vessels.	Gross Tonnage,	Receipts.
1870,	486	654,915	£206,373
1871,	765	1,142,200	£359,748
1872,	1082	1,744,481	£656,303
1873,	1173	2,085,072	£915,892
1874,	1264	2,423,672	£994,375
1875,	1494	3,000,000	£1,155,189
1876,	1457	3,072,107	£1,199,000

The increase of receipts would have been greater but for the diminution of tolls, of which M. de Lesseps complains bitterly. The point to which attention should be called is the necessity which is pressing for the improvement and enlargement of the Canal works, which must continually be increased with a traffic augmenting with an incredible momentum. The tonnage, the real gauge of material requirements, has more than quadrupled in seven years. New shipping companies are being formed, and existing companies are adding to their regular service. It is plain that ere long the present dimensions of the Canal will be inadequate to the requirements of the two hemispheres. M. de Lesseps discovered in his early studies, that the traffic from East to West doubled every ten years. The Suez Canal, be it said once more, has more than quadrupled its own traffic in seven years.

CHAPTER IX.

Insurrection in the Herzegovina, July, 1875—Journey of the Emperor of Austria through Dalmatia—His reception by his Slavonic subjects—Excitement among the Southern Slaves—Disturbance at Nevesinje—Spread of the Insurrection—The vilayet of Bosnia—Dervish Pasha governor—Six thousand soldiers of the Nizam collected—Position of Klek—Austrian rights in the Adriatic—Insurgents defeated near Trebinje—Disturbance at Banialouka—Revolt of the Bosnians—Meeting of insurgent leaders at Kosierovo—Disagreements—Engagement at Prapatnitza—The insurrection stimulated by priests—Abortive expedition of Chevket Pasha to the Zubzi—Dervish Pasha superseded by Raouf Pasha—Defeat of Paulovich at Biela Dolina—Repulse of Chevket Pasha by Gruich—Goranitschka relieved by Raouf—Relief of Niksich—Herzegovina and Rascia formed into a vilayet—Raouf succeeded by Mukhtar Pasha—Interposition of the Great Powers—Server Pasha and the Consuls—Futility of the negotiation—The Andrassy Note, 31st January, 1876, accepted by the Porte, rejected by the insurgents—General Rodieh and M. Wesseltzki Bogdanovich interpose in vain—Renewal of the conflict, February, 1876—Philoserbs at Ragusa—Mademoiselle Merkus and Ljubibratic arrested by the Austrians—Mademoiselle Merkus at Belgrade—Mukhtar Pasha at the Dnga Pass and Presjeka—Niksich and other forts revictualled—Disturbance in Bulgaria suppressed by Bashi-bazouks—Great atrocities committed—Abduction and rescue of a Christian girl at Saloniki—Disturbance among the Mussulmans—Interference of the French and German Consuls—Their murder in the Mosque—Indignation throughout Europe—Commission of Inquiry—Promptness of the French Admiral—Inadequate punishment of the murderers—Change of Ministry at Constantinople—Midhat Pasha—Conference at Berlin—The Berlin Memorandum agreed to by the three Imperial Governments, accepted by France and Italy, but refused by England—English Fleet ordered to Besika Bay—Revolution in Constantinople—The Conspirators—Deposition of Sultan Abdul-Aziz—His death—Assassination of Hussein Avni and Reshid Pasha in council by Hassan Bey—Servian sympathy with the insurgents—Changes of ministry at Belgrade—Preparations for war in Servia—Alliance with Montenegro—Terms proposed to the Porte refused—Distribution of the Turkish forces—Servian armies—General Alimpich on the Drina—General Zach defeated at Sienitza—Rout of the Timok army by Osman Pasha—Retreat of Leschjanin to Saitschar—General Tcherniaieff and Colonel Ivanovich—Retreat of the Southern Army—Repulse of the Turks by Alimpich—Combined movement of Tcherniaieff and Leschjanin on Veliki-Isvor defeated by Osman Pasha—General advance of the Turks—Fall of Saitschar—Occupation of Gurgussovatz—Defects of the Servian army—Bad commissariat of the Turks—The irregulars—Abdul Kerim in the Morava Valley—Five days fighting—The Turks fall back from Alexinatz—Prince Milan's birthday—Russian volunteers—Insanity and deposition of Sultan Murad—Prince Milan solicits the intervention of the Powers—Turkish victory before Alexinatz—The Servians retreat to Deligrade—Negotiations—Hard terms of the Porte—War in Montenegro—Successes of the Mountaineers—Interview of the Emperors of Austria and Russia at Reichstadt—Port of Klek closed against the Turks—Chances of war—Prince Nikita in the Urbitza—Mukhtar Pasha at Bilek—Repulse of the Turks—Selim Pasha killed and Osman Pasha a prisoner—Triumph of the Mountaineers—Nikita's responsibilities—Kutchi allies near Podgoritza—Blockade of Medun—Mahmoud Pasha at Scutari—Victory of Buko Petrovich—Defeat of Dervish Pasha—Movements of Mukhtar—Negotiations—Six days truce granted to Servia—Tcherniaieff proclaims Prince Milan King of Servia—Return of Prince Nikita to his home in Cettinge—Truce prolonged—Midhat Pasha's new constitution—Negotiations with the Great Powers—Turkey proposes an armistice of five months—Hostilities resumed—Medun surrenders to the Montenegrins—Servian army cut in two and Djunis captured by the Turks—Prince Milan appeals to the Czar—Russian ultimatum at Constantinople compels an armistice—Suggested Conference of the European Powers at Constantinople.

WE have already seen the success of the Servians and of the Greeks in their revolt, the establishment of an improved administration in the Lebanon, and the failure of the insurrection in Crete. From the sunny south we turn to the land of the mountain and the flood, to that extreme north-western corner of the Turkish Empire which lies hedged in between the Save and the Dalmatian Alps. The Turkish vilayet of Bosnia has never been a very quiet place; its south-western part, the Herzegovina, was always in a chronic state of disturbance, and many a local rising there had been put down with little heed from Europe. At last, early in 1875, the general discontent began to show itself more distinctly, the common complaints of the oppression of the tax-gatherers grew more open, the aspirations of the oppressed took a more definite shape. About this very time an event occurred

which tended yet further to excite the minds of the people. The Emperor Francis Joseph, in his capacity of King of Dalmatia, paid a visit to his rocky kingdom by the Adriatic shore, and was received with the utmost joy and enthusiasm by his South Slavonic subjects. Echoes of the happy greeting exchanged between king and people were not slow to find their way across the mountains; and the painful contrast between their own oppressed condition, and the contentment of their Dalmatian brethren under a Christian monarch, was brought more strongly than ever before the minds of the people of the Herzegovina. Throughout all the South Slavonic lands whose frontiers join those of the Apostolic King a general stir made itself felt. Not that the people there had any notion of transferring themselves to his sceptre; they knew that they would get help, in any case, from their brethren

beyond the Alps ; but so far as their hopes turned to any sovereign, they turned to one of their own blood and speech—to Prince Nikita on his “rough rock-throne of freedom” in the Black Mountain. His dominions were open to all who sought a refuge from Turkish oppression or help to stand against it. It was, however, near the Dalmatian border that the insurrection began this time.

In the middle of July, 1875, a rising took place in two little villages near Nevesinje on the Narenta, on the occasion of the collection of the taxes. Such an event was neither new, strange, nor alarming in itself. But this time the conflagration spread with startling rapidity throughout the whole southern part of the Herzegovina, and a “central committee for the liberation of the rayahs” was formed so speedily, that on the last day of the month it issued a general appeal to revolt. The Turkish troops in the Herzegovina amounted to barely 4000, scattered about as garrisons in various towns, and utterly insufficient to cope with such an outbreak as this. The deficiency of regular troops was supplied by the Beys, who organized themselves into volunteer corps, taking their Mahometan servants as *Bashi-bazouks*. These free lances set to work to plunder and slaughter just as they pleased. The aged men, women, and children fled into Dalmatia or Montenegro; the men who could fight made ready to do so, gathering in the fastnesses on the borders of the Black Mountain. The vilayet of Bosnia runs into the Dalmatian and Montenegrin territories at three several places. The first of these points, the rocky district of Zubzi, lies a little south of Trebinje; its southern portion, the Sutorina, runs right through Dalmatia to the Adriatic, and divides the Ragusa territory from the Bocche di Cattaro. The middle point is a small district around the Turkish fort of Niksich. This fortress, barely three miles from the Montenegrin frontier, is connected by the Duga pass with the plateau of Gatschko (*Metokia*). These two points communicate with each other on Turkish ground through the mountainous district of Baniani, to the south of Bilek; but there is a much shorter way through Montenegro, by Grahovo. The third point is at Kolaschin on the upper Tara, and is in direct communication with Novi-Bazar in Rascia, and with the middle point by the difficult pass of Piva. Here also there is a much shorter way through the Montenegrin pass of Moratschka. These points are

of importance, as they form the whole basis of the Herzegovinian operations, which extended down the Piva valley towards the plateau of Gatschko, thence through the valley of the Trebinschitza on the one side towards Nevesinje and Mostar, on the other to the port of Klek. The whole theatre of the war lies in a nut-shell—only a distance of one or two days’ march between each of the chief stations, if one could go direct. But it must be borne in mind that, except between Mostar and Klek along the Narenta, the roads are impassable for vehicles of any kind, and that in many places there are no roads at all; the length of the march is thus often tripled and quadrupled by the necessity of toiling up and down hills, by circuitous paths through forest and brushwood, or over hard and barren rocks.

On the first news of the rising, Dervish Pasha, the then governor of the vilayet of Bosnia, collected together from the different garrisons the six battalions of the *Nizam*, or standing army, which comprised all the troops at his disposal, and sent them to Mostar, intending to take the suppression of the revolt out of the hands of the Beys and accomplish it by means of the regular troops. The garrisons were replaced from the Bosnian *Redif* or militia, comprising eight battalions—about 6000 men. The central government presently began to see that this new revolt was likely to become a serious business, and accordingly sent some regular troops to Klek. Now Klek is in a very curious position. Like Sutorina, it is a Turkish *enclave* running through Dalmatia to the sea. When Venice held Dalmatia, she claimed and maintained entire command of all the *waters* along the coast. Consequently, though the Turks might have it all their own way on the land at Klek, they could make no use of the harbour without the leave of Venice. When Austria got possession of both Dalmatia and Venice she claimed all the rights of the latter, and kept them in spite of Turkey’s protestations. Thus it befell that when the Porte wanted to land troops at its own harbour of Klek in 1875, it had to get leave first of the Austrian Government. This leave was granted, and Turkey was thus saved the trouble of landing her troops at Antivari, and marching them half round Montenegro before they could reach the seat of war. On August 6 the insurgents surrounded the Turkish fortress of Trebinje. The first Turkish troops that landed at Klek at

once set forth to hinder this movement; on the 20th they severely defeated the insurgents, who dispersed into the districts of Zubzi and Bania, checked, but by no means crushed.

Meanwhile Bosnia had caught fire too. On August 16 a few mounted armed Turks amused themselves by cutting down some Christians quietly going about their work near Banialouka. The victims' relations sought in vain for judicial redress. A fight broke out in the streets of Banialouka between the Moslems and the Christians; the latter were beaten, but they fled into the neighbouring villages, and centres of revolt began to form in various parts of Bosnia. The rising was, however, much less prompt and vigorous than had been that in the Herzegovina. At first no one took part in it but the rabble, and the plundering bands of Uskoks who infest the banks of the Save. As it was, however, Dervish Pasha felt it needful to ask the commandant of the third army corps at Monastir for reinforcements in Bosnia. All he received was a single battalion of rifles of the Nizam, and they came too late to be of much use. The Herzegovinian leaders, on the other hand, were preparing to make up for their first defeat. On August 27 they held a meeting in the convent of Kosierovo, between Bilek and Montenegro, to consider the better organization of the rising, and lay out the plan of a campaign. The chief men among them were Lazar Sotschitza, Luca Petkovich, Bosevich, Peko Paulovich, and the president of the meeting, Ljubibratich. These two last named very soon came to a disagreement, Paulovich being a Montenegrin, who naturally had the interests of his own Prince and country most at heart; while Ljubibratich, a Pan-Servian agitator who had fought under Luca Vukalovich, was devoted to those of Servia and Prince Milan. For the present, however, all was unity. After a month spent in making raids to intercept Turkish convoys, at the end of September 2000 insurgents, headed by Ljubibratich and Paulovich, marched out of Zubzi over the Gradina mountains to Prapatnitza, on the road between Stolatz and Klek, and there lay in wait for four Turkish battalions which had just landed at Klek, and were on their way to Stolatz. The first two battalions, taken completely at unawares, were soon routed; but when the other two came up, with 1600 men who had been sent from Mostar to meet them, the insurgents, finding themselves outnumbered,

retreated to Lubinje. The gain was all on their side; they had killed or disabled 500 Turks, lost very few men themselves, and seized a considerable amount of arms and provisions. The news of this victory soon spread through Bosnia, kindling new zeal and new hope, and rousing the priests to preach to their flocks a veritable crusade. In the circle of Novi-Bazar the first attempt at a rising had been checked by the governor of Sienitza, Mehemet Ali Pasha. But the news of Prapatnitza soon brought fresh reinforcements from Novi-Bazar to join the Herzegovinians in Bania and Zubzi. A new wrong added fuel to the flame. Turkish promises had tempted a few refugee families back to their homes at Popovopolje, only to find the honeyed words at once changed to fire and sword.

All through the autumn the insurgents continued a desultory warfare, not risking a direct engagement, but profiting by their superior knowledge of the country to intercept the passage of the Turkish troops, whose long straggling columns were quite at their mercy among the mountain passes. In this state of things Dervish Pasha sent orders to Chevket Pasha, commander of the Turkish brigade stationed at Trebinje, to clear the Zubzi of rebels. Chevket set out accordingly on October 11. At Tschitchevo, not very far from Trebinje, he was met by a few hundred insurgents, whom he defeated. On the 13th, a little south of Grab, he found the heights on the east of his road occupied by about 2000 insurgents. The Turks fought gallantly; and having the advantage of numbers managed to take the enemy's position, but found it untenable, and gave up, not only the pursuit, but the whole intended expedition, and returned to Trebinje. By the end of November the number of insurgents had risen to 10,000, and their equipment had been considerably improved by the arms and munitions which they received through Montenegro from Russia. They now began to extend their raids further, and ventured on the blockade of some Turkish forts. First Peko Paulovich and Sotschitza surrounded the little fort of Goranitschka, near Piva; then 3000 men planted themselves in the Duga pass, watching the fort of Niksich, and cutting off its communication with Gatschko, to the north. They were not capable of a siege, having no artillery. A French volunteer who had joined them afterwards suggested the use of dynamite;

but his operations were without effect. Meanwhile, in less than a month there had been three successive war ministers at Constantinople. The last, Namik Pasha, determined to make short work of the Herzegovinian revolt, and having no great faith in Dervish Pasha's military capacity, appointed Raouf Pasha special commander of the troops in the Herzegovina; at the same time sending another brigade to Klek under Halil Pasha.

The new Commander-in-chief of the Herzegovina was met at Mostar with the news that Goranitschka and Niksich were both surrounded, and that the former was almost in extremities for lack of provisions. He at once ordered Chevket Pasha to advance from Metokia to its relief, which he did on November 9, with about 5000 men. Peko Paulovich was on the watch. Leaving 2000 men before Goranitschka, he set out with the rest of his forces to observe Chevket's movements from the wooded heights of Biela Dolina, and issued orders to the besiegers of Niksich to send Gruich, at the head of 2000 men, to Golia, at the northern end of the Duga Pass. The motive of Peko, who throughout the war showed himself an able strategist, was to be ready to intercept Chevket whether he turned towards Goranitschka or Niksich; for it was impossible to guess beforehand which direction he intended to take. The plan was excellent: if he advanced upon Niksich, Gruich would stand in his way at the mouth of the Duga Pass, and Peko would fall upon his rear and flank. On the other hand, if Chevket turned towards Peko's front Gruich would attack him in the rear—that is, if he could get up in time. Here lay the doubt, whether Peko's foot-messenger, his only means of communicating with Gruich, could arrive before the advance of the Turks, and the failure of this communication ruined the whole scheme. On the morning of the 10th Chevket advanced against Paulovich; a hard fight ended in the defeat of the Montenegrin leader; his colleague, Gruich, had not come up. The beaten insurgents retired to a sort of terrace on the slopes of the Leberschnik mountains, and lighted signal fires to guide their belated friend; and that night he reached the end of his toilsome march to find that he was too late. But he made up for it next day. Chevket, on his march at early morning through the mountains, was encountered by the troops of Gruich, and beaten back with heavy loss to the

camp where he had passed the night. Next morning he abandoned the relief of Goranitschka, as he had abandoned the clearing of the Zubzi, and started on his way back to Metokia. This little expedition of Chevket's was so unsatisfactory to Raouf Pasha, that he resolved to take the relief of Goranitschka upon himself, and for this purpose assembled a force of 12,000 men and twelve cannons at Metokia, whence he started on November 24.

The insurgents, elated by their success, did not expect that the Turks would so soon venture on another attempt, as the weather was now very severe. Taken quite by surprise, they could not collect their forces in time to stop Raouf; he reached Goranitschka without striking a blow, revictualled the place, and only on his return did the insurgents succeed in overtaking his rear-guard, and inflicting upon it a very slight injury. No sooner had he got back to Metokia than he heard that the rebels in the Bania were planning a descent on the Moslem village of Biland near Bilek. He sent ten battalions to its defence, and himself followed with his reserve. When the Turks reached the village the fight had already begun; the insurgents were defeated and driven back into the Bania. Meanwhile, by Raouf's orders, Selim Pasha had been making several fruitless attempts to force the Duga Pass and revictual Niksich. That fort was at its utmost need when Raouf determined on a combined effort. While Selim made a last attack on the northern end of the pass, he himself marched through the Bania to the southern end. All the valour and skill of Peko Paulovich, whom the acclamations of the insurgents had now saluted as Voïvode of the Herzegovina, could not withstand this double attack. Niksich was revictualled, and then, from the middle of December to March, 1876, there was a lull, for the winter rendered further operations impossible. The Turks went into winter quarters in their blockhouses and wretched barracks; the hardier insurgents found perhaps a better refuge among the people of the mountains. During this interval the Government of the Porte made some official changes. The Herzegovina and Rascia were now separated from Bosnia, and made into a distinct vilayet under Ali Pasha, to whom, from whatever motive, a Christian chief counsellor was given in the person of Constant Effendi. At the same time Raouf Pasha, who has the merit of

having conducted his successful military operations under the disadvantage of very bad health, suffered so much from his exertions that he had to beg for his recall. He was therefore replaced by Mukhtar Pasha, a son of Sultan Abdul Medjid, and nephew of Abdul Aziz. The new commander reached Klek on January 1, 1876, and went straight to Trebinje, which he made his head-quarters, and where he found that, of the 30,000 troops or more who had been sent into Herzegovina since August, little more than half remained in a condition fit for mountain warfare.

During the ensuing interval of quiet the great Powers interposed. At the very beginning of the revolt Austria, Russia, and Germany had taken counsel together, and agreed to keep aloof for the present, only using their influence to prevent Serbia and Montenegro from interfering; Austria moreover put her own frontiers in order, and took measures to provide a proper reception for fugitives from the Herzegovina. When the revolt broke out in Bosnia also, the three Empires, on August 18, offered to the Porte their good offices as mediators in the dispute, at the same time suggesting that some concessions would be needed to secure a real pacification. This first proposal of mediation the Porte simply refused. Four days later it was renewed by five of the Powers; the three Empires being joined by France and Italy. It was now proposed that the consuls of the Powers in the disturbed districts should begin negotiations, by persuading the insurgent leaders to accept an armistice for the purpose of laying their demands before a commissary of the Porte. This scheme the Porte accepted. Server Pasha, as Turkish commissary, was to meet the consuls and the insurgent leaders at Mostar. He went on August 23, and the consuls early next month; the insurgents never went at all. They had meanwhile held a great meeting at Kosierovo, and there resolved to listen to the consuls' proposals, but to commit themselves to nothing at present. To meet Server Pasha at Mostar was an idea they were little likely to entertain, having, rightly or wrongly, a suspicion that, were they to do so, advantage might be taken of their confidence in a way inconsistent with any purposes of peaceable negotiation. The German, Austrian, and Italian Consuls went to Trebinje; those of France, Russia, and England, who had at last made up her mind to join the other Powers, betook themselves

to Nevesinje. From these two points they obtained interviews with the patriot chiefs; but without any result, as the latter refused to have anything to do with any Turkish commissioner. As the Powers were resolved against all interference in the internal affairs of Turkey, the consuls went back to Mostar only to report their failure.

In the beginning of November a fresh deliberation of the Powers resulted in the production of the Andrassy Note. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Reshid Pasha, contrived to delay its presentation till he had got another firman issued, wherein the Sultan "voluntarily" promised a series of reforms, much the same as those demanded by the Powers. As there were no guarantees for the fulfilment of these promises, they were quite unsatisfactory; but they made it necessary to remodel the Andrassy Note, so as to render it in some sort an answer to the firman. In its new shape it was presented at last by Count Zichy, the Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople, on January 31, 1876. It claimed for the Christians of the revolted provinces complete religious freedom, abolition of tax-farming, equitable local administration of finances, and the appointment of a special committee, consisting of an equal number of Moslems and Christians, to watch over the fulfilment of these reforms.

Towards the middle of February the Porte accepted all these proposals, and issued an *iradeh* announcing their speedy fulfilment. Meanwhile the European Consuls, who were still at Mostar, had, in pursuance of instructions from their Governments, been trying to get the insurgent chiefs also to agree to the scheme of Count Andrassy; but in vain. On February 26 the leaders assembled in the Sutorina; the Voïvode Lazar Soschitz, the Archimandrite Melentji, Luca Paulovich, and the Priests Bogdan and Stembkovich, issued a manifesto very eloquent in its simple way. They thanked all the Powers for the kindness they had tried to show in various ways; but they declared that these Western projects of reform were impracticable; what they wanted was simply *freedom*. Let the Powers help them to *that*; let their brethren in Serbia help them. They had made up their minds to go on fighting till they were free as the Black Mountaineers. Now or never, they called on Russia to deliver her brother Slaves.

After this the Governor of Dalmatia, General Rodich, tried to arrange an armistice to give

opportunity for the execution of the reforms promised in the *iradeh*, which had now been published in Bosnia and the Herzegovina. M. Wesselitzki Bogdanovich, a gentleman of Serb origin, also came, partly as an agent of Prince Gortschakoff, partly on his own account as a Serb and a brother, to use his influence for the same purpose. The insurgent chiefs had an interview with him on April 5, and told him plainly where the difficulty lay. The guarantees were insufficient. The scheme of a joint committee of Moslems and Christians to insure the carrying out of the reforms was useless. Past experience had taught that the Christian members of it would be mere ciphers; the Moslems would have everything their own way, and the reforms would not really be carried out at all. Instead of this committee the insurgents demanded a commission of the great Powers of Europe—the only sort of committee, according to their view, capable of making the Porte fulfil its promises. Next day they met General Rodich with the same answer. As such a committee would have been a direct interference in the internal relations of the Ottoman Empire, which the Andrassy Note most anxiously guarded against, and to which one at least of the European Governments could not possibly be brought to consent, General Rodich had to put an end to his endeavours after a settlement, and content himself with forwarding the insurgents' other demands to Constantinople, and waiting for the result of the next campaign.

The manifesto of February 26 was the signal for a renewal of fighting. During the winter rest the insurgents had gathered fresh forces. At its beginning the Herzegovina was exhausted, and even Montenegro in very hard plight; so the presumption is that the provisions and arms which enabled the people to renew their efforts in the spring came chiefly from Russia. Where or how they were landed nobody knows, and friends of the insurgents did not want to know. Dalmatia's whole heart was with her kindred beyond the mountains, and it was easy enough to smuggle supplies across the narrow rocky shore and up into the passes of Montenegro.

The first move was made by Ljubibratich. He had been spending the winter in Ragusa, and there exerted himself with great success in getting up secretly a corps of volunteer Philoserbs. They were of various nations, and included a Dutch

lady, whose name was Mlle. Merkus. She was very rich, and spent her money freely in the cause. On a newspaper correspondent remarking to her that he supposed she was come to make herself useful as a nurse of the Geneva Red Cross Society, this dauntless Amazon laughed in his face, and told him plainly that she liked able-bodied Serbs better than sick and wounded ones, and that her intention was to fight. She accompanied Ljubibratich when he set out at the end of February. His project was to call to arms the districts of Ljubuschka, Mostar, and Konjiza, which had not yet risen, and thereby establish a communication between Bosnia and free Servia. The Philoserbs embarked in small parties, how and where they could, on the last day of February, and in due time they all landed at Klek. Ljubibratich assembled his forces, and marched northwards along the Dalmatian frontier. On March 5 he met and defeated a company of Bashibazouks; on March 11 he had got near the Dalmatian village of Imoski, and there he and his staff were stopped by Austrian authorities, disarmed, and marched off to be interned in Austria. The Serbs declared he had been unfairly seized on Turkish soil by a Hungarian officer; Austria declared that the insurgent chief, who had undeniably been skirting her frontiers very closely, had unwarily overstepped them, and that she was therefore in duty bound to arrest him. Anyhow, the captives, on their passage through Dalmatia, were greeted with acclamations by the people. Ljubibratich was interned at Brunn, and his companions at Linz; but very little restraint was put upon the latter. By the end of the month Mlle. Merkus was at Belgrade, being there received with enthusiasm, and declaring herself ready to take service in the army of Prince Milan. Ljubibratich's troops, who had luckily not followed him across the frontier, dispersed, and made their way, some, like the Dutch lady, to Servia, some to join the rising in Bosnia and the southern Herzegovina.

Mukhtar Pasha had received considerable reinforcements during the winter, but still his forces were not sufficient to enable him to crush the rising by a really vigorous action. He might have done it if they had not had the Black Mountain at their back; as it was, he had to content himself with a hand-to-mouth sort of campaign—just doing whatever was most needed at the moment, which was most commonly revictualling some strong

place where provisions were running short. The insurgents, on the other hand, were not equal to a successful siege of a great fortress. They succeeded better with small forts; but when they had secured them they did not know what to do with them, and in the end the Turks took them back. So the chief strategy of the Turks was applied to the escorting of provision convoys, and that of the Herzegovinians to intercepting the said convoys—an operation in which they were very often successful, and which had the double advantage of supplying their own needs as well as damaging the enemy.

The first point of importance for the Turks was the revictualling of Niksich. The Prince of Montenegro, at General Rodich's intercession, had allowed this to be carried on through his territory until April 10, but only from one day to another; so that when the fixed term expired the garrison had very little food left over for future needs. On the 13th, therefore, Mukhtar felt it necessary to set out from Gatschko with about 9000 men and a convoy for Niksich. He knew he must fight his way through the Duga Pass. At its northern end he at once met with resistance from the insurgents; but his troops behaved gallantly, and in four days they cut their way through and reached Presjeka at the southern end, though with diminished convoys, and in such a state of exhaustion that Mukhtar dared not push on to Niksich. He therefore placed the provisions in safety at Presjeka, and started on his return journey at once, before the insurgents were on the look out for it. They very soon caught him up, and he lost nearly all his sumpter-beasts; but he got safe to Gatschko, and thence started again on the 23rd with 18,000 men, simply to go to Presjeka, and thence carry the provisions left there to Niksich. It was impossible to take more, as there were no means of transport, and in fact men and officers alike had to carry each his own provisions for the march. As soon as they entered the pass, on the 28th, they found the heights occupied by insurgents, about 5000 strong. Mukhtar sent his right wing to engage their adversaries on the heights, while he marched the left wing down the pass, and before nightfall the Turks had made their way through to Presjeka. The garrison of Niksich made a sortie that night, and under cover of the darkness and the fighting the men of the place, who had collected in a small

detached fort, slipped through the besieging ranks and got to Presjeka, whence they carried some of the provisions safe to their fort, and then easily transferred them to Niksich itself. Mukhtar stayed two days at Presjeka to cover a second transport of provisions, performed in like manner, and then fought his way back to Gatschko. He had some reason to be proud of his expedition, notwithstanding his immense advantage in point of numbers; for he had, by compelling the insurgents to concentrate all their attention on the Duga and Niksich, made the revictualling of the other forts, Trebinje, Drieno, and Goranitschka, a comparatively easy matter.

Meanwhile Ibrahim Pasha of Bosnia was sending to Stamboul complaints that the revolt in his vilayet was getting worse and worse, and that he had only about 1000 men to set against at least 15,000 rebels all over the province. The rising, however, was more troublesome than alarming, for the insurgents were not organized like those of the Herzegovina; they formed independent bands, and their operations consisted only in falling upon Mahometan villages whenever they could. One band, which fixed itself close to the Austrian border, was led by Prince Karageorgevich, the rival of Prince Milan for the Servian throne. The Porte had some time previously thought it advisable to gather troops on the Servian frontier; on April 21 it decreed the forming of a camp at Scutari in Albania, to watch the southern frontier of Montenegro. And now at last a few poor people in Bulgaria, about Bellova, at the foot of the Despotodagh, dared to think of following the example of Herzegovina and Bosnia. Some little disturbance arose; the Turks set the Bashi-bazouks to put it down. Foremost among these were the Circassians settled in the vilayet of the Danube. By the end of May 15,000 regulars were ready at Philippopolis and Tatar-Bazardchik; but by this time the Circassians are said to have plundered, slaughtered, burned, and done things more horrible still, and the only difference made by the coming of the regular troops is reported to have been that the work of desolation went on yet more widely and rapidly.

There was a certain rich Turk of Saloniki, Emin Effendi by name, for whose harem a pretty young Bulgarian girl had been stolen and brought by an old negress by train to Saloniki on May 6. When she got out at the station, out of the very

same train came also her mother, who had come to seek her missing daughter. The two women rushed into each other's arms, crying bitterly; a crowd soon collected round them, and they both sobbed out their complaint, that the girl was a Christian, that she had been forced to renounce her faith, and was being carried to Emin Effendi against her will. The Christians and Turks of Saloniki were already in a high state of mutual distrust and hatred; parties soon ran high in the crowd, the Turks declaring that the women were telling lies, the Christians supporting them; till at last the latter, being the more numerous, contrived to get the girl into an empty carriage which stood near, and took her to the house of a Greek merchant, who placed her in safety. The carriage was that of the American Consul, a Greek gentleman named Lazaros, who had gone to some place in the neighbourhood, and had not returned at the time expected. All that day and the next there was a great disturbance in Saloniki; fanatics and people sent out by Emin went about the town proclaiming that the girl's story was false, that she had turned Moslem of her own free will, and had been captured by the Christians when on her way to the Governor to make public avowal of her conversion, and they stirred up the people to demand her back. Fanaticism is easily roused; the rabble soon began to cry out for a massacre of the Christians, and a threatening deputation went to the Governor. The best thing he could think of to quiet the uproar was to send out two men to speak to the people—the chief constable and Emin Effendi himself! The effect may be imagined. Such being the Turkish officer's notions of restoring order, the French consul, M. Moulin, thought it right to make an attempt. He went to his German colleague, Mr. Abbot, who was also his brother-in-law, and the two together went to the Governor. They were told he was in the mosque; so they followed him thither, accompanied by the soldiers of the watch. He was not there, but all the Moslem officials of the city were, among them Emin. A murmur arose round the latter when the consuls appeared; the Governor presently entered; they turned to him and began their appeal; the murmur deepened into a roar; and the two Franks fell beneath the knives and yataghans of the mob, while the Governor looked on without stirring a finger to save them.

This murder roused all Europe, and the two

countries most nearly concerned lost no time in demanding satisfaction. France, as ever, was the quickest to act; the very next day she ordered a detachment of the squadron at Toulon, under Admiral Jaurès, to proceed to Saloniki, and it arrived there on the 16th May. Germany sent a squadron under Admiral Batsch, but it only left Wilhelmshafen on May 22; the German corvette *Medusa* had, however, reached Saloniki on May 10, as also several ships of the French Mediterranean squadron. Austria, Russia, and Italy also sent ships of war. As for the English Government, it sent a gunboat to escort the Turkish corvette which on May 8 conveyed to Saloniki a commission to inquire into the murder. These commissioners were too much afraid of the fanatic mob to do anything till Admiral Jaurès arrived. Under his protection, or compulsion, the guilty parties were arrested one after another and carried on board ship, and a few belonging to the lower orders were hung at once; the rest were taken to Stamboul, tried, and condemned in the middle of June to such absurdly light punishments as France and Germany could not possibly consider satisfactory; and the money indemnity to the consuls' families was only obtained, after great trouble, six weeks later still. In Stamboul the news of the Saloniki murder hastened a ministerial change which had been long preparing. The Grand Vizir Mahmoud was believed to have leanings towards Russia, and an opposition party had been gradually formed among the Ulemas and Softas—chief priests and scribes, as influential and fanatical in Stamboul as ever they were in Jerusalem of old—with Midhat Pasha, a former governor of Bulgaria, at their head. The Softas would have it that the Saloniki affair had originated in a Russian plot to disgrace Turkey in the eyes of Europe; they went in a body to the palace to demand the dismissal of the Grand Vizir; and on the 12th May he was accordingly replaced by Rusehdi Pasha, Midhat getting a seat in the cabinet.

Meanwhile the three Imperial Chancellors—Gortschakoff, Andrassy, and Bismarck—were holding a long conference at Berlin, which resulted on May 13 in a state paper, composed by Prince Gortschakoff, and accepted by the other Chancellors, and called the Berlin Memorandum. This document pointed out that the pledges given by the Porte in accepting the Andrassy Note had not

been fulfilled; that the continued disturbances and the crimes committed at Saloniki were due, in the first place, to their non-fulfilment. It then proposed an armistice of two months between the Porte and the insurgents, on the basis of the five points of the Andrassy Note and the other five contained in the first demands of the insurgents; and it ended by declaring that should the armistice expire without the Powers having gained their object, they would consider it needful to concert active measures for amending the state of affairs.

This Memorandum was at once communicated to the other three Powers, that it might be presented to the Porte with their united approval. France and Italy agreed to it at once; the English Government on May 19 refused it. The latter declared that the Andrassy Note was sufficient, that anything more would be an interference with the independence of the Ottoman Empire, and that in their opinion "active measures" would involve a breach of the Treaty of 1856. So the Berlin Memorandum came to nothing; and at the same time with the English Government's answer an order went out for a fleet of twenty vessels, nearly all ironclads, under Admiral Drummond, to proceed, not to Saloniki, but to Besika Bay, at the southern opening of the Dardanelles. The Turks never doubted it was sent there for their special protection, and everybody else thought the same; but this was afterwards explained to be an unfortunate misunderstanding. Taken in conjunction with the rejection of the Berlin Note, it misled the Turks into thinking they were sure of being upheld by England whatever they might do.

Meanwhile a revolution took place in Constantinople. The new ministers—the Grand Vizir, Ruschdi Pasha, the War Minister, Hussein Avni Pasha, and Midhat Pasha—backed by the Softas, plotted to depose Sultan Abdul Aziz. The three ministers went to the Sheikh-ul-Islam, the supreme depositary of Mahometan law, and asked him—"When the Commander of the Faithful is afflicted with a disorder of his mental capacities, so that he cannot rightly understand matters of state; when by his personal expenditure he increases to an unbearable degree the burthen of the nation; when by the disorder he creates in spiritual and temporal affairs he endangers the safety of the Empire and of the community of believers; in a word, when his existence is injurious—ought he to be deposed?" "The Law saith, Yea!" was the answer

of the Sheikh-ul-Islam. Question and answer were embodied in a *fetwa* signed by the Sheikh; and with this, to every Moslem, indisputable warrant in their hands, the conspirators set about their work in the simplest and shortest way possible. They fixed Tuesday, May 30, for the execution of their scheme, but Abdul Aziz unconsciously brought his fate upon himself a day earlier. Late on the evening of the 29th Hussein Avni Pasha received a message bidding him proceed at once to the Sultan at his palace of Dolma Batsche. His Majesty had seen a ship pass laden with troops, and wanted to know whether they were going to Bulgaria or the Herzegovina. The War Minister thought the Sultan would hardly have summoned him out to Dolma Batsche in person merely to answer that simple question, so he went to consult his friend Ruschdi; and they agreed that, in case their plot was discovered, they had better execute it at once. Everything was ready. An ironclad frigate was lying just off Dolma Batsche; Redif Pasha went off at the head of three battalions of infantry to surround the palace, and sent orders to the captain of the frigate to land troops to assist him. Meanwhile all the other high officials and the Ulemas assembled in the great hall of the War Office. Hussein Avni left them there; and presently returned, bringing with him the new Sultan, Murad, eldest son of the late Abdul Medjid, who was at once proclaimed as his uncle's successor. As soon as this was done, orders were sent in Murad's name to Redif Pasha, in pursuance of which he sent to Abdul Aziz through the Kiskar Aga a message in these words—"The Ottoman nation has deposed thee. Sultan Murad V. reigns in thy stead, and commands thee to proceed to the seraglio of Top Kapon, which he intends for thy abode." The Kiskar Aga laughed at the message, till Redif showed him the troops all round him, and then he went in terror to seek his master. The latter at first thought his slave was mocking him, opened the window, and called for some one to punish him. In another minute he was made to understand the truth; then, as a true Moslem, he only said, "Allah is great!" and without another word allowed himself, his mother, his sons, and eleven wives to be conveyed to their destined place of confinement.

Deposed Sultans never live long. On June 4 Abdul Aziz was found dead in a pool of blood.

Nineteen doctors of all nations agreed that death was caused by cutting a vein in his arm with a pair of scissors. The official story was that in his despair he had borrowed his mother's embroidery scissors under pretence of trimming his beard, and used them to commit suicide; the common belief was that the death had been caused by some other hand. Soon after he was avenged. About midnight on June 15-16, a council, at which all the Ministers were present, was being held at the house of Midhat Pasha, when suddenly an officer entered the room unannounced, locked the door behind him, pulled out a revolver, and before any one of the five ministers awakened from their blank amazement, fired several times at Hussein Avni, finding time between the shots to smash the chandelier, so that only one wax-light remained in the middle of the large room. He then took out a knife and despatched Hussein, who was lying conveniently stretched out in Oriental fashion. The Ministers, though still four to one, were helpless; the assassin shot the Foreign Minister, Reshid Pasha, dead, and severely wounded the Capitan-pasha, before Midhat's steward forced the door, and tried to seize the intruder from behind. He too fell a victim, and so did an adjutant who came to help; but at last the police got the man off to prison. His trial did not take long; next day at 4 a.m. he was hung from a large mulberry tree in the courtyard of the War Office. His name was Hassan Bey, and he was brother to one of the wives of Abdul Aziz. He had held promotion in the army under his brother-in-law, but had, after the latter's fall, quarrelled with Hussein Avni, and the official story was that his attack on the latter was simply a piece of vengeance for private wrongs. Some people even thought he had been set on by Midhat himself, who wished to be rid of his colleague; and some thought the Sultan's widow had set her brother to avenge her husband. Any way, Stamboul was in a ferment; the new Sultan Murad was avowedly suffering from softening of the brain, and the rumours of war on the Montenegrin and Servian borders were fast approaching realization.

When the Herzegovinian insurrection broke out in the summer of 1875, the Government of Servia was in the hands of a ministry wholly inclined to peace. The young Prince was of the same mind with his Ministers. Early in August he spent a fortnight in Vienna, where he held counsel with Count Andrassy; about the same time he became

engaged to be married to a very pretty young lady of Bessarabia, Princess Natalie Mussuri, and these circumstances combined to make him desirous of peace. But the ministry, being in a minority in the Skupschina, resigned early in September, and a new ministry was formed by Messrs. Stefscha and Ristich. The nominal cause of the change was that the late ministers had mismanaged their finances; the real one was that their determination for peace at any price did not please the people and their representatives. The sympathy of the free Serbs for their brethren in the revolted provinces was growing stronger every day, and the frequent violations of the Servian frontier by the Turkish troops assembled there did not tend to lessen it. The new ministry belonged to the national and democratic party, and the Powers of Europe urged Milan to get rid of it; which at last he did, and replaced it by another less dangerously disposed. On October 17 the Prince was married to his engaging Russian bride. Then came the winter, during which Herzegovina was quiet and Servia too; but trouble came with the spring. The unlucky expedition of Ljubibratic moved the people greatly; the arrival of Mlle. Merkus in Belgrade added fuel to the flame; every day reports came in from Bulgaria such as well-nigh maddened every Slave; till in May, 1876, the popular agitation became irresistible, and the peace ministry gave way to that of Ristich and Gruich. M. Ristich had made up his mind to war; but he put it off as long as he could. The Prince was against it; the Powers were against it; finances were low; the army was not ready. But he set to work at once to make it ready. On May 24 a loan was raised; two days later Servia concluded an offensive and defensive league with Montenegro for the protection of Slave interests in the Peninsula, and on the 29th the Russian General Tcherniaieff came to take a high command in the Servian army. The Porte demanded an explanation of these warlike demonstrations, and received a reply with which it professed to be content. It was now resolved that Servia and Montenegro should lay before the Powers and the Porte their scheme for pacification. They proposed that Bosnia should be joined to Servia, and Herzegovina to Montenegro, and if this could not be gained by peaceful means they were ready to fight for it. They trusted that some at least of the Powers would ultimately be forced into active interven-

tion; not unreasonably, for though the official representatives of the various Governments still adhered to their diplomatic combinations, the agitation among the Russian people was becoming a very serious matter, and the cry that went up from the innocent blood shed in Bulgaria had made its way across land and sea, and caused even quiet England to wake up with a start. On June 29 the Servian agent at Constantinople presented the demands of the allied Principalities to the Porte. It was a mere form; in a proclamation issued to the army the same day at Semendria Prince Milan took their refusal for granted. They were refused flatly. The Servian agent left Constantinople at once; Servia was put under martial law, and war was declared.

The Black Mountain had no preparations to make; she had been "ready, aye ready" for 400 years. On July 2, in the early morning, the whole Montenegrin army—that is to say, the whole male population of Montenegro from sixteen to sixty—was drawn up at Cettinge beneath the eyes of Prince Nikita. Every man of them knew him, loved him, trusted him implicitly; he was to them leader, sovereign, friend, and father, all in one. When he came forth and solemnly announced that he had declared war against the Turks, he was answered by a loud shout of enthusiasm. From his hand the troops received their standards; then he rode to the head of the column, and in the dawn of the summer morning led the way towards the mountain passes that communicate with the Herzegovina, while the women, left alone not for the first time, stood watching from every door and window in Cettinge, Nikita's brave Princess Milena herself straining her eyes after the stately figure which had been first to disappear down the road.

The Turkish forces prepared for resistance to Servia and Montenegro at the end of June consisted of about 100,000 horse and foot, with proportionate artillery and transport appliances. Mukhtar Pasha was in Herzegovina, near the northern frontier of Montenegro, at the head of 20,000 men; 4000 or 5000 occupied Scutari and Podgoritza, to the south of the Black Mountain. On the Danube Eyoub Pasha commanded a force of about 50,000, of which one division was concentrated in and around Nissa, Akapalanka, and Pirot; a second, under Osman Pasha, occupied Widdin; and a third, under Fazyl Pasha, was at Nikopolis. Besides this there were the garrisons

of Rustchuk, Schumla, Varna, &c. A force under Ali Pasha in north-western Bosnia, and another in Rascia, about Sienitza and Novi-Bazar, under Mehmet Ali, made up together about 15,000 men. These forces all belonged either to the regular army or the organized militia (the Redif); 30,000 more regulars had gone into Bulgaria in May, under the War Minister, Abdul Kerim, himself. Over and above all this, there were plenty of irregular troops, Bashi-bazouks, Arnauts, Circassians. The Turkish troops on the spot were certainly not equal in number to those of the allied Principalities, but the Porte soon supplied the deficiency. In the first days of July the whole Turkish militia was called out, and troops were picked from all the Asiatic corps—some came from the depths of Arabia Felix itself—to strengthen the northern corps, and form a new one at Prishtina, under Ali Sahib Pasha. In feudal phrase, the whole *ban* and *arrière-ban* of the Ottoman Empire was called up. Of course, it was one thing to summon all these troops, and another to get them to the scene of action. Servia had this advantage, that what forces she did possess were all on the spot; it did not take long to get them to their posts on the frontiers. She, too, had called all her fighting men into the field. They formed two lines of militia. The first line may be counted as the regular army; the second consisted chiefly of raw recruits, not fit for anything more than garrison duty, but in the end they had to go and help the others as well as they could. Besides these there were several volunteer corps, made up of fugitive Bosniacs and Bulgarians and Slavonic friends from the dominions of Kaiser Francis Joseph. Those from the land of the Czar came at first only one by one; at a later stage they became an important element in the war. The Servian troops were disposed in four divisions:—1. The army of the Drina, 20,000 strong, commanded by General Alimpich, and destined, as its name implies, to guard the western frontier. 2. The army of the Timok, about the same force, under General Leschjanin, ex-governor of Belgrade; this took up its position at the opposite corner of the Principality. 3. The army of the Ibar, also about 20,000 men, posted along that river and the Western Morava, commanded by General Zach (an Austrian by birth), and including a volunteer corps from Rascia, under the Archimandrite

Duesich. 4. The Southern army, which took up its position about Alexinatz and Deligrade, and was under the orders of the well-known Russian General Tcherniaieff.

The avowed object of the Servian campaign was to free the neighbouring Slaves; the scheme of the campaign was to unite Servia's forces with theirs. The Drina army was to penetrate into Bosnia, and organize the people there; the Ibar army was to march through Rascia, and if possible effect a junction with some of the Montenegrin troops; the Timok army was to march against Widdin, not to take it, but to keep the road clear for the Southern army, which was to make its way into Bulgaria, give new life to the crushed spirits of the people, and overthrow the Turkish corps as they came up one by one from the capital. Meanwhile the second line of militia, unfit for offensive warfare, was to guard the frontiers, and keep the real fighting outside the Principality. The plan was not without merit, and yet it failed.

Alimpich crossed the Drina at five a.m. on July 3, between Leschnitza and Badinovatz. His first step was to attack the Turkish fortifications which lay between the river and the town of Belina. An assault on these failing, Alimpich intrenched himself in his turn, and moved his trenches day by day nearer to Belina. This went on for several weeks; but it obliged the Turks to concentrate all their available forces in Belina, whereby the Serbs gained possession of Little Zwornik, and thus had the command of the whole right bank of the Drina.

The operations of the Ibar army were less promising. The nature of the country obliged General Zach to leave a considerable part of his forces scattered about the mountain passes to prevent the communications being cut off. With the main body he crossed the frontier at Javor, and marched straight upon Sienitza; while to his right Duesich went to stir up Nova-Varosch; and on the left a detachment, under Colonel Teholak-Antich, was sent to attack Novi-Bazar. The Archimandrite took some Turkish block-houses, and did a good deal of more or less successful skirmishing. Antich contrived to take up a good position before Novi-Bazar, and maintained it for some weeks; but he, too, never got beyond skirmishing. Zach on July 6 found himself near Sienitza face to face with a Turkish force far outnumbering his own, commanded by Mehemet Ali Pasha, and

posted in a most advantageous position. Retreat was scarcely possible, so the fight had to be risked. The Serbs fought bravely, but were severely beaten, and compelled to retire to Servian ground. The General's horse was shot under him, and he fell and was much hurt. He was an old man; and between physical injuries and mental vexation became so ill, that at the end of July he resigned his command, and Colonel Antich took his place. The intended junction with Montenegro was thus no nearer achievement. Meanwhile the Timok army had not prospered any better. Leschjanin set out on July 2 with his best troops, among whom was a volunteer corps called the Sacred Legion, towards Widdin. Near Karaoul they fell in with a strong body of Turks and Circassians. The Sacred Legion, whose zeal was much greater than its discipline or skill, was cut to pieces, and would have been simply massacred altogether if Osman Pasha had not come up and stopped the useless butchery. So complete was the rout that the Servian forces were compelled to retreat at once towards Saitsehar; and next morning Osman Pasha carried the war into the enemy's country, and drew up his forces opposite the Servian intrenchments on the right bank of the Timok. He then sent a body round to attack these from behind; and Leschjanin, in danger of having his retreat cut off, was compelled to retire into Saitsehar itself—a step which was not accomplished without great difficulty and loss. This disaster on the Timok was the more serious, because it jeopardized the southern army, then the most important division of the Servian defensive force.

General Tcherniaieff had set out for Akapalanka and Pirot with the main body of his troops, leaving the South Morava division, under Colonel Milan Ivanovich, to cross the frontier on the left bank of the Morava, and make a demonstration against Nissa. Ivanovich had to leave garrisons in the important posts of Alexinatz and Deligrade, and form several detachments to guard his right flank; and when all this was done his forces were only sufficient to sustain a hard skirmish at the bridge of Mramor, and make the garrison of Nissa aware of his approach, without attempting more serious operations. Tcherniaieff meanwhile had sent a detachment round by Gramada to observe Nissa from the other side; another body made its way round to the left to Pirot, through very bad roads; the

central column reached Akapalanka, and drove out the little Turkish garrison on July 4. Tcherniaieff had now to choose between three courses: turning all his forces upon Nissa, marching on to Sophia, or retreating. The taking of Nissa would have involved a siege, for which he had not the needful appliances, and which would have been a great loss of time. The march to Sophia was his favourite plan; but it would be a most terrible risk, unless he were sure of the successful co-operation of Leschjanin on the Timok, Ivanovich at Alexinatz, and the Bulgarians rising as he went along. If these failed him he and his 20,000 men would find themselves deep in the enemy's country, with their retreat cut off by all the forces of Osman and Eyoub Pasha, and all would be lost. The fate of the Timok army and the difficulties of Ivanovich have been seen; as for Bulgaria, its people, utterly unaccustomed to the use of arms, were too completely cowed to stir in their own defence. So Prince Milan issued, and Tcherniaieff obeyed, the order for retreat, and on July 10 the southern army turned back into Servia. Thus, within a fortnight the tables had turned; the Turks had become the aggressors, and the Servian forces were all obliged to retire into their own territory, except the army of the Drina. There Alimpich was still intrenched at Popovo, and had received reinforcements in the shape of insurgent Bosniacs, whom he was fast getting into good military training. On July 20 a Turkish force of about 4000 regulars and several thousand Bashi-bazouks marched against him from Belina. The Bashi-bazouks began the fire from a distance; then the regulars stormed Alimpich's intrenchments; after four hours' fighting they were driven back with heavy loss. Two days later the Turks made a vigorous attempt to get possession of the Serb intrenchments of Little Zwornik, and also of a battery which Alimpich had set up at Radalie, on the right bank of the Drina, and which was greatly in their way; but both these efforts also failed.

On the Ibar nothing was doing. In the south-east, Leschjanin and the bad weather were helping to cover the retreat of Tcherniaieff. A Turkish detachment under Hafiz Pasha drove away Tcherniaieff's rear-guard from Babina Glava, but was not strong enough to continue the pursuit. Fresh troops were coming up from the south under Suleiman Pasha to unite with those of Eyoub; but

their advance was slow, and Tcherniaieff hoped before they could threaten the southern frontier he might make his way into the Timok valley, and Leschjanin might give a beating to Osman Pasha, who was now encamped at Veliki Isvor. On July 18 Leschjanin, in compliance with Tcherniaieff's desire, made the attempt. He himself, starting from Saitschar, led his centre against Osman's right flank; the right wing under Bukovich went to attack Osman's advanced post at Karaoul; the left wing, under a Russian officer named Kirejeff, was to make a long detour by Salasch and Radowa to cut off Osman's retreat to Widdin. Osman contrived to stop the progress of all three divisions. Kirejeff was wounded, and again the Servians had to return to their old posts on the Timok. Still Osman did not pursue his advantage, but withdrew his main force to Turkish ground, and only sent a few outposts to keep the Serbs occupied around Saitschar. By July 20 Tcherniaieff had got his troops again collected on the Morava, about Alexinatz and Deligrade; the Timok army had been reinforced by the second line of the militia, and they were now prepared to stand on the defensive against the attack of the Turks. A week later the Turkish commanders concerted an attack on the line of the Timok. Osman Pasha undertook to drive Leschjanin from Saitschar; Eyoub Pasha marched from Nissa against the other chief Servian post, Gurgussovatz; his right wing, under Suleiman Pasha (who had now come up with his reinforcements), went round by Pirot and Pandiralo; the left, under Hafiz Pasha, took the way by Gramada and Derwent. On July 28 Osman drove Leschjanin's outposts back into Saitschar; on August 4 he arrived before the town, nearly all whose inhabitants had already fled. That night he mounted a battery on the heights to the north-east; next day, under cover of a fight all along the river bank, he set up two more, one of which completely commanded the town. Saitschar was now untenable, and in the evening Leschjanin withdrew his troops. When the Turks entered it next morning there was not a soul in the place, but there was a considerable quantity of provisions left behind. The Turks burned the town and its contents. Meanwhile Suleiman and Hafiz Pasha had compelled their respective opponents to fall back in the direction of Gurgussovatz; they had effected a junction with each other, and Achmet

Eyoub had come up to take the command of a united attack on Colonel Horvatovich's forces at Tresibaba. The fall of Saitsehar put Horvatovich in imminent danger of being surrounded by overwhelming numbers, so after two days' fighting he retired upon Alexinatz and Deligrade; and on the 7th the Turks entered Gurgussovatz unopposed.

The weakness of the Servian army lay in this: it was a militia army, of which fully one-half was utterly unaccustomed to stand fire, and a considerable part had not been in training long enough to understand the right use of arms. What Servia lacked was neither good generals nor proper munitions, but simply actual fighting power. That was just what the Turks possessed; their troops were emphatically fighting men, physically and morally. Their officers, too, were well qualified. And yet they did not do what everybody expected they would now do—gather up all their strength for a double attack on the lines of the Timok and the Morava, and force their way right through to Belgrade. The Turks were not so strong as they seemed. They, too, had their weak point—the transport and commissariat department. The resources of Turkey were, of course, far greater than those of Servia; but there was no proper organization for making them available. The Turkish troops, wasting all around them, had got into the middle of a desert; and behind them lay Bulgaria. Provisions could only be brought up the Danube, thence across country by the most troublesome roads, and had to be either bought on the shores of the Black Sea—no easy matter, as Russia threw all possible hindrances in the way, not to mention that Turkey had no money—or taken by force from the depths of Asia Minor. Moreover, the general call to arms had deprived the Moslem portions of the Empire of their cultivators, and there were symptoms of a general famine in consequence. This was a danger from which Servia was exempt; *her* men, too, had all beaten their ploughshares into swords, but their wives and sisters were not helpless Oriental women; they were quite able to prevent any serious damage to the agricultural condition of the country. The Turks were also seriously lacking in ammunition. And even their numerical strength, though very much greater than that of the Servians, did not increase as rapidly as it should have done; fresh troops were very slow in coming

up. Of irregulars there was, indeed, an almost unlimited supply; but just at this time they had to be used with caution, for the horror of England at the doings of the Bashi-bazouks had compelled Lord Derby and Sir H. Elliot to remonstrate, and give the Porte a hint, that if she did not restrain these lawless men, the British Government would be obliged to withdraw its support.

In this state of things the Commander-in-chief, Abdul Kerim, who had now arrived on the scene of action, directed all his energies to an attack on Alexinatz and Deligrade. Henceforth the whole interest of the war centred in the valley of the Morava. Osman Pasha's successes on the Timok did him very little real good after all; he failed to carry them any further, and Horvatovich even regained some unimportant positions. On August 17 Achmet Eyoub Pasha quitted the Gurgussovatz district to join his troops to those of Ali Sahib on the southern Morava, under the supreme command of Abdul Kerim. On the 19th one Turkish detachment arrived at the convent of St. Stephen; on the 21st another reached the village of Katun, both places situated very near the right bank of the Morava. On the 19th Ali Sahib, who had for some time been established in the neighbourhood of Prokoplie (otherwise called Urkub), set out to attack the Servian posts on the left bank of the Morava. He wanted to gain a position close upon the river, in order to throw a bridge across and establish a direct communication with Achmet Eyoub at Leschitza, a few miles above Alexinatz; at present their only means of communication was by Nissa and Mramor, a very long way round. The ground was very bad for marching. Ali could not go direct through the valley on account of the badness of the road and the position of the Servian forces; he had to spread his troops along the higher ground, and for two days a sort of wandering battle went on all along the line. On the third day, August 21, it began again, and now Achmet Eyoub also joined in on the right bank at St. Stephen's. The Servians were thus occupied on both sides at once; the same thing went on next day, and now the Turks began to build their bridge at Leschitza, and to form intrenchments on the left bank. At daybreak on the 23rd the Servians renewed the attack; that day the fighting went on almost uninterruptedly from four a.m. to eight

p.m. It was not so much a pitched battle as a kind of vast artillery skirmish. Achmet Eyoub's chief aim was to guard his trenches; Ali Sahib's was to prepare the way for a great attack on the trenches of Alexinatz. Early next morning he set his artillery to work on them; the infantry stormed them in the afternoon and made some progress; but a heavy fire from the Serb ranks compelled them to retire with great loss. In the evening Abdul Kerim received information that Horvatovich, who had re-occupied Gurgusovatz as soon as Achmet Eyoub evacuated it, was marching southward, and would probably attack the right flank of the Turks at St. Stephen's next morning. On this the attempt to storm the Servian defences on the right bank was given up, and at night the Turks fell back exhausted upon Katun.

It was while anxiously awaiting news of this fight round Alexinatz that Prince Milan, on August 22, completed his twenty-second year; his son and heir had been born on the 14th. Of course the news of the Turkish repulse caused great joy in Belgrade; at the same time it was announced that the army of the Drina, of which nothing had been heard for some while, had repulsed an attack on Little Zvornik. Servia's fortunes seemed to be again rising, and she was daily getting more help. For now the Russian volunteers were coming in no longer by twos and threes, nor even by dozens, but by scores and by hundreds. The streets of Belgrade were gay with Russian uniforms, officers and men, who were not long in finding their way down to the Morava Valley and the camp of their countryman Tcherniaieff. Being the freshest and strongest of the troops, they, like the Philhellenes in the Greek war, gallantly put themselves in the front, and during the struggle round Alexinatz they suffered most severely. For about a week after the battle of the 24th nothing of any importance occurred on the scene of war; the next event of moment took place in Constantinople. Sultan Murad—Murad the Unlucky, he might well be called—had been a shadowy sovereign from the first; he was said to be afflicted with melancholy madness. At last an Austrian physician, famed for his treatment of insanity, pronounced His Majesty's mental infirmity incurable. So his ministers did again what they had done in May—consulted the Sheikh-ul-Islam as to the

lawfulness of deposing the Commander of the Faithful, and with the same result. This time there was no need for secrecy or violence; poor Murad was so hopelessly imbecile that nobody could object to his removal. He himself was unconscious of what passed around him, when on the last day of August he was quietly sent into retirement, and his brother, Abdul Hamid, proclaimed in his stead.

Next day there was a decisive battle. At the solicitation of Prince Milan the Powers had been trying since the 25th August to arrange a cessation of hostilities. Turkey's advantages just then were not great enough to give her the right of dictating her own terms; it was therefore resolved to make one vigorous effort to gain a great victory before the negotiations were fairly in progress. Accordingly, about eight a.m. on September 1 Abdul Kerim Pasha gave orders for an advance, with the object of turning Tcherniaieff's right flank, and cutting off the communication between Alexinatz and Deligrade. Both parties knew that the great crisis had come, as the Turkish forces made their way cautiously along the undulating ground opposite Alexinatz, on the left bank of the Morava, trying to avoid the Servian batteries, and to bring up their own artillery to oppose them. The Servian artillery was the finest part of the whole army. The batteries were excellently placed and admirably worked, and inflicted very serious damage on the Turks; but they, too, were well provided with artillery. By degrees they mounted their batteries; and about 11.30 the infantry fight began. Foot and horse at once hurried out of Alexinatz over the pontoon bridges to resist the advance of the enemy's infantry. Tcherniaieff, at the head of his staff, rode about energetically directing his troops. Two hours later the Turkish shells from the advancing batteries set fire to a couple of villages occupied by the Servians, who retreated, at first in very good order. But they could not resist the steady advance of the Turks. Further and further up the defiles the enemies made their way; another village burst into flames; a panic set in among the Servian militia, and there was a general rush back upon Alexinatz. By four o'clock the streets were crowded with wounded and bleeding fugitives. The terror of the Servians was becoming quite uncontrollable. Their artillery, however, behaved admirably; the batteries were shifted with

the utmost skill throughout the day, and the men stood to their guns and fell beside them like heroes. The fire of the Turks was overwhelming. Night was coming on; at seven p.m. most of the Servian guns were brought out of action and parked. The Turks were within half a mile of the end of the main street of Alexinatz, whence a wooden bridge crosses the river. One gallant little band of Servian troops stood for full ten minutes bearing and answering as well as it could the plunging fire of the Turks on the slopes above them. The summer sun had already gone down, as it does at that season in Servia, all on a sudden, without any twilight; fires blazing all over the hillsides lighted the last effort of Servian valour. Then all was lost, and there was nothing to be done but to get all the civil population and the wounded soldiers out of Alexinatz as fast as possible.

It was a terrible day; the most fatal defeat that Servia had yet undergone. Tchernaieff was obliged to withdraw his forces to Deligrade. Alexinatz was lost; there was nothing now to hinder the junction of Achmet Eyoub and Ali Sahib. Achmet crossed the Morava unmolested; and if the Turks did not actually occupy Alexinatz, it was only because they did not think it worth while. The Morava valley lay wasted by fire and sword; the southern army, on which all Servia's hopes had been built, was routed. General Antich's efforts to bring the Ibar army to its assistance had not been crowned with success; on the Drina things were going wrong, and Alimpich had been recalled. Prince Milan in desperation pleaded earnestly with the European Powers for an honourable armistice; but the Porte insisted on the acceptance of certain very hard preliminary conditions of peace before they would grant it. This brought another difficulty to light; there was another party concerned in the negotiations—Prince Nikita of Montenegro. As the war had begun on a principle of close offensive and defensive union between Servia and Montenegro, the one ally could only put an end to it with the full consent and approval of the other. The terms first proposed by Turkey were such as the Powers could not expect even defeated Servia to accept; but it was only for her ally Servia's sake that Montenegro could fairly be expected to accept any terms whatever, for she herself had neither need nor desire to stop fighting.

The Allies having been compelled by circumstances to carry on their campaigns independently of each other, we have found it necessary to follow that of the Servian army first. We must now go back two months, and glance at the career of the mountaineers whom we last saw assembled round their Prince in the dawn of July 2.

The Montenegrin forces were divided into two bodies. One took up its position on the southern frontier, opposite the Turkish posts of Medun, Podgoritza, and Scutari, and there stood on the defensive. The northern corps entered the Herzegovina, joined communications with the insurgents, and advanced towards Stolatz. The right wing, under Sotchitza, marched against Gatschko, where Selim Pasha left a sufficient garrison, and then led his other troops to form a junction with Mukhtar, according to orders. On his way to Nevesinje on July 11 he was caught by a corps of Montenegrins, and had some trouble in fighting his way through. On the same day a body of insurgent Herzegovinians under Peko Paulovich attacked the Turkish posts to the east of Klek, and drove them back into that fort; and on the same lucky 11th July the central body of Montenegrins, headed by the Prince himself, reached Stolatz, and drove the Turks out of it and the neighbouring little forts. This was a good beginning, and presently another piece of good fortune befel the Black Mountaineers. On July 8 the Emperors of Austria and Russia had an interview at Reichstadt, and one result of their consultation was that on July 14 Austria announced to the Porte that no more Turkish vessels would be admitted into the waters of Klek; thus cutting off the Turks from their shortest route into Herzegovina. The conduct of the Austro-Dalmatian Government was most consistent and honourable. So long as Turkey only wanted to land troops against insurgents she was within her legal rights, and Austria could not fairly stop her. But when it came to a war between Turkey and Montenegro the case was altered. The Black Mountain was a sovereign state just as much as Turkey or Austria herself; the latter was bound to treat the two belligerents on equal terms, and therefore to deprive Turkey of the decided advantage which would have been given her by the continued freedom of access to Klek. The Porte, which has always persisted that Montenegro is, or ought to be, tributary to herself, protested strongly, but in vain.

During the next few days the southern Montenegrin corps occupied itself in skirmishes around Spuz and Podgoritzza, and preparations for an attack on Medun; Peko Paulovich continued effectually to guard the passes above Klek. On July 16 the northern corps drove back Selim Pasha from Nevesinje to Blagai, and next day beat him again at the latter place. On the 19th their progress was checked by Mukhtar Pasha, who marched against them from Mostar with a large force, and compelled them to retreat. Nikita, however, had never intended to take Mostar; his object was to guard his own northern frontier, and wait patiently till he could give Mukhtar a beating. When that was done, it would be time enough to think about what was to be done next. The Montenegrins, after their defeat, retreated towards Gatschko. Mukhtar pushed on before them to Bilek, thus threatening to cut them off from their own frontier. But the Prince knew what he was doing. On July 28 his army lay encamped in a long, narrow, deep valley, bearing the name of Urbitza, divided by a range of steep hills from the larger valley of Vucidol, and running at right angles to the Bilek road. The Montenegrins were in expectation of an attack from Mukhtar at Bilek, and their expectation was not disappointed. During the night of July 27-28 the Turks took up their position, and planted their artillery on the rounded ridge which separates Vucidol from the road. Soon after daybreak they began crossing the plain, and made for the hills between Vucidol and Urbitza with such speed, that they surprised the Montenegrins by appearing on the top of the ridge and dropping some shells into the empty tents in the Urbitza valley. As soon as they came within range the Montenegrin reserve, under Vukotich, opened a fire which checked their progress, and kept them occupied till the two wings, under Piletich and Peko Paulovich (who, being no longer wanted at Klek, had joined the main force), overlapped the Turks on both sides. Then right, centre, and left made one simultaneous charge, broke the Turkish line, drove it back in confusion on the reserves and artillery, right over the ridge into the plain beyond, and all the way back to Bilek. Prince Nikita, after burying the dead bodies in Vucidol (the "plain of the wolves"), sent a flag of truce with a letter to Mukhtar Pasha to inform him that one of his generals, Selim

Pasha, had been found dead on the field, and buried with military honours becoming his rank; and that another (Osman Pasha) having surrendered, was being conveyed to Cettinge, and would like his baggage sent to Grahovo. The letter was perfectly civil, and was sent under a flag of truce; but the Turks received the messenger with the coarsest insults, refused to take the letter, fired at the man, and sent some Bashibazouks to catch him. The fleet-footed mountaineer, however, easily outstripped them, and got safe back to his Prince.

Nikita's plans had so far been crowned with complete success, and justified his name, which means "the Victor." Mukhtar Pasha had been led to challenge to battle a force which he innocently believed he had already defeated. The result was that the whole available Turkish forces in the Herzegovina, with the three best generals at their head, were utterly routed by 10,000 mountaineers. Of the sixteen battalions which left Bilek at daybreak, only four returned in headlong flight. Two generals, two colonels, a great number of inferior officers, were killed; 300 men were made prisoners, and the victors got five guns, besides a quantity of rifles, ammunition, and several standards—the whole Montenegrin loss, killed and wounded, being under 400. The "strong battalions" might carry the day in Servia, but in the passes at the foot of the Black Mountain a thousand might well be stayed by three. Mukhtar was in imminent danger of being shut up at Bilek; but the Montenegrins did not take the trouble to press the blockade at once, so he hastily made his way out to Trebinje. Gatschko, Bilek, everything on that side, was abandoned. At Trebinje Mukhtar stayed for a fortnight in a state of utter helplessness, anxiously hoping that Dervish Pasha from Sienitza, or Jellaledin from Mostar, would come and break the cordon which the Montenegrins had drawn all round him. For some time the doings of the northern Montenegrin army were shrouded in mystery. Some outsiders complained sorely at the dilatoriness of the Prince, who, it was said, having the enemy literally at his mercy, ought promptly to have taken both Trebinje and Mostar. So he might if he had been a Western general at the head of a Western army. But his responsibilities were much more complicated. His little army was not only the sole help of Herzegovina against Turkish forces which might come up from

almost any side, it was also the sole defence of the Black Mountain itself. And Nikita was sovereign as well as general. He had to be here, there, and everywhere—now paying a flying visit to his own territory to make sure that all was right there, now going off suddenly northward on the look-out for Turks; disappearing and re-appearing in the most mysterious way, and carefully keeping his movements as secret as possible, so that very often his own Princess at Cettinge did not know where her husband was. She and all his own people, at least, took it upon trust that wherever he was he was in the right place. Their faith in him was unlimited, and they alone knew the peculiar circumstances which hindered him from profiting by his first successes.

Meanwhile the fighting on the southern frontier was wholly to the advantage of the defenders. The Montenegrins here had some very useful allies—a tribe of Albanians called the Kutchi, who inhabit the mountains above Podgoritza. Part of these people were already united to Montenegro; the rest were nominally under the Turks, and had received from them a supply of arms and ammunition, immediately after which they openly joined their neighbours of the Black Mountain. They only made up about 2000 armed men; but every little helps, and what made the defection of the Kutchi a serious matter for the Turks was their position, which would enable them to fall on the rear of any force that might attempt to enter Montenegro by the easiest way—from Podgoritza by Spuz and Danilgrade.

A good deal of skirmishing, in which the Turks never gained any real advantage, had been going on all through July in this neighbourhood. Here, as in the Herzegovina, the Turks were beginning to find their forts more trouble than use. They were in a chronic state of blockade and want of provisions. Such was the predicament of Medun. The Turkish commanders did not like to give it up, thinking that would look like a confession of weakness; so they had to go on risking their troops in troublesome marches through very bad roads, liable at any moment to be caught in some inextricable corner by the ever-watchful foe, and all for the sake of relieving a wretched little fort, which was of no real use.

The Turkish forces at Scutari had been at the beginning of the war under the command of Hamdi Pasha, whose success had not been great.

Early in August Mahmoud Pasha arrived at Scutari to take his place, and soon found it needful to make one of the periodical expeditions to Medun. Several attempts had already been made to clear the Kutchi out of the way, for they were a serious obstacle on the road between Podgoritza and Medun. Mahmoud now resolved on another effort. On August 14 he set out from Podgoritza with about 6000 regular and as many irregular troops. To guard against surprises, and secure the line of retreat, he made a succession of intrenchments along the road. Four thousand Montenegrins and about 2000 Albanians, Kutchi, and others, under Buko Petrovich, came up in the morning, and attacked the advanced guard of the Turks, who retired behind their first line of intrenchments; and being better armed, had decidedly the advantage so long as they kept their position, which they did till the afternoon. At last, encouraged by their success, they broke forth from their intrenchments, expecting to drive back their assailants. At once the mountaineers threw aside the strict tactics which they had been trying hard, though not very happily, to learn at their Prince's bidding, and resorted to their old plan of the wild Highland charge. Yataghan in hand, they swarmed down upon the Turks from three sides at once, as at Urbitza; while another body, which had been on the other side of the Moracca, crossed the river and fell on the Turkish flank. Unprepared for such a wild onset at close quarters, the Turks rushed back in disorder to the next intrenchment, hotly pursued by the Montenegrins, by whom they were chased back from one intrenchment to another, till all had to be abandoned. The loss was severe, but fell chiefly on the irregulars; Mahmoud got the regular troops to fall back in tolerable order. The Montenegrin loss was a comparative trifle, and their gain was a quantity of rifles, banners, and provisions.

Thus the Black Mountaineers had won a great southern victory to match their northern one. During the rest of the month no very important movement occurred; Dervish Pasha, from Podgoritza, made several attacks on the Montenegrin frontier, which never came to anything. Early in September there was a great fight at Rogano, on the Moratcha, where the Turks were again beaten back by the Montenegrin charge from the heights, leaving 800 dead on the field, and more than 1000 drowned in their desperate flight across

the river. In the Herzegovina nobody knew exactly what was happening at the end of August; Montenegrins and insurgents were scattered about in detachments in various directions trying to guard against a junction of the Turkish forces. But with all the good will possible they could not guard all roads at once, and at length Jelaledin Pasha succeeded in joining Mukhtar at Trebinje, while Nikita was anxiously watching the northern approaches of Gatschko. The Montenegrins next bombarded Bilek. On September 2 Fuad Pasha set out from Mostar with 5000 men, and proceeded by way of Nevesinje towards Trebinje; thence he followed Mukhtar, who had now made his way on to the plateau of Grahovo, very near the Montenegrin frontier. When there, however, he did nothing particular; he did not take Grahovo itself, but sat still waiting for Fuad, and got nearly surrounded by a band of Montenegrins under Vukotich.

Nikita was still the unconquered leader of an unconquered people; but he was temporizing now out of consideration for his ally Servia, to whom an armistice was a matter of absolute necessity. On September 4 the Powers, through their ambassadors, made another appeal to the Porte, which still threw difficulties in the way, and insisted on laying down such a basis for the future treaty of peace, as there was not the slightest probability that Montenegro would accept. It was now proposed that Servia and Montenegro should make their arrangements separately; and Nikita was quite willing, as this would really be the best thing for both, but Milan was not unnaturally reluctant to have his interests separated from those of his more successful ally. So matters dragged on; Tcherniaieff and Horvatovich on the Morava, Antich on the Ibar, kept up a spasmodic struggle with their respective Turkish opponents, till, on September 17, the Porte, getting tired of the ambassadors' representations, suddenly sent notice to her generals that they were not to attack the Servians unless first attacked by them, for the next six days. Of course Servia thankfully accepted the short breathing time; unluckily, on the same day some of Tcherniaieff's troops did a very rash thing in proclaiming Prince Milan King of Servia, which naturally gave offence to the Porte, and did not smooth the way for the negotiations which were actively pressed during the suspension of hostilities. Everybody

hoped the definite armistice would be concluded in a few days. On the 19th Prince Nikita and his staff went home to Cettinge. The gay dresses were soiled and worn, and the little army was sadly diminished since that July morning when it first set out; but nevertheless those who did come back came in triumph with their victorious Prince still at their head, and as they rode over the hill and in sight of the tower the great bell pealed out its welcome; the convent bells caught it and kept up their ringing greeting as the troops rode on by the zig-zag path; and then all Cettinge was astir with eager, joyous faces and voices, giving the Prince and his men their welcome home.

On the 21st September Abdul Kerim sent an officer to parley with General Tcherniaieff, and establish a formal armistice to last till the 25th; Russia, Austria, and England immediately set to work to procure an extension of the armistice, and succeeded in obtaining a further suspension of hostilities till October 2. None of the belligerents were very scrupulous in observing the truce; on September 28 there was a battle on the Morava, in which the Servians were defeated with heavy loss inflicted by the Turkish artillery. It is right to recall to mind that though we may call the Christian force "Servian" for convenience' sake, the greater part of it really consisted of Russian volunteers; for the worse Servia's plight became, the faster did the Russians pour in to her assistance.

Servia was very impatient of these short suspensions of hostilities by two or three days at a time; what she wanted was a regular armistice, long enough to give time either for a peaceful settlement or to enable her to recover her strength. This, however, Turkey refused to grant till some conditions had been agreed upon as a basis for the definite peace negotiations; and the opinions of Turkey, Servia, Montenegro, and the Western Powers as to these conditions were far from unanimous. On September 25 the English ambassador at Constantinople, Sir Henry Elliot, presented a note setting forth the demands of the Powers. There was the usual dilatory course of questions and answers before any result was achieved. Just at this time Midhat Pasha announced that he and his colleagues were going to frame a constitution for the Turkish Empire on the most approved Western pattern. Strong in the prospect

of internal reform, Turkey refused the armistice, but granted another week's informal suspension of hostilities from October 2. Scheme after scheme had been proposed and fallen through. Russia had discussed with Austria a joint occupation of Bosnia and Bulgaria; but Austria's hands were tied by Hungary. Russia alone both could and would act, but it was both her duty and her interest to leave no means untried of getting the other Powers to share the work with her, in some way or other, before she took the whole upon herself. The Russian ambassador to the Porte, General Ignatieff, had gone home to his own country at mid-summer, and it was the English ambassador who had taken the lead in all subsequent negotiations. These negotiations were carried on for ten days more, while hostilities were again nominally suspended, but neither Turks, Montenegrins, nor Russo-Servians made any scruple of skirmishing whenever it suited them. In the end Turkey got her own way. Instead of answering the proposition of the Powers, she made a counter-proposition. They were demanding a month's armistice; she checkmated them all by offering, on October 10, one of five months. This was a great deal too long to please either Servia or Russia. These parties thought that if peace was to be made and reforms introduced, both ought to be done in much less time than that; and if they were not to be done, and the war was to be resumed, five months' delay would be sheer loss to the Servians and clear gain to the Turks.

The great and the little Slave States, however, stood alone in their opposition; the English Government caught eagerly at the Turkish proposal, and the other Powers were inclined to think that a long suspension of hostilities was better than a continuance of the war. On October 20 General Ignatieff returned to his post at Constantinople. Russia and Servia went on, the one with her warlike demonstrations, the other with her desperate defence; in Montenegro and the Herzegovina no attention was paid to what the diplomatists were doing. On the 21st the bells of Cettinge rang to celebrate the surrender of Medun. Two days before the Turks had made the first of another series of attacks on Tcherniaieff's position along the Morava; again they were successful. A long fight on the 29th ended in the Russo-Servian army being cut in two, and Djunis, the key of the Servian position, falling into the

power of the Turks. In Belgrade, as soon as the news became known, it was felt that all was lost; Prince Milan telegraphed an appeal to Russia to procure an armistice as soon as possible. The appeal to Russia was not in vain. General Ignatieff presented to the Porte, on October 30, a demand for an instant armistice, announcing at the same time that, if it was refused, the Embassy would leave Constantinople within forty-eight hours. Under this pressure the Porte agreed to a formal armistice, to last from November 1 to December 28. This time it had to be properly observed, and Commissioners were appointed to fix the lines of demarcation for the opposing armies.

With this the war between Servia and Turkey came to an end. The great subject of interest now was a Conference of the European Powers, which the English Government had suggested some time before as a means of settling the much-vexed Eastern Question. Now that the armistice was satisfactorily arranged, the whole diplomatic skill of Europe was employed to prepare for this Conference, from which great things were hoped.

In view of a great, possibly an internecine, conflict with one of the great military powers of Europe, it was to the advantage of Turkey to come to terms with her Servian vassal. By so much was the number of her enemies diminished, and her own available force for attack or defence augmented. It was of less consequence that the quarrel with Montenegro should remain unsettled, for the Montenegrins never fight far from their mountain home, and the Ottoman troops might almost with impunity leave the dominions of Prince Nikita free if the Sultan's service required them elsewhere. There is another outlying province of Turkey, the attitude of which in any struggle between the Czar and the Sultan cannot but be of considerable importance. By race and religion the Roumanians are drawn towards the Russians rather than to their Moslem masters, yet their history shows that the yoke of the latter has not pressed so heavily upon them as it has upon other subject peoples. On the other hand, the aspirations of Moldavia and Wallachia after a free constitution have rendered them extremely suspicious and jealous of that colossal neighbour, which patiently submits to the absolute rule of an autocrat. A brief historic notice of the Danubian Provinces will render this more clear.

CHAPTER X.

The Danubian Principalities—Moldavia and Wallachia—The ancient Dacia—Dimensions and Boundaries—Dominion of the Getæ—Conquests of Trajan and Domitian—Roman Colonists—Derivation of Wallach and Roumani—The Goths—Huns—Gepidæ—Conversion to Christianity—Formation of the Principalities—Wars against the Moslems—National Heroes—Voïvodes elected—Alliance with Hungary—Battle of Varna—Arrest of Hunniades—His revenge—Treaty with Sultan Mahomet II.—Encroachments of the Turks—Fortresses on the left of the Danube—Michael the Brave—League with Moldavia and Transylvania—War with Mahomet III.—Alliance with Austria in Transylvania—Assassination of Michael—Subjection of Wallachia to the Turks—Voluntary submission of Moldavia to Solyman I.—Voïvodes Stephen and Bogdan—Usurpation of Sigismund—Polish invasion—Government by native Princes who paid tribute—Phanariote Hospodars—Bucharest a century ago and now—Irruption of Phanariote Greeks—Insurrection of Roumanians—Nicolas Mavrocordatos—Severe reprisals—Alexander Hyspantes—Theodore Vladimiresco—Gregory Ghika in Wallachia—John Stourdza in Moldavia—Dissolution of the Greek Monasteries—Russian occupation of the Principalities, 1829—Terms in the Treaty of Adrianople—General Kisseleff—Russian withdrawal, 1834—Michael Stourdza and Alexander Ghika Hospodars—Ghika deposed and George Bibesco elected—Popular dread of Russia—Revolution of 1848—Demonstration at Jassy—Stourdza temporizes—Calls in Russian troops—The Wallachs appeal to Turkey—Revolution at Bucharest—Abdication of Bibesco—Republican Government—Triumvirs—Advance of troops from Russia and Turkey—Fuad Effendi restores the old Government—Convention of Balta-Liman—Reform Commissions—Joint occupation of the Provinces—New Hospodars, Gregory Ghika and Prince Stirbey—Difficulties of their position—Stirbey retires when the Russians cross the Pruth, 1853—His return—Useful administration—Resignation—Alexander Ghika made Kaimakan of Wallachia—Agitation for the Union of the two Principalities—Gregory Ghika at Jassy—Appointed Hospodar of Moldavia—His administration during and after the occupation—Opposed to Russian domination—Retires to Vienna in 1853—Austrian occupation—Ghika commits suicide—Theodore Balsh and Nicolas Vogorides—Effect of the Crimean War on the Principalities—Conversation of Czar Nicholas—Treaty of Paris—Part of Bessarabia added to Moldavia—Russian protectorate abolished—Commission appointed—Divan *ad hoc*—Count Valewski's proposal for Union—Election of Divans—Enthusiastic support of Union policy—Five Points—Opposition of Turkey and Austria—Paris Conference, 1857–58—Lukewarmness of English Government—Union not sanctioned by the Powers—Colonel Couza elected Hospodar by both the Assemblies at Jassy and at Bucharest—Couza acknowledged as Prince Alexander John—His history—Amalgamation of the two separate Cabinets and of the two Chambers—Political conflicts—Assassination of M. Catardji—Resumption of monastic lands—Universal suffrage—Rural law of allotments—Opposition aroused—Abolition of the *corvée*—Class enmities—Revolution of February, 1866—Dethronement of Prince Couza—Various attempts on his life—Hospodariat offered to the Count of Flanders and refused—Accepted by Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen—His journey to Constantinople—Complaints of the Jews—Prince Charles' warlike tastes—His disappointment at the failure of the Conference—Small grievances of Roumania against Turkey—Difficulty of the position—Present constitution of Roumania—Administration—Religion—Revenue—Expenditure—Public debt—Various loans—Population and area—Diminishing ratio of increase—Commercial intercourse with Great Britain—Exports—Railways.

THERE yet remains to be noticed one large and important dependency of the Ottoman Empire, which from the nature of its geographical position, as well as by its historical traditions, can hardly fail to be involved in any great war between Russia and Turkey. This is the ancient Roman colony of Dacia, consisting of the two Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, long governed by separate Princes or Hospodars, and known as the Danubian Principalities; and finally united under one constitutional ruler, and named Roumania, in accordance with the Roman origin of its people. This large and important country, occupying a space 350 miles in breadth and 160 in length, is bounded by the Carpathian Mountains, and by the rivers Theiss, Pruth, and Danube, and lies between the great Empires of Austria, Russia, and Turkey, owing to the latter a fealty gained by right of conquest in the palmy days of Ottoman glory, but gradually attenuated to a mere nominal allegiance

by the decay of that once formidable power. The Getæ or Dacians, who inhabited this region in the time of the Emperor Augustus, extended their sway from the Black Sea to the borders of ancient Germania, and were a people too powerful for the Roman Emperors to endure as neighbours. Both Domitian and Trajan sent their legions to bring the hardy barbarians under the rule of Rome, and succeeded at least in driving them from their homes into mountain fastnesses and to the further shores of the river Dniester. Colonists from all parts of the Empire were summoned to occupy the vacant territory, and with the aid of Roman arts and Roman discipline to form a bulwark against the inroads of barbarians, already too threatening, who lay beyond the Dniester. Gigantic structures are still to be found in the country, bearing the impress of Roman genius and power. The name of Wallach, or Vlask, is but a Slavonic corruption of the name Welch, applied in many countries as the distinctive

appellation of the inhabitants of Italy; while the word Roumani, which is in more general use, points to the home from which the Roman settlers came. When the days arrived for the decline and fall of the great Empire, and the irresistible irruption of the barbarians from without, the colonists of Dacia fled to the mountains. Dacia was governed by a Roman pro-prætor till the year 274, when various parts of it were seized by the Goths and other barbarous nations. Towards the year 361 the Goths obtained exclusive possession of the province, and embracing Christianity, they established the faith so firmly, that it has ever since been the dominant religion of the inhabitants. In 376 the Huns in overwhelming numbers attacked Dacia. Their approach spread such consternation among the Goths of the interior, that those who had the means of escaping, to the number of some hundred thousand, fled into the Roman territory, and were permitted by the Emperor Valens to settle in Thrace. The Huns remained masters of the province until the year 453, when they were driven back into Scythia by a people called the Gepidæ. These in their turn were driven out by the combined strength of the Lombards and the Avars in 560.

By degrees the old inhabitants returned to their deserted plains, and in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries grouped themselves into the two Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. From that time they make some figure in the history of Oriental Europe, having acquired the respect of Venetian and Genoese navigators, and attracted the attention of the Roman pontiff. Though detached from the Latin Church, they were valiant champions of Christianity against the Moslems during the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries. Conspicuous among their heroes were Mircus I., and Stephen the Great, Radu, and others. Radu and Bogdan, two Hungarian chiefs, took possession of the country, the former settling in Wallachia, and the latter in Moldavia. These chieftains assumed the Slavonic title of Voïvode, equivalent to that of commanding Prince. They at first acknowledged the supremacy of the kings of Hungary, but by the middle of the fourteenth century they had obtained their complete independency. The Voïvodate was not made hereditary, the dignity being obtained by means of election. Several successors of Radu strengthened the government, the population increased, and a

great number of small towns and villages were built in the country. Frequent hostilities against the Hungarians, arising from the claims of the latter to sovereignty, accustomed the Wallachians to war; and in 1391 the Voïvode Mirtza collected a numerous force, and attacked the neighbouring possessions of the Turks. The Sultan Bajazet being at that moment employed in Asia, had left his conquests near the Danube without the means of defence. But as soon as possible he despatched a numerous army to Wallachia, and the Voïvode being completely defeated was compelled to become tributary to the Sultan. The annual amount of tribute was fixed at 3000 piastres. (Four piastres and a half are equal to an English shilling.) Wallachia continued to pay this tribute till the year 1444, when Ladislas, King of Hungary, preparing to make war against the Turks, made an alliance with the Voïvode Dracula. The Hungarians were defeated at the celebrated battle of Varna, and Hunniades, their general, escaping from the field, was arrested by the Voïvode, fearful of the Sultan's vengeance, and kept prisoner for a year, in order to show the Turks that the Wallachians treated him as an enemy. When at length Hunniades reached Hungary, he assembled an army and returning to Wallachia, attacked and defeated the Voïvode, and had him beheaded in his presence. After this he raised one of the primates of the country, named Dan, to the dignity of Voïvode.

In 1460, during the reign of the Sultan Mahomet II., the Voïvode of that time, also named Dracula, made a fresh attempt to shake off the Turkish yoke, but was unsuccessful; and the Sultan forced him to sign a treaty by which the Wallachians were bound to pay perpetual tribute. The principal article of this important treaty is thus worded—"The Sultan consents and engages, for himself and his successors, to give protection to Wallachia, and to defend it against all enemies, assuming nothing more than a supremacy over the Principality, the Voïvodes of which shall be bound to pay to the Sublime Porte an annual tribute of 10,000 piastres." Although the amount of the tribute was often increased under the successive Voïvodes, the payment with all the old formalities was continued up to the year 1716, when various changes took place. This treaty was in many respects advantageous to Wallachia, but the Sultan considered the qualification of a tributary

Prince as not implying sufficient submission ; and in order to place the person of the Voïvode under a more immediate dependence, he gave him the rank and title of a Turkish Pasha ; a dignity for a long time inseparable from that of Voïvode or Hospodar. The Principality remained at peace for some time after the war with Mahomet, and the incapacity of its Princes afforded the Ottoman Court opportunities for increasing their own arbitrary power. In 1544 portions of territory bordering on the Danube were ceded to the Turks ; the fortresses of Ibraïl, Giurgevo, and Turnu, which have constantly figured in subsequent European wars with Turkey, were constructed and garrisoned by Turkish soldiers. Having gained so strong a footing in the country, the Turks soon abused their power. The Porte connived at the depredations committed by the soldiers of the fortresses, and soon treated the Principality as on the same footing with its other Christian conquests. This state of things continued to the year 1593, when a Boyar named Michael was elected to the Voïvodate. This Prince determined to deliver his country from the Turkish yoke, and restore it to independence. Circumstances soon afforded him an opportunity of putting his design into execution. The Prince Sigismund of Transylvania, also tributary to the Turks, revolted against them during this period at the instigations of the Pope and the Emperor Rodolphus. With him and with the Voïvode Aaron of Moldavia, Michael formed a league against the enemies of Christianity.

Ordering their proceedings with circumspection, the Allies sent a long list of grievances to the Porte, demanding redress, and insisting on certain guarantees of future reforms. The only answer the Porte vouchsafed to these representations was the despatch of 3000 Janissaries into Wallachia, who went about the country pillaging and committing all sorts of outrages upon the inhabitants. A Wallachian force was collected and sent against them, and they were all put to the sword. Soon after this Michael, at the head of the allied army, marched against Giurgevo, and compelled its garrison to retire to the other side of the Danube. The threatening attitude of Michael and his allies induced the Sultan Amurath to desist from further provocation ; but he died in 1595. His successor, Mahomet III., resolved to reimpose the Ottoman yoke on the Principalities. Forty thousand Turks

and 20,000 Tartars under the orders of the Grand Vizir invaded the Wallachian and Moldavian provinces nearly at the same time, and a long war ensued. The invaders suffered a series of defeats in the course of five years, during which they renewed the campaign again and again, until the Sultan was finally compelled to relinquish his claims. In 1600, after the abdication of Sigismund of Transylvania, the Emperor Rodolphus bestowed upon the Voïvode Michael the sovereignty of that province, and Michael fixed his residence in this new acquisition, appointing a governor in Wallachia. The Transylvanians, however, not satisfied with his administration, revolted, and invited their former Prince, Sigismund, who was living as a private individual, to resume the supreme authority. An Austrian army, under the command of General Baste, was despatched to stop the progress of the rebellion ; and Michael, who had repaired to Wallachia, returned with some troops and joined the Imperial General. They marched together against the rebels, who had formed an army of equal strength, and an obstinate battle took place, which terminated in the entire defeat of the insurgents, and in the subjection of the whole province. Immediately afterwards the two allied commanders began to quarrel concerning the administration of the province ; and Baste resolving to get rid of Michael, caused him to be assassinated. His death, which took place in 1602, spread great consternation in Wallachia. The clergy and nobility wasted precious time in deliberations on the measures that were to be pursued ; and the neighbouring Turkish pashas, perceiving the opportune moment had arrived, despatched a large body of troops across the Danube, which, meeting with slight resistance, soon reduced the Wallachians to their former state of dependence. The tribute was reimposed, and the amount was fixed at a much higher sum than it had previously been. From this period until quite lately Wallachia remained under the power of the Sultans ; and although its inhabitants, in the course of the seventeenth century, made many efforts to throw off the yoke, they were never permanently successful.

With regard to Moldavia, the first act of its submission to the Turks was not the effect of conquest, but a voluntary measure of precaution and security. It was only in 1536 that this Principality consented to become tributary to the

Sultan. In 1529 the Voïvode Stephen, being on his death-bed, called to him his son, Bogdan, and his principal nobles. He addressed them at length on the political situation of the country, and dwelt on the sternness of character of the reigning Sultan, Solyman I., recommending them in the strongest manner rather to seek his clemency by the voluntary offer of a tribute, than to expose themselves to his vengeance. Bogdan for some years neglected his father's advice, till he was compelled to acknowledge the necessity of following it, and in 1536 sent ambassadors to Constantinople to offer tribute. The Sultan then entered into written engagements with him, by which the same privileges as those of Wallachia were granted to Moldavia. The latter province was governed on the same plan as Wallachia, and frequently shared the same fate in war; sometimes ravaged by the Turks, and at other times partially successful in resisting them. Towards the close of the sixteenth century the Principality, after successful co-operation with Wallachia, was seized by Sigismund of Transylvania, who deposed the Voïvode Aaron, his ally, and appointed a man of his own choice, whom he bound to pay him tribute. But in 1597 a Polish army invaded the province, and, taking it from the hands of Sigismund, restored it five years later to the Turks, under whose nominal authority it remained till recent times. Upon the whole, it may be affirmed that the weight of Moslem power pressed more lightly upon the inhabitants of these provinces than it did upon other tributary states. The Principalities were not occupied by Moslem troops, nor governed by Turkish pashas. Native princes for a time held the reigns of government, acknowledging the Sultan as their Suzerain, and paying him tribute, while a free and national government was guaranteed to the people by capitulations. In process of time these rights were encroached upon by the appointment of Phanariote Christians as governors of the Principalities. These Greeks from the Phanar quarter of Constantinople, who had grown rich and powerful by facile compliances with the vices and caprices of the Sultan's court, were more merciless and unscrupulous in their treatment of the Roumanians than any Turkish Pasha could have been. But it is something to have escaped the outward tokens of an alien and humiliating subjugation. The symbols of Moslem supremacy are absent from the towns and villages of Roumania. No mosques

are to be seen there, no minarets, no crescent, or other trace of the Turk; while the tricolor flag that is borne by the native militia bears in its folds the Roman eagle, carrying a cross in its beak. Not that the country was always free from the moral effects of the yoke of bondage. Less than a century ago Bucharest appeared what it really was—the capital of a Turkish satrapy, groaning under Byzantine tyranny. The Phanariote governors were corrupt and cruel, the native boyars were apathetic and luxurious; the city was but a collection of villages, where the peasantry lived in squalor and misery. The gain of even comparative liberty changed all this, and converted Bucharest into a spot more worthy of its name—the “city of joy”—and into a home of civilization, emulating that of other abodes of the Latin races.

The greatest danger incurred by the Roumanians as a nation was that of being overrun by the Byzantine Greeks who preceded, accompanied, or followed the Phanariote Hospodars. They came in crowds to make their fortunes in the subject Principalities. Many a humble pastry-cook, or seller of lemonade, arrived from Constantinople, and rose by degrees to positions of distinction; so that it became a popular saying among the nurses in the Greek quarter of Stamboul to wish that their charges might one day become “a pastry-cook, a dealer in lemonade, and a prince of Wallachia.” Against these oppressive place-hunters the Roumanians rose in insurrection; on more than one occasion with success, but they suffered in their turn terrible reprisals. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, under the hospodariat of Nicolas Mavrocordatos, a Phanariote, they were subjected to frightful exactions, and to a severe proscription. Poison and the dagger were employed to get rid of leading men who were obnoxious to the Greeks. Endeavours had been made with but too much success to extinguish the national language, and substitute for it a corrupt Greek dialect. The bitterness of the animosity existing between the Greeks and Roumanians was fully revealed in 1821, when the Hellenic insurrection in Moldavia, headed by Alexander Hipsilantes, chief of the Hetairists, and fomented by the Government of Russia, failed entirely in the Danubian Principalities. Theodore Vladimiresco, the leader of a national party in Wallachia, paid the penalty of his life for what

was called a traitorous defection. Under pretence of negotiation, he was caught in a trap by two aides-de-camp and the secretary of Hypsilantes, and was put to death. The Ottoman Porte at this time, greatly angered by the revolt of the Hellenes, showed great favour to the Roumanians; and "in consideration of their fidelity, and of the ingratitude of the Greeks," appointed Gregory Ghika Hospodar of Wallachia, and John Stourdza Hospodar of Moldavia—both being eminent nationalists. This act of the Suzerain was a return towards a better state of things, and one of its first results was the dissolution of the Greek monasteries of the Principalities, and the extradition of a large number of Greek monks.

Other reforms were about to follow, when in 1828 the war between Russia and Turkey broke out, and Moldo-Wallachia became the pledge which Russia held for the payment of the indemnity she claimed in the Treaty of Adrianople (1829). It was provided by this treaty that the Hospodars should be elected for life, and not for seven years as heretofore; also, "the better to secure the future inviolability of Moldavia and Wallachia, the Sublime Porte engaged not to maintain any fortified post, or any Mussulman establishment, on the north bank of the Danube; the towns situated on the left bank, including Giurgevo, were restored to Wallachia, and their fortifications were not to be rebuilt; all Mussulmans holding possessions on the left bank were to be bound to sell them to the natives in the space of eighteen months. The government of the Hospodars was to be entirely independent of Turkey; they were to be liberated from the quota of provisions they had hitherto been bound to furnish to Constantinople, and to the fortresses on the Danube. The provinces were to be occupied by the Russians till the indemnity was fully paid up, for which ten years were allowed; and to be relieved from all tribute to the Porte during their occupation, and for two years after it had ceased." Under such conditions the "restored" Principalities scarcely proved a valuable acquisition to the Sultan. The indemnities referred to in the convention were £5,000,000 for public compensation, and £750,000 for private injuries. The indemnity was paid by 1834, and the Russians retired behind the Pruth, but the predominance of Russian authority remained in force, though it was nominally shared by the Sultan. Dur-

ing the five years' governorship of the Russian General Kisseleff, a constitution had been formed, not on the ancient national mould, but based on the Phanariote system. The power of the National Assembly was greatly limited, and together with that of the Hospodar made to depend on the goodwill of both the Czar and the Sultan. The Greeks of Constantinople were recalled, and the Greek monasteries re-established. Roumania found herself possessed of less national life than she enjoyed when a vassal of the Sultan alone. Russia had made herself an ally of the Phanar to the detriment of the purely national party, to which as a party General Kisseleff, while governor, had shown anything but favour.

New Hospodars were appointed—Michael Stourdza in Moldavia, Alexander Ghika in Wallachia. The former, who was endowed with some of the political craft of the Greeks and Russians, steered a middle course, so as not to offend either his protectors or his subjects. Prince Ghika was not so cautious as his brother prince, but showed the resentment he felt against the patriots, who carried on a vigorous agitation in the Assembly and in the press, by aiming at a dictatorship. The party of "Young Wallachs," which was more purely national, and that of "Old Wallachs," which leaned towards Russia for support, quarrelled with one another at times, but kept united against the pretensions of the Prince. In the end the latter was deposed with the consent of his Suzerain, the Sultan, and of his protector, the Czar. His bitterest antagonist, George Bibesco, who in the violence of party warfare had descended so low as to reproach Prince Alexander with his ugliness, was raised by a vote of the National Assembly to the first dignity in the State. The new Hospodar mounted the throne of Wallachia arrayed in the costume of Michael the Brave, and caused universal joy through the country as being a true Wallach and the *elect* of his people. The Phanariotes were dismayed on seeing this popular outburst, but were soon consoled by observing that Prince George was less national than he seemed. Having gratified his ambition by securing a place in which his showy qualities could be seen to advantage, he took to governing by himself, putting his trust in Russia should need arise. He kept the National Assembly closed for a long time, and ruled without control. This state of things was interrupted by a mandate from the Porte, which ranged itself

on the liberal side as against Russian influence. A new Chamber came into existence, but was sufficiently subservient to the Prince's will. Dread of Russian intrigues and encroachments strongly tinged the opinions and feelings of Roumanian society at this time. In 1842 there was a sanguinary insurrection in Bulgaria, which extended across the Danube to the Wallachian town Ibraïla. The legal inquiries into the nature of this outbreak gave occasion for the following strong observations on the part of the Wallachian judge, Butzoyano, namely—"That there was no one who could be prosecuted in a question, in every step of which justice discovered his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias to be the principal criminal." Even Turkey was preferred as a master to Russia. Rather the government of the scimitar than the protection of the Czar! was once a cry at Bucharest.

The French Revolution of February, 1848, which led to a general upheaval throughout Europe, could not fail to produce a considerable effect in the Danubian provinces. The nobility and gentry of Moldavia and Wallachia were accustomed to send their sons to Paris for their education, and these young men returned to their homes imbued with French ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity in a form more or less modified. The effect was first felt at Jassy, where Prince Michael Stourdza, by his trimming policy and his avaricious propensities, had made himself anything but popular. On the 28th of March, 1848, an imposing demonstration of some of the best men in the country took place in the capital of Moldavia. A written project of reform was presented to Prince Michael at his residence, and was received by him with apparent acquiescence. In the course of the succeeding night, however, and with the concurrence of the Russian consul, he collected an armed band of Albanian and other adventurers, ignoring the national militia, and seized in their beds the principal personages engaged in the demonstration, and put them in prison. These safely immured, Stourdza called in the aid of General Duhamel, who commanded the Russian troops on the further side of the Pruth, and tranquillity again reigned in Jassy. Meanwhile the Wallachs, as ardent in pursuit of reform as their fellow Roumanians, set to work with more circumspection, and appealed to the Porte for protection against their greatly-dreaded

protectors, the Russians. "We see the error," they said, "of the old and fatal policy of our fathers, which gave rise to the protectorate of the Czar; we wish to repair the sad consequences of that step, by cordially rallying to the Sublime Porte, and giving all our support to the principle of maintaining the integrity of the Empire."

These aspirations for union with Turkey and independence of Russia were discouraged and even severely repressed by Prince George Bibesco. Insurrectionary attempts were the consequence; and on the 23rd June a youth, the nephew of Maghiero, a well-known patriot, stood in the market-place of Bucharest and read a Declaration of Rights, which he affirmed the Prince had sanctioned. Ten thousand unarmed men, believing or seeming to believe this assertion, went to the palace to offer their thanks. The Prince, taken by surprise, signed the Declaration; but abdicated next day, when his place was supplied by a provisional government. The intention was to form a Wallachian republic, under a president, who should be called "Domnul," a Roumanian word, and not "Hospodar," which is Slavonic. Subsequently a triumvirate was formed, consisting of the poet Eliade, composer of the Declaration of Rights, General Tell, and Nicolas Golesco. The Porte, caring little for forms of government, heard of this revolution with indifference, all the greater that the Sultan's suzerainty was mentioned in the Declaration with profound respect. Ottoman troops were sent forward under the command of Suleyman Pasha, who adopted a very conciliatory tone towards the Wallachians. It was not so with the Czar protector. His reply to the Declaration was the advance of 40,000 Russian soldiers more across the Pruth, and a public manifesto declaring it to be his duty to protect the Principalities from the evils of democracy and socialism. At his instance, as is supposed, the complaisant Suleyman Pasha was replaced by Fuad Effendi, who, advancing to the plains of Bucharest, soon put an end to the hopes of the republicans. At his request a deputation of 300 patriots waited on him in his tent, where he told them that unless they restored the old Constitution they would be treated as rebels. Loud and energetic were the protests of the delegates, of whom 250 went to prison rather than deny their newly-blossomed political faith. Bucharest was occupied by the Ottoman army; but not without the sacrifice of a handful of native

soldiers in the garrison, who offered a desperate resistance to the superior force of the invaders. Other partisans of the short-lived republic fled to the mountains, and began to organize a guerilla warfare under the leadership of Maghiero, chief of the Pandours.

For eighteen months the two Principalities had to endure a double occupation by Russian and Turkish troops. On the 1st May, 1849, the two Powers signed the Convention of Balta-Liman, with the view of establishing order in the country, where very "exceptional" circumstances had arisen. It was agreed between them that the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia should be chosen by the Sultan for seven years, and not for life, as settled by the Treaty of 1829. The Assembly of Boyars was abolished, because it gave rise to disturbance and disobedience. Two Commissions, composed of the most trustworthy Boyars, should meet at Jassy and Bucharest respectively, to revise existing laws, and to propose for the approval of Russia and the Porte such changes in the ancient Constitution as would give regularity and stability to the administration of the provinces. These decisions of the suzerain and protecting Powers were to be guarded from external interference by a Turco-Russian army of 30,000 men, to be gradually reduced in number as the labours of the two Commissions approached completion. The operation of this Convention was limited to seven years, at the expiration of which term the two Powers would be at liberty to act severally as they deemed best for the welfare and tranquillity of the Principalities. The publication of the Treaty of Balta-Liman gave rise to much discontent, and alienated from Russia multitudes of those Christian subjects of the Porte who had long regarded the Czar as their natural protector. The Turks also came to regard the joint occupation of the provinces with jealousy, as being a mere pretext on the part of Russia for placing her forces nearer to Constantinople. The prolonged stay of the Russian troops in Roumania after complete tranquillity had been established increased the feeling of suspicion, which was further strengthened by the impolitic demand of the Czar's Government in 1849 for the extradition from Turkey of certain Hungarian political refugees.

In June, 1849, a month after the signature of the Convention of Balta-Liman, two new Hos-

podars were appointed to the Principalities. In Moldavia, Prince Michael Stourdza gave way to his nephew Gregory Ghika, and retired with a vast fortune to Paris to spend his days in peace. In Wallachia, the place of George Bibesco was filled by an elder brother of his, who had taken the name of Stirbey from a maternal uncle who made him his heir. Prince Stirbey, who was approaching his fiftieth year, was educated in Paris, and had taken an active part in public affairs from early manhood. He was one of the Hetairists of 1821, and subsequently a refugee in Transylvania. He was secretary to the Reform Committee empowered to draw up the Moldo-Wallachian Constitution of 1829. He served under the Russian Commissioner, General Kisseleff, was Minister of Justice in 1837, under Prince Alexander Ghika, and drew up a commercial code on the French model. He competed with his brother for the Hospodariat in 1843, but at the last moment withdrew, accepting from Prince George the portfolio of Minister for the Interior. In this capacity his name is connected with some important public works, such as the quays of Braila, the bridge at Slatina, and the drainage of the marshes at Chesmedjy. He was in Paris at the time of the Revolutions of 1848, and the following year was appointed Hospodar by the Sultan for seven years. The weakness of his Suzerain, the domination of Russia, and the discontent of the national party, combined to render the position of the new Hospodar very difficult. He did his utmost to re-organize the country, obtained the removal of the army of occupation, and improved the national finances. The crossing of the Pruth by the Russian army on July 3, 1853, placed Prince Stirbey in a painful position. He wrote to the Porte for instructions, and was informed that, trusting in his wisdom, they left him to his own devices. After the Russian declaration of war he quitted Bucharest for Vienna, leaving the direction of affairs provisionally to the Council of Administration. He returned after the evacuation of the Principalities, in September, 1854, and resumed active duties, opening a national bank and a first line of railway. He also carried a law for the emancipation of the gipsies, who numbered about 500,000 in Wallachia. He strove hard, by diplomatic correspondence with various European Powers, to secure a larger national life for his fellow countrymen, and he was a warm advocate

for the union of the two Principalities under one hereditary ruler, selected from some foreign royal family. He resigned his power in 1856, under pressure from Constantinople, and because he wished to leave public opinion free play on the subject of union; he was elected a member of the Divan *ad hoc*, and voted the first for the union which took place in 1859. He retired to France, and spent the rest of his days alternately at Paris and at Nice, dying at the last-named place in 1869. Meanwhile the deposed Prince Alexander Ghika returned in 1853 from Vienna, his place of refuge, and on the departure of Prince Stirbey, in 1856, he was named Kaimakan of the Principality. He heartily supported the policy advocated by his relative Gregory Ghika, Hospodar of Moldavia, for the union of the two Principalities, although the project was far from being popular in Wallachia during the reign of Prince Stirbey. Ultimately, Prince Alexander Ghika made way for Colonel Couza, the first ruler of the united provinces, and died at Torrel-del-Monte, near Naples, in January, 1862.

To return to Jassy and Prince Gregory Ghika:—This Prince was born at Botuschani, in Moldavia, on the 25th August, 1807. Entering quite young into the diplomatic service, he successively occupied various posts in the administration, being *Hetman*, or Commander-in-chief of the Militia, in 1826, Secretary of State in 1842, and Finance Minister, under the Hospodariat of Michael Stourdza, in 1843. At that period the governmental policy was inclining day by day more strongly towards the Russian system. Ghika, after vainly opposing this tendency, resigned his post, and from that time became one of the chiefs of the liberal opposition, or national party. After the Convention of Balta-Liman, and the fall of Michael Stourdza, Russia and Turkey proceeded to elect fresh Hospodars for the two Principalities. Russia having secured the appointment of her candidate for Wallachia, Turkey, by way of counterbalance to Russian influence, selected Prince Gregory Ghika as Hospodar of Moldavia on the 16th June, 1849. This Prince's Government may be divided into three distinct periods. During the first, entirely paralyzed by the presence of the Russians, who managed by diplomatic finesse to prolong their sojourn in the provinces, his endeavours were limited to alleviating the burdens of a country groaning under a double occupation. In 1851, the Russian soldiers having

recrossed the Pruth, Prince Gregory, relieved from foreign pressure, endeavoured by the institution of a good system of police, and other useful measures, to repair the disasters of the preceding administration. Among his various useful acts at this time may be enumerated the creation of a corps of gendarmerie, the augmentation of the militia, the foundation of public schools of instruction at Niamtzo, Houch, and Galatz, the promulgation of a code of laws, the establishment of an institute, named after him the Gregorian, and the erection of town halls and other public buildings in various parts of his Principality. The re-entry of the Russians in 1853 brought all this work of reorganization to a stand still. Prince Ghika was not strong enough to resist the Russian demands, yet he refused to submit to them. Summoned to break off all relations with the Porte, and to discontinue the tribute sent annually to Constantinople, he refused acquiescence without first consulting the Sultan. The latter advised him to quit the Principality for a time, and on the 30th October he left Jassy and retired to Vienna, where he remained till the end of the following year. At that time the last Russian divisions having abandoned Moldavia, where they had been replaced by Austrian troops, Prince Ghika was invited by the Porte to return to his old Government. Arrived in his capital, he inaugurated his restoration by the formation of a liberal ministry. The following important measures were then passed in quick succession:—The reform of the penitential system, the abolition of slavery and of the censure of the press, the establishment of a national bank, and the regulation of the navigation of the Pruth and the Sereth. This useful and liberal legislation deserves all the more credit for having been accomplished in presence of the Austrian occupation, and notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of the Cabinet of Vienna. When the question of the union of the two Principalities was brought forward in the Protocols of the 30th March, 1856, Prince Ghika gave his official approbation to the proposition. The union movement was embraced with ardour by all Roumanian patriots, and its supporters having spread the idea over the whole of Moldavia, soon inoculated Wallachia. The new nationality, however, did not suit the tastes either of Turkey or Austria, so Prince Ghika found himself compromised with the Porte; and when the seven years' term of their election had

expired the Hospodars of both Provinces, Gregory Ghika and Prince Stirbey, were deposed by the Porte, who replaced them by Theodore Balsh in Moldavia, and Prince Alexander Ghika in Wallachia. On the 3rd July, 1856, Prince Gregory Ghika, whose Hospodariat had diminished instead of increased his private fortune, retired to France. He resided at the Chateau of Mée, near Melun, until the end of July, 1857, when, broken in spirit, and tortured by the odious imputations with which his enemies pursued his administration, he committed suicide by shooting himself.

Theodore Balsh's career as chief ruler in Moldavia was too brief to allow of any great development of his policy as a separatist, for he died in the spring of 1857. His friend and successor, Nicolas Vogorides, was ardent in opposing all plans for union, in which line of conduct he was supported by the Governments of England and Austria. His zeal gave rise even to complaints carried by the French ambassador to the Commission which was sitting in Constantinople for the regulation of the affairs of the Principalities. Nevertheless, Vogorides gave his strenuous support to the candidature of his brother-in-law, Michael Stourdza, who competed with Colonel Couza for the Hospodariat of the united Provinces in 1859.

The Crimean war had naturally a considerable effect on the welfare of the Danubian Principalities. In one of his celebrated conversations with Sir Hamilton Seymour preceding that war, the Emperor Nicholas defined their position as being that of an independent State under his protection. "That is a state of things," he added, "which may continue. Servia," he went on to say, "may receive the same sort of government, and Bulgaria too, but not as independent States." It was in the same conversation that the Czar spoke with undiplomatic frankness of the possible fate of Egypt. "I understand the importance that territory has for England, and all that I can say is, should there be a partition of the Ottoman Empire after its fall, and you were to take possession of Egypt, I would raise no objection. I would say as much for Candia. That island might suit you, and I do not see why it should not become an English possession." The failure of this bold bid for a cordial understanding with England on the basis of common interests brought about the terrible war of 1854-56. In a manifesto issued June 26, 1853, the Czar announced his intention

to occupy the Principalities, "in order to show the Porte how far their obstinacy may lead them." War did not immediately follow this decisive step, but it was not long in coming. Negotiations became more difficult and entangled. England and France came to the aid of Turkey, and invaded the Crimea, while Austria sent troops to occupy the Principalities, which Russia had to evacuate.

The Treaty of Paris of 1856 contained provisions which were of great importance to the two provinces. By one of the clauses the mouths of the river Danube were given into the charge of a European Commission, which was bound to see them cleared, and every facility afforded for the free navigation of the river. Another clause handed over to Moldavia, subject to the suzerainty of the Sultan, that portion of Bessarabia which was taken from Russia. The protectorate so long exercised by the latter Power over the Principalities was abolished by Article 22, which says that no exclusive protection shall be exercised by any of the guaranteeing Powers, who collectively assured to the inhabitants the maintenance of all the privileges they then possessed—an independent national administration, with full liberty of worship, legislation, trade, and navigation. Most important of all, however, for their future development was the agreement to appoint a Commission, under the sanction of the high contracting Powers, for the revision of the laws and statutes then in vigour. This Commission, which assembled first at Constantinople and then at Bucharest, was to inquire into the actual state of the Principalities, and to propose bases for their future organization. The Sultan promised to convoke in each Principality a representative body under the name of a Divan *ad hoc*, which should communicate with the Commission on all subjects that concerned the interests and wishes of their respective communities. The protection of the two States was to be confided to a national militia; and if foreign aggression were threatened at any time, the Porte was entitled to seek the aid of the contracting Powers to repel such aggression.

It was Count Valewski, Minister for Foreign Affairs in France, who from his high position as President of the Congress of the Great Powers in 1856, renewed a proposition made the previous year by France for the union of the two Principalities under the government of a foreign hereditary Prince. The proposal was supported by

England, Russia, and Sardinia, but keenly opposed by Austria and Turkey. It was agreed, at length, that the Porte should ascertain the opinion of the Roumanian population on the subject of reorganization, and an international commission was charged to visit the provinces; and consult with the provincial assemblies. The latter were elected without difficulty in Wallachia, but the Moldavian ruler, who was anti-unionist, interfered so much with the elections, that they were annulled by the intervention of France and three other Powers. At length an immense majority of the national party, favourable to the union, was returned to both Divans. That of Moldavia was opened first on Sunday, the 4th of October, 1857, amidst enthusiastic acclamations. After an animated debate, five points were carried unanimously; they demanded—

1st. Respect for the ancient rights of the Principalities, and of the ancient capitulations concluded with the Sublime Porte.

2nd. Union of the Principalities in one state under the name of Roumania.

3rd. A foreign hereditary Prince, connected with a reigning house of Europe, whose heirs should be brought up in the religion of the country.

4th. Neutrality of the territory.

5th. The legislative power to be confided to an elective assembly. All this under the guarantee of the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris.

Great joy was manifested while the vote was being taken. The Metropolitan, who presided over the Assembly, was the last to sign the document recording the vote, which he did in favour of the resolutions, saying, "where the flock is, there also is the shepherd." Out of eighty-three voters eighty-one pronounced in favour of the five propositions.

The Wallachian Divan was opened at Bucharest on Sunday, the 11th of October. The town was brilliantly illuminated, and on every side were seen emblems with this inscription—"Union, Autonomy, Foreign Prince, Constitution." It was the national programme which, embodied in resolutions similar to those of the Moldavian Divan, was made the subject of a lively debate, and carried unanimously. The Government of the Sultan witnessed this unanimity with anything but satisfaction, nor was Austria pleased a whit more. The two Powers declared their

intention of preventing the union of the two Principalities. The other Powers intervened; and when the Conference of 1857 assembled in Paris to receive the report of the commission which had been examining the resolutions passed by the two Divans at Bucharest, there seemed little chance of an agreement between the guaranteeing Powers on the subject of a union of the Principalities under a foreign prince. It was said that French policy in favour of union was modified after the interview of Napoleon III. with Queen Victoria at Osborne in September, 1857, and after a speech of Lord Palmerston's in the House of Commons upholding the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The Conference met at Paris, May 22, 1858, and completed its labours on August 19, when the Act regulating the future organization of Roumania was signed.

By this convention the sanction of the Powers to the incorporation of the two Principalities was refused; but authority was granted to institute a joint council of eight deputies from each province, who were to meet at Fokschani, a town situated partly in both provinces. It was further allowed that a joint high court of justice and appeal should be formed, and a militia jointly organized, but with a Hospodar for each Principality, to be chosen by themselves, and for life only. The Principalities took action promptly, and Turkey did all she could to secure the return of Turkophile candidates who would resist the new regime. The Moldavian Assembly again met at Jassy on January 16, 1859. In the Assembly the Turkish candidates found no favour. On the 17th they elected Colonel Couza, who was not rich, or of high rank, but who had made himself popular, both in a military and civil capacity, and by his energy in supporting the national privileges. At Bucharest the National Assembly met on February 3; and on the 5th, in spite of the utmost efforts of the Turkish officials, they also elected Couza unanimously, thus practically neutralizing the intended separation of the two Principalities. He assumed the government under the name of Alexander John. Turkey was dissatisfied, and protested. The representatives of the European Powers met again at Paris on April 7 to consider the position of affairs, and resolved that the choice of the people should not be interfered with, but that this election should be an exceptional case. In August the Sultan consented to acknowledge

the double return on condition that Couza should present himself at Constantinople to acknowledge his Suzerainty, and to do homage. The convention at Paris also required Couza to have a separate administration for each Principality.

Alexander John Couza was born at Galatz, in Moldavia, in 1820, and belonged to one of the small families among the gentry. From 1834 to 1839 he was a student at Paris; and upon the completion of his studies, returning home, he entered into the Moldavian militia, and soon arrived at the grade of colonel. His next promotion made him Vice-president of the Galatz tribunal; and in 1850, when Gregory Ghika was at the head of affairs, he became *percalabe*, or prefect of Galatz, and soon attracted public notice by his administrative talent, and the tact with which he smoothed away the difficulties incident to his position. When the Austrian occupation of 1854 was imminent, Couza displayed a determined opposition, and soon afterwards resigned his offices as a means of protesting against the government of the Kaïmakan Vogorides. In addition, he denounced at considerable personal risk the corruption exercised by Austria in the elections for the Divan of 1857, and was a means of obtaining their annulment. The convention signed at Paris in August, 1858, imposed fresh elections on Moldavia; and on this occasion Couza was chosen deputy for Galatz, and entered into the provisional Cabinet as Minister of War. A warm champion of the union movement, when the idea fell through at the Congress of Paris, he saw the realization of his patriotic aspirations in the double election mentioned above, and the practical union of the two Principalities in 1859. He was chosen by acclamation at Jassy, Prince of Moldavia; and shortly afterwards, with equal unanimity, at Bucharest, Prince of Wallachia. The first acts of his administration and his first choice of ministers proved his strong interest in the national party, and his desire to calm the susceptibilities of European diplomacy, which his election had somewhat disturbed. His election having been ratified as exceptionally valid at the Congress of Paris, was later on with some difficulty recognized by the Porte. During the ensuing years Prince Couza's Government can only be described as a series of ministerial crises. In 1860 there was a double Cabinet, with M. Golesco representing Wallachia, and M. Cogalniceano, Moldavia.

At the end of that year Prince Couza obtained a firman from the Porte, authorizing the amalgamation of the two ministries and of the two chambers of each Principality into one great legislative Assembly of the Roumanian people. This stricter union did not mend matters, as had been hoped, and the conflicts between the Government and the majority of the deputies were still incessant. The opening of the first sitting of the Roumanian Assembly took place on the 5th of February, 1862, with M. Barbo Catardji as President of the Ministry. This gentleman a few months later was assassinated in broad daylight, the murderer escaping with impunity. The Cabinet was then completed, with M. Cretzulesco as President; and soon afterwards the Assembly itself was suspended, and Roumania entered on a period of something like anarchy. The electoral law and the budget were the subjects of continual dissension. Yet in the midst of this turmoil, the Prince managed to pass an important measure, the re-assumption by the government in the name of the nation of the monastic lands, the ecclesiastical element having managed, in the course of time, to gain possession of a fifth part of the Roumanian soil. In 1863 Prince Couza assumed the immediate command of the army, nominating as his Major-general the Minister of War, John Emmanuel Floresco; and at the end of the year he presented to the Assembly a programme containing such radical political and social changes, that it appeared to be the immediate forerunner of a *coup d'état*. The year 1864 was rendered remarkable by a storm of conflicting interests and political struggles, which it is hardly possible for English readers to appreciate, or even comprehend. In May the Prince submitted to the country some important modifications in the Constitution, making an appeal to universal suffrage. He endeavoured to strengthen the Senate, to reform the electoral law, and to obtain by means of the rural law, rejected once already by the Assembly, an allotment of land to each peasant who up to that time paid by labour for his use of a portion of the soil. The *plebiscite* voted by yes and no, from the 22nd to the 25th of May, uniting 611,094 affirmative votes out of 682,621. A protest of the signatory Powers of the Treaty of Paris against this democratic proceeding was drawn up on the proposition of Ali Pasha. Nevertheless the relations of Prince Couza with the Porte were not strained, to judge

by the hearty welcome accorded him by the Sultan on his visit to Constantinople in the following month. In Roumania fetes and ovations inaugurated the triumph of the Prince.

Still the complication of the situation was growing day by day. A decree of the 2nd of May had accorded to the Government the right of suppressing any obnoxious paper or print, without warning or litigation. Conspiracies began to be talked of, arrests followed; suspicion and distrust were the order of the day. The roads and highways became insecure, and a reign of terror seemed about to begin. In deference to the Porte and the guaranteeing Powers, certain modifications were introduced into the articles of the Plebiscite. A State Council and a Court of Accounts were created, and with their aid the Prince promulgated the new laws, the principal being the rural law, which abolished the *corvée* (forced labour) and gave to the peasants the ownership of the land they occupied, after paying an equitable indemnity to their Boyar masters. Changes of this importance, touching men so closely in their self interest, could not but breed enmities and suspicion between class and class. At the end of the year the Roumanian Government had to borrow 37,000,000 francs, at seven per cent., from the Ottoman Bank. In December, 1865, the Prince introduced the Code Napoleon, but crisis followed crisis. In January, 1866, the Chamber of Deputies presented an address to the Prince, thanking him for having promulgated new laws and re-organized justice; for having introduced trial by jury, for having abolished forced labour, and for having suspended army recruiting for the year, words being added to the effect that "the country has ever been and ever will be with your Highness." Yet in two or three weeks all was changed, and the formation of the Cabinet of February, 1866, the twenty-seventh of his short reign, in opposition to the majority of the Chamber, was the signal for an explosion. A revolution, at once parliamentary and military, broke out on the 23rd of February, 1866. At four o'clock in the morning the conspirators penetrated into the palace and forced the Prince to abdicate. This fact was communicated immediately to the Senate and the Chamber, and his dethronement was proclaimed. A provisional government was nominated, and to their credit, the first care of the successful party was to provide for the safety

of the fallen Prince, and conduct him in safety to the frontier.

The elevation of Prince Couza had not been without difficulty and even danger to himself. Violent attempts were made upon his life, once by means of an infernal machine. The agents of these criminal attempts were foreigners, but the animosity which prompted them lay nearer home. Many partizans of the old government, many persons who had been his superiors in rank, envied this Moldavian gentleman his elevation to power. His mind was set upon carrying measures obnoxious to the old nobility on the one hand, while on the other, his cautious mode of proceeding, for fear of offending the neighbouring powers, did not at once satisfy the advanced liberal party. Austria, in particular, was very jealous of the free development of a constitutional state on her own borders and so near Hungary, then seething with disaffection. The Central Council assembled at Foks-chani in 1859 disputed his authority on every occasion, and endeavoured to establish an oligarchical control over him. This he resisted, and at length, on November 12, 1861, he received the Sultan's firman sanctioning the union of the two Principalities and his election as Hospodar of Roumania. Having no children, he adopted in May, 1865, a son of Princess Obrenovitch as his heir. The revolution, however, of the following February cut short his troubled career as a ruler, and drove him into retirement at Paris.

At the head of the new provisional government were two of the Ghika family, leaders of the old Boyar party, who were instrumental in bringing about Couza's abdication. This took place without the slightest disturbance, and the change was notified to the representatives of the foreign Powers. Next day the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies agreed unanimously to offer the Sovereignty to the Count of Flanders, younger brother to the King of the Belgians, who at once declined to accept the honour and responsibility. Russia, Turkey, and Austria sent troops to the frontiers to watch events. Turkey demanded of the other Powers that none but a native should be recognized as Sovereign. The provinces, however, elected Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. Prince Charles, styled the First, of Roumania, was born on the 20th April, 1839, and is the son of the Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, head of the second of the non-reigning lines

of the princely House of Hohenzollern. Prince Charles was a sub-lieutenant in a regiment of Prussian dragoons, when the expulsion of Prince Couza suddenly elevated him to a throne. His candidature, supported principally, it is said, by Prussia, was accepted by the Roumanian Parliament; and on the 22nd of May, 1866, he entered Bucharest in state. His first care was to write to the Sultan Abdul-Aziz, assuring him of his respect for the treaties which bound the Principalities to Turkey. In the October following he proceeded to Constantinople to receive from the hands of the Sultan his regal investiture, and the firman which conferred it dates from the 23rd October, 1866. The reign of Prince Charles during its early years was only remarkable for internal agitation and parliamentary crises. European intervention was called for to prevent certain severities practised on the Jews by the Roumanians. The consuls of the foreign Powers succeeded in obtaining some alleviation in the treatment of those unfortunate people, who were accused of farming the spirit tax, to the great injury of the native population. At the same time, the attention of the Government was drawn to the bands of brigands which, forming on Roumanian territory, were the pests of the lower Danube.

What with stormy sessions of the Chambers, resignations of old, and formation of new Ministries, culminating in February, 1869, in a dissolution, there is little to record of internal progress. It was reported, towards the end of 1867, that Prince Charles was forming a normal school for teachers. The year following, however, found him more congenially occupied in making preparations for war. The Prussian Colonel Krouske, who figured in the battle of Sadowa, was intrusted with the organization of the Roumanian army. Cannons and gun-carriages were ordered from Prussian factories, rifles were bought from America, rockets from France, and large quantities of powder and saltpetre from different countries.

The warlike aspirations of the Prince are sufficiently notorious. He remained neutral during the insurrections in Herzegovina, Bosnia, and Bulgaria, and throughout the war between Servia, Montenegro, and Turkey; but he expected a reward for his moderation, and claimed it at the hands of the Conference at Constantinople. The abortive close of the Conference disappointed his expectations.

Many small differences with the Sublime Porte had been left unsettled for ten years. The Sultan had never yet recognized the new name of Roumania, which still had received the sanction of all the guaranteeing Powers. This was a somewhat sentimental, but none the less a sore grievance. Under the circumstances of a war between Russia and Turkey, the Government at Bucharest had little choice between a friendly convention with the Czar, for the passage of Russian troops, and the calling in aid from the Suzerain Power at Constantinople. If the latter alternative had been adopted, Roumania would become the field of a terrible conflict. A semi-independent state could hardly hesitate to choose the other course.

The constitution now in force in Roumania was voted by a Constituent Assembly, elected by universal suffrage, in the summer of 1866. The charter vests the legislative power in a Parliament of two houses, a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The Senate consists of 76 members, and the other house of 157 deputies, of whom 82 are for Wallachia and 75 for Moldavia. The members of both houses are chosen by indirect election, the first voters nominating electors, and these in their turn the deputies. Voters are all citizens aged twenty-five years, who can read and write; and eligible as deputies are all Roumans aged thirty, possessing a small yearly income. The Prince has a suspensive veto over all laws passed by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The executive is in the hands of the reigning Prince, assisted by a council of five ministers, heads of the departments of the Interior, of Foreign Affairs, of War, of Finance, and of Justice.

Wallachia is divided into eighteen, and Moldavia into thirteen districts, each of which has a prefect or governor, a receiver-general of taxes, and a civil tribunal, consisting of a president and two other judges. Moldavia has a director of police and a town-council in each municipality. Judges are removable at the pleasure of the superior authorities. The legal codes are founded upon the civil law and the customs of the Principalities; but though the system of jurisprudence has been much amended, many reforms remain to be effected, especially in the administration of the laws, which is said to be corrupt. Nearly the whole population belong to the Greek Church, and every village has a small church or chapel, with one or more priests, who act as curates. The ecclesiastics

of this order are chosen from among the people, from whom they are little distinguished in appearance, and whose avocations they follow when not engaged in their clerical functions.

The chief source of revenue is a capitation-tax of thirty piastres, or seven shillings per head on the rural population, with a higher scale for tradesmen and merchants. Direct taxes, the profit from State property, and the tobacco monopoly, produce about one half of the national income. The sources of revenue and branches of expenditure were as follows in the budget estimates for the year 1875:—

SOURCES OF REVENUE.

Direct Taxes— Lei, or Francs.

Personal tax,	10,097,849
Roads,	3,399,416
Licenses,	1,462,435
Licenses for sale of spirits,	7,700,000
Land tax,	6,059,316

Total, 28,719,016

Indirect Taxes—

Customs,	9,980,000
Salt mines,	5,000,000
On spirits,	3,911,000
Judicial fines,	300,000
Tobacco monopoly,	8,010,000
Stamps and registrations,	5,000,000

Total, 32,201,000

National Domains—

Rent from estates,	17,875,132
Forests, fisheries, &c.,	1,200,000

Total, 19,075,132

Miscellaneous—

Post-office,	1,300,000
Telegraphs,	1,200,000
State railways,	1,000,000
Miscellaneous receipts,	4,833,454
Extraordinary,	812,500
Repayment of advances,	1,937,313

Total, 11,083,267

Total estimated revenue in 1875, 91,441,418
£3,657,656

BRANCHES OF EXPENDITURE.

Council of ministers,	44,049
Ministry of interior,	7,749,149
Ministry of foreign affairs,	724,017
Ministry of justice,	3,896,832
Ministry of education and worship,	8,329,929
Ministry of public works, trade, and agriculture,	5,100,356
Ministry of finance, including service of debt,	52,029,544
Supplemental credits,	1,000,000

Total estimated expenditure in 1875, 97,149,552
£3,885,980

According to these estimates, there was a calculated deficit of 5,708,134 lei, or £228,324, in the year 1875. The preliminary budget estimates for 1876 were based upon a revenue of 94,236,884 lei, or £3,769,472, and an expenditure of 101,236,386 lei, or £4,049,452, leaving a deficit of 6,999,502 lei, or £279,980.

The public debt of Roumania amounted, according to an official report of the minister of finance, to 532,250,698 lei, or £21,290,024, on the 1st of December, 1875. The following tabular statement contains the particulars of the debt, after the ministerial report:—

Year of Issue.	Nominal Capital.	Interest.	Amount outstanding on the 1st of December, 1874.
	Lei, or francs.	Per Cent.	Lei, or francs.
1864, . .	22,889,437	7	16,575,000
1864, . .	12,027,285	9	5,956,341
1865, . .	106,616,629	10	55,693,710
1865, . .	10,975,122	7	1,909,192
1866, . .	31,610,500	8	25,127,500
1868, . .	248,130,000	7½	247,492,269
1868, . .	51,750,000	7½	51,666,715
1871, . .	78,000,000	8	70,070,000
1872, . .	3,770,215	8	3,174,650
1872, . .	9,985,320	7¼	9,985,320
1875, . .	44,600,000	5	44,600,000
Total, .	620,354,508		532,250,697

The loan of 1864 was contracted with the Imperial Ottoman Bank and Messrs. Stern Brothers of London, and the loan of 1866 with Messrs. Oppenheim and Co. The loan of 1868 consists of annuities due for the construction of the Bucharest and Giurgevo State Railway to Messrs. Staniforth and Barkley of London; while other liabilities are due for the construction of twenty-three iron bridges contracted for by Messrs. Staniforth and Barkley in 1864, and of bonds issued in London for the balance by Messrs. Devaux and Co., bearing 7 per cent. interest. The loan of 1871 was issued and subscribed for at Bucharest, and is known as the Domeniali, being guaranteed on state property specially assigned to that purpose. An internal loan of 58,500 lei, or £2,340,000, of which 42,500,000 lei, or £1,700,000, for railway construction, was added to the existing debt in March, 1876.

The military forces of Roumania will be fully treated in Chapter XVI., under the head of forces auxiliary to those of Russia.

No detailed census of the population of Wallachia has been published since 1860. The popu-

lation was then stated to be 2,400,921 souls. There is no official return of the population of Moldavia, but in a report of the Bucharest Board of Health dated January 1, 1864, it was stated to be 1,463,927 souls. The following table gives the area of each of the Principalities, after the most trustworthy estimates, and the numbers of the population on the basis of the returns of 1860 and 1864.

	Area: English Square Miles.	Population.
Wallachia,	27,500	2,400,000
Moldavia and New Bessarabian Provinces,	18,142	1,463,927
Total,	45,642	3,864,848

Other estimates of the year 1873, give the numbers of the population at 5,073,000, comprising 2,618,136 males, and 2,454,864 females. The census of 1860 grouped the population into 1,101,000 families, of which 209,000 lived in towns, and 892,000 in rural districts. About four-fifths of the population are employed in agricultural pursuits. The last returns published by the Government show a steady annual decay in the ratio of increase of population. In 1869 the excess of births over deaths was 41,371; it sank to 35,559 in 1870; and to 30,434—145,010 births, and 114,576 deaths—in 1871. The deaths exceeded the births in the year 1866, when the cholera broke out, by 27,500. It is stated in a consular report that the decay of population is owing mainly to “a vegetable diet diluted with strong spirit.” The capital of the Principalities and seat of the Government, Bucharest, had 221,150 inhabitants in 1872

The commercial intercourse between Roumania and the United Kingdom is shown in the sub-joined statement, which gives the value of the exports from Roumania to Great Britain, and of the British imports into Roumania, in the five years 1871 to 1876:—

Years.	Exports from Roumania to Great Britain.	Imports of British Home Produce into Roumania.
1871	£1,151,291	£705,769
1872	1,044,406	814,675
1873	1,024,334	1,079,473
1874	611,745	1,244,871
1875	594,158	1,054,744
1876	1,238,091	707,568

The staple article of Roumanian exports to the United Kingdom is corn, the value of which was £1,212,549, in 1876, comprising £168,558 for wheat; £322,541, for barley; and £721,450, for maize. The British imports into Roumania consist of miscellaneous articles of British manufacture, chief among them cotton goods, of the value of £375,912 in 1876. The commerce and industry of Roumania largely profited by the construction, in recent years, of several lines of railway. In 1869 the first line, 42 English miles in length, was opened from Bucharest to Giurgevo on the Danube—facing Rustchuk and the Turkish railway to Varna—and in subsequent years, to 1876, a network of railways was completed connecting the capital with Western Europe through the towns of Ploesti, Buseo, Brahilov, Tekutch, Roman, and Sutschava, and from thence to Lemberg in Austria. A connection with the Russian lines at Ungheni, on the Pruth, was completed in 1876. The whole of the railways of Roumania are state property.

CHAPTER XI.

Diplomatic Phases of the Eastern Question, 1875-76—Firman of the Porte, 1856—Its promises unfulfilled—Distinction of Classes—Equality before the Law—Corruption and Malversation condemned—Neutrality of the European Powers in a Russo-Turkish War—Difficulty of Self-reformation in the Turkish Administration—Government in Turkey for the Twenty Years, 1856-76—Opinion of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe—Complaint of Russia in 1860—Condition of the Christians in Turkey, 1867—Tithe and Tax Farming—Administration of Justice—Futility of Friendly Intervention—Financial Embarrassment of Turkey in 1871—Turkish Loans—Insurrection in Herzegovina, 1875—English Advice and Non-intervention—Proclamation of Server Pasha—Moral Pressure on the Porte—No Coercion—Diplomacy of Russia—Old Differences with Turkey—Need of Foreign Intervention—Promises of the Porte to Bosnia and Herzegovina not carried out—German Proposals—Guarantees required—The Andrassy Note—Its Five Articles—Adopted by the European Powers—Production of no Practical Result—Demands of the Insurgents—Plan of Pacification proposed by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe—Midhat Pasha the Grand Vizir—His new Constitution announced—Its principal Features—The Berlin Memorandum Signed by the three Imperial Powers, 13th May, 1876—Guarantees again demanded of Turkey—Efficacious measures threatened—Note accepted by France and Italy—Rejected by England, and not presented to the Porte—Spread of the Insurrection—Declaration of War by Servia and Montenegro—Suspicion of a Slave Conspiracy—Differences amongst the Slaves Political and Religious—Roman Catholics not favourable to the Insurrection—Two sides of the Eastern Question—Grievances of the Turks as set forth in Safvet Pasha's Speech—His account of the Benefits offered by the New Constitution—Claims the Sympathy of the Great Powers—Rumours of Atrocities in Bulgaria—Outburst of Moslem fury—Frightful Massacre—Achmet Agha and the Bashi-bazouks—Ontrages in the Valley of Batak—Mohammed Agha—Burning of the Church and Slaughter of the People—Mr. Baring's Report—Mr. Schnyler's Report—Sixty-five villages burnt—Achmet Agha promoted and decorated—Effect in England of the Reports of the Atrocities—Summary Solution of the Eastern Question proposed—Despatch of Lord Derby and demands for reparation—Ottoman Rule denounced by Mr. Gladstone—Earl Russell suggests Alliance with Russia—Opinions of Mr. Lowe, Mr. Freeman, and of Mr. Carlyle adverse to Turkish domination—Dream of Mr. Grant Duff—Further suggestions of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe—Turkish proposals—Russian Plan of Occupation with Austria—Lord Derby's proposals and the Conference at Constantinople—Negotiations—Russian Ultimatum in November, 1876—Armistice granted to Servia—Speech of the Czar at Moscow—Further Declaration of the Czar—Preliminary Conference of the Six Powers—Russia's Determination to Act Alone if necessary—Meeting of the Conference—Marquis of Salisbury—Promulgation of the New Ottoman Constitution—Ten Meetings of the Conference—Rejection by the Porte of all Proposals of Reform—Departure of the Plenipotentiaries from Constantinople—Preparations for War in Russia and Turkey—Uneasiness in Europe—Prince Gortschakoff's Note—Mission of General Ignatieff to various Courts—He proposes Federal Execution—Protocol—Reservation of the English Government—Rejection of the Protocol by Turkey.

RIGHTLY to understand the great change that has taken place in the main current of English opinion with respect to Turkey since the conclusion of the Crimean War, it will be necessary to recapitulate with some detail the diplomatic phases through which the Eastern Question passed in 1875 and 1876.

The sentences quoted below are taken from the Firman, or Imperial Proclamation, issued by the Porte in 1856; and the several charges urged against the Porte since that time may all be reduced to this one general charge—That the promises contained in that important document, and especially those contained in the sentences here appended, have not been carried into execution.

1. "Every distinction or designation tending to make any class whatever of the subjects of my Empire inferior to another class, on account of their religion, language, or race, shall be for ever effaced from the Administrative Protocol."

2. "All commercial, correctional, and criminal suits between Mussulmans and non-Mussulmans shall be referred to mixed tribunals. The testi-

mony of witnesses shall be received without distinction upon an oath taken according to the religious law of each sect. Corporal punishment shall not be administered, even in the prisons, except in conformity with the disciplinary regulations established by my Sublime Porte, and everything that resembles torture shall be utterly abolished. The organization of the police shall be revised in such a manner as to give to all the peaceable subjects of my Empire the strongest guarantees for the safety both of their persons and property."

3. "The laws against corruption, extortion, or malversation shall apply according to the legal forms to all the subjects of my Empire, whatever be their class and the nature of their duties. Lastly, all the orders contained in the Firman are to be henceforth carried out with the most rigorous punctuality."

These promises, and others like them in their common tendency, were given by the Porte as articles belonging to the Treaty of Peace signed in 1856, and as pledges that all things possible

would be done on the part of Turkey to prevent another outbreak of war on the Eastern Question. The blood and treasure expended by England and France in the Crimean War were not, it was said, lavished in vain if they obtained for the whole population, and especially for the Christian people of the Ottoman Empire, such reforms as were promised in the Firman of 1856. But since that time a great alteration in public opinion respecting Turkey has taken place, as may be shown clearly enough by one momentous fact of the present time. When Russia and Turkey are involved in warfare, England and France, as well as Germany and Austria, are found holding a neutral position. Leaving unnoticed other causes assigned for the change that has taken place, one must be described as the chief source of all the arguments against Turkey that have been employed in the diplomacy of 1875-76. This source is a distrust in the promises made by the ministers of the Porte; and the distrust now prevalent arises, it is said, out of the facts of the twenty-one years extending from 1856 to 1877. It is declared, in the first place, that the reforms promised in the Firman have not been carried into execution; and, secondly, that the Porte is incapable of self-reformation.

This general conclusion is so comprehensive, and so important in its obvious results, that it should not be given without references to the evidence on which it is founded. That evidence, to be sufficient, must show that the *facts* of government in Turkey during the last twenty years have mostly contradicted all the *promises* made in the Firman of 1856; in other words, that the failure foreboded long ago by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe has actually occurred. That ambassador, so well acquainted with the political affairs of the Porte, expressed as early as in 1858 his fears, that the document then viewed as a sort of *Magna Charta* (the Firman of 1856) might at last have no value greater than so many words; that it might prove itself to be nothing better than a reformation "on paper." He talked about it with the Sultan himself, whose manner on that occasion was "reserved." The ambassador argued that, in accordance with the terms of the treaty, the maintenance by England of the independence of Turkey must depend on the performance by the Sultan's ministers of all the promises solemnly made in their Firman. Years passed away, and there were the promises still preserved in the document, but the reforms there named

were not taking place in the Empire. In 1860 Russia addressed to the Government of Queen Victoria a complaint to the effect that, in utter contempt of the promises made in 1856, the treatment of the Christian inhabitants of Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Herzegovina was still "Turkish;" or in other words was just what it had been in the time preceding the Crimean War. When this complaint came to London, it was immediately recommended that Sir Henry Bulwer, the British ambassador at the Porte, should make inquiries respecting the alleged causes of dissatisfaction. A general report was returned, of which the purport is indicated in these words:—The affairs that had been referred to were "not in a much worse state than under the circumstances might be expected." With this summary appended by the ambassador, there were sent home various special reports supplied by consular agents in Turkey. A later series of reports was presented to Parliament in 1867, and they supply evidence for the facts here briefly noticed.

It is reported, as to the Turkish system of levying taxes on agricultural produce, that the rights of taxation are not immediately enforced by the servants of the State, but are sold to certain men called "tithe-farmers." These sub-sell their rights distributed in smaller portions, and thus profits are so divided, that to make them satisfactory to all the buyers the taxes must be made oppressive. After all, the State gets only a moiety of the gross proceeds. For the productive class the effects are often calamitous. The "tithe-farmers" exact the uttermost farthing of their demand; sometimes standing crops are damaged or entirely wasted while, in obedience to a farmer's orders, they are left on the ground until he comes to tax them; when the grain is ready for sale, and delay may lower its price, the villager must not move it before the "tithe-farmer" comes to tax it; by means of such delay and by other means, the villager is often compelled for want of funds to borrow money at the rate of 120 per cent. With regard to the administration of justice the consuls report that Turkish policemen stationed in Christian villages usually act as petty despots; that Christians, arrested but not convicted, are often treated with brutality; that persons falsely charged with offences and left long without a trial are, like trivial offenders and debtors, imprisoned together with felons of the vilest class; that in both civil and criminal cases, the evidence borne

by Christians is as a rule disregarded, where the two parties concerned are a Mussulman on one side and a Christian on the other; that a rayah, or Christian peasant, is hardly ever successful in any law-suit; that for obtaining evidence bribery is the recognized means of success, and that Christians who have on their side plenty of good evidence are compelled to pay bribes to Turks in order to escape punishment; that in some districts years have passed away during which hardly one grave offence has been recorded against a Mussulman; that in many cases where murders have been on very probable grounds ascribed to certain Turks, no legal inquiries have followed; that in many so-called courts of justice judgments and acquittals have been sold almost as openly as ordinary wares. The general effect of the reports returned from many districts has a character of the highest importance, as regards the issue of war and the establishment of permanent peace in Europe. We proceed, therefore, to recall with some details the diplomatic transactions of the time 1875-76, and notice the failure of the Conference held near the close of 1876 and in the beginning of 1877.

In England accounts of disturbances in Turkish provinces were in 1871 associated with certain painful facts then made known respecting the financial position of Turkey. Up to 1871 the Turkish Government had borrowed, during the previous eighteen years, hardly less than £100,000,000 sterling, and in the course of the three years following, £80,000,000 more. These financial facts preceded the news of the insurrections in Herzegovina that followed in the midsummer of 1875. Her Majesty's Government then thought it better that the Porte should deal with the insurgents without foreign intervention of any kind; but in accordance with the request of the Porte, and acting in concert with other Powers, they sent an English consul, as already related, to the scene of insurrection, to inform the insurgents that they must not expect to receive from England any support of their movement, and that they would do well to desist from hostilities, and make known their complaints to a Turkish commissioner. It was in no way implied that the discontent of the insurgents had not sufficient reasons. The mission in which the consul was then employed served to show that the policy of England, as regards Turkey, would henceforth be literally "a policy of non-intervention." It was

virtually then declared by her Majesty's Government that—excepting war in defence of her own rights—England would fight neither for nor against the Turks, and consequently any threats of coercion made on her part would be insincere, and unworthy of her own character.

From the general tenor of all the diplomatic correspondence transmitted to London in 1875, it appeared that on two points the Powers were agreed: their general desire was to prevent the spread of the insurrection, while they saw clearly that, unless the reforms demanded were conceded, the Eastern Question would again be mooted, and Europe might soon be involved in warfare. The Porte was therefore urged again and again to grant to the insurgents a semi-independent administration, like that which had been granted already to Crete; but this advice was rejected. Instead of granting any well-timed and real concession, Server Pasha, as the ruler of Herzegovina, issued in September a proclamation containing nothing more than such "promises" as had been made long ago—officials "found guilty" of extortion and oppression were to be dismissed; reformed courts of justice were "soon" to be instituted, and "men unjustly banished" should be allowed to return to their homes. These verbal remedies for real grievances did not satisfy the insurgents. They had already been deceived by "promises" almost literally like those of the proclamation, and therefore they demanded "guarantees" of the Porte's good faith in carrying into execution the reforms that so long had consisted of nothing better than written words. In the diplomatic correspondence that followed the word "guarantee" was often made prominent, and requests essentially like the demands of the insurgents were afterwards urged on the attention of the Porte by all the Powers, whose general aim was to prevent the spread of the insurrection and the outbreak of war in Europe; but her Majesty's Government still resolutely abstained from everything that might look like a threat of coercion. It was again and again declared that England would fight neither to support nor to destroy the Government of Turkey; and that the Porte, in rejecting the advice of the Powers, and in persisting in the use of its own plans of suppressing insurrections, must expect to find itself left isolated among the Powers of Europe, and must never expect to receive any military assistance from

England. To make clear these declarations was the general aim of English diplomacy in 1875. The diplomacy of Russia was of another and more aggressive kind.

The differences of opinion prevalent, respectively, in Turkey and Russia were essentially the same that had existed as far back at least as 1828. On the side of Turkey it was urged that disturbances among the Porte's subjects were excited by the emissaries of the Czar, and were not lamented, but rather were hailed as occasions for urging such demands of foreign intervention as must lead to the dissolution of the Turkish Empire. On the side of Russia it was asserted again, as in 1828 and in 1853, that Turkish oppression was the cause of the whole series of insurrections by which the provinces governed by the Porte were so often disturbed, while the general peace of Europe was endangered; and it was as firmly declared that the difficulties of the Eastern Question could not be overcome without foreign intervention in the political affairs of Turkey. It was confidently assumed, as an axiom always to be taken for granted, that for the Porte every thing like self-reformation was a thing impossible; in other words, its Government must be reformed by foreign intervention, or must cease to exist as a political institution recognized as holding a place among the Powers of Europe. These were the declarations made by Russia long ago and again in 1875, when a Russian journal, regarded as partly official, proposed that Bosnia, though still left nominally subject to the Sultan, should in reality be made subject to a "Governor-general," who must be a "Christian," and for a time at least must be protected by Austria or by Russia; perhaps by both.

Meanwhile, after rejecting both foreign advice and intervention, what was the Turkish Government doing in the latter part of the year (1875) to strengthen its own authority, and to pacify the discontented among its subjects? The reply must be, hardly anything that deserves to be noticed in detail. In October it was "promised" that the taxation of the peasantry in Herzegovina should be made less oppressive and ruinous. More was promised near the close of the year. Bosnia and Herzegovina were to form two provinces, each having a Governor-general and a Sub-governor; the former might be and the latter would, in fact, be a Christian. In the election of members for

their Parliament, Mussulmans and Christians were to have votes proportionate to their respective numbers; but the Acts of their Parliament could not become law until they were confirmed by the supreme authority of the Porte. This last provision made null and void (as the insurgents declared) all the reforms apparently granted, though they included such as the following:—land to be sold at low prices by the Government; the whole system of "tithe-farming" to be abolished; a general amnesty to be granted to the insurgents; and, in a word, all the chief reforms promised in the Firman of 1856. In reality, all these provisions amounted to nothing more than a renewal of the pledges already given; for no real transfer of power or authority was made. Something better than this plan of unreal reforms must be granted, in order to restore to the Christian subjects of the Porte a general confidence that her Government would act sincerely and in earnest in carrying into effect the reformatory measures that had so long been demanded. The convictions expressed by the Christian subjects of Turkey in Bosnia and Herzegovina were not left unsupported by the public opinion of Europe. In Germany it was proposed, by some eminent writers on history and politics, that the two classes of the people in Bosnia—the dominant Mussulmans on one side, and the discontented Christians on the other—should be locally separated from each other, the former being stationed in the cities and fortresses, the latter remaining, as an agricultural people, in their villages.

Among other measures of pacification those recommended by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe claim especial notice, as the suggestions of a diplomatist thoroughly well acquainted with the difficulties of the Eastern Question. In his opinion some pressure must be exercised by foreign Powers in order to carry into effect such reforms as were urgently required by the disturbed provinces. He admitted that a Government submitting itself to that form of intervention might be fairly described as reduced to a state of "tutelage," and added, that in Turkey such a state of tutelage had already been admitted as a necessary result of circumstances. Considerations of the same nature were occupying the minds of diplomatists in Austria, Germany, and Russia, and were at last expressed in the scheme for a solution of the Eastern Question which they in concert accepted. This scheme is contained in

the noticeable document commonly known as the Andrassy Note, which was accepted by her Majesty's Government.

This Note (dated December 30, 1875) proposed that a joint representation of the Powers should urge on the Porte a plan of reform including the following five articles :—(1) That full religious liberty should be granted to all Christian subjects, and that their testimony should be accepted in all Courts of Justice ; (2) That the system of " tithe-farming " should be abolished ; (3) That the taxes levied in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be henceforth applied to the immediate uses of the province ; (4) That these and other reforms should be carried into effect under the control of a Commission, including equal numbers of Mussulmans and Christians ; (5) That measures should be taken to improve the condition of the Christian peasantry, and to enable them to make themselves owners of the land they cultivated. Her Majesty's Government expressed a doubt as regards the practical value of the Note ; but they commended the general tendency of the measures there defined, and accordingly their adhesion to its plan was announced in a despatch dated January 25, 1876. When the Note was presented, the Porte yielded verbally almost everything that was required, but the practical result was merely that which had been too well foreseen. As no real guarantee was demanded, none was given.

The insurgents, as discontented as ever, acted now without asking for foreign intervention, and addressed to the Porte a series of demands, in substance equivalent to these :—Turkish troops should be withdrawn from the disturbed districts, and should be stationed in garrison towns ; materials should be supplied for rebuilding the churches, schools, and houses lately destroyed ; funds should be supplied in aid of destitute families, and for the next three years no taxes should be levied in the districts where distress prevailed ; the execution of these measures of relief should be intrusted to a Commission independent of the Turkish Government ; and finally, all Christians should be allowed to carry arms. It is hardly necessary to add that these demands were not granted by the Porte.

Not long afterwards, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe brought forward his own plan of pacification, of which the leading measures were defined in his letter dated May 18, 1876. These included a

demand for the equality of all classes in Courts of Law ; a reformation of the fiscal administration ; admission to the army to be granted to all classes, with exemption on payment of a war tax ; an equal representation of Mussulmans and Christians in all Councils of State ; a formal recognition of religious freedom ; exemption from all penalties imposed by laws made after the commission of the offences to which they applied ; lastly, the institution of a Board of Trade, composed partly of the Sultan's subjects, and partly of foreigners. In this last article it was stipulated that the measures to be carried into operation by the Board should be submitted to the consideration of the Great Powers, who would thus obtain a formal right of intervention. An Empire requiring such aids as were here provided might well be described as one existing in " a state of tutelage." It was soon made evident that the Ministers of the Porte would not submit to such tuition as it was said they required.

Midhat Pasha, the Grand Vizir, was at this very time quietly persisting in his own way of showing that the Porte, though willing to pay some attention to the suggestions of the great Powers, did not intend to be guided by them, but meant rather to attempt such reforms as might be concerted and carried into effect without the aid of any foreign intervention. He had already prepared for Turkey a New Constitution, a fact which was announced with considerable pomp about the middle of June. Of this New Constitution some of the more prominent articles were the following :—Each of the provinces should send four deputies to a National Assembly holding its sessions in Constantinople ; that Parliament should control the finances, vote the budget, insure justice to all, revise existing laws, and put forth new edicts ; and to that Parliament the Ministers of the Porte were to be made responsible. The Powers did not spend much time in studying the details of the scheme, apparently because no word was there said of any real " guarantee " for its execution. Their attention had already been invited to another plan, which contained distinct references to a " guarantee."

On the 11th of May the Czar had arrived in Berlin, in order to act in concert with the rulers of Germany and Austria in preparing some efficient measures for the pacification of the Turkish provinces. Accordingly the document known as

the Berlin Memorandum was framed by the Chancellors of Russia, Germany, and Austria; and on the 13th of the same month it was communicated to the representatives at Berlin of England, France, and Italy. The following are the most noticeable points in the Memorandum:—It was observed, in the first place, that as the Sultan had given to the Powers a pledge to execute mainly the reforms required by the Andrassy Note, he had thereby given them a moral right to insist that his promises should be faithfully observed. Christians could not, without some real guarantees, repose faith in the promises made by Turks. The guarantees now required must be of a nature to insure beyond doubt the loyal and full execution of all the measures agreed on between the Powers and the Porte. The Imperial Courts would demand, first of all, a suspension of hostilities for two months. As a basis for discussion, they would then propose that the Porte should restore in the disturbed districts the churches, schools, and houses that its troops had destroyed, and that these troops should be concentrated until the existing excitement should pass away. It was also proposed that meanwhile Christians, as well as Mussulmans, should be allowed to keep their arms, and that the consuls or other delegates of the Powers should have a supervision of the reforms to be carried into execution. Assuming that the armistice required might fail to bring peace, the three Imperial Courts were of opinion that it would then be necessary “to supplement their diplomatic action by the sanction of an agreement, with a view to such efficacious measures as might appear to be demanded in the interest of general peace, to check the evil and prevent its development.” Such was the tenor of the Berlin Memorandum, to which in the same month the French and Italian Governments notified their adhesion. On the 19th Lord Derby, addressing the British ambassador at Berlin, made a declaration to the effect that her Majesty’s Government could not promise their co-operation in the policy recommended by the three Powers. For this conclusion several reasons were suggested, but the chief was evidently suggested by the concluding intimation of the Berlin Memorandum. It had been resolved that England would not sanction a policy of coercion. Consequently her Government could not notify their adhesion to a scheme, of which

one part—the reference to “efficacious measures”—was something like a distinct threat of coercion. Prince Gortschakoff soon afterwards wrote, saying that he deeply regretted the resolution taken by the London Cabinet. He wished, at the same time, to express the desire felt by the Czar, to see England maintaining a place befitting her character, and acting in concert with the other great Powers. The Berlin Memorandum was never presented to the Porte. Soon after their refusal of adhesion, her Majesty’s Government advised the Porte not to resist any advice or proposals that might be regarded as practicable and advantageous for the promotion of peace.

In the meantime insurrection had rapidly spread itself in the Turkish provinces, and at the beginning of July the Prince of Servia issued a proclamation of war against Turkey. The conflict of opinions respecting his motives, and those of other parties engaged in the warfare that followed, must be impartially noticed by every student who wishes to understand the complication of interests involved in the Eastern Question.

It is already known that Servia was once a powerful State, and then included under its sway both Montenegro and the province of Bosnia, of which one division was called Herzegovina. Soon after the terms of the Andrassy Note had been accepted by England, and while a suspension of hostilities was recommended to the Porte, the chieftains of Montenegro, who were acting in concert with the Bosnian insurgents, were urgently advised to desist from warfare for a time; but the advice then offered by the agents of the British Government was not practically accepted, nor was neutrality long observed when it was supposed to be recommended even by the Czar himself, who had already advised the Porte to desist from warfare against Montenegro. On the day immediately following Prince Milan’s declaration of war (the 1st of July), the Prince Nikita of Montenegro also issued a manifesto of war against the Porte, and it was confidently expected that both these Princes would be vigorously supported by the insurgent chieftains of Bosnia. Soon afterwards certain circumstances occurred, which were made known in Turkey, and led even the more intelligent people among the Turks to believe in the existence of a wide-spread Slave conspiracy for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. It was, indeed, expected that, unless

vigorous measures were soon employed to prevent it, a general "scramble for Turkish provinces" would soon take place. At the same time it was believed that at Ragusa, in Dalmatia, the Russian consulate was made the head-quarters or chief meeting-place of the Slave insurgents and their friends. These were all circumstances that naturally made the duties of diplomatists engaged in recommending to the Porte a cessation of hostilities very difficult, and it was not seldom suggested that their well-intended endeavours might be as reasonably employed in other directions. Excepting, however, their common hostility against the Porte, the Slave populations of the districts already named did not seem to have any firm bond of union, or any general plan of government that should follow the overthrow of the Turks. Prince Milan, indeed, was apparently desirous of restoring to Servia something like the extent of territory possessed by that State in former times. At the same time it was understood that he would oppose his forces to an Austrian occupation of Bosnia, and would strongly object to the cession of any parts of that province to the Principality of Montenegro. It was also asserted that he would not allow any concession of "autonomy" to be made in favour of Bosnia, though it might be placed under a Christian governor.

Accordingly, though some of the great Powers were inspired with a sincere wish to put an end to hostilities as soon as possible, there were still left great difficulties to be overcome before the Eastern Question could find a peaceful solution. The interests involved were complicated. Christians of the Greek Church on one side, and the defenders of Islam on the other; these were apparently, at first sight, the two chief parties immediately interested in the solution. But the contention, as it developed itself in the course of the year 1876, assumed more and more clearly the aspect of a warfare between two races—the Slaves and the Turks. Of the former, those belonging to the Greek Church form in Servia and Bosnia a very large majority; but one not so great that the two names, Slave and Greek Christian, can be correctly understood as synonymous. The war of Servia against the Porte was opposed by great numbers of Greek Christians, while it was, almost without an exception, condemned by every Roman Catholic in Bosnia.

The Christian subjects of the Porte do not form

a homogeneous class. In Bosnia alone a considerable number of those called Christians—about one-seventh of the whole population—are Roman Catholics, and few of them agree in their political sympathies with their neighbours of the Greek Church. On the contrary, it is said that they would rather be governed by the Turks than by the Slaves, whose religion they regard as one founded on a merely secular authority. There are about 60,000 Roman Catholics living in the neighbourhood of Mostar in Herzegovina; but of this number there were hardly *ten* who at any time acted in concert with the insurgents of that district. Among the more educated priests of the Roman Catholics in Bosnia, there are many who recommend to their flocks a prudent submission to the existing authorities, and who are bold enough to express their opinion, that the Turks are on the whole a people more civilized and more tolerant than the Slaves. The Christians of Bulgaria included in 1859 many who then expressed a desire for union with the Roman Catholic Church, and the Pope would most probably have received them, if political means had not frustrated his design. These, and many facts of the same kind, all serve to show that peace in the Turkish provinces peopled mainly by Slaves, would not be the sure result of any hasty or one-sided attempt to solve the Eastern Question. Granted an entire liberation of all the Slaves, there would still remain some serious matters of controversy; and the task of building up a great Slave State, to take the place of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, might be found more difficult than the process of a gradual dissolution or the work of a sudden destruction. On each side of the dispute there are weighty matters for consideration, and it is most important that a fair hearing should be given to both parties in the controversy. It should be understood that the arguments urged on one side do not wholly contradict those on the other side. It is not an axiom that of two contending parties one must have a monopoly of truth and justice on its side. The Turkish allegation that the Porte is attacked by a conspiracy supported by foreign intervention does not disprove the assertions made on the other side respecting the want of good government in Turkey.

Of all the chief complaints urged against Turkey a summary has already been given. It is just, therefore, that the case as stated on the side

of Turkey should also receive a fair amount of attention, before we turn to notice the disastrous events that aroused against the Turks, and especially against their military system, great indignation. The previous provocations endured by the agents of the Porte are described in the well-known speech of Safvet Pasha, Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Ottoman Empire. For all the assertions of that speech he alone is responsible, but it is probably an expression of the opinions maintained by other ministers and political agents of the Porte. It embodies the general sentiments expressed on the side of Turkey at the Conference where the representatives of all the great Powers of Europe were assembled.

"When some months ago disorders broke out in a district of Herzegovina, bordering on Montenegro, these disorders were provoked by a certain number of persons who, after having been settled some time in Montenegro, were authorized to return to their homes at the solicitation of Prince Nicholas. As soon as they had received information, the Imperial Government hastened to send to the spot a Commission of Inquiry, charged with examining into the grievances which might have been alleged to justify, or at least explain this rising. Our Commissioners were fired upon; all their propositions were rejected without inquiry, and the local authorities found themselves in a short time in face of an armed resistance, for which they were in no way prepared. At this moment prompt military action would have soon got the better of the few factious bands who were endeavouring to disturb the tranquillity of this province. Nevertheless, moderate counsels prevailed; notwithstanding the repeated advice which came from different quarters, the Government would not make immediate use of the superiority of their forces against their misguided subjects. Instead of chastising them, it endeavoured to calm them, and we still like to think that its efforts would not have remained fruitless, had there not appeared other symptoms of a formidable conspiracy which, as facts have since proved, made Herzegovina the starting point of a more general action against the peace and tranquillity of the Empire.

"Under the influence of emissaries paid by insurrectionary committees, the moderation of the Government appeared in the eyes of these ignorant and credulous people to be a proof of weakness. The interest to which the steps taken by the

Powers testified in favour of prompt measures of peace, was interpreted by them as an indirect encouragement; and the two neighbouring Principalities having given to the insurrection a support both moral and material, adventurers from all countries at once began to bear down on these unhappy districts. Acts of unheard-of barbarity were inflicted in one way or another by these strangers on the misguided populations, with the perfidiously calculated object of giving to the conflict the character of a strife of nationality and religion; and when the Government, frustrated in its benevolent intentions, had recourse at last to arms, the movement had already assumed the proportions of a formidable insurrection, which being directed by strangers supported by resources from abroad, and taking for its base of operations the territory of Servia and Montenegro, dared to oppose the military forces which had been sent.

"Beaten in every encounter, the insurgents retreated behind the boundary of the two Principalities; and the bands driven back on one point of Servia or Montenegro reappeared some days afterwards at another point, to fall on the neighbouring districts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, bringing with them each time large numbers of Servians and Dalmatians. In the midst of this disorder the Government raised its voice more than once, in order to bring back its misguided subjects, in order to turn their attention afresh towards useful reforms; but in vain. Efforts were made to impugn the sincerity of its word; and there is no artifice which the instruments of the conspiracy did not employ to prevail upon the insurgents to persevere in civil war. The strife continuing under these conditions, the Government of Austria-Hungary took the initiative in the proposition of certain reforms applicable to the insurgent provinces. These propositions were not of a nature to meet in principle with the opposition of the Porte. Nevertheless, the Government hesitated to receive them in the form which had been given them. For it was possible that the system of concession applied to revolted subjects might defeat the proposed object, and that, far from disarming the rebellion, it might lend to it new strength and ardour. Notwithstanding these observations, the Sublime Porte adhered to the propositions of Count Andrassy, which were sanctioned by Imperial authority, and thus became a law of the State.

"It is well known how this attempt at peace failed, as had been feared; this failure was followed by a reappearance of audacity on the part of the insurgents, and of a redoubled activity of the revolutionary party. The internal circumstances of the Empire increased the difficulties of the situation, and the conspirators thought that the moment had come for extending the circle of the insurrection to other provinces of the Empire. The disturbances beginning in Bulgarian villages were the first attempts of this new plan of action. These were, however, promptly put down, and the Government thought itself justified in counting upon the fidelity of its Bulgarian population, when, towards the end of March, the Bulgarian insurrection broke out suddenly with great violence in a country as quiet as it was prosperous, and whose inhabitants, both Mussulmans and Christians, living side by side, had never before undertaken anything against the authority of the Sultan. The documents which have fallen into the hands of the authorities show that the insurrection was organized at a distance. The Bulgarian population had been the object of a special solicitude, to such an extent that some went as far as to accuse the Porte of partiality in favour of its Bulgarian subjects.

"At the time of which I am speaking Insurrectionary Committees had sent to the Christian villages emissaries inviting them to the massacre of the Mussulmans. A certain number of Bulgarians, blinded by deceitful promises, and by fallacious visions of immediate help from abroad, allowed themselves to be dragged into a revolt, and signalized themselves in the first instance by a massacre of the Mussulmans, by pillaging their goods, and by setting fire to their habitations. The danger was great. The Bulgarian districts which were in insurrection were completely denuded of regular troops. The prolongation of the insurrection in Herzegovina, and difficulties of all sorts, had paralyzed the administration. The Government deplored this revolt and its consequences, and strove, as soon as it was able, to heal the wounds of civil war, and to accomplish the work of reparation. While the Porte was finishing the pacification of the country, a new programme of reforms applicable to the insurgent provinces was proposed, and was submitted to the examination of the Powers. But Serbia and Montenegro thought proper to persist in their open hostility. It is clear that all the events

which have succeeded one another, during a period of more than ten months, had their origin in the one idea. In short, the peace of the Empire has been disturbed by a cause absolutely foreign to the interests of the Christian populations, in whose name all these acts have taken place.

"When the Servians, conquered on the field of battle—in spite of the assistance of every kind which came to them from without—were reduced to ask for the mediation of the Powers to obtain peace, the Government did not hesitate to grant the suspensions of hostilities asked of her. Quite lately the Servians, by breaking a truce granted by the Government, have necessitated on her part a more vigorous military action.

"While the Porte was fighting in defence of its rights, and for the re-establishment of authority, other works not less important were being accomplished in the Empire. The principles of a political and administrative re-organization were proclaimed. In conformity with these principles new institutions, embracing the whole body of society from top to bottom, have been in preparation in the councils of the Porte. This work, now completed, considered as a New Constitution, secures civil and political equality between all Ottomans, without distinction of race or religion, and grants the participation of the country in the management of its own affairs. The work will develop itself, and in virtue of its own power, and to some extent independently of the Government itself. It is the best guarantee that the Porte can give for the execution of its own programme of reforms; for it is the country itself which is constituted guardian of its own institutions. The principle of equality which forms the principal feature of the New Constitution is not to be applied only to all the members of the great Ottoman family, but also to every one of those parts of which the Ottoman Empire is composed, whatever may be its geographical situation or its ethnological character. All are to have a common lot, to enjoy the same advantages, to be subject to the same authority, and to submit to the same laws.

"It is under these circumstances that the Government, presenting, on the one hand, a faithful statement of the events which have troubled the Empire, and, on the other, the New Constitution, comes to take her place in the councils of Europe. If in the midst of difficulties, perhaps unexampled in history, the Government had allowed the prin-

ciple of authority to be endangered; if it had flinched from the attacks of which it has been the mark; and if the revolt had triumphed—it is not difficult to see that the gravest complications must have arisen. In giving incontestable proofs of vitality, in rendering a marked service to the general cause of order, and, in consequence, to that of true progress as well, the Ottoman Government believes it has acquired new claims to the sympathetic interest of the great Powers.

“Turkey now undertakes to consolidate by a series of new institutions, conceived in a spirit both liberal and practical, the order which she has been able to maintain. She is conscious of being able to bring to a good result this second portion of the important task which devolves on her; and in reviewing the period which has elapsed since the Treaty of Paris, as also the recent events already noticed, she sees nothing which can prevent her from reckoning on the profound confidence of the great Powers friendly to her, of whom I have the honour to recognize in you, Messieurs, the authorized representatives.”

Enough has been said on both sides to show the great difficulties naturally attending the Eastern Question, even while it was calmly considered. These difficulties were made far greater by the indignation aroused throughout Europe by reports widely spread, in the summer of 1876, respecting the atrocities then committed by Turkish troops in Bulgaria. The accounts given by various reporters seemed incredible when they were first received in England, and respecting some facts several conflicting statements were made; but after a careful examination, the facts that still remained well established were more than enough to excite the intense horror of all civilized nations. Of these facts the following, with others, may be found recorded in the “Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Turkey (in 1876),” presented to both Houses of Parliament in 1877.

In May a panic was spread in Bulgaria. The fear at first excited by an insurrectionary movement that was easily suppressed, was followed by an outburst of fury on the side of the Mussulmans. It was believed, or at least was commonly reported among them, that a wide-spread revolution was beginning among the Christians of Bulgaria, that they were supported by foreign agitators, and that their aim was to overthrow the Turkish Government. The first acts of the insurgents served, in

one district, to confirm to some extent the general report spread against them; but as soon as they were attacked they made a very feeble resistance, and the Turks gained a rapid and easy victory. The fury of the latter was then turned against the inhabitants of several districts, and a series of summary executions followed, of which the victims were counted by thousands, including unarmed men, women, and children. The chief responsibility for these rests upon absence of regular troops in the disturbed districts, and the call to arms of a fanatical people, including the infamous Bashi-bazouks, commanded by Achmet Agha. It must have been well understood that no limits could be set to the horrors that might follow the employment of such troops. Their atrocities have left the darkest of all blots on the history of Turkey in the present century, and have excited throughout Europe feelings of indignation, such as have made men almost forget the carnage of previous ruthless wars and suppressions of revolt. On the other hand, the equally savage peasantry spared no opportunity of wreaking a fearful vengeance on defenceless Moslems.

It was from Tatar-Bazardjik, a stronghold of fanaticism, that Achmet Agha led on his band of Bashi-bazouks against the village of Batak, a thriving place of industry and agriculture. Its resources were partly supplied by several saw mills for carrying on a trade in planks, and partly by the pasturage afforded in the valley for oxen, sheep, and goats. The village, almost a day's journey on foot from Bazardjik, lies on the south of the Balkan range, and is hidden by surrounding hills; so that it may be admitted that when the Turkish authorities of the province sent in their “official report” of the insurrection and its suppression, they were not well informed respecting the fearful tragedy of Batak. On his way to the village Achmet Agha joined with his own the forces led by Mohammed Agha, and they went on together to their work of devastation. Achmet Agha summoned the inhabitants to give up their arms. Some delay and a parley followed; but when a promise of safety was given by that individual, all the arms of the villagers were surrendered to the Bashi-bazouks, who immediately “set upon the people and slaughtered them like sheep.” About 1000 of the villagers rushed to find shelter within their church, a solid building, which for some time resisted the attempts

made to burn it from the outside. The assailants then mounted the roof, tore off the tiles, and threw down on their victims lighted rags and pieces of wood dipped in petroleum. At last the door was forced in, the massacre was completed, and the inside of the church was burnt." Hardly any escaped. "The only survivor I could find," says Mr. Baring, "was one old woman, who alone remained out of a family of seven. The spectacle which the church and churchyard presented must be seen to be described. Hardly a corpse has been buried; where a man fell, there he lies; and it is with difficulty that one picks one's way to the door of the church, the entrance of which is barred by a ghastly corpse stretched across the threshold. In the streets at every step lay human remains, rotting and sweltering in the summer sun—here a skull of an old woman, with the gray hair still attached to it; there the false tress of some unhappy girl, slashed in half by a yataghan, the head which it had adorned having been probably carried off to be devoured by some of the dogs, who up to this have been the only scavengers. Just outside the village I counted more than sixty skulls in a little hollow, and it was evident from their appearance that nearly all of them had been severed from the bodies by axes and yataghans. From the remains of female wearing apparel scattered about, it is plain that many of the persons here massacred were women. Enough, I think, has been said to show that to Achmet Agha and his men belongs the distinction of having committed perhaps the most heinous crime that has stained the history of the present century; Nana Sahib alone, I should say, having rivalled their deeds. As regards the numbers of killed, I have before stated that about 5000 is my estimate. I am, however, willing to believe that the Turkish authorities were not aware, before I visited Batak, of the horrors that had been committed there. Had they really known that the place was a mass of putrefying corpses, would they not have taken some measures to clear them away before I reached the scene? The surviving inhabitants live in wooden huts constructed outside the village, and are in great misery; they are stunned by this disaster, and do not even try to bury their dead. Some of the women I saw sitting on the ruins of their houses singing the most melancholy sort of dirge; others wandered about the churchyard among the

corpses, while a few, who seemed more than half bereft of reason, rushed about tearing their hair, beating their brows, and uttering piercing shrieks."

When the writer of the report here quoted visited the ruins of Batak, he found there, still living in the village, only 250 persons; but he was informed that about 1000 or rather more had escaped death and had wandered away to various places. Altogether there were reasons for believing that out of a population of 6500, including women and children, about 1500 remained alive. Consequently, 5000 victims perished in the massacre perpetrated in obedience to the orders given by Achmet Agha and Mohammed Agha. The punishment of these inhuman individuals remains to be noticed in another place. To the account given above may be added the following summary of the report made by Mr. Schuyler, which is to be found in the "Correspondence" already referred to:—

"The insurgent villages made little or no resistance. In many cases they surrendered their arms on the first demand. Nearly all the villages which were attacked by the Bashi-bazouks were burnt and pillaged, as were also all those which had been abandoned by the terrified inhabitants. The inhabitants of some villages were massacred after exhibitions of the most ferocious cruelty. The number of villages which were burnt in whole or in part in the districts of Philippopolis and Tatar Bazardjik is at least sixty-five. Achmet Agha, who commanded at this massacre, has been decorated and promoted. These atrocities were clearly unnecessary for the suppression of the insurrection, for it was an insignificant rebellion at the best, and the villagers generally surrendered at the first summons; nor can they be justified by the state of panic, which was over before the troops set out on the campaign. At Batak the Turks seemed to have no stronger passion than the thirst for blood. This village surrendered, without firing a shot, to the Bashi-bazouks under the command of Achmet Agha, a chief of the rural police. Despite his promise, the few arms once surrendered, Achmet Agha ordered the destruction of the village and the indiscriminate slaughter of the inhabitants. I saw their bones, some with the flesh still clinging to them, in a hollow on the hill side, where the dogs were gnawing them. Not a house is now standing in the midst of this lovely valley; the saw-mills (for the town had a large trade in timber

and sawn boards) which lined the rapid little river are all burnt, and of all its former inhabitants not 2000 are known to survive. Fully 5000 persons—a very large proportion of them women and children—perished here, and their bones whiten the ruins, or their putrid bodies infect the air. The sight of Batak is enough to verify all that has been said about the acts of the Turks in repressing the Bulgarian insurrection, and yet I saw it three months after the massacre. On every side were human bones, skulls, ribs, and even complete skeletons; heads of girls still adorned with braids of long hair, bones of children, skeletons still encased in clothing. Here was a house the floor of which was white with the ashes and charred bones of thirty persons burnt alive there. Here was the spot where the village notable Trandafil was spitted on a pike and then roasted, and where he is now buried. Here was a foul hole full of decomposing bodies; here a mill-dam full of swollen corpses; here the school-house where 200 women and children, who had taken refuge there, were burnt alive; and here the church and churchyard where fully 1000 half-decayed forms were still to be seen, filling the inclosures in a heap several feet high; arms, feet, and heads protruding from the stones which had vainly been thrown there to hide them, and poisoning all the air. Since my visit, by order of the Mutessarif, the Kaimakan of Tatar Bazardjik was sent to Batak with some lime to aid in the decomposition of the bodies and to prevent a pestilence.”

The reports of which these are summaries produced in England, as in other parts of Europe, a great change in the tone of controversy on the affairs of Turkey. To a great extent feelings that make mankind one family assumed the place of cold arguments, and it was soon made apparent that the dismal facts reported from Bulgaria had done more to discredit all the humane professions made by the Porte than could have been done by many volumes filled with arguments in favour of the Slaves and their insurrectionary movements.

Still the Eastern Question itself remained unaltered in its essential character. There still remained the vastly important queries, Shall a number of petty States be allowed to arise in the provinces misgoverned by the Porte? Or shall one great Power assume there the duties to fulfil which the Turkish Government is found incom-

petent? For a time these hard problems were almost forgotten; or, to speak more carefully, their difficulty was forgotten, and they were solved *ex tempore* by the proposal “that the Turks should immediately be driven out of Europe.” Lord Derby wrote to the effect that the perpetration of these atrocities had done more harm to the cause of Turkey than the loss of a great battle. He further addressed a despatch to the British ambassador at the Porte, of which the following is a summary:—

“It is unnecessary for me to refer in detail to the several passages in Mr. Baring’s report which show how effectually fanaticism and rapine have done their work on the population of this unhappy province [Bulgaria]. Even now no serious effort has been made to redress the injuries of the people, and to provide effectually for their future safety. The cattle that have been carried off and the goods that have been plundered have not been restored; the houses and churches are left in ruins; the people are starving; industry and agriculture are suspended; and those Christian villages which have hitherto escaped feel no security that their turn may not come. Acts of violence, as the Mudir at Avrat-Alan acknowledged, still continue, and the Porte is powerless or supine. I have already informed your Excellency of the just indignation which the statements published of these atrocities have aroused in the people of Great Britain, nor can I doubt that a similar feeling prevails throughout Europe. The Porte cannot afford to contend with the public opinion of other countries, nor can it suppose that the Government of Great Britain can show indifference to the sufferings of the Bulgarian peasantry under this outbreak of vindictive cruelty. No political considerations would justify the toleration of such acts; and one of the foremost conditions for the settlement of the questions now pending must be that ample reparation shall be afforded to the sufferers, and their future security guaranteed. In order that the views of her Majesty’s Government may be impressed in the most effective manner upon the Sovereign who has recently been called to the Ottoman throne, her Majesty’s Government desire that your Excellency will demand a personal audience of the Sultan, and communicate to his Majesty in substance the result of Mr. Baring’s inquiries, mentioning by name Shefket Pasha, Hafiz Pasha, Toussoun Bey, Achmet Agha, and

the other officials whose conduct he has denounced. Your Excellency will, in the name of the Queen and her Majesty's Government, call for reparation and justice, and urge that the rebuilding of the houses and churches should be begun at once, and necessary assistance given for the restoration of the woollen and other industries, as well as provision made for the relief of those who have been reduced to poverty; and, above all, you will point out that it is a matter of absolute necessity that the eighty women [lost or carried away] should be found and restored to their families. Your Excellency will likewise urge that striking examples should be made on the spot of those who have connived at or taken part in the atrocities. The persons who have been decorated or promoted under a false impression of their conduct should be tried and degraded, where this has not been done already, and every effort should be made to restore public confidence. With this view it would seem advisable, as a provisional measure, and without prejudice to such future arrangements as may be made, in concert with the Powers, that the disturbed districts should be at once placed under an able and energetic Commissioner, specially appointed for the purpose, who, if not himself a Christian, should have Christian counsellors in whom trust could be reposed by the Christian population."

Foremost among the eminent men who denounced loudly the very existence of the Ottoman Empire in Europe stood Mr. Gladstone. He would cordially act in concert with Russia, and would, without delay, drive all military and official Turks out of Europe. They might find some place for themselves in Asia; but out of Europe they must be driven at once, "bag and baggage." With an almost equal fervour, the veteran statesman Earl Russell suggested that in order to put a stop to outrages like the "Bulgarian atrocities," England might well act in alliance with Russia; but not long afterwards his Lordship observed that he did not wish to see Russia at the head of the government of Turkey. About the same time Mr. Lowe treated with ridicule the notion of attempting to maintain any longer the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The words in which Mr. Freeman, the historian of England in early times, described that attempt were still more energetic than those employed by Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Lowe. "It

seems to me," said Mr. Carlyle, the advocate of stern control, "that something very different from war on his behalf is what the Turk now pressingly needs from England and from the world—namely, to be peremptorily informed that we can stand no more of his attempts to govern in Europe, and that he must as soon as possible turn his face to the eastward, for ever quit this side of the Hellespont, and give up his arrogant ideas of governing anybody but himself. Such immediate and summary expulsion of the Turk from Europe may appear to many a too drastic remedy, but to my mind it is the only one of any real validity under the circumstances. Improved management of these unhappy countries might begin on the morrow after this long-continued curse was withdrawn, and the ground left free for wise and honest human effort. The result is in the long run inevitable, and it were better to set about it now, than to temporize and haggle, in the vain hope of doing it cheaper some other time. As to the temporary or preparatory government of the recovered provinces, cleared of their unspeakable Turk government, for twenty, or say any other term of years, our own experience in India may prove that it is possible, and in a few faithful and skilled hands is even easy."

Still more extraordinary than the notions already briefly referred to was the proposal made by Mr. Grant Duff, to the effect that the Ottoman Empire in Europe might be instantaneously extinguished, and leave in its place an administrative board of Anglo-Indians, having for their president the Duke of Edinburgh. The plan looks like a magnified copy of some trick of legerdemain. To turn from these unreal projects to plans more or less connected with practicability, the suggestions offered by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe must be named in the first place. His Lordship recommended that the Powers should now appoint a Commission for carrying into execution the reforms most urgently required by Turkey. He would place the Porte, as a minor, under the guardianship and control of trustees—responsible, of course, to the Powers by whom they were appointed; in other words, he would confide the government of Turkey in Europe to a mixed Commission, including representatives of the three classes—Turks, Christian subjects of the Porte, and foreigners. It is obvious that of these classes, the third—representing England, France, Russia,

and Germany—would be the most powerful ; and that the scheme, if fairly carried into execution, would tend towards a gradual extinction of the autonomy hitherto claimed by the Turks in Europe.

With all his experience of Eastern affairs, Lord Stratford could not promise that the Turks would peaceably grant their co-operation in the realization of his own theory. Meanwhile they were speaking for themselves. They wished that the Powers should still be patient while the Porte gave evidence of its own ability to remedy all the defects of its government. In the first place, the Ministers of Turkey sent in their own "Official Report" of the Bulgarian transactions denounced throughout Europe as "atrocities." The attention of diplomatists was in the next place invited to the verbal plan of a New Constitution for the Ottoman Empire, which contained no reference to such "guarantees" as had been often enough demanded.

There was nothing that could give satisfaction to the Powers in this scheme of a Turkish reformation, of which the unreal details had already been made wearisome by their repetition in many broken promises. Something more serious was intended in the plan next to be noticed, which was suggested by the Czar himself in a letter addressed to the Emperor of Austria. It was here proposed that each of the disturbed provinces, Bosnia and Bulgaria, should be occupied by foreign troops ; one by Russian and the other by Austrian soldiers. This energetic plan of action was supplemented by the proposals made by General Ignatieff. He would, in the first place, require a general surrender of arms in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria. This first measure of pacification would make possible another—a popular election of their own rulers by the natives of the disturbed provinces. It would be tedious to notice in detail all the opinions and projects that served in 1876 to make more and more difficult the duties of her Majesty's Government in relation to the affairs of Turkey in Europe. Ultimately a plan, that at least had the merit of securing time for further deliberation, was brought forward by Lord Derby, who left its details to be supplied by a Conference, in which the representatives of all the great Powers should meet together to concert measures for the preservation of peace. At the same time he suggested,

as proposals to be entertained at that Conference, such measures as the following:—That Servia and Montenegro might retain the positions they held before the outbreak of disturbances ; that institutions of local and administrative "autonomy," or something like that form of self-government denoted by the term "autonomy" (a term he did not like), might be granted to Bosnia and Herzegovina, while some similar power of self-protection might be given to Bulgaria. In making these and similar proposals, he asserted that his aims were to secure for both Mussulmans and Christian subjects of the Porte an equality of position in all courts of justice, and to obtain for all the Christians in the Turkish provinces some essential guarantees against the recurrence of such outrages as had been perpetrated in Bulgaria. Thus, at the moment when Europe appeared to be urged on to the brink of war by the terms of the ultimatum with which Russia had enforced her demand for an armistice, Lord Derby's proposal of a Conference served at least to postpone hostilities, and to afford an opportunity for calm deliberation. Meanwhile he had shown, in a despatch addressed virtually to the Ministers of the Sultan, that England could say nothing to palliate their conduct respecting their mode of treating the parties accused of the atrocities committed in Bulgaria. It was strongly suggested that the efforts they had made to prevent a recurrence of similar outrages were altogether unsatisfactory to the people of England.

The war declared by Servia in July had in the latter part of the year results very disastrous for that country. Already, in August, the Servians had been repelled, and their fighting had afterwards assumed a defensive character, though they were not then so far reduced as to ask for an armistice. But on the 1st of the next month they were utterly defeated at the battle of Alexinatz. As the terms of peace offered by the Turks were inadmissible, Prince Milan asked for the mediation of the Powers. The Porte was not then inclined to make peace on easy terms ; but granted a slight extension of the short time already allowed for a cessation of hostilities. Some tedious discussions followed respecting the terms of peace that would be generally accepted as satisfactory, and meanwhile it was hard to come to an agreement on the length of the armistice to be arranged between Servia and Turkey. At the same time the general

proposals made by Lord Derby, and intended to serve as bases of discussion in a Conference of the Powers, did not give entire satisfaction either to the Porte or to Russia. For once these two parties were agreed, or rather their different objections conspired to delay the assembling of national representatives, whose consultations might—as many then supposed—conduce to the restoration of peace. The Porte disliked making any concessions, such as might be understood to imply “autonomy.” The Russians, on the other hand, thought it desirable that some threats of coercion, such as England would not employ, should be added to every protocol of reforms, in order to gain guarantees that the reforms so long promised should be realized. To this Russian suggestion Lord Derby replied, that he did not anticipate an absolute rejection of his proposals; that there was great danger in using threats of coercion while our aim was to secure peace; and that, if these threats were widely made known in Turkey, they might lead to fresh outbreaks of fanatic rage on the part of the Mussulmans, and the Christians might again have to endure outrages committed against their property and themselves. The correspondence that followed on these differences of opinion was extensive, and for some time it led to no satisfactory results. The ministers of Turkey repeated again and again their objections to granting any rights and privileges such as might be denoted by the word “autonomy;” but they were plainly told by Lord Derby that, to meet their objections, the terms of his own proposals would not be modified in any considerable degree. Accordingly, he recommended that they should consider the danger of another outbreak of warfare, and should grant to Servia an armistice that might lead to a permanent peace. The proposals made by Russia were referred to the Conference intended soon to be held; but this delay was not satisfactory to the representatives of the Czar. They argued that some coercive measures should first of all be concerted, to be put into force if the Porte at last rejected the plans recommended by the intended Conference. Some display of military or naval power might make more cogent the arguments that would be employed. If it were resolved that the disturbed provinces should not be occupied by Russian and Austrian troops, then it might be at least advisable to send to the Bosphorus the united fleets of the great Powers. It

would thus be suggested that the Powers were mildly asking for that which they could take by force, if they chose to do it. This suggestion was rejected by Lord Derby. At the same time the Sultan’s ministers were informed that in any dispute they might have with Russia they must not expect to receive any material aid from England; in other words, the principle asserted in the beginning of the controversy was once more declared to the effect, that England would fight neither for Turkey nor for Russia. But England would urge that an armistice of not less than a month should be arranged with Servia, and that the terms of peace should be left to be considered at the Conference. To this advice the Porte returned for some time no satisfactory reply, while Austria made objections to the bases of the designed Conference, and Prince Bismarck, speaking for Germany, thought that certain preliminary questions should be settled before the proposed meeting of the Powers should take place. It would be advisable, he thought, that the designs of their several representatives should be clearly defined and mutually well understood before the opening of their Conference. The long delay that seemed likely to be caused by these differences of opinion was prevented by the act of Russia in sending to the Porte an *ultimatum*, which was accepted at the beginning of November, and was immediately followed by a concession.

Accordingly, Turkey granted to Servia an extended armistice, and soon afterwards the Governments of Russia and Austria announced their common acceptance of the plan proposed by Lord Derby for holding a Conference, having for its aim the settlement of questions by which the peace of Europe was endangered. On the next day the Czar delivered at Moscow a speech containing the following words:—“During my whole reign I have endeavoured to obtain for the Christians in the East what right and justice demand. Unfortunately, my pacific efforts have not obtained the desired result. A Conference is now about to assemble at Constantinople, in which Russia will present her demands. If her endeavours are not crowned with success, Russia will be forced to take up arms, and I count on the support of my people.” Not long afterwards the Czar, in his second speech at Moscow, added some words of which the following is a translation:—“I have great hopes that we shall come to a general understanding [at the

Conference about to be held]; but if this agreement is not brought about, and if I see that we do not obtain *bonâ fide* guarantees for the execution of that which we have a right to demand from the Porte, I am firmly determined to act alone, and I am sure that in this case the whole of Russia will answer to my call when I shall judge it necessary, and when the honour of the country requires it. I am equally convinced that Moscow will set the example, as it always has done before. May God help us to fulfil our sacred mission!" It has been supposed that the Czar, when speaking at Moscow, referred to some remarks made by the Earl of Beaconsfield in his well-known speech at the Guildhall; but the notion is erroneous. The Czar had, at the time, no knowledge of those remarks. As regards the meaning of his own speeches at Moscow, he soon afterwards made some observations, that in substance may here be repeated.

In an interview with Lord Loftus, the English ambassador at the court of St. Petersburg, his Majesty observed that the Porte by its evasions had frustrated the endeavours of Europe for securing a general pacification. If Europe could receive such oft-repeated rebuffs from the Porte, his Majesty could not. He was indeed anxious to act in concert with the Powers; but if Europe was not now prepared to act with the energy required, then he should be compelled to act *alone*. He regretted that there still remained in England a suspicion of Russian policy, and he solemnly declared that Russia had no intention of gaining possession of Constantinople. If he should find himself compelled to occupy Bulgaria for a time, that would be done only provisionally, in order to obtain peace and safety for the Christians dwelling there. The Porte must give effective guarantees for the execution of the reforms so long demanded and promised.

Near the close of the year it was proposed that the representatives of Russia, England, France, Germany, Austria, and Italy should hold some preliminary conferences, at which the attendance of the Sultan's plenipotentiaries would not be required. The information afforded by the Grand Vizir had already made it evident that the advice offered by the Conference would not be regarded by the Sultan's advisers as a welcome aid. They would greatly prefer that Turkey should still be left alone to manage her own affairs; but under the circumstances it was hard to see how they

could decline the assistance once more offered by the Powers. Already the Czar had mobilized a portion of his army, and other signs of the times had recalled to mind the saying ascribed long ago to a Russian diplomatist:—"There must take place some intervention in the affairs of Turkey. It may be effected by several Powers acting in concert, or possibly by *two*; but if all the rest neglect the duty, there is certainly *one* Power that will interfere." The Ministers of the Porte were, however, fully resolved to adhere to their own plans of reform, when they addressed to England their despatch formally accepting, in terms like the following, the general plan for holding a Conference in Constantinople:—"The Porte, out of deference to the Powers, does not hesitate to consent to the assembling at Constantinople of the proposed Conference. At the same time, the Porte trusts that the several representatives, when they meet together there, will keep in sight that respect for treaties, the strict observance of which the great Powers have so constantly recommended to the Porte." In this last sentence there may be noticed an ironical hint artistically half concealed, but referring to the two treaties of 1856 and 1871. In some of their clauses the general purport of these documents is identical with the second of the two proposals which were submitted by Lord Derby to the Powers, and were intended to serve as the "bases" of all the deliberations of their Conference:—(1.) The independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire to be maintained. (2.) A declaration to be made to the effect that the Powers will not in this Conference seek for any territorial aggrandizement, or any exclusive influence, or any concession with regard to the commerce of their subjects which those of every other nation may not equally obtain.

After long discussions and many hindrances of various kinds, it was at last arranged that the Conference should immediately be held in Constantinople.

The Marquis of Salisbury was appointed Her Majesty's special ambassador to act at the Conference conjointly with Sir Henry Elliot, our resident ambassador at Constantinople.

The *first* meeting of the Conference was mostly formal. Safvet Pasha, the President, defended the measures of the Porte (in 1875-76) in a speech of which a summary has already been given. At the close of that speech a theatrical effect was pro-

duced by salvoes of artillery announcing the promulgation of a "New Ottoman Constitution." "A great act," said the President, "is at this moment accomplished. It changes here a form of government that has lasted 600 years, and inaugurates a new era of happiness for all the subjects of Turkey." It was then observed by some of the representatives present, that some "guarantees" would still be required to make the new Ottoman scheme real and efficacious. At the *second* meeting the Turkish Plenipotentiaries raised objections to each of the proposals submitted by the Powers. At the *third*, some further time was required by the Porte for a consideration of the proposals then brought forward, and it was promised that certain "counter proposals" would soon be prepared, which the representatives of the six Powers would, in all probability, find much better than any of their own schemes. The time required was granted. Meanwhile the Turkish Commission of Inquiry respecting the "Bulgarian atrocities" was sitting, and in the course of a few days Achmet Agha was formally sentenced to death; but there was evidently an intention to spare his life, and to screen from justice others accused of crimes like his own, while facts based upon the surest evidence were rejected by the Commission. At the *fourth* meeting of the Conference nine proposals submitted by the Powers were rejected, and certain reasons for their rejection were brought forward at the *fifth* meeting, when the arguments employed by the Ottoman Plenipotentiaries were not accepted as satisfactory. In the course of the *sixth* meeting, order was to some extent interrupted by some passages of declamation, and as to business nothing was done. The *seventh* meeting was another failure. The proposals then submitted by the six Powers were again generally rejected. The representatives of the six Powers then prepared a modified summary of all their proposals, which was submitted at the *eighth* meeting, when the Turkish Plenipotentiaries requested that some further time might be allowed for their consideration of the summary. Their request was granted. The whole of the summary was rejected by the Plenipotentiaries of the Porte at the *ninth* meeting of the Conference. It was soon afterwards arranged that all the ambassadors of the six Powers should leave Constantinople in the course of a few days. "This rejection of our summary," said General Ignatieff,

"places me under the painful necessity of declaring that the grounds of the deliberations of the Conference are exhausted, and that we consider it from this moment dissolved." These words served to express the unanimous decision of the other representatives.

Their *tenth* and final meeting was held on the 21st of January, 1877. "The Ottoman Plenipotentiaries had agreed to be present on that occasion," "but they did not come." On the following day Lord Salisbury left Constantinople.

In the course of a few days a note sent by Lord Derby conveyed to her Majesty's special ambassador her expressions of entire approval respecting the whole of his proceedings at the Conference. It was an inevitable failure. Its fruitless conclusion had evidently been predetermined by the Ministers of the Porte. The opinion of Europe was unanimous—that all that was possible to insure the success of the Conference and to prevent the outbreak of war had been done by Lord Salisbury, who had most faithfully represented the views of her Majesty's Government.

Great disappointment was felt in England at the failure of the Conference to secure a peaceful settlement of the Eastern Question. In the minds of some a feeling of indignation was aroused by what was thought the unseemly obstinacy of the Ottoman Government in resisting every proposal of reform. General uneasiness was felt at the possibility of a general European war. Preparations of a warlike character were being openly made both in Russia and Turkey. A diplomatic note, conceived in a threatening tone against the Porte, was sent by Prince Gortschakoff to the Russian embassies at the various courts of Europe. The reply to this note was an ominous silence observed by the several Governments. Russia made one more attempt at negotiations, and sent General Ignatieff on a mission to Vienna, Berlin, Paris, and London. His Sovereign, he said, had undertaken great responsibilities and had incurred heavy expenses, having concentrated 500,000 men on the Russian frontier, and spent ten millions sterling. If Europe would join with Russia in coercing Turkey to do right and justice to her Christian subjects, in obedience to the resolutions of the Conference, would perform, in fact, a "federal execution" upon the recalcitrant state, the Czar would willingly put an end to his costly armaments, and deconcentrate his troops.

On March 13 Lord Derby received a draft Protocol from the Russian ambassador, and it was at once accepted in principle by the English Cabinet, as it was hoped that by means of it the European concert might still be kept alive, and the Eastern Question be prevented from degenerating into a duel between Russia and Turkey. In its final shape the Protocol recited that the Signatory Powers "have undertaken in common the pacification of the East," and affirmed afresh "the common interest which they take in the improvement of the condition of the Christian population of Turkey." It informed Turkey that "as regards Montenegro the Powers considered the rectification of the frontiers and the free navigation of the Borana to be desirable." It invited the Porte to place its armies on a peace footing, and to put in hand, with the least possible delay, the reforms necessary for the tranquillity and well-being of the Provinces. The only practical step proposed to be taken was to watch carefully, by the ambassadors at Constantinople and the local agents, the manner in which the Porte carried out its promises. If the hopes of the Powers should once more be disappointed, and if the condition of the Christian subjects of the Sultan should not be improved in a manner to prevent the return of the complications which had periodically disturbed the peace of the East, they declared that such a state of affairs would be incompatible with their interests and those of Europe in general. In such case they reserved to themselves to consider in common as to the means which they might deem best fitted to secure the well-being of the Christian populations and the interests of the general peace. The Protocol was signed at the Foreign Office in London, on 31st March, by the representatives of Germany, Austria, France, England, Italy, and Russia; but Lord Derby made a special declaration to the effect that as it was solely in the interests of European peace that her Majesty's Government had consented to sign the Protocol proposed by Russia, it was understood beforehand that in the event of the object proposed not being attained—namely, reciprocal disarmament on the part of Russia and Turkey, and peace between them—the Protocol should be regarded as null and void. Count Schouvaloff, the Russian ambassador, also made the following

declaration before signing the Protocol:—"If peace with Montenegro is concluded, and the Porte accepts the advice of Europe, and shows itself ready to replace its forces on a peace footing, and seriously to undertake the reforms mentioned in the Protocol, let it send to St. Petersburg a special envoy to treat of disarmament, to which his Majesty the Emperor would also, on his part, consent. If massacres similar to those which have occurred in Bulgaria (*qui ont ensanglanté la Bulgarie*) take place, this would necessarily put a stop to the measures of demobilization."

The reply of the Porte was given on April 10 in a circular sent to its representatives accredited to the Great Powers. It stated that not only could the Porte not accept the Protocol, but it questioned its validity, as an instrument which had been drawn up and signed without its participation. While reiterating its resolution to carry into effect the proposed reforms, the Porte could make no difference between the provinces mentioned in the Protocol and the rest of the Empire. "The Imperial Government believes Europe is convinced that the disturbances which have troubled the peace of the Provinces were due to foreign instigation, and the Imperial Government could not be held responsible for them." As to the invitation to disarm, the Porte was ready if Russia would do so likewise, but the armaments of the Porte were of an exclusively defensive character. With respect to the sending of a special envoy to St. Petersburg, the Porte had no objection to such an act of courtesy, provided it were reciprocal; but there was no necessity for such envoys to effect disarmament—an order of each government being sufficient for that purpose. The reply further stated that the Sultan had granted a constitution for all, and that constitution was a sufficient guarantee for the execution of the promised reforms. As for the right of surveillance claimed by the Powers in the Protocol, the Porte could not admit it, as it would establish an interference contrary to treaty. "What, indeed, cannot be sufficiently regretted, is the small regard in which the Powers seem to hold both the great principles of equality and justice—the sway of which the Imperial Government has endeavoured to assure in its internal administration—and its right of independence and sovereignty."

CHAPTER XII.

Last Debate in the British Parliament on Eastern Affairs before the Declaration of War—Speech of the Marquis of Hartington, Leader of the Opposition—Conduct of the Government—The Policy of Coercion admitted by the Protocol—Lord Derby's Declaration annexed to the Protocol a departure from the common European Agreement—Speech of Mr. Hardy—The Treaty of Paris still in force—Last word not yet spoken—Course of the Government throughout—Conduct of the Turks no justification for Armed Interference—Disarmament and Demobilization—"British Interests"—Determination of the English Government not to use coercion from the commencement—A distinct issue on their conduct invited—Criticism of the action of the Government by Sir. W. V. Harecourt—What had become of the Treaty of 1856?—Position of England—The Three Objects of the Government Policy—Speeches of Mr. Forsyth and Mr. Ashley—Beneficial effects of previous Coercion in the affairs of Turkey—Policy of the Government—Defence of the Government and Censure of their Opponents by Mr. Roebuck—Condemnation of the Action of Russia—The Russian dream of Constantinople—Sir C. Dilke on the Protocol and Lord Derby's Declaration—The "Gospel of Selfishness"—Mr. Butler-Johnstone's opinion of Mr. Gladstone's Proceedings—Persecution by Russia of the Members of the United Greek Church—Speech of Mr. Goschen—England baffled by Turkey and checkmated by Russia—Criticism of the Protocol and Declaration of Lord Derby—The Chancellor of the Exchequer on the Government Policy—Refusal to employ Threats which they did not intend to carry out—The Situation at the close of the Conference—The Russian Declaration relating to Disarmament—The Honour and Interests of England—Debate in the House of Lords—Lord Granville's opinion of the Protocol and of Lord Derby's Declaration—The Policy of the Opposition—Earl Derby's opinion on the Autumn Agitation—The English and Russian Declarations—Reasons of the Government for Signing the Protocol—Speech of the Marquis of Lansdowne.

FUTURE generations will turn again and again to the latest occasion on which the British Parliament discussed the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 as a thing of the future, problematical, possibly to be averted, and still a subject for those counsels which can be proffered even on the eve of despair. It will be inquired whether England realized the import of that new phase of history on which Europe was entering; just as nothing can be more interesting than to note the various forecasts of statesmen and great writers on the eve of the Great Revolution. Politicians will ask, with a proper regard to the interests of Party, whether their own leaders showed a truer appreciation of the crisis than those of the other side, and whether there was in any one man that gift of prophecy which is the best qualification for power. The nation will ask, in a more general way, How did we regard Turkey? How did we regard Russia? and in the fact that the public at large had somewhat disagreed there will be all the more reason for asking what the "collective wisdom" of the country thought about the question before it became a question of war.

On the re-assembling of the House of Lords after the Easter Vacation, on Friday, April 13, the Earl of Derby, Foreign Secretary, promised to lay on the table forthwith the answer of the Porte to the Protocol (described in the previous chapter), and added, "I am bound to say it is not one of a satisfactory character, or one that holds out much hope of a peaceful settlement."

In the House of Commons the same night the leader of the Opposition (the Marquis of Hartington) brought the question under discussion. Moving for further papers he said, Since the conclusion of the Conference the information which the Government had placed before them had been extremely limited. But in what had been given he found much which in the absence of further papers appeared totally inexplicable and thoroughly unsatisfactory; much also which led to the conclusion that the Government were directly responsible for the present state of affairs. In regard to the Russian circular, asking what, in view of the refusal of the Turks to accept the recommendations of the Conference, it was proposed to do, a dilatory line was adopted, for which no papers before them furnished justification.

There appeared to be a false assumption, which had more or less pervaded all these negotiations, that in this great issue Russia should be acknowledged by common consent to place herself in the position of counsel for the plaintiff. That was a position which Russia had always desired to assume, and was not very far removed from the protectorate that Russia had always claimed—the protectorate against the extension of which the Crimean War was waged, the protectorate which ever since the Crimean War Russia had endeavoured to recover, the protectorate which, in a blind and short-sighted opposition to Russian policy, we had gone a very long way to restore to Russia. He should ask for the first draft

of the Protocol, without which it was impossible adequately to discuss the effect of the instrument itself. The Protocol, though an ineffectual instrument, certainly could not be said to be an unimportant one. It contained almost for the first time an acknowledgment of the duty which the Government had undertaken. In common with the other Powers, they had undertaken the pacification of the East. The Protocol contained more than that. He did not see how her Majesty's Ministers who signed this Protocol could any longer taunt any gentleman sitting on that side of the house with being alone in favour of a policy of coercion; for this Protocol contemplated coercion. It was said that a great deal of time had been spent on the wording of the Protocol, and that much depended on the substitution of the word "means" for "action." But whether the word were "means" or "action," the Protocol did contemplate action, or else it contemplated nothing. Sir, if the Protocol contemplates, as I maintain it does, the use, although the deferred use, of coercion, what, I ask, became of the fervid protestations made not long ago by the right hon. gentleman the Secretary of State for War (Mr. Hardy)? I see that the right hon. gentleman seems prepared to address the House, but I ask him—whether the delay be one of six months, or one year, or two years—whether it will not bring shame to his face then as it would now to use coercion towards the Porte? I ask him whether it would not be as inconsistent then as now with the treaties to which we are a party, and with those moral principles to which he appealed. Although the Protocol was an ineffectual and inefficient instrument, that was not because it did not contain within itself principles of the highest importance—principles which established the right of interference in the affairs of Turkey—principles which were inconsistent with the independence of the Porte, at all events in that sense in which it was understood at the time of the Andrassy Note and the Berlin Memorandum—and principles which he must say did not appear to him to be so easily reconciled with the letter of the ninth article of the Treaty of Paris. If the Protocol was inefficient, it was because the Powers shrank from the immediate application of the principles it contained; because either they did not believe in the truth of their own assertions, or because they shrank from carrying those principles to a logical conclusion. What was the

assertion contained in this Protocol? It was a declaration that an effective improvement might be secured in the condition of the Christian population of Turkey.

Well, sir, if the Government believed in the truth of that assertion, what reason have they to shrink from the conclusion that some immediate steps should be taken for effecting an amelioration of the condition of the Christian population of Turkey? Is it that they still cling to the hope that the Porte will by itself be able to effect those improvements? If they do, I ask her Majesty's Government what reason have they for doing so? What has happened since the conclusion of the Conference to justify any such expectation? Has the condition of the Christian provinces been in any degree improved? What has happened towards that end since Lord Salisbury said that one object of the Conference was the obtaining of effectual guarantees against the bad administration by the Porte of those provinces?

Were those guarantees less required now than they were when Lord Salisbury made that statement? And if they were not, why did her Majesty's Government and the other Powers shrink from doing that which they considered necessary to obtain them? It was this clinging to the hope that the necessary reforms would be carried out by the Porte itself that had led to the making of an ineffectual use of the Protocol, and which had placed her Majesty's Government in a false position.

Sir, what occurs here every day? Questions are asked as to those outrages, and what do the answers of her Majesty's Government amount to? They have not heard of the outrages, or, if they have, they have reason to believe they are not so bad as was reported. That is the attitude they assume, and it is applauded by their supporters. But why, I ask, is not her Majesty's Government able to take what one would think is the natural position the Government of this country should occupy? Why are not her Majesty's Government here to say, "These things may or may not be true, but we are not responsible for them? We have done what we could to prevent them; we have represented to the Porte in the strongest language we were capable of the injury these things are doing to the Government of the Porte, and we can do no more." But that is not the excuse which is made by her Majesty's Government. They assume an attitude of defence of themselves from

something for which they are responsible. What is the reason for that attitude? It is because they know that to take any other attitude would be to show the fallacy of the position they are still occupying, and the fallacy of the hope to which they are clinging, that the Porte of itself will effect these necessary reforms.

It might be said that the Protocol served at least to gain time; but was there any reason that the necessary measures contemplated by the Protocol should be postponed? On the contrary, it seemed to him that the then present time was the most suitable for making one bold and vigorous attempt to deal with this great question. He did not know whether there was any diplomatic precedent for the declarations which had been annexed to the Protocol, but in the absence of the papers and of explanations, he was totally at a loss to conceive what was the motive of her Majesty's Government for appending those declarations. What was the one great advantage which, in spite of all its weakness and all its deficiency, was secured by the Protocol? It was that the Powers "before all proposed to maintain the agreement so happily established between them, and jointly to affirm afresh the common interest which they take in the improvement of the condition of the Christian population of Turkey." Well, but the declaration of Lord Derby was of itself a departure from that common agreement. What was it that induced her Majesty's Government, at the very outset of the agreement which they desired to maintain, to launch into a separate line of action? If this declaration was necessary, what was the reason it was not joined in by Germany, France, Italy, and the other Powers?

What, I ask, was the reason which induced her Majesty's Government at the very outset to take a step in the direction of separate action by themselves? What was the danger which was foreseen when the Protocol was signed? It was that one of the Powers might separate itself from the common agreement, and take a line of individual action. Well, then, whose interest was it to make the Protocol as binding and as conclusive a document as it could be made? Was it that of the Powers which desired to maintain the common agreement, or of any Power which desired to take separate action. Surely it was the interest of the Powers who desired to maintain common concert, and not that of any Power which desired to take

separate action? Well, if you had not accompanied the Protocol with the declaration, what would be the language you could now naturally and justly use towards Russia? Why, you could appeal at once to the Protocol, which was not only signed by Russia, but proposed by Russia. You could say to Russia: "This instrument—your own instrument—binds us to concerted action; that action you are now on the point of taking is individual action; it is separate action, inconsistent with the Protocol and the combined action it contemplated."

That was the action which might have been used towards Russia by the Government and the other Powers. But what had they done? They had pointed out to the Power which desired to enter on the path of separate action the way by which she might get rid of the restraint imposed upon her. They had placed in her hand the weapon by which she could strike off at any moment the chain by which they might have restrained her. But that was not all they had done. They had not only put it in the power of Russia whenever she pleased to destroy the Protocol, but put it in the power of Turkey, not a party to the Protocol, to destroy it also.

No reasonable man being able to doubt that the object of Turkey must be to break up the concert of Europe, what are we to think of the policy of her Majesty's Government, which has placed, by this declaration, in the hands of Turkey the power—without any fault of Russia or of any other Power—of breaking up and destroying the Protocol? But this is not all that has been done by the declaration of Lord Derby, or by the policy which prompted it; for you have provoked the Russian declaration, which bids fair to be the immediate cause of an outbreak of hostilities. Your policy has been described—I do not say whether correctly or otherwise—in the words, "No demobilization, no Protocol." But that is not exactly what you have got. You have not got demobilization, but you have signed a Protocol; and in spite of a stipulation that under certain circumstances it is to become null and void, I maintain that there is a great deal in the Protocol which in no circumstances can ever become null and void. Assertions as to matters of fact and of principle can never be affected by the stipulations which have been referred to. The declarations to which you have set your hands must, therefore, of neces-

sity remain the declarations of her Majesty's Government, notwithstanding anything you may say. There is much in the Protocol which can never be unsaid; but you have raised the question of demobilization, and if you had been content not to raise that question it is possible—I do not say it is certain—that Russia might have been satisfied with the promise, although it was a deferred promise, of European action, and might of her own accord have undertaken to demobilize. But you have pressed the Government of Russia to say that she would demobilize. Before the Protocol was signed you raised the question in such a way that Russia, thinking her dignity and her honour were engaged, appears to have declined to undertake the making of terms of demobilization as you required. You consented to sign the Protocol, but you insisted upon appending your declaration to it, and that resulted in the Russian declaration, which seems likely to cause an outbreak of hostilities between Russia and Turkey.

He could hardly imagine that in a document so long and carefully considered there could have been any haste as to its terms, but he nevertheless hesitated to believe that the plain and obvious meaning of that declaration was the one which her Majesty's Government attached to it. The terms of the declaration were contained in the following words:—

It is solely in the interests of European peace that her Britannic Majesty's Government have consented to sign the Protocol proposed by that of Russia, and it is understood beforehand that in the event of the object proposed not being attained—namely, reciprocal disarmament on the part of Russia and Turkey and peace between them—the Protocol in question shall be null and void.

He maintained that the plain and obvious meaning of that declaration and of the signing of the Protocol was not that the one was made and the other signed with a view to obtain a better government of the Christian provinces of Turkey, or to remove the causes which disturbed the tranquillity of Europe. The obvious meaning of the declaration was that action was taken solely in order to secure peace, even though it might only be temporary, between Russia and Turkey.

I hesitate to believe that such was the meaning of the Government, but I repeat that it was the only interpretation to be attached to the text of the declaration. I hesitate to believe that

the Government would have desired in this way to contradict the statements contained in the Protocol, the instructions given to the Marquis of Salisbury before he went to the Conference, the statements which the noble Marquis made in the course of the Conference, or the statements over and over again repeated by the Government. But yet at this supreme moment, when the Christian subjects of Turkey are anxiously waiting to know whether it is to European concert or to the action of Russia alone that they must look, the Government make a declaration which is susceptible of the meaning that I have ascribed to it.

It was not for him either to defend or to condemn the terms of the Russian declaration, which was made in consequence of the declaration of her Majesty's Government; but the more objectionable we might consider the Russian declaration, the more ought we to regret that the making of that declaration was due to the action of her Majesty's Government.

I admit that for more than a year the Government has laboured ardently and anxiously to remove causes which, until removed, must continue to disturb the tranquillity of Europe, but what has been the result? It is now understood—I hope the Government will be able to contradict it—that Europe is on the very verge of a war, and no security has been obtained for the Christian subjects of Turkey, although her Majesty's Government has, or may have, laboured to bring it about. The Government has laboured to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but that Empire is at the present moment threatened with an attack more dangerous to its existence than any which has occurred within this century.

If he were told that the papers were of a confidential character, and could not be produced without injury to the public service, he would not press for them. He had long thought it improbable that a tangled web composed of semi-civilized forces, fanatical rivalries of race and religion, and political intrigue, could be unravelled without an appeal to the sword. If the last word of England and of the other European Powers had been spoken, if Turkey or Russia, or either of them, desired war, then war was inevitable. There was only one way in which the honour and dignity of Turkey could be preserved, and that was by making her feel that she must yield to the demands of Europe, and that she had no more chance of evad-

ing those demands if made by Europe collectively, than if they were enforced by Russia alone. If her Majesty's Government could even at this last moment say a word which would give this assurance to Russia and to Turkey, and which would strengthen what they had already done, it might be productive of much good; and if he (Lord Hartington) had given them an opportunity of saying that word, then he should feel that the course he had taken had not been altogether fruitless. He then moved for the production of the papers he had referred to.

Mr. Hardy (Secretary of State for War) said the noble Lord, instead of asking Parliament to censure those who had been guilty of such conduct as he described, ended his address by moving for certain papers. At that moment a large mass of papers was on the point of being presented, which would lay before the House the history of this transaction from beginning to the end. With regard to the draught Protocol, application had been made to the Powers, and in consequence of their reply it could not be produced, though the Government had not the slightest objection to produce it. As regarded a reply to Prince Gortschakoff's Circular, if the Government delayed to give an answer it merely acted in concert with all the other Powers of Europe. It must be perfectly obvious that Russia was contemplating other action in this matter. It was always assumed by hon. members opposite that all the action that was going on was between England and Russia alone, the truth being that that action was being taken between Turkey and Russia and all the other Powers of Europe. Therefore, when hon. members thought they were making an attack upon her Majesty's Government, they were, in point of fact, making an attack, not upon England alone, but upon all the other Powers of Europe. The noble Lord said he did not know whether the last words of England on this question had yet been spoken. The noble Lord had taken too much upon himself in assuming that the last word of either England or of the Powers of Europe had been spoken upon this question.

The noble Lord further said that it must be taken that that part of the Treaty of 1856 no longer existed which provided that one Power should not go to war with Turkey without previous consultation with all the other Powers. I entirely disagree from him upon that point, because in my opinion that provision in the Treaty of Paris is still

in force. The noble Lord has asked for papers. One paper that will be laid upon the table to-night — namely, the answer of the Porte to the Protocol and to the declaration—shows that we are not inclined to delay presenting to the House all the papers that we have the power to produce. I am bound to say that that is an unciliatory document, and that it does not give rise to very sanguine hopes of peace. But although I am disguising nothing, even in the present condition of things I am still justified in saying that the last word has not yet been spoken.

The Government had throughout the negotiations laboured for two things—for peace, in the first place, and also for that which they had always kept and always would keep in view, the interests of the country, not allowing them to be interfered with, but not coming into collision with others so long as they could avoid it.

We have taken one decided course throughout, that which we were ready to join Europe in pressing upon Turkey—namely, the necessity of treating her Christian subjects better; but we have kept our hands free, so that nobody should be able to say, "You have engaged yourself to join us in forcing at the point of the sword any of these obligations on Turkey." All along we have been urging on the Porte the necessity of ameliorating their condition; but we do not believe that the way to benefit them is by an armed interference; we do not think that the way to peace is to wade through slaughter, or that the devastation of these fair provinces is the best way of securing their peace and prosperity. Above all, we have felt that we have had no personal wrong done to us, and that we have no right as a country—or I may say from on High—to take upon ourselves the vindication of these Christians. The Government of Turkey has, of course, been unspeakably bad, but the guilt of that Government does not give to us either from earth or from heaven the right to be the executioner of Turkey. If, however, Turkey had interfered with our nationality or our honour, our duty would be very different. I will not hesitate to say, speaking as I am in an assembly of her Majesty's subjects, that nothing but the interests of the country itself can justify us in drawing the sword. We are not to draw the sword because our feelings are affected, but only in the interests of justice and right. The hon. and learned member for Oxford (Sir William

Harcourt) has, I know, used words which he is perfectly justified in using; but if, like Jehu, he drives his chariot for the destruction of his enemies, let him show his commission. He derives it only from feelings which are very creditable, but which are felt just as strongly on this side of the House.

Coming to the Protocol, Mr. Hardy repeated that it was signed "solely in the interests of European peace." The noble Lord said they threw over the Christians by Lord Derby's declaration. On the contrary, any one could see that that declaration bore no such meaning. The Protocol was not pressed upon England as bearing only upon the Christian population. Russia had it in her power to disarm, but, as she urged, could not do so without dishonour. Then she places before us a document, and says, "If you sign it, we shall be able to disarm. We shall not make it a part of the Protocol, but we give an assurance if Turkey disbands her troops and disarms, we also shall take steps to disarm." The noble Lord says, "You ought not to have signed it without demobilization." Without demobilization? Why, we have got a much stronger word—disarmament. Demobilization is a very difficult word to interpret. It may mean the mere withdrawal of troops from the position they are in at the present moment; it may merely mean their withdrawal from the cantonments in which they now are, without the selling of a horse or the removal of a gun. But disarmament is something special and clear. Disarmament is a word that has a meaning. Demobilization might again in a few weeks be turned into mobilization; but with disarmament you cannot restore things to their former state without a greater effort.

He supposed the noble Lord would say, as it was said by an hon. member the other night, that with an armed European concert bound to use force Turkey would submit. Well, he differed utterly from that opinion. But when once we said, "We are going to coerce," the ultimate resort was the sword.

Suppose, then, with an army composed of the forces of the six great Powers Europe is to take possession of Turkey, and is to proceed to distribute it into autonomous States, or what you please, have you really the unwisdom to expect that the European Powers who might agree to destroy the Turkish army would agree how to carry on the Government? You propose to bring an army composed of the forces

of different States against Turkey; but, with all deference to Mr. Gladstone, who declaimed so strongly the other day against our setting up British interests as Russia sets up Russian interests and Germany sets up German interests, my opinion, I am sorry to say, is that we should do so. My own opinion is that Russia in all these transactions is setting up her own interests. Germany is setting up hers, Italy is setting up hers, Austria is setting up hers, France is setting up hers, and England would be very much behind in the race if she did not set up hers. But if you get a European concert up to a certain point, you are then to consider whether you are likely to have complete unity as to the division of the spoil. I believe I may say that would be an impossibility with the world in arms.

If we were to have an agreement of great Powers in arms, to suppose that they would not be led to seek what was advantageous to themselves was an absurd notion, considering the history of nations and of past times, and that we were not much better than our forefathers. There never was a nation which did not consult its own interests, and there never would be until we arrived at a time when there should be universal peace, and men should never have a quarrel, personal, political, or social. To suppose that when nations come armed together they will agree, and will make no quarrel over the partition of the country into which they have entered, was to suppose something so monstrous and absurd, that he did not think it necessary to enter into its refutation. As to the declaration of which the noble Lord spoke so slightly, it was the honest statement of the view which England had always taken, for the purpose of preserving peace. Her object had never changed, not to use coercion, but just the reverse; letting those associated with her know what her policy was—that the moral force, not the armed force, of Europe should be adopted. Russia knew the conditions which we laid down; she accepted them, and she used the very terms we did. She used even the term "disarmament" in order to conform to the declaration. Therefore, she showed that we were entering into an agreement in this matter, not with a view to ulterior measures, which we always refused—we guarded ourselves from the beginning against the *mesures efficaces*; our object was the maintenance of peace, and not to pledge

ourselves in any way that might involve a war. With regard to the Russian declaration, he would not comment on it.

If the noble Lord and his friends wish to show us a path we are not following, or if they condemn the path we are following, let them appeal to this House on the subject. We are entitled to it. It is not just or fair to us to make these covert attacks. Let them raise a distinct issue, and let it be put fairly before the House. We have not shown a blind opposition to Russia; but, on the contrary, we have pursued one steady policy. We will not pledge ourselves to draw the sword against Turkey. We will not pledge ourselves to be a party to a Protocol which falls to the ground when war breaks out between two nations; but we reserve to ourselves the position which we have always held, that as every great country has a right to look to its interests, honour, and dignity, whatever may ensue, we shall watch over this matter with a view to the interests of the Christian subjects of Turkey; but at the same time we shall be guided in what we do by a faithful fulfilment of the trust reposed in us as the ministers of the Crown—that is, to maintain and support here and in every part of the world the honour and the interests of the United Kingdom.

Sir W. V. Harcourt (Oxford) said the right hon. gentleman had not answered the only question he had to answer; he had not given the country the slightest indication of what, in the opinion of the English Government, were the “other means” that would be used; and unless the Government knew what those means were, and applied them, they would have done nothing to secure the peace of Europe. The Protocol laid down a number of sound and valuable principles, but it disposed of the rubbish of the Ministerial prints that this was no affair of ours. The Protocol declared it was our affair, because it concerned the peace of Europe. The Government had admitted that it was on account of our special treaty obligations, but there was not a word in the Protocol about treaty obligations.

He was willing to leave the matter where it was left at the Conference by Lord Salisbury’s declaration—that the treaty could not be one-sided, but that it placed Turkey under obligations she had not performed, and, therefore, the obligations on the other side were at an end. With that statement we might be satisfied, and it followed

that the Protocol was signed on the assumption that the ninth article of the treaty, forbidding interference in the internal affairs of Turkey, was not in force. The Treaty of 1856 contained a general guarantee; what had become of it now that we had warned Turkey that we would not support her against Russia? That declaration in effect terminated the arrangements of 1856. Why? Because they applied to Turkey which did not exist at that time, which never had existed, and which he believed never would exist. They referred to Turkey, not as she was when the treaty was made, but they referred to what Turkey promised to become under the firman which was issued at the time. She had never fulfilled those obligations, and had never entitled herself to the guarantees which were dependent on the performance of her pledges. These were the principles of the Protocol, as distinct from the manner in which effect was given to them, and they were the principles held by the great majority of the English people.

In the Easter recess the youngest member of the Cabinet (Sir M. Hicks-Beach) announced to his admiring constituents that we were the leaders of Europe. As “leaders of Europe” the Government had written despatches which had been ignored; they had sent plenipotentiaries to Constantinople who had returned without accomplishing their mission; they had withdrawn their Ambassador, and were going to send him back again; they had signed the Protocol, and that had been rejected. The position in which this country now found itself was one of ignominious failure, and the reason was that the Government had never convinced Turkey that they were in earnest.

They signed the Andrassy Note “with great regret;” they rejected the Berlin Memorandum because it contemplated ulterior means. The Protocol also contemplated ulterior means, with this difference, he supposed, that the means it contemplated were not to be efficacious. Nor was that all. For fear the Protocol should be too strong even with the inefficacious means in it, they appended to it a declaration, showing the parties how to put an end to it when they liked. Then during the negotiations the attitude of Europe was disturbed by two Ministerial speeches, in one of which the first Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Ward Hunt) complimented Turkey on her “indomitable pluck.” By this was meant, no doubt, the pluck

she had displayed in rejecting the advice and remonstrances of Europe.

He believed the Government had missed several opportunities of securing peace upon a solid and durable basis. He deeply regretted the apparently cynical language which Mr. Hardy had used. If it went forth to-morrow that England had no concern in the affairs of Europe except as far as they affected her own interests, they would ask in vain for the co-operation of Europe. (The Chancellor of the Exchequer intimated dissent.) He was glad to receive that disclaimer from the right hon. gentleman, and on that assurance he would take it that he must have misunderstood the language of the Secretary of State for War. English interests in that matter were European, and not exclusively insular.

The Government had declared that there were three objects of their policy. The first was the peace of Europe. Where was the peace of Europe now? Their second object was the amelioration of the condition of the Christian population of Turkey. What had they done to accomplish that amelioration? Their third object was to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Where would that integrity be, it might be to-morrow, or next month, or next year? It was the business of those on this side that night, and on every occasion which it was proper to seize, to assert their profound conviction that it was only on the principles of right and justice that they either could or ought to seek a solid and durable peace for Europe.

Mr. Forsyth (Marylebone) thought the House ought not to press for the production of those papers, and if the motion went to a division he would certainly vote for the Government. He doubted whether anything would be gained now by criticizing the policy of the past. They had to consider the present crisis, and to look to the present and the future. He stood almost alone on that (the Ministerial) side of the House in regard to his views on the question of Russia and Turkey. In the Ministerial press and among many members on that side of the House the utmost jealousy of Russia was shown, and he confessed he was astonished at the language sometimes applied to Russia by Conservative speakers. Our great security in a war between Russia and Turkey was this—that if Russia were to show a cloven foot and reveal that she was going to seize Constantinople as a permanent possession, Germany and Austria, and

most likely France, would enter the field to contest the prize of Constantinople. He thought the policy of Russia in this Eastern Question did not require any defence.

Mr. Ashley (Poole) wished to remind the Secretary of State for War that coercion had before now been applied to Turkey with the happiest results. What else was the action of various European Governments in regard to the independence of Greece, or the interposition which gave the Lebanon so excellent a form of government? There was in both cases a direct and armed intervention on the part of foreign Powers, and there was no question in either case of any division of the spoil. All through these negotiations there had been no sufficient recognition of the fact that this was a struggle of race and nation, and not a mere conflict of Cabinets; all through the acknowledgment of our responsibilities had been tardy; all through there had been an eager desire to snatch at every opportunity, and accept any excuse to do nothing; all through there had been a desire to “hedge,” so that if a step was taken in one direction with the right foot, a simultaneous step backwards with the left foot should leave our Foreign Office in a position of prudent equilibrium.

This country had lost one of the most splendid opportunities ever afforded it of extending its influence in the guidance for good of the world's destinies. Coercion did not mean war, but he hoped that it meant what was tantamount to war—that was to say, that, without gratifying the passion for conquest of any particular Power, it would secure what united Europe believed to be just and right. If in this eleventh hour we were to tell Russia and Europe that we were willing to join them in coercing Turkey, the former would be satisfied, and the latter would be compelled to yield.

Mr. Roebuck (Sheffield) wished to say a few words, not in support of one party or of another, but as a politician who had long studied politics, and who was now near the end of his days. The question had been put in a very convenient form for those who did not wish to incur responsibility. It would have been more consonant with the practice of English politicians had they come forward in an open, plain, and honest fashion, and called upon the Ministry to account for their conduct to the country.

From the beginning of this business I have

been very anxious to learn what possible course the Government could pursue that they have not pursued. I know of none; and if there be any meaning in the language used by gentlemen on this side of the House, they would declare war against Turkey and support Russia in attacking her. But England at this moment does not desire war. I know many of my countrymen, and often meet large bodies of them, but I have never yet found among them any desire to go to war with Turkey; and sure am I that if the Administration had taken measures to foster war—designedly to foster war—if they had called upon Russia to make war upon Turkey, their tenure of office would not have been worth ten minutes' purchase.

The Government had told the Turks that they must treat their Christian subjects properly, and that unless they did so, England would in no way support them. What more did gentlemen on this side of the House intend should be done when last autumn the minds of the people of this country were stirred by the reports from Bulgaria, and when an attempt was made to raise a cry against the Administration, as if they had been the supporters, the perpetrators, or the suggestors of those massacres?

Oh, they wanted peace, and good, kind, affectionate treatment for their Christian brethren! To my mind they had another motive. It appears to me that they were animated, not so much by a desire to benefit the Christian subjects of the Porte, as to injure their political opponents. No doubt at first the people of this country were moved with horror at the massacres which had occurred; and when eloquent and violent men came forward and described those things in Homeric language and in Homeric figures, it was believed that the doom of the Ministry was sealed. But the people of England, while a sympathetic and generous people, were a cautious, prudent, and honest people. They learnt that the matter before the Government was a very difficult one; they learnt that the Government had acted like honest men, like wise and prudent men, and true friends and rulers of their country. It was on that account that the storm thus raised suddenly went down to a dead calm. It is now a calm, in spite of all the attempts made to stir it up again. No wind follows the bellows blowing, and I feel certain that whatever may ensue, if the Russians do go to war, it will not be imputed to the Ad-

ministration which now governs this country that they have made the Russians go to war. If they go to war, you may say what you like about Russian honesty and the honesty of Russian diplomacy, but I shall believe that it has been thoroughly dishonest. From the beginning to the end they have put forth pretence, and not reality. I am not a prophet, sir, but of this I am sure, that, whatever may happen, England will not see Turkey pass into the hands of Russia. Austria will not see it; Germany will not see it; Italy will not see it; and France will not see it. ("Hear hear," from the Opposition.) You say "Hear, hear;" I wish your "Hear, hear," were loud enough to be heard in St. Petersburg. It is for that purpose that I desire to refer to that great dream or expectation of the Russian people—you cannot meet one of them without feeling that they cherish it—the expectation that they will one day be at Constantinople.

But let not the Czar lay that flattering unction to his soul. Russia would never be permitted to take Constantinople while England had a ship at her command or a soldier that she could send. If we were to have war, the consequences and the responsibilities of that war must rest on the Russian Government and on the late Administration of this country.

The responsibility of a war, if a war is to come, must be shared, I say, by the late Administration. That I know may be deemed a bold assertion. It never has been my habit to withhold the opinions that I entertain. It has been my habit in life to express myself in very plain language. I do so on the present occasion, and I feel satisfied that when the time shall come for posterity to decide, as it must decide, on the shares of all who have taken part in these great transactions, their praise will be given to the present Administration, and their reprobation to the last.

Sir C. Dilke (Chelsea) said the Government had invented the policy of European coercion which they now opposed, and for which they had now substituted an undignified and dangerous coercion by Russia in the name of Europe. He would have preferred to speak in support of a vote of censure, rather than in support of a motion which was only a motion for papers. The hon. baronet went on to comment on the Protocol, which he warmly approved, and especially the phrases in which the Powers stated that they had "undertaken in com-

mon the pacification of the East," and that the treatment of the Eastern Christians was "incompatible with their interests." Even the word "*moyens*" was a very strong one, and the "means to be taken to secure" were a repetition of the "securities" and of the "guarantees" of which they had heard so much and seen so little. When, however, he came to the declaration of Lord Derby, his satisfaction was turned into dismay. He confessed that he thought the declaration absolutely untrue, inasmuch as it declared the object of the Protocol to be that which palpably was not its object. The object of the Protocol was obviously from its first line to its last that improvement of the position of the rayah population of Turkey which was not so much as mentioned in Lord Derby's declaration. No declaration could destroy the statements in the Protocol, which were statements of facts to which in the future Russia would hold us bound—such, for instance, as that in which we solemnly declared that the position of the Eastern Christians was "incompatible with our interests." Still, as regarded Turkey, the declaration had been disastrous. He knew of no precedent for declarations so entirely neutralizing the effect of the documents to the signature of which they were attached as did those of England and Russia made on this occasion. He wished to ask—and here was a reason for further papers—which Power set the bad example to the other. If Russia first knew of Lord Derby's intention to make his declaration, then they must maintain that Lord Derby's declaration caused the Russian declaration, and so produced the present dangers of the European situation. If, on the other hand, Lord Derby first knew of the intention of Russia to make the declaration that she made, then he ought not to have been a party to the hollow mockery of the signature of a useless Protocol—a signature which could do no service to any one not upon the Stock Exchange. Not only in this one case, but all along, the result of the conduct of the Government had been to destroy the effect produced by European concert upon the Turks. He never heard such a gospel of selfishness as had fallen from the right hon. gentlemen the Secretary for War that night. British interests, nothing but British interests! One would have thought this had ceased to be the country which had made such sacrifices not only of money but of blood, in many parts of the world,

to put down the slave trade by direct interference with other Powers. He would only say that if England was to appear before the other Powers in the light in which she had been placed by the right hon. gentleman's speech, much as he disliked Russia, he would sooner be a Russian at the present time. He was proud of being an Englishman, no man prouder; but if we were to look forward in this country to living for nothing but the selfish purpose proclaimed by the right hon. gentleman, he would sooner belong to a nation which, whatever the doctrines of their Government, had risen superior to selfish considerations, and had laboured for the emancipation of their oppressed brethren in the Turkish Empire.

Mr. Butler-Johnstone (Canterbury) thought the Protocol was the natural corollary and issue of the Conference, and could not help bringing about the same result—failure—and leaving us on the very verge of a European war. By what right did we seek to press terms upon Turkey? We did so in the name of the European concert. When had Europe concerted for a good object? It had concerted twice—once for the partition of Poland, and once at Verona to crush the rising liberties of Spain. Was there such a thing as Europe? She was an elderly lady who had no character to lose, for she began by being the mistress of Jupiter and ended by being the handmaid of Russia. No man had better right to advise the people of this country than Mr. Gladstone. He would be the last man to blame the right hon. gentleman for the course he took in the autumn—indeed, he never admired the right hon. gentleman until then. It was a great thing to be the successful leader of a triumphant majority; but to be in a minority and to dictate the policy of this country, this was a thing of which any man in his personal capacity might be proud. In ancient times a place was provided for statesmen like the right hon. gentleman in the Privy Council. If the ancient Privy Council still existed a place would have been provided for him, and we should not then have had the great question of the East decided in the streets.

The right hon. gentleman had successfully dictated the policy of the country, and had made the country turn its back upon its ancient traditions. The result of these negotiations had been that we had falsified the meaning of the English language, and had become involved in equivocal expressions

and secondary intentions. We talked of maintaining the integrity and independence of Turkey, and put her at the same time under a warlike tutelage. We spoke of coercing Turkey, but it was not by involving her and ourselves in a bloody war, but it was coercion in some abstract and metaphysical sense, which should act on her mind while leaving her batteries and ironclads intact.

What was the deliberate policy at the present day of Russia in Poland towards the United Greek Church? A sort of Star Chamber was established to induce the professors of the United Greek Church to return to the Orthodox faith.

The popes and priests were compelled to sign a petition to the Emperor to be allowed to return to the Orthodox Church, and if they refused these popes or parish priests were banished from Russia. To send those bishops and priests into banishment was equivalent to sentencing them to starvation. But not only did they so suffer, the peasants also were bound to go into the Orthodox churches, and Cossacks were employed to drive them there; aye, and to administer fifty stripes of the Cossack's whip to men who refused to go, five to women, and ten to children. He challenged the Government to deny that they were cognisant of those facts. More than that, many peasants belonging to the United Greek Church refused to obey, and forty of them took refuge in a barn, set fire to it, and were burnt to death rather than join the Orthodox Church. If such things happened in the broad day, what could they say of those who roared like lions when Turkish misdeeds were concerned, and cooed like sucking doves when Russian misdeeds were spoken of.

Mr. Goschen (London) said that after the cheers which followed the close of the speech of the Secretary for War (Mr. Hardy), it was rumoured in the House that an intelligent foreigner had rushed away, believing that the House had cheered an announcement that peace had been concluded. But what were they celebrating? Why, a speech which virtually meant that England had been baffled by Turkey and checkmated by Russia. The hon. member for Sheffield (Mr. Roebuck), alluding to some cheers which were heard in the course of his speech in reference to what has been done in Russia, said that those cheers would be heard in St. Petersburg; but he wished it also to be remembered that other cheers which encouraged Turkey would be also heard at Constantinople. He wished

that the speech of the right hon. gentleman the Secretary for War had been more clear as to how these two declarations pertained and attached to the Protocol. Although he listened with the greatest possible attention, he could not make out, and he did not believe that the House at the present moment understood, whether it was by the action of Russia or by the action of England that these extraordinary declarations were appended to the Protocol.

What was a Protocol? It was a record of the past and a minute of the present. This, he believed, was the proper definition of a Protocol among diplomatists. Now, what were the nine paragraphs of the present Protocol? In the first the great Powers "recognized," in the second they "took cognisance," in the third they "considered," in the fourth they "considered again," in the fifth they "invited and recognized," in the sixth they "took special cognisance," in the seventh they "believed they had grounds for hoping," in the eighth they "proposed to watch," and in the ninth they "thought it right to declare, and they reserved to themselves to consider." They "considered," they "recognized," they "took special cognisance," they "considered again," and they "declared?" but all their consideration and all their cognisance were declared null and void. Was it to be null and void as regards the whole of the six Powers, or as regards England alone?

Lord Derby had said it was solely with a view of patching up peace that we consented to sign the Protocol—he presumed at the dictation of Russia, because this was implied and insinuated by the words "We have consented to sign." If disarmament did not ensue, then the Protocol, it was said, was to be null and void.

Had the other Powers accepted the declaration or not? What did they think of it? Did they approve the breaking up of the European concert in the very document that was to establish it? Did they consider that the Protocol would be null and void as regards them? After all, it was not of much importance whether they considered the Protocol would be null and void, because there was nothing in it that could by any power of language be made null and void. You could not say that your cognisance of past acts was null and void. There were only two points which could by any straining of language be considered null and void. They were "that they proposed to

watch," and "that they reserved to themselves to consider." Therefore possibly they abandoned the proposal that they would watch Turkey if Turkey refused to disarm, in which case she ought to be watched more than ever. Again, the Protocol might possibly be null and void when they "reserved to themselves to consider" in common, and in his belief we must look to this last phrase for the intention of the Government in saying that the Protocol was to be null and void. As his hon. friend the member for Oxford had pointed out, this last phrase was contrary in practice to the ninth article of the Treaty of Paris. That treaty was not repealed in terms by the Protocol, but a heavy blow was dealt at it; and therefore gentlemen on that side of the House were not very surprised at the Secretary for War (Mr. Hardy) not speaking at such length this evening as he did on a former occasion on the obligations of the treaty. He had changed his ground, and dwelt rather on the absence of any mission from heaven to insist on reforms in Turkey, than on the obligation of treaties which would prevent us from doing so.

He apprehended the meaning of the provision attached to the Protocol was that the English Government would not consider in common, and would refuse to take the united action which was contemplated in the Protocol, if either Russia or Turkey should refuse to disarm. Was not that putting a premium on Turkey's refusing to disarm, and was not that precisely what happened? Our Government, by consenting at the same time that the Russian declaration, which was even more offensive to Turkey, should appear, made it still more certain that the Protocol would be of no avail.

The Secretary for War had, indeed, made a clean breast of what he regarded as the English view to Europe, but he trusted that was not in reality the English view, which had been so eloquently described by his hon. friend the member for Chelsea (Sir Charles Dilke) as the gospel of selfishness, which the right hon. gentleman had preached. But even taken on the grossest and most vulgar ground of English interests, was it, he would ask, for the true interests of England that we should entirely abstain, and so ostentatiously declare our abstention, as had been done by the right hon. gentleman?

The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir Stafford

Northcote) considered the mover of the demand for papers ought to have taken some definite course, either confining himself to the putting of questions, or definitely challenging the policy of the Government. The Government refused to be taunted out of the policy which they had deliberately adopted: and that policy was expressed in the instructions given to Lord Salisbury when he went to the Conference.

But while we have announced that that was our policy, we have also at the same time announced in what manner we would and in what manner we would not pursue it; and we have distinctly said that we would not bring about, or be parties to bringing about, any reforms of that kind by the use of force and by a resort to war. We have never said that no circumstances should induce England to draw the sword; but we have said, with reference to this particular point, that we have refused, and consistently refused, to exercise the coercion by a recourse to arms. We believed that although, as I ventured to say on one occasion, it is possible by coercion to compel a Government to give up a province or to make any particular concession, it is not possible by the mere use of force to compel a nation to govern properly. You may say you will take away provinces, and put them under some other Government. That is a policy which is intelligible. But is that the policy advocated? We want to know what is the policy that is put in opposition to ourselves. Does any one venture to say in so many words, "I am an advocate for coercion"? I am told—unfortunately I was not in the House—that the hon. and learned member for Poole went very nearly to that point, if not quite, in the course of this evening. I do not know whether I am misrepresenting him—he will correct me if I am wrong—but I am told he said something to this effect, that he recommended coercion, by which he did not mean war, but something tantamount to war. [Mr. Ashley assented.] I have no doubt that the hon. and learned gentleman has in his mind some subtle distinction by which he thinks we can, without going to war, get all the advantages of going to war.

Mr. Ashley here said he meant, not a general war for the purposes of conquest, but a special coercive act which had a limited object.

Sir Stafford Northcote:—I greatly regret for my own sake, and I have no doubt that there are

many others here present who must also regret, that they had not the advantage of hearing this interesting illustration. I am told that he went on so far as to give an example of the sort of coercive act which he recommended—that is, that somebody, I don't know that he said who, should take Bulgaria away from Turkey. But, sir, there are others who, I think, are not prepared to be quite so practical; who go very far indeed on the lines of coercion, and yet do not mean to bring matters actually to the arbitrament of arms; who think that if you threaten with sufficient show of force you will probably carry your point, and that if you fail, you may in that case not do anything. You fall into the error against which Lord Beaconsfield has protested, of threatening and then refusing to act. If there has been anything like weakness in this transaction, you must attribute it to the determination of Lord Derby, who would not use language implying threats that we did not intend to carry out. We have refused to join in certain documents, such as the Berlin Memorandum, because that document meant coercion; by coercion I mean coercion by physical force. There is, no doubt, another kind of coercion, which, when it is successful, is much more effective. There is the line of moral coercion, which, if pursued in favourable circumstances, may lead to a happy result. I say when it is pursued in favourable circumstances; but if there are any unfavourable circumstances to moral pressure, it is when military coercion is threatened at the same time, and when moral pressure is thus neutralized by the spirit of opposition in a proud nation—and I may say a gallant nation—when they are called upon to yield not merely to arguments addressed to their common sense, but to threats of military force.

The Conference might have been far more successful than it actually was, if it had not been that the presence of the Russian army and the attitude which the Russian army maintained during the negotiations complicated the position, and made it the more difficult for Turkey to give way. Well, what was the situation in which we were at the end of the Conference?

We were in this situation. Turkey had proposals made to her and pressed upon her by every argument that could be used, and with all the influence that could be brought to bear, and Turkey refused. I will not take notice of the steps

which the Turks took within their own dominions in consequence of what passed. But as far as the recommendations of the Powers assembled in the Conference were concerned, Turkey rejected them. What was to be done? That was a natural question for any government, and especially for the Russian Government, which had taken so prominent a position, to be the first to ask. That question was asked, and it was obvious at once that there was considerable difficulty in answering it as long as the attitude of Russia was maintained. It was evident that the position of the Russian army, which was a cause of difficulty during the Conference, would continue to be a cause of difficulty. What happened. Russia came forward, after having put this question, which would not and could not be conveniently answered, and which it was not desired by Russia should be answered, and she told us what would be sufficient. She said, "If these proposals cannot be accepted, you may at least put matters on a footing which will be sufficiently satisfactory, and which will show sufficient evidence of progress to enable me with honour to disband my troops."

Expressions of contempt had been heaped upon the Protocol, but the Protocol was not the invention of the British Government; it was the proposal of the Russian Government. Then it was said by some, "The Protocol is good enough in itself, but it is destroyed by the declaration." Even a glance at the papers on the table might have shown that the declaration was arranged by Russia before any was made by Lord Derby. It was perfectly obvious. For what was the position?

Russia having her troops under arms comes forward and says, "If you will sign this Protocol we will be prepared to take the step of disarmament." The declaration, though not part of the Protocol, is of equal authority as showing the intention of Russia, and what the considerations were which induced us to sign the Protocol, in the hope that it would be a step to the reciprocal disarmament of Russia and Turkey, and thereby conjuring away the danger of war. That is the simple explanation of the position; and we believed that if the danger could be conjured away even for a year, or less than a year, it would form a breathing time and opportunity of pressing on the Porte those measures which were more or less concerted and agreed upon at the Conference as measures which

would be likely to bring about the better government of Turkey.

He was not prepared to say that all hope for the maintenance of peace was at an end. But whether there came peace or war, the attitude this country had taken was one which she would be able to maintain, and we should be free from all entangling engagements except those which bound us in time past, and which are still binding upon us. It was said that the Protocol was to set aside the Treaty of Paris. He did not see in what sense or way it was to do so. He sometimes heard it said that any engagement or any proposal on the part of European Powers to watch over the proceedings of Turkey, or to keep an eye upon the condition of her subjects, was contrary to the ninth article of the Treaty of Paris. He could not understand such language from anybody who had the article before him.

Every nation has a right to watch what its neighbours are doing, if they are doing anything which is likely to be dangerous to the peace of Europe; and we have maintained that right still. My right hon. friend was taunted with speaking of our caring only for the interests of England. We maintain the honour of England; we maintain the faith of treaties; we maintain the right England has always desired for herself, that of endeavouring to use her influence in such a manner as it may best be used in the cause of peace and humanity. Reference has been made to one of the brightest jewels in the Crown of England, the suppression of the slave trade; and the spirit which animated England in suppressing it is a spirit which is not dead among us. It lives and is as vigorous as ever. Whatever may be the course of events, it need not be feared that those who direct the counsels of the Sovereign of England will fail to exhibit that spirit which has animated their predecessors, and which still animates the nation. I am quite certain that if any Ministry failed in this respect to maintain the honour and the interests of England, whatever temporary majority they might have in the House of Commons, they would soon find out what it was to forfeit it.

In the House of Lords on Monday, April 16, Earl Granville again called attention to the papers relating to the Protocol. He complained of their insufficiency, and wished to know why the draft Protocol was not produced. The Protocol itself

was "not a very clear or business-like document." It omitted all mention of the guarantees which the noble Marquis at the Conference joined the other Powers in asking of Turkey. The Government seemed to have had no definite line. There had been "too much inclination to be always going up and down according to the thermometer of Russia." Having said so much against the Protocol, the remainder of his remarks in reference to it would be in its favour. It had been stated that the effect of the Protocol was to destroy the Treaty of 1856: he did not concur in that. Referring to a speech delivered during the recess by the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Ward Hunt), as to the pre-eminence of England among the Powers, and as to the indomitable pluck of the Turks, Earl Granville said it might have been becoming in a "jolly tar," but was hardly judicious in a Cabinet Minister. Another Cabinet Minister, the Chief Secretary to the Lord-lieutenant of Ireland (Sir M. Hicks-Beach), in a speech delivered at Gloucester on the same day, made remarks so similar that he thought there must have been some previous communication on the subject; but he should think that communication, if it occurred, must have been at the Irish Office rather than the Foreign Office. With regard to the Protocol, he would take it that the declaration of Count Schouvaloff was the first made; but he presumed that there must have been some intimation of an intention to make it.

I should like to know whether any demand was made for it by her Majesty's Government, and I should like to know whether or not they objected to it in the form in which it was made. There could have been nothing more natural than to say, "Here we are all signing a Protocol expressing our common views and intentions; and if you make any declaration which introduces new conditions we shall hesitate to sign the Protocol." I should like to know whether the declaration of her Majesty's Government was communicated to the other Powers, and was approved by them. If it were not, clearly you exposed yourself to the imputation that you were breaking up the European concert. If, on the other hand, the other European Powers did see and approve your declaration, why did they not join in it? Italy made a declaration of her own; but why did not France and Germany and Austria join you? Why, if there was to be such a declaration as yours, were

yours the paws to be put in the fire? If you had any reason to believe that, immediately after the signing of the Protocol, Russia would go forward and disregard that diplomatic act, you should have taken some measures to prevent yourselves from appearing as her dupe. What a great pity it is you did not adopt the words of the Italian declaration, which is clear and simple, and meets all the difficulties of the case. The Italian Government do not insert the word "solely," and thereby allow it to be inferred that they signed the treaty in the interests of European peace alone, and without regard to the condition of the inhabitants of the Christian provinces of Turkey. I know it is said that the word "solely" was not used for the purpose of excluding the latter object; but the great advantage of the Italian declaration is this—that it is a clear statement on the part of the Italian Government in this sense, "We sign a certain document with five other Powers; if one, two, or three of those other Powers depart from it, we shall not be bound by the others to adhere to the agreement by that document come to." But you do not put the *onus* on the Power or Powers which might depart from the general agreement, but you make the validity of the agreement subject to what is done by Turkey, which is not a party to it, and to what is done by Russia as regards disarmament.

Having further reviewed the Protocol, and referred to the Berlin Memorandum, Lord Granville asked at any rate for more oral information from Ministers. "I hold," he said, "and have held, that even if her Majesty's Government were justified in pledging themselves against all measures of coercion—which I do not admit—it was madness, at a time when the noble Marquis was using all his eloquence at Constantinople to enforce the views of the Conference, for you to be assuring the Turks that they had nothing to fear; and I think it was very unwise, at the time when you were signing the Protocol, to declare that it lay with Turkey or with Russia alone to break up the whole of the agreement that had been come to in this matter between the European Powers. Attacks had been made on the conduct of the Opposition, both during the recess and since the opening of Parliament.

Party motives were attributed to some of us who united with persons of all conditions and politics in complaining in the autumn of the want of sup-

port which her Majesty's Government gave to the Christian subjects of the Porte—persons who were equally strong in support of the Government when, by the noble Earl's demand for reparation, by the proposal of the Conference, and by the mission of the noble Marquis, it was hoped that the Government were changing their course. That those demands failed, that that Conference was without results, cannot by any possibility be laid to the account of the Opposition; and I trust that some of those who were so much alarmed lest appeals to the sentiment of the people might obscure their judgment as to their material interests will, in the critical times which are coming, remember that appeals to pride, anger, and prejudice may lead the judgment as far from a knowledge of their real interests, as appeals to sympathy for suffering and horror of injustice and wrong. Since the opening of Parliament we have, I hope temperately and with moderation, laid down the general lines of the policy which we advocate. It is not to alienate, but to conciliate, the Christian subjects of the Porte; it is not step by step to facilitate the position which Russia takes up of being the only Power in earnest in the matter, and to pave the way for the step which, in my opinion, she so unfortunately is prepared to take. The policy they wished to see adopted was that this country should be the promoter, and not the obstacle, to that union of Europe which should show itself in earnest in insisting upon those reforms which Europe had declared to be necessary to the peace of Europe.

We are told that our policy means the bombardment of Constantinople and bloody battles, resulting in a general partition of the spoils by the whole of Europe. I say that our policy is no such thing. You might as well say that I am encouraging street disturbances because I wish half a dozen policemen to stop a "rough" from throwing stones to the danger of the passers-by. If the boy was utterly reckless he might kick a policeman's shins, and possibly get a little roughly handled himself; but the chance of real opposition would be *nil*. Is it possible to infer from the obstinacy of the Turks at the present moment, which the noble Earl so properly condemned, but which another Minister calls indomitable pluck, after you have succeeded in convincing them, rightly or wrongly, that they have Russia alone to fear, that they would have opposed a similar resis-

tance to United Europe seriously and earnestly intent upon the pacification of Europe? . . . If by abstinence from votes of censure the Government think they are hurt, they have their remedy in votes of confidence. If we bring questions on, it will be for the country to consider whether we have done so for party or personal objects, or for the public good.

The Earl of Derby, after some remarks as to the duty of an Opposition, spoke of the agitation in the previous autumn. "I am bound," he said, "to say, that however humane the feeling which may have led to it, I cannot but think that agitation itself did considerable mischief, because it gave a false impression abroad as to the real feelings and opinion of the English people." As to producing the draft Protocol, Count Schouvaloff objected. Moreover, it would serve no useful purpose, because it has been altered again and again, "so that if I produced the first draught I should be bound to produce the second, the third, the fourth, and the fifth—I really forget how many of them there were—and their multiplicity would only lead to confusion." The noble Earl was of opinion that the Protocol itself was an unbusinesslike document. "Well, that is matter of opinion. As my feelings as an author are not concerned, I shall not quarrel with the noble Earl on that point. As to its general tenor, no doubt the good government of the Christian provinces was a very important object, but we could not hope to effect that until we succeeded in inducing Russia and Turkey to disband their immense forces." That was the practical object they had in view. As to the Berlin Memorandum, nothing would have secured its requirements being carried out but the employment of force. The noble Earl wished to know which of the two declarations was first made—the English or the Russian. "Well, as a matter of fact," continued Lord Derby, "the Russian declaration preceded mine in point of time. For my part, my Lords, I do not see that any importance attaches to the fact, the two declarations being made and to signed at the same meeting. Then, again, the noble Earl asks whether the English declaration was elicited by any demands made on the part of any foreign Government. In the first place, we had asked whether the Russian Government would be prepared to disarm in the event of the Protocol being signed. We said that we saw no particular advantage in entering into an engagement of this

kind. It was not our plan. It was not devised by us. The Russian Government asked us to sign a document of this nature, giving as their reason that they were anxious to disarm, but that it was impossible for them to do so, or to appear to retreat in the face of Turkey, unless they had something to show that in the action they took they had the support of Europe. The Russian Government asked us to sign this Protocol, so as to give them, as they said, an excuse for demobilization. Well, that being so, I think it was necessary for us to say, "If we sign that which we do not consider any particular advantage to us, what guarantee will you give us that it will accomplish the object for which you propose it? If the Protocol be signed, will you demobilize? The Russian Government said they could not undertake to do that, and they put forward reasons which we were not inclined to dispute. They said, "We cannot tell whether peace will be made with Montenegro or not, and if the war with Montenegro goes on, and Montenegro is again invaded, we cannot disarm." They said, too, that fresh events might take place which would render it impossible for them to withdraw. We admitted that there was a certain amount of force in that reasoning, and we adopted the expedient of the declaration, which comes to this: we said, You ask us to sign a certain document for a certain purpose; we will sign it for that purpose, but we will accompany it with a condition which, if that purpose is not accomplished, will prevent it being used for any other purpose. That was the whole object of the declaration to which the noble Earl alluded. Then the noble Earl asks, "Did you consult the other Powers as to your intention to make this declaration?" I do not, speaking off-hand, remember in what form the intention was communicated, but I know this, that we made no secret of our intentions in that respect. It was known to the representatives of the other Powers, and from the language which they held to me, and from such other means of information as I had in my power, I did not think that any objection or any disapproval was expressed in any quarter. The noble Earl asks whether I was aware of the Italian declaration, and I have to state that I did not know of it until it was signed. But the noble Earl says that one effect of our declaration was that it enabled Turkey, without consultation with any other Power, to render the

Protocol ineffectual. That, my lords, is quite true. But recollect what was the object of the Protocol. We were mediating, or endeavouring to mediate, between Russia and Turkey, and if one of the parties refuses and declines our mediation, no matter what form you adopt, that one party can prevent the success of the project. No doubt it was in the power of Turkey to render the Protocol unproductive, but my contention is that precisely the same objection would apply to any course of pacification. It may be asked why we took this course, and why we signed a document of this kind. My answer is as follows:—We were bound to assume that when the Russian Government came and told us that they wanted an excuse for disarmament, we were bound to an expression of opinion, and it was obviously our duty to help them in removing any obstacle in the way of peace. If, on the other hand—which I do not say is desirable, but I only put it forward as an hypothesis—you were to suppose that from the beginning there had been no *casus belli* against Turkey, then I say that upon that hypothesis our best course was to do that which we did, because in the event of our refusing to take that course it is quite certain that the whole responsibility and the whole blame would have been laid on this country. I think I have answered the question which the noble Earl opposite has put, and probably in the present circumstances your Lordships will agree with me that I should act wisely in abstaining from any speculations as to the future.

The Marquis of Lansdowne could not conceive how a more serious blow could have been struck against the Treaties of 1856 than had been inflicted by the Protocol. The explanation of the noble Lord opposite (Lord Derby) was almost cynical

in its candour. The noble Earl told the House that the Protocol was accepted because it was the only means which her Majesty's Government saw of obtaining peace. It was the one thing urgent at that time. Now he ventured to say that, although the Protocol might give her Majesty's Government the prospect of a short breathing time, they should have hesitated to sign a paper which so completely condemned—he might almost say stultified—their previous action. The Protocol expressed this conviction of her Majesty's Government. They had grounds for hoping the Porte would profit by the present lull to apply energetically such measures as would produce a real improvement in the condition of the Christian population, which was considered indispensable to the tranquillity of Europe. What were these "grounds for hoping" that the position of the Christians would be improved? The only grounds mentioned in the Protocol were the promises volunteered by the Porte itself. But over and over again those promises had been declared by the noble Earl and his colleagues to be positively worthless.

Should war break out, he was afraid many like himself would think some share of responsibility attached to the Government, who had from the outset hesitated between two lines of policy. They might have adopted a policy of strict non-intervention, or the policy indicated by the noble Marquis opposite at Constantinople, who used not only strong language, but resorted to strong action as well against the Porte. The Government, however, had hesitated between those two policies, and the result was a threatened European war, greater and more terrible, probably, than any which this country had known.

CHAPTER XIII.

Certainty of War—Decision of the Russians to advance to the Frontier—Visit of the Czar to the Army—Review and Address to the Troops—Manifesto of the Emperor of Russia and Declaration of War—Explanatory Despatch from Prince Gortschakoff to the European Powers—Reasons for the Suddenness of the Russian Decision—Comparison of the Manifesto of the Czar with that issued by the Emperor Nicholas before the Crimean War—Grand Military Review and Imposing Religious Ceremony on the Declaration of War—Exciting Address to the Army by the Archbishop of Kischeneff—Feeling in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and throughout Russia—Appeal by the Empress in aid of the Sick and Wounded, and Gratifying Response—Departure of the First Sanitary Train from St. Petersburg—Address of the Grand-duke Nicholas to the Army—The War regarded in Russia as a Religious Crusade—Return of the Czar to Moscow—Scenes in the City—Addresses from the Provincial Nobles and Town Council—Enthusiastic Reception at St. Petersburg—War Scenes on the Russian Railways—Arrival of Mr. Layard, the English Ambassador, at Constantinople—Important interviews with the Grand Vizir and the Sultan—Great efforts of England to preserve Peace—Departure of the Russian Embassy—Manifesto of the Sultan—The Banner of the Caliphate and its wonderful influence on Mahometans—Strange Scene in the Ottoman Parliament—The Armenian Church and the Turks—Circular from the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs to the European Powers in justification of Turkey and condemnation of Russia—Opinions and Feeling in Constantinople with regard to the War—Sumptuary Decree with regard to Women's Dress—Admiral Hobart Pasha's opinion on the true Position of Affairs—Russian Subjects in Turkey placed under German protection—Egypt and the War.

WHEN the Turkish reply to the Protocol became known, it was felt in every capital in Europe that all hope of preserving peace was at an end. A week or two might elapse before war was actually declared, for the weather was not settled; but then the great cloud which had so long been gathering on the Turkish frontier would break in a furious storm, and discussion would be exchanged for breathless watchfulness.

On April 10 a Council of War was assembled at the head-quarters of the Russian Army of the South at Kischeneff, under the presidency of its Commander-in-chief, the Grand-duke Nicholas, when it was determined that the movement of troops towards the frontier should begin. The Czar—accompanied by the military attachés of Germany, France, and Austria—left St. Petersburg for Kischeneff on Friday morning, April 20, and it required a very sanguine temperament to believe that somewhere on the frontier of Russia and Roumania he would renew negotiations with the Sultan with a view to the maintenance of peace. On Sunday, April 22, he reviewed the ninth army corps at Tiraspol, and the eighth, eleventh, and twelfth at Ungheni. The greatest enthusiasm prevailed amongst the troops and the population, and also amongst the Roumanians who had come from the Pruth to witness the spectacle. After the review the carriage of the Emperor was escorted by the crowd, amidst the cheers of the army. At the railway station his Majesty, addressing the officers of the inspected troops, said:—"Before your departure I give you my blessing. If you

should encounter the enemy show yourselves brave, and strive to uphold the ancient glory of your regiments. There are among you young men who have not been under fire. I hope they will not show themselves inferior to their veteran comrades, but will prove themselves their equals. I trust that you may soon return covered with glory." His Majesty also addressed the men, and said he felt grief at sending them to the field of battle, and had therefore delayed action as long as possible, hesitating to shed their blood. But now that the honour of Russia was attacked he was convinced they would all, to the last man, vindicate it. "May God be with you! I wish you complete success. Farewell until your return."

Two days later—Tuesday, April 24—war was virtually declared by the issue of the following Manifesto:—

"Our faithful and beloved subjects know the strong interest which we have constantly felt in the destinies of the oppressed Christian population of Turkey. Our desire to ameliorate and assure their lot has been shared by the whole Russian nation, which now shows itself ready to bear fresh sacrifices to alleviate the position of the Christians on the Balkan Peninsula. The blood and the property of our faithful subjects have always been dear to us, and our whole reign attests our constant solicitude to preserve to Russia the benefits of peace. This solicitude never failed to actuate us during the deplorable events which occurred in Herzegovina, Bosnia, and Bulgaria. Our object

before all was to effect an amelioration in the position of the Christians in the East by means of pacific negotiations, and in concert with the great European Powers, our allies and friends. For two years we have made incessant efforts to induce the Porte to effect such reforms as would protect the Christians of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria from the arbitrary measures of the local authorities. The accomplishment of these reforms was absolutely stipulated by anterior engagements contracted by the Porte towards the whole of Europe. Our efforts, supported by the diplomatic representations made in common by the other Governments, have not, however, attained their object. The Porte remained unshaken in its formal refusal of any effective guarantee for the security of its Christian subjects, and rejected the conclusions of the Constantinople Conference. Wishing to essay every possible means of conciliation in order to persuade the Porte, we proposed to the other Cabinets to draw up a special Protocol, comprising the most essential conditions of the Constantinople Conference, and to invite the Turkish Government to adhere to this international act, which states the extreme limits of our peaceful demands. But our expectation was not fulfilled. The Porte did not defer to this unanimous wish of Christian Europe, and did not adhere to the conclusions of the Protocol. Having exhausted our pacific efforts, we are compelled by the haughty obstinacy of the Porte to proceed to more decisive acts. A feeling of equity and of our own dignity enjoins it. By her refusal Turkey places us under the necessity of having recourse to arms. Profoundly convinced of the justice of our cause, and humbly committing ourselves to the grace and help of the Most High, we make known to our faithful subjects that the moment foreseen when we pronounced words to which all Russia responded with such complete unanimity has now arrived. We expressed the intention to act independently when we deemed it necessary, and when Russia's honour should demand it. In now invoking the blessing of God upon our valiant armies, we give the order to cross the Turkish frontier.

“ALEXANDER.

“Given at Kischeneff this twelfth (24th) day of April, in the year of grace one thousand eight hundred and seventy-seven, in the twenty-third year of our reign.”

On the same day a Circular Note was published which had been addressed by Prince Gortschakoff to the Russian ambassadors in Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, and Rome, and which they were to bring to the cognisance of the Government to which they were accredited. It stated that the Imperial Cabinet had, since the commencement of the Eastern crisis, exhausted all the means in its power in order to bring about, with the co-operation of the great Powers, a lasting pacification of Turkey. All proposals made successively to the Porte, in consequence of the understanding established between the cabinets of the Powers, had, however, met with insurmountable resistance from the Porte. The Protocol signed in London on the 19th (31st) of March was the last expression of the united will of Europe. The Imperial Cabinet had in signing it offered its hand at its last attempt at conciliation. By a declaration attached to the Protocol it had from that day marked out the conditions which, if loyally and sincerely accepted, and carried out by the Turkish Government, were calculated to bring about the re-establishment and strengthening of peace. The Porte had answered it by a fresh refusal. This eventuality was not provided for in the London Protocol. Europe, in framing its wishes and resolutions, had confined itself to stipulating that the great Powers, if they should see themselves disappointed in their hopes of seeing the Porte carry out with energy the measures for the improvement of the position of the Christian population, and unanimously considered as indispensable for the peace of Europe, reserved to themselves the right to point out in common the means which they should think proper to secure the welfare of the population and the interests of the general peace. Thus the cabinets had foreseen the contingency that the Porte would not fulfil the promises which it would make, but not that the Porte would reject the demands of Europe. At the same time, it had been established by the declaration which Lord Derby made as an addition to the Protocol, that since the Government of her Majesty the Queen of England had only consented to the signature of the Protocol in view of the interests of general peace, it was to be understood from the outset that in the event of this object—namely, the mutual disarmament and peace between Russia and Turkey—not being obtained, the Protocol should be regarded as null and void. The rejection of the Protocol by the Porte,

and the motives upon which it was based, left no hope that the Porte would accede to the wishes and counsels of Europe, and excluded also every guarantee for the execution of the projected reforms for the improvement of the lot of the Christian population. They also rendered peace with Montenegro, and the execution of the conditions by which disarmament and pacification could be brought about, impossible. Under these circumstances, the success of any attempt at compromise was excluded, and there remained only the alternative, either to allow the state of things to continue which the Powers had declared incompatible with their interests and those of Europe, or to try by coercive measures to obtain that which the unanimous effort of the Powers did not succeed in obtaining from the Porte by means of an understanding. His exalted master had resolved to undertake that which his Majesty had invited the great Powers to do in common with him. His Majesty had given his armies the order to cross the frontier of Turkey. In taking this step he was fulfilling a duty which was imposed upon him by the interests of Russia, whose peaceable development was impeded by the constant troubles in the East. His Majesty had the conviction that he at the same time responded to the views of Europe.

On the same day Prince Gortschakoff addressed the formal notification of belligerency to Tavfek Bey, the Turkish chargé d'affaires, stating that the earnest negotiations between the Imperial Government and the Porte for a durable pacification of the East not having led to the desired accord, his Majesty saw himself compelled, to his regret, to have recourse to force of arms. "Be therefore so kind as to inform your Government that from to-day Russia considers herself in a state of war with the Porte. The first consequence of this is the rupture of the diplomatic relations of the two countries. I request you to kindly inform me of the number and rank of the persons of whom the Ottoman embassy in St. Petersburg is composed, in order that you may be furnished with the necessary passports. As regards the Ottoman subjects living in Russia, those who are desirous of leaving the country are at liberty to do so unmolested; those who should prefer to remain may consider themselves assured of the full protection of the laws."

All the above documents having been published throughout Europe simultaneously, the public

were at once put in possession of everything relative to the resolution of Russia to take matters into her own hands. Although the turn which affairs thus took had been for some time felt to be inevitable, the suddenness, as well as the thoroughness of the change, was rather a surprise. When the Czar left St. Petersburg for Kischeneff there were grounds for believing that the date for the beginning of the Russian intervention had not been actually fixed; and that it would not probably be taken before his Majesty's return. Moreover, it was believed that steps, in the first instance, would have been confined to an occupation of Roumania, without any direct declaration of war against Turkey. Although the information in this respect was not directly given by the Russian Government, which naturally showed great reserve with regard to its decision, yet it came from such an authority that it could not well be doubted. The fact that the Russian Circular Note was despatched from St. Petersburg almost simultaneously with the departure of the Czar was not necessarily opposed to this view, since according to recent Russian practice the time of despatching her communications furnished no clue to the time of their presentation. In the present case the Circular Note appeared in print before it was officially presented; so that the passage of Russian troops into Roumania had already begun before this step was officially notified to the governments by the Circular. Hence it is only fair to infer that something must have occurred which somewhat precipitated the action of Russia. The Russian *ultimatum* respecting the armistice, the Czar's Moscow speech, and the mobilization itself had shown that—consistent though the Russian policy had been in the main—yet as the daily course of that policy was dependent on the will of one man, it was naturally exposed to sudden resolutions, and this doubtless was the case in the present instance. Once in the midst of his army the Czar was removed from those influences which had been at work to delay and moderate, at any rate, if they could not prevent, a decision; thus leaving a door open to the chapter of accidents. The entry itself of the Russian army into the Principality might indeed be, but was not necessarily, at once the beginning of war. It might be regarded in the light of a menace of war; and, therefore, as a means of pressure to which Turkey might still yield in the

end. Such a course, too, seemed all the more plausible, as it would throw the responsibility of declaring war on Turkey. But all these considerations, which were supposed to have had weight before the Czar's departure from St. Petersburg, were set aside at Kischeneff. The men of the sword asserted their supremacy over the men of the gown; and simultaneously with the passing of the frontier the declaration of war was notified to the Porte. Even if there had been originally no great enthusiasm in the Russian army, it was but natural that when once kindled, all those diplomatic devices and political stratagems which were to have insured victory to Russia without fighting would not be looked upon very favourably, but would be regarded as more calculated to compromise the dignity of the great Russian nation than to achieve the end desired. The military point of honour almost demanded that an end should be made to all further finessing, and that the sword should decide where the pen had so wofully failed.

Not only in the train of thought, but even in some portions of the wording, the manifesto of the Emperor was on the pattern of that which his father issued before the Crimean War in 1853—*mutatis mutandis*, of course. For the rights of the orthodox church was substituted the fate of the oppressed Christian populations, which the Czar, not less than the Russian people, had at heart. While following the manifesto of 1853 as closely as circumstances would allow, the present document had, however, two not unimportant omissions. First, in the manifesto of 1853 there was the declaration that Russia had no intention to commence war, but that by the occupation of the Principalities she desired only to have such security as might insure the conservation of her rights. This was now passed over in silence, as well as the other declaration, that Russia did not seek for conquest, and needed it not. The first omission may perhaps be explained by the Circular Note of Prince Gortschakoff to the Powers, in which Russia, though she did not exactly say she had a commission to carry into effect the resolutions of Europe, still intimated plainly enough that she considered herself acting in accordance with the wishes of Europe—that is, that she did not regard her proceedings as war, but as the execution of a judgment. As for the other declaration—that Russia did not mean conquest—

its omission, both from the Manifesto and the Note, was probably in consequence of the assurances of the Czar to Lord Augustus Loftus in the November previous.

It will be seen that the Manifesto stated incidentally that, at the time of his celebrated Moscow speech, in November, 1876, the Emperor foresaw the necessity of acting on behalf of Russia independently of the other Powers. It would therefore seem that he never hoped much from the Protocol, and he thus apparently laid himself open to the accusation of using diplomacy principally as a means to gain time. The Circular addressed by Prince Gortschakoff to the Foreign Powers invalidated the Protocol by an argument which was more ingenious than convincing. The cabinets, it was urged, had taken thought of the contingency that the Porte might not fulfil the promises that it had made, but not that it might reject the demands of Europe. Immediate war was thus justified by the manner rather than by the matter of the Turkish refusal.

A grand military review and religious ceremony took place at Kischeneff on the day on which war was declared, at which the proceedings were of the most imposing and solemn character. At six o'clock in the morning the army was formed in line of battle in the plain two miles from Kischeneff—a crowd of spectators, estimated at nearly a hundred thousand, being present. On an elevation in front of this gigantic army and multitude of people an altar from the Cathedral had been conveyed, together with the banners, lamps, and various paraphernalia of the imposing ceremonies of the Russian Church.

At the appointed hour his Majesty appeared, and with his Imperial Staff passed in review the army, standing in three ranks—the infantry in front, the cavalry second, and the artillery in the rear, all forming a line of a mile in length. During the passage of the Emperor and his suite the military bands greeted him with the National Hymn, and the regiments made the welkin ring with their loud and long hurrahs and cries of "God save the Emperor."

When the review was finished, the Emperor made his way to an elevation on which was placed the altar, where he was awaited by the Archbishop and the chief dignitaries of the Church. He there dismounted, and assisted in the performance of religious ceremonies of the most solemn nature;

at the conclusion of which the venerable Archbishop mounted a platform, clothed in the magnificent robes of his office, and read in a solemn voice the Manifesto of War. The scene was most solemn and impressive, and though nearly half a million of people were gathered on the field, no sound was heard but the venerable priest, as he read that the sons of Russia were to go out and fight the oppressors of their kinsmen, and to do battle for the cause of God and Christianity. After reading the Manifesto, the Archbishop thus addressed the army. "Yours," he said, "is the great destiny to raise the Cross of Christ above the Crescent in the lands beyond the Danube as upon these shores, to raise above the blasting and annihilating domination of the Mussulman the tree of life, the banner of the victory over death, the blessed Cross, and all the rights of Christian citizenship which are dependent upon it. Before you will go, as in life, the holy images of the ancient Princes of Russia, Oleg and Igor and Sviatoslav, the majestic and holy forms of the Czars and Czarinas, Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, the blessed Alexander, the heroic Nicholas, the Romanoffs, too, and the Suwaroffs and the Kutusoffs, with their mighty triumphs. These and other mighty men of Russia made many a time the walls of Constantinople tremble before the weight of their arms. By their glorious achievements they raised up the Russian Empire, and widened its bounds by ever wider and richer territories conquered from the Turk. O warriors, how glorious are the memories which will inspire you in your victories and conquests!"

Presently the Metropolitan turned to the Czar and said:—

"Orthodox Czar and Master! Leader of the hosts of Russia! Before thy face do I bless the army, beloved of Christ through thee, in the name of our God, the Omnipotent. The Lord Jesus Christ be with thee, who art the champion of the cause of Christ. May He crown thy hero deeds with glorious victory!"

Then turning to the Grand-duke Nicholas, the Commander-in-chief, the Metropolitan continued:—

"Leader, beloved of Christ, of the armies which have assembled on our bounds! By the sacred image of Herbowetz, the sacred image of the chosen one, the celestial mother of God, the protectress of our city and our land, I bless thee

and thy companions in war. I give you all over to the mighty care of the Queen of Heaven, and I pray, and I shall continue to pray, that she may lead you from hero deed to hero deed, from victory to victory. God guide you back unhurt and uninjured, and crowned with laurels!"

At the conclusion of this address the Czar advanced towards the aged priest, and attempted to say a word to be conveyed to the army. For a minute he stood in silence, then spoke a few inaudible words, when his voice was suppressed with emotion, and again he stood with tears coursing down his cheeks, unable to speak. When it was seen that the Emperor could not speak, the multitude about him raised a loud hurrah to testify their sympathy in the determination he had made to send forth the armies to combat for their faith. The hurrah passed from the crowd about the altar, and was caught by the regiments and passed down the line of soldiery, and again and again repeated, until the very earth beneath their feet and the sky overhead seemed to resound to the echo. His Imperial Highness the Grand-duke Nicholas then approached the Emperor, and with a voice trembling with emotion thanked his Majesty for the honour that had been conferred upon him in confiding to his command the Army of the South, which he hoped would perform its duty, and show itself equal to any emergency or sacrifice demanded of it. His Majesty then knelt before the Archbishop, as did all his suite, and during the chanting of the choristers received the prayers and blessings of the church. The army then passed in review before his Majesty, and took their positions for a forward march towards the scene of their future operations; and the Emperor took a carriage and left the field, whilst the soldiers hurrahed, sang, threw their caps in the air, and appeared wild with enthusiasm and joy. The city of Kischeneff was decorated in a most gorgeous manner, and each householder vied with his neighbour in making the more imposing display.

In St. Petersburg the Manifesto was printed in a separate form and distributed all over the town by a numerous body of *Gazetchiks*. In all clubs, *traktirs*, *cafés*, and restaurants the long looked for ukase was posted up on the walls, and scattered about in great profusion on the tables. No trouble or expense was spared to place the important document in the hands of the public as

soon as possible. The excitement there was naturally great, though not so great as at Moscow. There prayers were offered up the same evening in the churches. Immediately after 50,000 persons assembled on the plain, and large crowds were everywhere met with in the streets. The noise of the great bells of the Kremlin and of the numerous other churches was deafening. At a meeting of the town council the Manifesto was read amid loud shouts of "Long live the Emperor! Long live our troops!" The council then agreed to furnish the Society for the Relief of the Sick and Wounded with 1000 beds, and then and there voted a million of roubles out of their funds for the sanitary necessities of the army. A committee was afterwards appointed to draw up a loyal address. At the head of the committee were the two celebrated patriots, Aksakof and Samarin; the latter was the proposer of the great Moscow address to the Emperor, which was the precursor of the innumerable addresses from all parts of the Empire that had continued to pour in for the previous four or five months. In St. Petersburg the chief place of proclamation was, of course, the Isaack Cathedral. At 10 o'clock in the morning the church was filled with an eager crowd, including a large number of officers of the Guards. All the ministers in the town were present. The litany was recited, and other rites were gone through; prayer was also offered up, the whole congregation kneeling. The Metropolitan and six other mitred priests then ranged themselves in the centre of the cathedral to hear the Manifesto, which was read from the steps of the high altar by a reader, in a loud voice. One could see by the trembling of his hands as he held the paper that he was considerably agitated, and every time he emphasized any particular passage a stir was visible among the closely-packed listeners; but there was no noise, no response. When this was finished, a priest in sober brown monkish garb mounted the too rarely used pulpit, and spoke for about twenty minutes. His theme was the Turkish yoke imposed on the necks of their Christian brethren, the patience and long-suffering of their venerated monarch, and the sacredness of the great task he had undertaken. He said this holy task did not fall to Russia solely because their distressed brethren were Christians, but because they were Slaves besides. The orthodox Czar had ever been anxious for peace, but the rest of

Europe having refused to succour the Eastern Christians, the Czar above all was bound to do so. His discourse was listened to with the deepest attention. There was not, however, any great enthusiasm, such as possessed the people of holy Moscow. The population in St. Petersburg is too much mixed with foreign elements to be as demonstrative as that of the old capital.

The day after the Manifesto was published in the capital, it was read in all the churches of the Empire with great religious ceremonial, and the impression everywhere made was of a very profound and earnest character. The measured terms in which it was drawn up, and the avoidance of any appeal to popular passion, met with special approval, especially in the commercial towns. Its publication was, in fact, a great relief to the public mind. The never-ending crisis had acted like a nightmare that prevented every one from breathing freely. All felt its ill effects, but for the commercial and manufacturing interests it was absolutely ruinous. It was also a great satisfaction to those who felt that Russia had hardly shown spirit enough, and that the efforts for the preservation of peace had been pushed beyond the limits which a nation with a sense of its own dignity should have allowed to be passed. Up to the very last moment rumours of a peaceful solution had continued to circulate; the delay which had occurred after the ground had been fully prepared for Russia's decision by the Porte's refusal of the Protocol threw people off the scent, as it were, and tended to strengthen the belief in a peaceful issue. Thus the day on which the Manifesto was published was felt to be one of the most important in Russian annals, as on it would be for ever recorded the fact that the Czar liberator gave the signal for emancipating Russia's brethren in race and creed from their Turkish oppressors.

The document called forth a responsive echo from the whole Russian press. The *Golos*, one of the most influential journals in the Empire, said—"So the mighty word has been spoken. The Imperial Manifesto was proclaimed to-day, and at this moment is being read and re-read in all Russia. The Russian people, one in thought and feeling with their crowned leader, have during the last few days become convinced that even their persistent love of peace is no longer of any use. During the exciting hours we have just passed through, all Russian society, from its highest to

its lowest strata, has finally become persuaded that the moment has arrived to act out the Imperial words uttered in the Kremlin in November last. Russia has realized that, to vindicate honour and justice, there is nothing left but, with God's blessing, to resort to force and cross the Turkish frontier. There is no need to write long commentaries upon the Imperial Manifesto. The profoundest thought and most eloquent language would be insignificant in comparison to the grave decision arrived at by his Majesty in the face of the Russian people and the whole Christian world. At the first word of the Manifesto all Russians, literate and illiterate, will rise as one man and help their brethren engaged in war, and pray God to bless the Russian arms! To the rest of Europe this Manifesto will appear an unique document in its way. There is not a word in it to awaken an angry feeling in Europe. There is not a word of blame to Europe for leaving us alone to pacify the Balkan Peninsula. There is, on the contrary, praise for the assistance hitherto derived from the Powers. The Circular Note of Prince Gortschakoff is conceived in the same spirit. Russia, the Chancellor tells us, will act independently, but not on behalf of Russia or Russian interests. She will be content to vindicate philanthropy, as recognized by the noblest of mankind. A briefer and more pacific declaration of war was never penned. To-day's Manifesto will be recorded as one of the most memorable documents of our time and the present reign of peace. This Manifesto constitutes the crowning consummation of the present reign of peace, whatever may be the consequences of the great struggle undertaken by his Majesty the Emperor for the liberation of the Turkish Christians from the barbarous Mussulman yoke."

Almost simultaneously with the publication of the Manifesto the Empress issued an appeal, stating that war having become necessary despite every effort to preserve peace, and the declaration of war having been made, the moment had come for the Society for Aiding Sick and Wounded Soldiers to fulfil its holy mission, and to devote all the forces and resources at its disposal to the alleviation of the sufferings of those who were to fight on the field of honour. She did not doubt that the directors of local committees and all members of the Society in different parts of the country would strive with zeal and energy to accomplish their sacred mission. The wants of the sick and

wounded would be great; but she knew how great and deep also was the love of their neighbour and the spirit of charity in the Russian people. Now especially that their nation's valiant army had been called upon to meet the enemy for the liberation of their oppressed brethren, she was convinced that donations would not be wanting, and that the national sentiment would make a new advance among all classes and in all parts of their vast country. Every gift would be a benefit, every donation, little or great, would have an equal value before God. Regarding the coming events with profound sorrow, but with firm confidence in Divine assistance, she prayed that the Lord might bless the sacrifices all and each were making for the success of the beautiful and great work.

The response of this appeal showed, that never had any modern idea made such rapid progress in Russia as the Society of the Red Cross. It was not until 1867 that a Russian representative was sent to the Convention at Paris; but now the whole of the nation took part in the humane work. In the highest ranks ladies gave their name, influence, time, and money; while the poorest peasants brought their few kopecks to the boxes of the Society. The different religious communities sent in their subscriptions—the English amongst the rest; civic functionaries, and even day labourers, gave up a percentage of their salaries, to be regularly paid as long as the war lasted; and there were concerts and theatrical representations given for the benefit of the Society without number.

All the members of the Imperial family did their utmost to forward the good work. The Grand-duchess Alexandra Petrovna, wife of the Commander-in-chief of the army, converted several of the halls of her palace into huge workshops, at which all sorts of material were received, to be made up into articles for the use of the sick and wounded. An immense number of persons of all classes went to the palace every day, and took their places at the tables when the materials were distributed. The Czarevna also opened some of the rooms of her palace at Tsarskoe Selo for the reception of gifts of all kinds, and persons appointed for the purpose gave out materials to be made up to all who applied for them.

Thus from the palace to the hut, and from the capital to the village, the people vied with each other in their efforts to assist in succouring their suffering countrymen. In many circles also much

time and trouble were devoted to studying nursing and the dressing of wounds. Within a few days of the declaration of war more than 300 girls and women were selected as nurses at St. Petersburg by the Society. They first attended theoretical lectures, and were then sent to the military hospital, Semenof Alexander, where Dr. Heyfelder gave them practical instruction before their departure for the front. They were specially taught the various operations and modes of dressing and bandaging wounds. The ladies proved apt pupils; and although the confined limits of the hospital, which only contains about 300 patients, hardly enabled the 125 students who were quartered there at a time, to learn everything they perhaps ought to have learned, they showed such proficiency that their certificates were awarded them by the Government in two or three weeks; and as they left for the front their places were taken by fresh students.

Dr. Heyfelder, who took such pains in training these field nurses, is well known in England and the United States by his works on military surgery, and his professional activity in the field during the Franco-German war.

As it was known that their Majesties intended to go to the station to take leave of the first sanitary train which left for the army, the streets from the Winter Palace to the Moscow terminus were lined with people, who vociferously cheered the Imperial family as they drove by. A great many distinguished personages were in waiting to receive their Majesties at the station, and on their arrival prayers were offered up for the success of the expedition; after which their Majesties inspected the carriages, which were fitted up with every possible convenience. They were arranged in the American manner, with beds on each side, and a passage between. The beds are placed on springs, and can easily be removed, to be used as litters in case of necessity. There were in the train a kitchen, a store room for provisions, a dispensary, and a magazine for linen, lint, &c. One carriage serves for the office, with places for the Sisters of Charity and the attendants, and another for the doctors.

Immediately war was declared the whole Russian army commenced to move: the advanced guard had, in fact, crossed the Roumanian frontier in three places—Ungheni, Beschamak, and Kubei—on the previous night.

On the following day (April 25) the Grand-duke Nicholas, Commander-in-chief, issued the following Proclamation to the Troops:—

“Our Christian brethren in Turkey have been groaning for centuries under the Ottoman yoke. Their slavery has been a terrible one. All that is dear to man, the sacred religion of Christ, honour, and the proceeds of toil—all have been desecrated and appropriated by the Infidels. Unable to endure their sufferings any longer, our unfortunate brethren have risen against their tyrants, and Christian blood has been shed for two years running. Towns and villages have been destroyed; our brethren’s property has been plundered, their wives and daughters have been dishonoured, and the population exterminated in more places than one. All the representations made by our august Sovereign and some foreign Governments, with a view to improve the condition of the Christian subjects, remain without result. The long-suffering patience of our Czar liberator is exhausted. The fiat of the Czar has gone forth. The Czar has declared war against Turkey. Troops of the army intrusted to my command, we have been chosen to carry out the will of the Czar and to fulfil the vow of our ancestors! Not to conquer, but to defend our down-trodden brethren, and to vindicate the faith of Christ, do we go forth. Forward, then; ours is a holy work, and God is with us! I am convinced that from the general down to the rank and file every one of you will do his duty, and add to the glory of the Russian name. May the Russian name be as terrible now as it was in the past! May the greatest efforts and deprivations have as little power to stay our march as the resolve and obstinacy of the enemy! The pacific portion of the inhabitants, whatever religion and race they may belong to, are inviolate, nor must their property be troubled by you. For everything you take a proper equivalent is to be given. No arbitrary transactions will be permitted. I shall expect the strictest order and discipline from you all. Order and discipline are our strength and honour alike. On crossing the frontier, we shall be entering Roumania, a country which has ever been friendly to us, and for the liberation of which much Russian blood has been shed. I am convinced we shall meet in Roumania with the hospitality formerly shown in those parts to our fathers and ancestors. I enjoin you

to requite this hospitality by defending our Roumanian brethren, upholding their arrangements, assisting them against the Turks, and defending their houses as you would your own. This order is to be communicated to all the companies, sotnias, and batteries.

“The Commander-in-chief of the Active Army,
Inspector-General of the Cavalry and Engineers,
“NICHOLAS.”

Before transferring his head-quarters from Kischeneff the Grand-duke Nicholas, Commander-in-chief, attended a divine service, at which the Archbishop preached a sermon addressed to him personally, which showed very clearly that the Russian Church regarded the war as nothing less than a religious crusade. The Grand-duke was styled the “True-believing Lord,” and the Prelate thus continued:—“God performed miracles on behalf of the Israelites, through their great leaders, Moses and Joshua. He released them from Egyptian bondage, and led them across the bottom of the Red Sea and of the Jordan as if on dry land. He drowned the Egyptians in the returning waters. He broke the strength of the Amalekites in the plain. He demolished the walls of Jericho. He destroyed the evil-minded Canaanites, commanding even the sun to stand still, that Joshua might have time to overcome them and conquer their lands for the children of Israel. Greatly was God glorified through the works of his chosen servants, Moses and Joshua; and may he be glorified in like manner through our much honoured Emperor, and through you, our true-believing Lord, who, during your stay amongst us, have contracted the boundless and most sincere affection of all who are now going forth as leaders of our Christian armies. With humility, but with firm faith, the Church prays, and will not cease to pray, for the God who assisted Moses and Joshua, that he may shower down upon you his mercies, and give you strength in the present and glory in the future. May he assist you and your soldiers to conquer without heavy losses or sacrifices; may he enable you to cross our own dear Danube, and overcome or destroy all obstacles placed in your way; burning the enemies’ ships with fire, sinking them in the waves, breaking them into small pieces, into dust, and scattering them on the face of the waters. May he reduce the enemy’s strong places which

close to the liberators the road to the oppressed. May he turn the mountains of the Balkan into smooth and easy paths. May he arise everywhere to your help, and may the enemy be routed in the name of Christ, and fly from God’s face and from yours! As smoke vanishes so shall the foe disappear, and all his fortresses with him. Then shall the suffering people and all Christendom with them rejoice, for they will become the free possessors of their lands, and will sing songs of triumph in honour of you who will have liberated them from the Turkish yoke, more heavy and more intolerable than was the yoke of the Egyptians. The power of Christ’s cross, which brought the Israelites across the Red Sea, and which confounded the Amalekites in the plain, may it now assist you, now and for ever. With this cross you shall conquer.”

Before leaving Kischeneff the Emperor said he was glad to have seen with his own eyes the perfect state of the entire army, and the patriotic impulse which had been communicated to its various parts, and he was quite sure it would do its duty. His Majesty arrived at Moscow on Friday, May 4.

The excitement in the ancient capital on his arrival was intense, and the reception given to him by the people was enthusiastic beyond description. It was eleven o’clock at night before the Emperor reached the city. At the station he was met by the Empress and Czarevna, who had come down from St. Petersburg only a short time before. Although it was so late, the streets from the railway to the Kremlin were thickly lined on both sides with people. All Moscow appeared to have turned out to welcome the Monarch who had at last fully satisfied the aspirations of the holy city. Restaurants and *traktirs* were quite deserted, except in those thoroughfares through which the Imperial cortege had to pass, and here they were literally crammed with the trading and merchant class, and illuminated within and without. Electric lights illumined the route at various points, and lit up the faces of the waiting multitudes. The cheering of the vast crowds followed the Imperial party from the railway station up to the very gates of the Kremlin, and it was already morning before the streets were clear and quiet. The next day, Saturday, the Muscovites were up betimes, and the town was *en fête*. At ten o’clock all officials, both civil and military, repaired to the palace

within the Kremlin walls to meet the Emperor. Deputations of the nobility and merchants also assembled in the great halls of the palace to present addresses. The city was therefore in great commotion from an early hour. Preparations had been made for the Emperor's passage through the Cathedral close to the palace walls, and around this spot immense crowds collected. People filled all the galleries of John the Terrible's tower, as well as every other position from which a glimpse of the Czar could be obtained. A narrow wooden platform, covered with crimson cloth, had been laid down from the foot of the palace steps to the Cathedral door. All eyes were turned towards the large stone staircase leading from the palace into the courtyard—the same staircase on which the Czars, from John the Terrible downwards, have been wont to show themselves to their subjects on great occasions. At the Cathedral door a brilliant assemblage of priests in gold and silver vestments, headed by the Metropolitan, waited to receive his Imperial Majesty. About one o'clock a large number of masters of ceremony, with their wands of office, led the way for the Imperial procession down the famous stone steps. As soon as the Emperor, with the Empress on his arm, appeared, all heads were uncovered, and the cheering and surging to and fro of the immense crowds commenced. In some places the people broke the line of police and gendarmerie, and pressed on to the wooden pathway with such force that, at one moment, it was feared they would break the barriers placed on either side. The Emperor and Empress were followed by the Heir-apparent and the Czarevna, the Grand-dukes Vladimir and Constantine, and a numerous suite of officers and officials. The great bells of the Kremlin rang out, and yet above all the din the vehement cheering of the crowd could be heard even in the belfry of John the Terrible's Tower, where one would have thought that the deafening noise of the great bells would have drowned every other sound. The Emperor and Empress bowed repeatedly, as they walked slowly towards the Metropolitan and priests standing in a group at the Cathedral door. On arriving here the Emperor removed his helmet and kissed the cross. The cheering now ceased for a few moments, while a blessing was invoked by the Metropolitan. As soon as the latter's hands were lowered the cheering began again. The Imperial party passed some

time in the Cathedral, and then, after visiting another church in the same way, his Majesty and the Empress drove back to the palace in their carriage, closely pressed by the crowds from all sides. Altogether it was a magnificent sight beneath the gilded domes and spires of the ancient Kremlin, and one which could never be forgotten by the people of Moscow, who were determined to show once more that it was still the capital of Russia in all that pertained to Russian thought and feeling.

After his visit to the Cathedral the Czar received in the Great Hall of the Kremlin the deputies of the provincial nobility, whose President, Count Bobrinski, presented the following address:—

“Most Gracious Czar—With prayers in her heart and on her lips, the Russian nation rises at your bidding, in the name of Christ, to accomplish a great and just object. The time has come for the nobility to show themselves worthy of the station they occupy. True to the example of their ancestors, our sons and brothers are arrayed in the ranks of your gallant army. Not all of us can share the glorious distinction of fighting in the foremost ranks with the hereditary enemy of this country, for the liberation of our enslaved brethren. But we have all to fulfil another important though more pacific duty—to serve the sick and wounded in a spirit of brotherly love to the best of our ability. May God assist you, beloved Czar, in this grand and holy struggle.”

After this the Moscow Burgomaster, who likewise attended the reception, with the deputies of the town council, presented to His Majesty the address of the Municipal Corporation:—

“Most Gracious Czar—Thou hast summoned us to the fight, and all Russia utters shouts of joy. Having marshalled thy troops to the battle, thou comest to us and showest thyself to the people in the walls of this ancient capital. The air resounds with acclamations of gratitude and blessing. Never has thy humble people greeted thee with such emotion and thankfulness as now, when listening to thy martial behest. This is an important and sacred hour. After thou hast spoken, O Czar, the honour and the conscience of Russia breathe freely. Thy people are aware that thou, O most pacific of Czars, dost not unsheathe the sword of Russia for the sake of vain glory, but in the name of Christ, and for our much-suffering Slavonic brethren. Not to enslave and to destroy hurlest

thou thy gallant regiments across the Danube, but to create liberty and prosperity, and to call to a new and promising existence tribes of the same race and faith with ourselves. There can be no more justifiable war than this. Praising God, who commands her to take up this noble and holy quarrel, Holy Russia prays that God may enable her to show herself worthy of her mission, and to carry it out to the end, notwithstanding the intrigues of our enemies, and the malicious whispers of self-sufficient wisdom. Pitying the victims of the war, and wishing to spare the Russian blood, so dear to thy heart, thou, O Czar, hast postponed the day of battle. The loving words thou hast spoken are a guarantee of our coming success; Russian blood will not be shed in vain. The voice of Moscow is the voice of Russia. Faithful to thy Russia, O ruling Czar, rejoice in her sustained enthusiasm in the coming hours of trial. Cast about thee our love as an impenetrable coat of mail. The love of Russia is true and firm, and will work wonders."

In his reply the Emperor said: "Six weeks ago I here expressed a hope of a peaceful solution of the Eastern Question. I wished to spare to the utmost the precious blood of my subjects, but my efforts have been in vain. God has willed it otherwise. My Kischeneff manifesto has announced to the Empire that the moment I had foreseen had arrived. Fully answering my expectations, the whole of Russia, with Moscow at its head, has responded. To-day it is my happiness, conjointly with the Empress, to be able to thank my people for their patriotism, a patriotism which has been proved by deeds. The readiness they have displayed to undergo sacrifices exceeds our expectations. May God assist us to fulfil our task, and may He bless our troops who are about to engage in the combat for Faith, Emperor, and Fatherland."

His Majesty reached St. Petersburg on May 7, and the people gave him a magnificent and enthusiastic reception. The houses were gaily decorated with flags, carpets, and evergreens, and the streets through which the procession passed were crowded with people of all classes in holiday attire; most of the manufacturers closing their mills in order to let their workmen share in the festivities. Although so many troops had been sent off to the seat of war, there were plenty left to make a grand show; brigades of artillery, both regular and Cossack,

with brass guns brilliantly polished, long lines of infantry, and large masses of irregular cavalry. The Imperial family were loudly cheered as they drove down the Newski Prospect to the Nikolaevsky station to meet the Czar, but their welcome was as nothing compared to the shouts of excitement and enthusiasm which greeted the Emperor himself. The carriage containing the Czar and the Czarevitch was followed by a brilliant staff of several hundred officers—representatives of nearly all the regiments in the Russian service. Behind them came a carriage in which rode the Empress and the Princess Dagmar, and the rear was brought up by a string of carriages filled with ladies of the court, state officials, and municipal dignitaries. A halt was made at the Kazan Cathedral, while the Czar entered for a few moments' devotion, and the interior of which was hung with Turkish banners taken in former wars. When His Majesty again came out, the progress to the Winter Palace was continued amid the acclamations of the delighted populace. During the whole day a great number of ladies went about among the crowd, collecting money for the sick and wounded, and in the evening the city was brilliantly illuminated, the most prominent devices of course having reference to the war.

At the palace the following address of the St. Petersburg town council was presented to His Majesty:—

"Most Gracious Czar—Thy capital welcomes thee with joyous enthusiasm. With awe did we listen to thy Sovereign fiat commanding the valiant Russian troops to cross the Turkish frontier. We are firmly convinced, Czar, that Providence has destined thee to finish the holy struggle for the liberation of the Christians groaning under the Mussulman yoke. These chronic troubles on the Balkan Peninsula undermine the very foundations of European peace, and interrupt the continuous development of our prosperity. When the thunder of war shall be silenced, we shall hear the jubilant voice of the millions to whom this holy strife shall have opened the path of pacific progress. To complete this great work we are ready to lay down joyfully life and property at the steps of thy throne, O Czar Liberator."

The Emperor made the following reply:—

"I thank you for the sentiments you have just expressed. I was sure that after my speech at Moscow and my Manifesto, you would only give

expression to feelings which would afford me satisfaction. You know that I have done my utmost to arrange matters peacefully, in order to avoid shedding precious Russian blood, and prevent the disturbance of industrial activity in the Empire. It has pleased the Almighty to mark out for us the path by which our end is to be attained. Let us trust in the grace of God. The sentiments you have conveyed to me are the more gratifying as I perceive in them, not words only, but deeds. The donations which you have contributed will render the unavoidable sacrifice easier to bear. I thank you with all my heart, and beg you to express my gratitude to the whole municipality."

A journey over any of the main railway lines of Russia at this time was full of interest for either native or foreigner. Scenes both humorous and pathetic abounded. On the way to the south there was plenty to occupy attention in the military element in railway cars, buffets, and waiting-rooms. The sad side of the picture could be viewed in the parting of relations and friends, in the separation of husband and wife, father and son; and it could also be seen how the Russian peasant endeavoured to kill time and enliven his dreary existence when on the war path. At the various junctions and at almost every station of any importance between Moscow and Kischeneff were trains heavily laden with troops and their luggage, with ambulance waggons, gun carriages, and military supplies. Everywhere, in fact, were the signs and symbols of war. As the more rapid passenger train passed another freighted with human war material, occasionally were to be heard the sounds of the fiddle and the tambourine, and now and then the chorus of a village song, or the burden of some wild Cossack air. If the men were not packed like herrings in a barrel, and there was the least room to spare, the quick step of a country dance might sometimes be heard. At the stations where these transport trains stopped there was always a great rush of rough, thirsty soldiers to the tub of clean water then kept on every platform for this purpose. The men appeased their hunger with water and black bread, while their officers regaled themselves in the refreshment room on somewhat more luxurious and substantial fare. If there were time enough, a dance was often got up on the line. The side of a truck was thrown open, two fiddles and a tambourine set in motion inside, and some of the men

volunteered to foot it between the rails, surrounded by an admiring group of their comrades in arms. Their merriment was often soon cut short by the bugle, and they were again boxed up with their horses, which often occupied half of the truck, and slowly continued their journey southwards. The painful and distressing side of the picture was mostly to be seen at the railway termini of St. Petersburg and Moscow. At those places one was brought face to face with the most affecting incidents—leave-takings amid all the bustle and confusion attending the departure of a mail train. In many cases it was impossible to look on and keep one's eyes dry.

Mr. Layard, the newly-appointed English ambassador, arrived at Constantinople on April 20, and immediately had an interview with his Highness the Grand Vizir. He told him his mission was essentially one of peace; that it was the ardent desire of her Majesty's Government and of the English people that hostilities should be avoided; and that if the Turkish Government could contribute to this result it would be entitled to the gratitude of the civilized world. He would do the utmost to assist in this great work, and he counted especially upon the Grand Vizir's help and co-operation. Both would be promoting the highest interests of their respective countries, if they could by any means prevent the war which seemed to be impending.

His Highness answered that no one desired peace more than himself, and he was ready, in order to maintain it, to make every sacrifice consistent with the dignity of the Empire and with its integrity and independence. Beyond this neither he nor any Ottoman Minister could go. Turkey adhered to the Treaty of Paris; it was an amulet which she wore round her neck: it was the guarantee of her integrity and independence, of her very existence. It was not Turkey, he declared, who wanted war, but Russia; Russia was at that moment doing her very utmost to promote events which would render peace impossible. The European provinces of Turkey, and Servia, Roumania, and Greece, were undermined by her intrigues. She had secret agents in every direction, who at her bidding could at any given moment bring about occurrences which would afford her an excuse to make war, and to persuade Europe that she was justified in doing so. If Russia sincerely desired peace she could have it

at once. Turkey was eager for it, and ready to disarm if she could only obtain some kind of security against Russian aggression. Without such security she could not disband her troops and place herself at the mercy of her enemy.

Mr. Layard asked the Grand Vizir whether he had anything to suggest which, in his opinion, might stave off the danger of war. He answered that, had Turkey money—only £5,000,000 sterling—she might prolong negotiations, and time gained was always in favour of peace. But she must fight, and at once, because it was utterly impossible for her to maintain a great army without money. The Mussulman population, he declared, were eager for war. They felt humiliated and insulted by the proceedings of Russia. They well knew the risk of a struggle with that powerful Empire, but they were prepared to run the risk, and to perish in arms rather than yield with dishonour. Nothing could be stronger than his Highness' language in this sense. It was that of despair: at the same time, he repeatedly assured Mr. Layard that he was ardently in favour of peace. "Do you not think," he exclaimed, "that I would do my utmost to preserve the lives of the tens of thousands of inoffensive, innocent Mussulmans, which will be sacrificed in a war with Russia, and to enable them to return to their families and their fields? It could only be a profound conviction that the honour and independence of my country are at stake which could make me hesitate."

Mr. Layard remarked that, unfortunately, Turkey, by her answer to the Protocol, had placed herself in the wrong in public opinion. That answer, whatever might have been the intention of the Turkish Government, was looked upon as a provocation and a challenge which Russia could scarcely pass over, and it afforded her an opportunity of justifying to Europe her conduct in going to war.

His Highness defended the answer, but did not attempt to deny that it had been devised to bring matters to a crisis, and to compel Russia to define clearly her intentions. But, he added, up to the present time Russia has not expressed to the Porte officially any opinion upon it; and the Embassy had not been withdrawn.

Mr. Layard asked whether the refusal on the part of the Turkish Government to send an ambassador to St. Petersburg was final and absolute,

and the Grand Vizir answered that it was. He was ready to send an ambassador to Russia in the usual way, diplomatic relations not being suspended; but he would not consent to submit the whole Eastern Question to a discussion between a Turkish ambassador and the Russian Government at St. Petersburg. A special embassy was not necessary to arrange mutual disarmament. If the Russian Government really wished for peace, they had only to give the order for disarmament, and the Turkish Government would at once do the same.

Mr. Layard pressed his Highness to tell him whether any way remained for a last effort in the interest of peace, and asked him whether he had considered the eighth article of the Treaty of Paris, which rendered it obligatory upon each and all of the signatory Powers, before having recourse to force, to enable the other contracting Powers to mediate in order to prevent that extremity.

He answered that he had not forgotten the article referred to, and he was inclined to think that it applied especially to the present case, but he was not quite certain as to the manner in which it was intended to operate. He was not unwilling to accept the mediation of the Powers, but could he bind himself to accept a decision which might compromise the dignity of the Empire and its integrity and independence?

Mr. Layard told him that he had no instructions to suggest an application to the signatory Powers for this mediation, but he felt persuaded that any step which might afford even a remote hope of preventing war would be favourably viewed by her Majesty's Government. He used all the arguments he could command to persuade his Highness that in accepting such a mediation, under the reserve that the integrity and independence of Turkey as guaranteed by treaty should not be a subject of discussion, he could in no way compromise the dignity of the Porte; and he cited to him as examples the cases in which Great Britain had submitted to arbitration interests and questions of no less importance than those now involved, and had accepted without hesitation the decisions against her. He urged that it was of the greatest importance that Turkey should endeavour to set herself right in the eyes of Europe, and that she would not find a better way of doing so than by making every effort and sacrifice for the preservation of peace. He suggested, at the same time,

that if the Powers appealed to accepted the task of mediating, it might furnish the Sultan a good opportunity of issuing a firman or decree for disarmament, which would, he was convinced, have a good effect upon public opinion.

His Highness appeared struck with what had been said to him, and observed that he had not before considered the question from the point of view in which it had then been placed before him, and said he would lose no time in consulting his colleagues on the subject.

Mr. Layard thought the opportunity a favourably one for calling attention to the state of opinion in England with regard to Turkey, and earnestly warned him not to entertain any illusions on the subject. That opinion, said Mr. Layard, had not changed, and he could only repeat what had been said by her Majesty's ambassador with reference to it on previous occasions; namely, that a conviction still unhappily prevailed that the Turkish Government had not punished, and did not intend to punish, the authors of the outrages upon the Christian populations in Bulgaria; but that it was disposed, on the contrary, to screen and protect them. This conviction had caused, if possible, even greater indignation against Turkey than the outrages themselves. If those who had been guilty of them had been promptly and signally punished, the impression that the Turkish authorities were responsible for them might have been removed. The Grand Vizir entered into a long explanation to prove that the accounts of those outrages were immensely exaggerated; that they had been brought about by Russian and Panslavist agents, and that the Bulgarians themselves had committed outrages equally great, and had contemplated the commission of others still greater. Mr. Layard replied that it was of little use to argue this matter anew; that the fact remained that Bulgarians had been put to death for their share in the events that had unhappily occurred, while no Mussulman had hitherto been similarly punished.

Early on the following morning Mr. Layard called on Safvet Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and had an interview which lasted over two hours. He found that the Grand Vizir had already seen him, and had reported to him what had passed between them on the previous night. He urged upon him, using the same arguments that he had used to the Grand Vizir, the vital

importance of making a last effort, without loss of time, to prevent war, at however great a sacrifice, and of adopting measures to satisfy public opinion in England with reference to the Bulgarian outrages.

His Excellency entered very fully into the question of an appeal to the mediation of the Powers under the eighth article of the Treaty of Paris, but Mr. Layard was met by the usual argument as to the sacrifice of the dignity and independence of Turkey. Safvet Pasha was not sure whether the Turkish Government could, consistently with its dignity, be the first to make this appeal; whether Russia ought not to take the first step, or whether the two Powers, according to the terms of the article, ought not to ask simultaneously for mediation.

Mr. Layard said it was shocking that the lives of tens of thousands of those whom the Grand Vizir had termed "innocent and inoffensive Mussulmans" should be sacrificed to such susceptibilities; and earnestly begged him to remember that a great Empire, in doing what was right, just, and humane, could not be accused of sacrificing its dignity.

After a prolonged discussion, Safvet Pasha said that he was not unfavourable to an appeal to the Powers for their mediation, under the reserve that questions affecting the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire, as guaranteed by treaty, should not be open to discussion. His Excellency promised to communicate at once on the subject with his colleagues.

With reference to the punishment of those guilty of the outrages in Bulgaria, he appealed to Mr. Layard to say whether it was possible then for the Turkish Government to execute the two, Achmet Agha and Bektash Metto, who had been condemned to death; they would be looked upon as martyrs by the Mussulmans of Bulgaria, who were convinced that through the energy these men had displayed they had been saved from the wholesale massacre which revolutionary agents had prepared for the whole Mahometan population. If they were put to death, either serious troubles would ensue, or, in the event of another rising of the Christians through foreign intrigue, the action of the Mahometans would be paralyzed. Their punishment would be commuted to fifteen years, or to some other term, of "*travaux forcés*;" others who were implicated would have to suffer various terms of imprisonment.

Mr. Layard replied that the Turkish Government had experienced no difficulty in carrying out the sentences of death upon Bulgarian Christians, and he could not believe that they had not the power of doing the same with regard to Mussulmans.

His Excellency assured Mr. Layard that very shortly all the Bulgarians, even those under condemnation to death, and whose guilt the British ambassador had admitted, should be amnestied; but he would not yield in respect to the punishment of Achmet Agha and Bektash Metto, though Mr. Layard repeatedly and urgently represented to him that until the Turkish Government had performed that act of justice, the English people would never be persuaded that the authors of the Bulgarian outrages were not shielded and protected by the Porte.

On April 24 Mr. Layard had the honour of being received in solemn audience by the Sultan at Yeldiz, a small summer palace on a hill overlooking the Bosphorus. After the public reception the Sultan saw Mr. Layard in private—the only person present being Safvet Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. His Majesty commenced the conversation by saying some obliging things with regard to the Ambassador personally, observing that he was fully aware of the interest that he (Mr. Layard) had always shown in the Turkish Empire, and that he considered it a special proof of the sympathy and kindly feeling of the Queen and her Government towards him and his people, that he had been selected as her Ambassador. Mr. Layard replied that he gladly availed himself of the opportunity to assure him that he had the true interests of his Majesty and of his country at heart, and that such being the case, he trusted that his Majesty would permit him to speak to him, on all occasions, openly and frankly as a loyal friend. He then communicated to his Majesty the kind and gracious messages with which the Queen had charged him for him at Osborne. He told him that her Majesty had not forgotten that he had been her guest in England, and that she felt true sympathy for him, and the liveliest concern in his happiness and welfare. His Majesty was very much touched by what Mr. Layard had been commanded by the Queen to say to him, and begged him, in very warm terms, to express to her Majesty his deep gratitude, and to assure her of the great importance that he attached to her friendship.

His Majesty then begged Mr. Layard to speak frankly to him. He looked upon him as his friend, he said, on whose advice he was prepared to place the fullest reliance.

In response Mr. Layard said he had arrived at the capital at a very critical and important moment. Unfortunately, as he (the Sultan) was aware, events which Mr. Layard was persuaded he truly deplored had led to an estrangement between the two countries, and to a change in that friendly feeling towards Turkey which had formerly so happily prevailed in England. It was, however, useless to go back to the past. It was now essential to think of the future, and he would submit frankly to his Majesty his opinion as to the course to be pursued. All that he felt authorized to do to assist his Majesty, was to offer him the advice that every possible exertion and sacrifice should be made for the prevention of war and the maintenance of peace; in order that if unfortunately war was inevitable, Turkey should not be held responsible for it, and the impression which had been conveyed to Europe that she intentionally provoked it should be removed. The Sultan replied nearly in these words:—"I am sure the Queen of England will feel for me. I came to the throne very young and without experience, at a time of unexampled difficulty, and under circumstances with which the world is acquainted. I cannot be held responsible for the state in which I found my Empire. I am willing, ready, and most desirous to do all in my power to ameliorate its condition. I know that war can only make that condition worse. It is therefore to my interest, and to that of my people, whether Mussulmans or non-Mussulmans, that there should be peace. Moreover, all my convictions and sentiments are in favour of peace. I would not intentionally crush an ant under my foot; how then could I be capable of wishing to sacrifice the life of a single man? But a great Power is determined to force me into war. Whilst professing to be peaceful, it has driven my country to resent such attacks upon its dignity and independence as no people who had any self-respect could submit to. Russia declares that she wishes for peace; she has only to give a proof of her desire for it by disarming one battalion, and I will at once disarm ten; and I beg you to give this assurance to her Majesty's Government."

Mr. Layard answered that he had ventured to

submit to his Majesty's Ministers his views as to the only course to be pursued which might offer a remote hope, a very remote hope, he admitted, of maintaining peace, and at the same time of setting Turkey right in the eyes of Europe. He trusted that they had been placed before his Imperial Majesty. He was afraid it was now too late to expect that the step to which he referred would be successful; but even if unsuccessful a last attempt by Turkey to maintain peace—an offer on her part to make every possible sacrifice consistent with her dignity and independence in so great a cause—would place her in a favourable position before the civilized world. He entreated his Majesty not to permit mere questions of dignity and susceptibility to stand in the way of peace. The Turkish troops, he said, had given ample proof of their valour and devotion; they were generally admitted to be amongst the bravest in the world; Turkish diplomacy had certainly afforded equal proofs of courage—perhaps, he might venture to say, of too much courage—and of a determination to maintain what Turkey considered to be her dignity and independence. No one could, therefore, now accuse Turkey of either want of courage or of dignity if, after showing all that she was determined and prepared to do in the case of war, she was ready to make sacrifices, however great, in favour of peace. If, Mr. Layard added, his Majesty could secure that peace which was so much desired and needed by every country in Europe, he would earn the lasting gratitude of all civilized nations, and would have achieved a glory not exceeded by that of any monarch who had occupied the Imperial throne.

His Majesty answered, with great earnestness, that he was prepared to make every sacrifice in the interests of peace consistent with the dignity and independence of his country. He would not go to war unless absolutely driven to it by Russia, and in that case he had the most complete reliance upon the courage and devotion of his army and of his subjects. It was true that Turkey wanted money, and many of the resources of other nations, but Turkish soldiers could and would fight upon bread and water, and without pay, and were ready to die to a man rather than see their country humiliated.

Mr. Layard observed that he entertained no doubt whatever of the bravery and devotion of the Turkish army, and of the readiness of every man

in it to die for his country; but he begged the Sultan to reflect that although these qualities were sufficient in the days of bows and arrows for conquest and defence, yet that war as now waged required other things, and above all money.

His Majesty replied that this was true, but what was to be done? He did not want war. It was Russia that was intent on driving him into it, and he feared that no sacrifice that he could make would deter her from her purpose. Turkey was now only defending herself from a wanton aggression. He begged Mr. Layard again most earnestly to assure the Queen and her Majesty's Government that he ardently longed for peace. "Without peace," he observed, "how can I hope to carry out those reforms which are necessary to the prosperity and happiness of all classes of my people, and in which it is my firm desire to persevere;" "and above all it is necessary," he remarked, with much warmth, "that I should re-establish the reputation for honesty and the credit of my country, which have been unhappily shaken by measures for which I am not responsible, and which I greatly deplore."

The eighth article of the Treaty of Paris, so much relied on by Mr. Layard in his interviews with the Turkish Ministers, is as follows:—

"If a disagreement arises between the Sublime Porte and one or more of the other signatory Powers, which threatens the maintenance of their relations, the Sublime Porte and each of these Powers, before having recourse to the employment of force, shall put the other contracting parties in a position to prevent this extremity by their action as mediators."

The idea that this article might be appealed to as a possible solution of the differences between Russia and Turkey was suggested to Mr. Layard by the Duc Décazes, at an interview in Paris, when the former was proceeding to Constantinople, and, as we have seen, both the Grand Vizir and the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs were favourably inclined to entertain it. The matter was at once referred to the council at Constantinople, and Mr. Layard soon learnt, as he had apprehended, that the war party, whose object all through had been to prevent peace, had passed a decision against having recourse to it, and that the Grand Vizir had yielded to their influence. In the meanwhile he had seen the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Ahmed Vefyk Pasha, with

whom he had a long-standing friendship, and he had promised to use all his influence with the Sultan and in other directions in favour of the appeal and of peace. Some other persons, whose acquaintance Mr. Layard renewed, and especially one who was much esteemed by the Sultan, and had at all times free access to him, made similar promises. This gentleman saw the Sultan on the two following nights, and informed Mr. Layard that he found his Majesty ready to make a last effort to prevent war, and that his suggestion as to an appeal to the Powers under the article had made a very favourable impression upon him.

After a severe struggle between the war and peace parties the latter prevailed, and Mr. Layard learnt in the morning of the day that he had his audience of the Sultan that the Council had finally decided upon making the appeal to the Powers. During his private audience with the Sultan he hinted to him that such had been the case.

Just before leaving the Embassy for the palace he received a telegram from Lord Derby informing him that the German Government would gladly co-operate with that of her Majesty and the other Powers if the Porte made the appeal. To this he attached great importance, as it appeared to secure to a certain extent to Turkey the approval of the four Powers. The Austrian chargé d'affaires had expressed his concurrence in the English views at the Porte in making this last attempt in the interest of peace.

Lord Derby lost no time in telegraphing the substance of Mr. Layard's interviews with the Turkish ministers to St. Petersburg, and Lord Loftus, the British ambassador there, at once communicated it to Prince Gortschakoff, and asked whether any course could be suggested acceptable to Russia which might avert war. The Prince at once stated that it was too late for any mediation, as the Russian troops were, if not already in movement, on the eve of marching. With regard to an appeal to the eighth article of the Treaty of Paris of 1856, he observed that it had been already exhausted by the Protocol of London, in which the combined efforts of Europe for peace were recorded, and which had been haughtily rejected by the Porte. He considered the Turkish Circular in answer to the Protocol as a rebuff to Europe and as a declaration of war.

As to a proposal of sending an Ambassador to

Kisheneff to meet the Emperor, Prince Gortschakoff said that it would be of no utility, as the Porte was unable to make any suitable offer after the attitude of the Chamber in regard to the Protocol, and the course which the Porte had taken in conformity with it. "In short," said his Highness, "the moment for action has arrived, the time for subterfuge and phraseology has passed away."

In further pressing him as to whether there were any means which would be acceptable to Russia for the avoiding of war, the Prince stated to Lord Loftus that nothing was possible, as the affairs were in the hands of the military authorities.

It will be thus seen that up to the very last moment the most strenuous efforts were made by the British Government to avoid war, and too much praise cannot be awarded to Mr. Layard for the energy he displayed in the three days which elapsed between his arrival at the Turkish capital and the Declaration of War.

Unhappily, at the very moment that affairs appeared to be taking a favourable turn, and there was a glimmer of a hope of peace, the Russian Government entered upon the struggle, and whilst Mr. Layard was in the palace receiving the most earnest assurances from the Sultan of his desire for peace, and his readiness to make every sacrifice to insure it, the telegram from the Turkish chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburg, communicating Prince Gortschakoff's note announcing war, was being deciphered at the Porte.

It is, however, important to note that the decision of the Porte to appeal to the Powers, under the eighth article of the Treaty of Paris, was come to before war was declared, as the article requires that the appeal should be made before recourse is had to force. Had the appeal on the part of the Porte to the mediation of the Powers been successful, Mr. Layard's next object would have been to endeavour to induce the Turkish Government to accept the Protocol of London, which, with some modifications in the "redaction" of no essential importance, he felt sure he could have succeeded in doing.

M. Nelidoff, the Russian chargé d'affaires, left the Embassy at Constantinople on Monday, April 23. A vast crowd collected at the gates to witness his departure; but owing to the order maintained by the police there was no display of excitement. Before leaving the Russian

arms over the Embassy were veiled in black, and a solemn *Te Deum* was sung at the Embassy. Prior to his departure M. Nelidoff informed the Porte that the Turkish authorities would be held personally responsible in case of more massacres of Christians.

The declaration of war was so generally anticipated, that the announcement was received with but slight signs of excitement in the Turkish capital. The universal feeling seemed to be one of satisfaction that the long period of suspense and anxiety which preceded it had at last come to an end.

The Sultan at once telegraphed the following Manifesto to the commanders of his armies in Europe and Asia:—

“The Russian Government has declared war upon us. Confident in the aid of Providence and the Prophet, we have been forced in our turn to have recourse to arms. We have always wished for peace and tranquillity, despite the drawn sword which we have held in our hand; and in our desire for peace we listened to the counsels of Europe, and worked with it to attain the desired result. Our enemy having, however, but one object in view—that of completely annihilating our rights and independence—it was impossible to satisfy his desire without sacrificing everything. Thus, without right or real cause, he has marched to attack us. We are convinced that the Judge of Judges, the Protector of right and justice, will grant us the victory by the aid of our own efforts and bravery, and by the union of the material and moral support of our faithful subjects. The enemy will not attain the desired end. I trust in God, who will grant the victory to the just cause. I hope my soldiers will guard the honour and glory of the Osmanli name and that of our ancestors, and keep our flag without stain. I salute all my generals, officers, and soldiers. They will show at this solemn hour all their ardour, zeal, and courage. Every foot of ground occupied by our soldiers was bought with the blood of our glorious ancestors. Let them defend the rights and independence of the Osmanlis. In so doing they will obtain the victory. The nation takes under its protection the wives and children of the soldiers. The Padishah is with them in his prayers. If needful he will take in hand the Banner of the Caliphate, and will join them, ready to sacrifice his life at the head of

the army for the rights, the honour, and the independence of Turkey. May God grant us the victory.”

The Sultan issued a proclamation to the officers and men of the fleet, specially recommending them to protect the Mussulman population of the Crimean and Caucasian coasts, “now groaning under the Russian yoke.”

The Banner of the Caliphate, referred to in the Manifesto of the Sultan, has a wonderful influence upon the minds of those who believe in Mahomet and his “Koran.” It is that which the Turks call “the Heavenly Standard,” and in their language “Bairack.” Its colour is green, and they believe it to have been the banner of the Prophet Mahomet, delivered to him by the angel Gabriel through the medium of Ayesha, as an indubitable token of victory over their enemies. This standard was formerly laid up in the Treasury of the Sultan at Constantinople, but it is now kept in the Mosque of Eyoob, where the new Sultans on the day of their coronation gird on the sabre of the Caliphate. In case of any serious struggle, a religious duty compels the Sultan to give orders to the “Mullas,” or Mahometan clergy, to display the Prophet’s standard before the people and army, proclaim “Al-Jehad,” or the holy war, by exhorting the Moslems to be faithful to their religion and defend their kingdom. “This is the Prophet’s banner,” the Sheikh-ul-Islam exclaims; “this is the Standard of the Caliphate; it is set up before you and displayed over your heads, O true believers, to announce to you that your religion is threatened, your Caliphate in danger, and your life, wives, children, and property exposed to be the prey of your cruel enemies! Any Moslem, therefore, who refuses to take his arms and follow this holy Bairack is an ‘infidel,’ and must, therefore, suffer condemnation.” Such an expedient has always produced wonderful effects among those who profess the Mahometan religion. All good Moslems are considered as being divorced from their wives, *ipso facto*, if they refuse to make haste to take up their arms, follow the Banner of the Caliphate, and fight against the enemy of their religion and kingdom. It is confirmed by trustworthy historians that the Standard of the Caliphate has been always kept with extraordinary care and reverence—that even the Janissaries, who were often disrespectful to the Sultans, trembled at the sight of this holy ensign. Only one instance of disrespect to the Heavenly

Standard is related in the Turkish annals. This happened in 1658, when Hassan Pasha, at the head of a seditious faction, waged war with his legitimate sovereign. The Sultan gave orders, as usual, to display the Banner of the Caliphate, with a view to induce Hassan Pasha and his partizans to obey and respect the Head of Islam. Hassan Pasha seems to have been of little faith, insomuch as when he saw the sacred Banner displayed he turned his back to it and to the exhorting Mullas, and gave orders to his soldiers to fight fiercely and carry on the war to the end.

As to the genuineness of this green Banner of the Caliphate, none of the biographers of Mahomet nor the reliable historians of Islamism, either Orientals or Occidentals, make any allusion whatever to a green banner used by Mahomet in his military engagements. Elmacin mentions only two flags, which were constantly carried before Mahomet in the twenty-five campaigns in which he was personally engaged. One was black, and was called "Al-'Okab," *i.e.*, the Eagle; the other was white, and was called "Al-Lewa," *i.e.*, the Standard *par excellence*. In the second place, the banners used in former times during the Sultans' wars as the Standard of the Caliphate were of different colours, and had different mottoes inscribed on them. Several Banners of the Caliphate have been also taken in different wars by the Christians. One of these was captured by the King of Poland in the year 1683, and sent to Rome to be presented to the Pope. The centre piece was of gold brocade upon a red ground, and its borders were of silver brocade upon a green ground. On one side was embroidered in Arabic the Mahometan formula, "There is but one God, and Mahomet is his apostle." On the other side were the following mottoes in Arabic: "Have confidence in God, O Faithful, and strengthen your faith." Another Standard of the Caliphate was captured by the Venetians in the year 1685 with seventeen other banners, 300 horses, twenty-eight guns, and other spoils. This standard was, by the order of the Venetian Senate, exposed in the Church of the Theatin monks at Venice. On one side of it the following words were inscribed in Arabic: "In the name of God, the Most High and Almighty, God the Lord of all things and the honourable prophets and saints, Mahomet, Abubekir, Omar, Othman, and Ali." On the other side was written also in Arabic: "There is but one God,

and Mahomet is his apostle. O God, our Lord, Thou art great in goodness, and Thou art the Lord of all nations." It appears, therefore, from these historical facts, that the green standard now kept in the Mosque of Eyoob, at Constantinople, is not the same as that used by Mahomet in his military engagements. And this accords with the tradition that says that when the Prophet was dying, Ayesha, his favourite wife, tore down the green *pardah* from the door of the death-chamber, and giving it to the assembled chiefs, bade them make it the flag of future victory. The Moslems, therefore, call this green banner "Bairack-un-nabi," as being used as the standard of the kingdom and the religion of Mahomet.

Notwithstanding all historical facts with regard to the non-genuineness of the "green" banner, the Moslems have always believed, and still believe, that the green banner which they possess is the true "Lewa," or standard, delivered to Mahomet by divine ordinance as an "indubitable token of victory." This strong faith compels them in conscience to carry their arms and follow it whenever they see it displayed; nay, the Sultans themselves are bound, as good Moslems and successors of Mahomet, to accompany the Banner of the Caliphate, and go into the midst of their troops to fight against their enemies. War is, indeed, not only a political expedient to the Moslems as it is to the Christians, but it is a religious duty enjoined upon them by the precepts of the Koran. In the forty-seventh chapter, entitled "Mahomet," it is said, "O, true believers! if you assist God by fighting for his religion, he will assist you against your enemies." In the eleventh chapter, entitled "The Cow," it is also said: "War is enjoined to you against those who fight against you. . . . Fight for the religion of God." And in the chapter "The Spoils," "O, Prophet! stir up the faithful to war," &c.

A Moslem, on looking at the banner of his prophet, who promises him "indubitable victory" on earth, and happiness in heaven, if he bravely fights for his religion, feels his spirit rise high, and his heart swells with joy and courage as he rushes at once to the field of battle with a conviction that, if he succeeds and conquers, the crown of a new kingdom will adorn his brow; and if he succumbs, the crown of martyrdom attends him in the Paradise of pleasure and happiness.

The Sultan intended to visit the army in Europe,

and send the heir to the throne (his brother) to visit that in Asia; but Redif Pasha and Mahmoud Damad persuaded him to abandon his intention, by representing to him that in his absence the people might be tempted to dethrone him and to place his brother Djellalledin, a young, resolute, and intelligent man, whom they preferred to the rightful heir, on the throne. The Sultan, who is naturally very timid, and knew himself to be unpopular, was thus easily persuaded to abandon his intention to encourage the troops by his presence.

The Russian declaration of war was solemnly read in the Ottoman Parliament on April 26, and at its conclusion all the Christian deputies of the Chamber rose, one after the other, each in his place, and protested against the Russian assumption to "protect" them. The enthusiasm occasioned by this incident was indescribable.

Shortly after the declaration of war Monsignor Narses, Patriarch of the Armenian Church, also addressed to his flock a pastoral, in which he called upon them to show, as in the past, their unalterable fidelity to the Ottoman throne. He recalled to their memory how the Armenians had worked for the good of the Fatherland, and had contributed to it by agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, and even by participation in administrative reforms. He summoned them to remain, as a Christian people, faithful to their traditions; to "render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and unto God the things which are God's." The Patriarch exhorted his people to give an example of fraternal love, whether to fellow-believers or otherwise, and, above all, to pray that God "may deliver us from the implacable enemies who come to our attack." His Eminence further inculcated the duty of assisting by every possible aid and contribution the Ottoman Government, to which they were bound to furnish every moral and material support. His Eminence also directed the Armenians to pray for the success of the Sultan's arms, "so that our ecclesiastical liberties, our language, and the free administration of our scholastic and religious establishments, may be preserved to us."

The day after the declaration of war by Russia the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs sent the Manifesto of the Sultan to ambassadors abroad, with a circular stating that Russia, by declaring war against the Ottoman Empire, and by opening hostilities through the invasion of its

Asiatic Provinces and of a Principality which formed an integral part of the territory of the Sultan, had made a most unhappy termination to the troubles and the political difficulties which had been agitating the East for more than two years. Europe, which in the interests of humanity, and in order to insure its own repose, had laboured ardently and perseveringly to obviate this unhappy calamity, had doubtless the right to seek for the causes of the failure of its efforts, and to determine upon which of the two states must fall the responsibility of the war and the evils which must follow in its train. The Government of the Sultan, on its part, felt solemnly bound to present to its peoples and the friendly Powers a faithful account of its acts and of the political events which had created the present situation. In the course of the year 1876 peace with Servia was restored, and the friendly disposition which the Sublime Porte manifested towards Montenegro seemed calculated to overcome the difficulties arising from the inadmissible claims of that Principality. The Imperial Government was unwilling even to be impeded in the accomplishment of its task by the necessity of maintaining its army on a war footing, and of thus supporting the crushing expenses of an armed peace. At that time it had thoughts of disarming; but before carrying into effect its resolution, so imperiously demanded by circumstances, it was thought necessary that Europe should not remain indifferent to the step, but that it should favour Turkey with its co-operative advice, in order that the demobilization of the Ottoman army might not be done incautiously and with improvident haste. At the very moment when the Sublime Porte was preparing to invite the assistance of Europe in this pacific work, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg thought fit to take the initiative of fresh measures, not by seeking an understanding with, but by exercising pressure on, the Imperial Government. This quite unexpected turn of events gave rise to the London Protocol, which was discussed and signed without the Imperial Government having been invited to share in the deliberations, and without even being consulted. The same reasons which had compelled the Sublime Porte to reject certain articles drawn up at the Conference of Constantinople made it necessary for it to discard the new resolutions of Europe, rendered still more inadmissible by the

private declaration of Russia which preceded them. No Government, jealous of its honour and its independence, could have given its adhesion to a programme thus presented to it, especially when conscious that its refusal in presence of a powerful neighbour, ready to support its demands by arms, would expose it to attack. The Government of the Sultan, backed by the unanimous approval of the representatives of the nation, did not hesitate to uphold its sovereign integrity; but the dreaded event had unhappily been realized. Russia, after having vainly endeavoured to weaken and humiliate the Ottoman Empire by inflicting foreign tutelage upon it, now sought by arms to satisfy her political ambition. She would meet in her path a united people armed for the defence of its soil, for the protection of its homes, for the maintenance of its own and its Sovereign's rights, and for the independence of its fatherland. But at the moment when this inhuman war was going to begin, and whatever might be the issue of it, Europe and the whole world must know the truth. All the populations of the Empire rallied round the throne, from a feeling of common danger, must learn the cause of the sufferings which they had already endured, and of the fresh calamities to which their country was about to be exposed; in fine, the Ottoman Empire, whether victorious or whether defeated, must be discharged of all responsibility for the present war. Wherefore the Imperial Government deemed itself bound to declare that the Christian populations of Herzegovina and Bosnia, and the vilayets inhabited by the Bulgarians, rose in insurrection solely at the instigation of Panslavic committees, organized and paid by Russia; that Servia and Montenegro only took up arms against the Sovereign Power through the direct intervention of Russia; that they never could have sustained the struggle without aid from Russia; that, in fact, all the ills which for the last two years had scourged their portion of the Empire were due to the action, open or hidden, but always present, of Russia. Let Europe now look upon the ruin which Russian politics had already made in Turkey; let it examine and judge with impartiality the pretended wrongs which Russia used as a pretext for breaking the general peace and plunging two great countries into the horrors of war; and let its verdict satisfy the public conscience. The aggressor of Turkey was as much the enemy of the

Christian as of the Mussulman populations; for she had caused them, and was now preparing for them, more ills than ever she could promise benefits when alluring them falsely on to civil war. She had the boldness to pretend that she had armed to protect the Christians, and that, too, at a moment when the most complete Constitution which a free country could wish for proclaimed the principle of equality among all Ottomans; at a moment when this principle was daily receiving confirmation of such a nature that it would be henceforth impossible for the Sublime Porte to do any political act in the country, good or evil, without benefiting or injuring all those, Mussulmans or non-Mussulmans, who lived under the authority of the Sultan. The Imperial Government said to Russia, as well as to the other European powers, 'Look on and judge,' and to these true, earnest words Russia replied by a declaration of war, without previously having recourse to the mediation of Europe, as she was bound to do by Article 8 of the Treaty of Paris, and without allowing the Powers the time and the means to accomplish this pacific task, in regard to which the Imperial Government declared that it had done its duty. In fact, Russia, in defiance of all the rules observed in such cases by civilized states, notified her declaration of war to the Turkish chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburg at the same time as she broke off her relations with the Sublime Porte through her own chargé d'affaires at Constantinople. But on the night even preceding the declaration of war she had invaded the territory of the Empire. History would record this unheard of act, that in our age of enlightenment, of civilization, and of justice, a great Power carried fire and sword into a neighbouring Empire, because this Empire was of opinion that the same observance should be paid with respect to it as to others, of international engagements and eternal rules of public law, the independence of its domestic administration, and above all, the honour and dignity of its people and its sovereign.

"It is to defend these sacred principles, and to beat back the most hateful and the most criminal of aggressions, that the Ottoman army is about to march to meet its assailant, with the whole nation marshalled round its august head, confident in the triumph of the justest of causes, prepared for any sacrifice, resigned to all kinds of suffering, and ready to fight and die for its

independence. May the Most High protect the right."

In another document, Turkey—in accordance with the advice of the English ambassador, as already described—fell back on the eighth article of the Treaty of Paris. Although it said it was the Russian Government which should make the appeal, the Turkish Government, to avoid all misunderstanding, appealed to the Powers to make application of the above-mentioned article, and put an end to the very perilous state of relations of the two States, by means of mediatory action. As we already know, the appeal came too late!

The opinions and feelings of the great majority of Mussulmans a few days before the declaration of war were thus given in the Turkish journal *Mussavat* (Equality):—"The Sultan, his ministers, the two Chambers, and the people are all of one mind, and are resolved once for all to put an end to foreign intervention. The proposals of Europe have been rejected. Our army of 600,000 regular soldiers at present assembled on the frontiers, and the 300,000 men, perfectly armed and equipped, who are about to join them, were only waiting for this resolution. The heads of the rebels who, worked upon by foreign intrigue, had raised the standard of rebellion, are being now borne aloft on the bayonets of our soldiers. In the event of the Montenegrins seeking to prevent the revictualling of Nicksich, Suleiman Pasha has received orders to send them all *en enfer* (*Djendemnè*). The crossing of the Pruth by the Russians will be simply deemed a declaration of war, and thereupon our muchirs and commanders of the army of the Danube will also cross the river, and administer condign earthly punishment to the Muscovites. If the Persians, influenced by the Russians, dare to lift their heads against the power of the Khalif, they will doubtless receive the same chastisement as the Montenegrins. If war is declared we doubt not that the French, the English, and the Hungarians will agree to co-operate with Turkey against the Russians. This may be guessed from the fact that an Englishman has just telegraphed to the Sublime Porte asking permission to join the Imperial army with 5000 of his brave fellow countrymen. The Minister of War, however, while thanking him, replied that our Empire had no need of soldiers, and that, if necessary, he could easily raise a million of volunteers at home. The Hungarians are already hastening to join us. They

are arriving daily in twos and threes at Constantinople, where they enlist at the Ministry of War, and then set off to join their battalions. Germany for the moment seems to be for Russia, and Austro-Hungary observes a neutrality favourable to Russia; but it is equally certain that at the first cannon-shot Austria will be the first to implore the protection of Turkey, who by this time, with the assistance of the Most High, will have given the whole world a proof of its valour and its power. As regards Germany also, there can be no doubt she will come to see that her only means of safety is hostility to Russia, and she will shape her course accordingly. If we look at the question of money, what do we find? The Ottoman Empire, which Europe looked upon as a fallen body, almost bereft of life, has just brought together 800,000 men, whom it has clothed and armed better even than European soldiers are. Let there be no doubt that this Empire will find as much money as may be necessary to trample under foot and annihilate Russia, who is nothing but a huge, empty colossus, intriguing, proud, poor, and a thousand times more base and cowardly than our own Bulgarians. With all that it must not be forgotten that, in addition to the 800,000 men now under arms, the 400,000 soldiers of the territorial guard, and the 400,000 volunteers eager for the Sultan's command to hurl themselves against the Russians, there are all the Mussulmans of Anatolia, of Roumelia, of Arabia, of Egypt, of Tunis, and of Central Asia, and even the Mussulmans of Russia, who are only waiting for the Sultan's nod to put themselves in motion. The advantages which spring from the power of the Khalif are a proof of the spiritual protection of our Prophet."

Another striking indication of the feeling at Constantinople on the outbreak of the war, was the issue of a sumptuary decree with respect to the dress of women, which showed a fixed determination on the part of the Mahometans to separate themselves as widely as possible from the hated Ghiaours, and to regain, by a more rigid adherence to Mahometan customs, the lost favour of Allah. The following was the decree:—"The head of the police at Constantinople sees with regret that certain Turkish women, unmindful of their dignity, walk about the streets and bazaars attired in a manner not at all in keeping with the established usages and regulations. Their feredjes, instead of being of a sombre and

uniform tint, are dyed with the most varied and fantastic colours. Their yashmaks, instead of forming a veil of thick material, are made of light gauze. Their feet, instead of being shod in the ancient and simple yellow slipper, are confined in ridiculous and uncomfortable boots of Frankish origin. All this must at once disappear. In consequence, the Minister of Police announces that he has the Sultan's orders to put an end to a spectacle which is described as being 'offensive in the eyes of respectable people;' and he has appointed a number of muffedieh, or secret police, to keep watch in the streets and bazaars. Any Turkish lady found wearing either of the articles of attire prohibited will be followed by one of these agents, whose duty it will be to obtain her name and address, whereupon the Minister of Police will notify to her family that she is not to be allowed to go out in future unless she is properly dressed. In the event of her transgressing a second time, she will be condemned to pay a fine." Simultaneously with this ordinance, there appeared another in which the Minister of Police complained that the orders of the Prophet enjoining the Faithful to say their prayers five times a day were habitually neglected. When the muezzins "call the true believers to prayer, many of them remain in the courtyard of the mosque, playing at backgammon, cards, &c. It is necessary that such a scandal, injurious to the interests of true religion, should cease, and we therefore call upon all true believers to enter the mosques when they hear the notes of the muezzin, and not to remain outside during the hour of prayer."

The police made great efforts to enforce the observance of the decree, and women who appeared in thin and transparent yashmaks, or in French boots, were frequently insulted.

About the same time Hobart Pasha, the admiral in command of the Turkish fleet, stated what he considered was the true position of affairs in a letter to the *Times* newspaper. He said—"So at last the farce is played out; diplomacy retires on its laurels, and Russia, forsooth, is to have the task of teaching the Turks how to rule their peoples. No sooner had the Turks seriously taken in hand the work of reform, when they had promulgated new laws, when they had elected to their newly-formed Parliament representatives of all denominations and religions, when they had dethroned two sultans as incapable, when they

had dismissed many high officials for corruption, chosen their best men to govern all the provinces, commenced a system of *gendarmerie*, invited foreigners to join their naval and military schools, &c., than Russia, fearful lest she might forfeit her long and sadly abused influence over her neighbour, puts her hand round her throat, calling, 'Stop! No bad example, Mr. Turk; we shall have our people next asking for a constitution and reform. You are going too fast; we are going to force you to reform in our own way, not in yours. We are going to do so by making you throw all your energies and spend all your means, not in the path of reform, but in self-defence. After that you are ruined, after your people are driven to desperation and excited to madness, then we will show you what to do. It may be that you will lose a province or so, but that matters not; never mind treaties. No answer. Fight you must. Every one has deserted you, so come on. We will place you in such a position that you cannot go ahead in the eyes of expectant Europe in carrying out your good intentions.' Sir, this is the *true* position of affairs; and cleverly has Europe been hoodwinked, cleverly has her persistent enemy played her game. Now we shall see what an oppressed nation of 15,000,000 can do against a powerful (if a somewhat divided) nation of 80,000,000 when it has to do battle for its very existence; now we shall see Poles, Circassians, Georgians, and the brave Hungarians setting aside all questions of religious differences and rallying round the Turk, thinking only of revenge for past injuries inflicted on them by this would-be instructor in the art of governing; and we shall probably see enough blood flow to satisfy even the most rabid humanitarian. Let us have no more ravings about fanaticism and Turkish misrule. The war now so imminent (if not actually declared while I write) will be a war waged on one side for aggression and spoliation, based on Catherine's dream and Peter the Great's will; on the other, by a nation which is not actuated by fanatical reasons, but which will fight—aye, and fight hard—for the hearths and homes of its people, and its honour as a nation. It is a grand sight to see an army and navy such as the Turkish, without pay for months—aye, you might say for years—sacrificing all for their country; no tobacco, often short rations, but happy as children and brave as lions. However, thank

Goodness ! they are well armed and clothed, and ready for anything in the way of hard work. I have been accused of espousing the cause of the Turks with too great warmth. No man has more openly condemned or more deeply regretted the sad events in Bulgaria. No one has censured the bad system of government existing heretofore more than myself. But I find in history many parallel cases during civil wars ; and as I know that there is so much real good in the Turks, I have always urged that they should have a chance given to them, in which case I foresee happy times and a great future for this country. The lessons they have received have not been thrown away ; but I prophesy fearful results if this war (supposing it to have been declared while I write) is allowed to go on. The Turks ask, with reason, ‘ What does Russia want ? Is it guarantees of reform ? ’ ‘ Can we,’ they say, ‘ begin a strict *régime* of government by accepting at the outset humiliation in the eyes of those we are to govern ? The only guarantee we can offer is immediate action, and this we cannot put into practice till we are free not only from war, but from intrigue.’ I fear that no guarantee would satisfy Russia. Let Europe guess what she wants and look to her own interests, while she (Europe) stands gravely by and sees a brave nation dismembered. But we have not come to that yet. Turkey will prove a hard, a very hard nut to crack. One hears (reports are always magnified) of disturbances here and there even now in the provinces. How can you expect anything else while every subject of Turkey has to give almost his last farthing in support of the army and navy ? ”

On the interruption of diplomatic relations between Russia and the Porte, the representation of the interests of Russian subjects in Turkey were intrusted to the German Embassy and consulates in that country. The Imperial Government most readily undertook the task, and was glad to be able to give thereby renewed expression to the amicable relations existing between Russia and Germany. The Porte, however, objected, and categorically refused to recognise the protection of Germany. It declared that Russian subjects who did not intend to be amenable to the laws of the Ottoman Empire must be expelled. Twelve days were given to Russian residents in Constantinople, and twenty-one to residents in the provinces, to prepare themselves for their expulsion. Germany

remonstrated very sharply against this decision, and the English ambassador tried hard to induce the Turks to modify it, but for a long time in vain. Ultimately, however, Mr. Layard was successful, and Russian subjects were allowed to remain under the protection of the German ambassador and consuls. The Porte, however, reserved the right of expelling or removing from points threatened by the enemy suspicious individuals. It also insisted upon all persons formerly in the service of the Russian Government leaving the country.

From the commencement of the war Russia unhesitatingly permitted Ottoman subjects to remain in that country, and agreed to their being placed under the protection of the representatives of England.

Shortly after the declaration of war the Khedive of Egypt, at a sitting of the Assembly of Notables, which had been summoned by his Highness for the purpose of taking into consideration the advisability of sending a contingent of troops to the Sultan, said that in the previous year, when some of the provinces of Turkey revolted, Egypt sent troops to Constantinople. Notwithstanding the most evident sentiments of conciliation, and the sincere desire of the Porte to preserve peace, Russia had declared war, and the Sultan was necessarily compelled to enter into hostilities with that country. It was important that Egypt should, as before, send troops to Turkey, and that their effective strength should be determined ; but the number could not possibly be fixed without a previous knowledge of the amount which the country could devote to the purpose, inasmuch as the estimates did not allow of their furnishing the number required. Therefore, in order to fulfil their duty to the Sultan, meet the exigencies of the situation, and respect their financial engagements, they must have recourse to exceptional resources. His son Hassan, being a soldier, would start for Turkey to share with his fellow-countrymen and brothers in arms the honour of defending the just cause and sacred rights of the Empire.

The Assembly, in response to this speech, decided upon the imposition of an extraordinary war tax of £480,000, and his Highness at once telegraphed to Constantinople that the Egyptian contingent then in Turkey, numbering 9,000 men, would be raised to 12,000. The remainder of the Egyptian contingent would be kept in Egypt for the protection of the Suez Canal.

CHAPTER XIV.

The interests of neutral nations in wars generally—Other nations peculiarly affected by a Russo-Turkish War—The attitude of Great Britain—First official intimation of impending war—Lord Derby on the perpetuity of Treaties—First Military Movement of Russia towards Turkey—Peace an impossible problem—Important Despatch of Lord Derby respecting the Declaration of War—Russia informed of the Views of the British Government on the Crisis—Criticism of the Despatch by the Duke of Rutland—Was Turkey an Independent Power?—Consequences of rejecting the Berlin Memorandum—Importance of the Emperor of Russia's solemn assurances—Lord Derby's reply—Inconvenience of pressing the Government constantly for its views—An *apropos* vindication of the *Daily News*—Reception of Lord Derby's Despatch by Europe generally—Turkish gratitude—The semi-official reply of Russia—Interventions of Europe in the affairs of Turkey—Efforts of Russia for a peaceful solution of the question—Fluctuations of the St. Petersburg Exchange—England clearly forewarned of the intentions of Russia—British Proclamation of Neutrality—Influence of the Foreign Enlistment Act on the Proclamation—Russian Decree concerning International Intercourse—Influence of the state of war on neutral countries generally—An easy but very effectual blockade—Effect of the Closing of South Russian Corn Ports—English Neutrality a disappointment to Turkey—Thomas Carlyle on British Interests—How Hobart Pasha became connected with the Ottoman Navy—The Proclamation of Neutrality causes his removal from the British Navy List—Effect of the War on the Suez Canal—Anxiety of M. de Lesseps—Important Declaration of Lord Derby as to the Canal—The "Highway to India" neutralized—M. de Lesseps obtains better guarantees than he had expected—An energetic policy may also be a very simple one—Interrogations in Parliament respecting Lord Derby's Declaration—Effect of the Neutralization of the Suez Canal on Russia and Turkey—Cosmopolitan importance of the step—Despatch, or letter, of Lord Derby, in reply to the Czar's declarations to the British Ambassador—British Interests specifically defined—Reply of Prince Gortschakoff—Russian intentions as regards the British interests mentioned—Object of Russia in undertaking the war—Difficulty of a satisfactory arrangement as to the Bosphorus and Dardanelles—Inconvenience of departing from the Treaty of Paris—Pacifying effect of Prince Gortschakoff's assurances.

It is very natural that, on the outbreak of any war, we should desire to know in what light the conflict was regarded by neighbouring nations; especially if such nations are powerful and influential, and if by their active interposition hostilities might have been averted or their area vastly extended, and its ultimate issue materially influenced. Some wars have, in fact, only been entered upon in the hope that third parties would be induced to join in the fray. Such was the case with the great war—great in its operations and its important results—between France and Prussia in 1870–71. The co-operation of South Germany was confidently relied upon by Napoleon III., and had he been able to forecast the part which South Germany actually did take, it is probable the struggle would have been, if not actually averted, at least postponed. It often happens in this way, that it is of as much interest to watch the course taken by other Powers, as to follow the events actually transpiring between the belligerents.

Especially is this the case in a Russo-Turkish war, when almost every European Power has, or is supposed to have, interests which might lead at any moment to an interference on one side or the other. Such a thing could scarcely be said of the war of 1870–71, when Europe generally watched the conflict, it is true, with some anxiety, but with determined and immovable neutrality.

Previous to the present war there was certainly the Triple Alliance, by which it was understood to have been arranged that the war should, as far as possible, be localized between the two Powers more immediately concerned; but the interests of both Germany and Austria were so much concerned in the Eastern Question, that the neutrality of neither of these Powers could be confidently reckoned upon in certain contingencies easily conceivable. France would probably abstain unless its great rival became entangled; but Italy might be expected to have something to say in the event of any re-arrangements on the Adriatic. While, therefore, it was earnestly hoped that hostilities would be limited to Russia and Turkey, the attitude of four other great European Powers—Germany, France, Austria, and Italy—could not but be regarded with intense concern.

To English readers, however, the action and attitude of the British Government has an interest peculiarly its own, and, leaving a description of the varied state of feeling in the country to a future chapter, in which we shall deal with the historical debate in the House of Commons on Mr. Gladstone's celebrated resolutions—it will be our object here to show the policy pursued by the British Government in the difficult circumstances involved by the outbreak of hostilities; and in the next chapter to trace the influence of the Declaration of War upon the several great European Powers.

On the 19th April a debate in the House of Lords elicited from the Foreign Minister (Lord Derby) an intimation of the fact that war appeared inevitable. Several noble lords expressed their opinion on that occasion that, under the terms of the Tripartite Treaty of 1856, Great Britain was bound to assist Turkey in the event of her being attacked by Russia, whether called upon to do so by the co-signatories, France and Austria, or not. The Government was urged to send a fleet which, without any declaration of war, might quietly ascend the Dardanelles, navigate the Sea of Marmora, and establish itself in the Bosphorus. It was said that order might thus be restored at Constantinople, Hobart Pasha released to carry on operations in the Black Sea, and British honour saved by preventing Russia from occupying the Turkish capital. Lord Derby, however, replied that the Government did not hold themselves bound, nor did they desire, to interfere in this unhappy war, if war there was to be; and on that point he said that the opinion of those best acquainted with the diplomatic situation did not justify him in indulging in sanguine hopes of averting this great European calamity. With reference to the Tripartite Treaty of April, 1856, his Lordship stated the rather important fact, that it was not a treaty under which we incurred any obligations to the Porte. It was a treaty between England, France, and Austria, and any obligations which we might be held to have contracted under it were obligations to those Powers alone. That being so, the first and most material question was, Did there exist at present, or was there the slightest probability that there would exist, any intention on the part of the French or Austrian Governments to call upon us to fulfil our treaty obligations? To that question his Lordship gave an unhesitating answer: he was perfectly convinced that neither the French nor the Austrian Government had the slightest intention of calling upon us to fulfil what we were bound to under the treaty of April, 1856, and consequently he had not thought it necessary to take any steps in regard to that treaty, or to free us from the obligations which it involved. No treaties could be or were intended to be eternal. They were framed with reference to existing circumstances, and though he could not say whether that was or was not the case in regard to the Treaty of 1856, yet

nothing could be more probable in European diplomacy than the recognition of the fact that treaties did, by the lapse of time and the force of events, become obsolete. Lord Derby did not think it would be a fair or satisfactory conclusion to come to, either that we must be eternally bound by a treaty made long ago under conditions wholly different from those now existing, or that we were to be held guilty of a breach of faith because we considered it to be no longer binding.

Such observations, while perhaps the reverse of satisfactory to Turkey, were reassuring to those who desired to keep aloof from the struggle. No great degree of surprise, moreover, was felt, after this announcement of the apparent hopelessness of maintaining peace, when Lord Derby stated in the evening of the following Monday, 23rd April, that a telegram from Mr. Layard had informed him of the suspension of diplomatic relations between Russia and the Porte, and of the intention of the Russian chargé d'affaires to leave Constantinople the same day. The Foreign Minister also announced that he was informed by a telegram from Colonel Mansfield, British agent at Bucharest, that a detachment of Russian officers and men had that morning arrived at Bucharest.

On the day on which war was declared by Russia (April 24), Lord Derby was interrogated by Earl Grey, who wished to know whether there was any truth in the fact stated by an influential newspaper, that Turkey was willing to agree to a protocol by which she bound herself solemnly towards the guaranteeing Powers to accomplish progressively, and with as little delay as possible, the reforms accepted by the Conference. The alleged protocol provided that if the reforms were not realized to the satisfaction of the guaranteeing Powers, they would consider in common what measures should be taken in order to oblige Turkey to keep her engagements. Lord Derby stated, in reply, that no such protocol had come officially to the knowledge of the British Government; and as it did not appear to have been proposed to Turkey, he could not say whether that Power would have accepted it or not. As to Earl Grey's expression of doubt as to whether all had been done that was possible to prevent the calamity of war, Lord Derby said the Government had done all that it was possible for them to do, in fact, all that it was possible for

anybody to do, to bring about an understanding. They had unfortunately failed, and those who judged after the event would no doubt say that if this or that had been done which was not done the result would have been different. For his part, he did not think that any form of protocol or any form of agreement would have put an end to the misunderstanding. Throughout these transactions he had found on the part of the Turkish Government a deeply-seated conviction that, do what they would, make what concessions they would, sooner or later war would be forced upon them. It was not for him to say whether that conviction was right or wrong, but it was fixed in the minds of the Sultan and his advisers; and that being so, the task of endeavouring to bring about an understanding was not a very hopeful one. Looking at the matter in all the lights which past experience threw on it at that time, his Lordship said he did not think that any other course than that which the Government adopted would have been more successful. He deeply regretted what had come to pass; but believed that in our endeavour to maintain peace between Turkey and Russia—an endeavour made through a sense of duty—the Government had been engaged in the solution of an impossible problem.

The same day on which this debate occurred (24th April) the Manifesto was issued in which the Czar explained to the European Powers his motives for ordering his armies both in Asia and on the Pruth to cross the frontier. It was also on the 24th that the official Declaration of War was delivered to Tavfek Bey, the Turkish chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburg. Both these documents are given at length in the previous chapter, and need not therefore be repeated here.

In reply to the circular despatch of Prince Gortschakoff which accompanied the Manifesto of the Czar, and which is also given in the previous chapter, Lord Derby sent the following important despatch to Lord Augustus Loftus, the English ambassador at St. Petersburg:—

“FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 1, 1877.*

“My Lord,—I forwarded to your Excellency in my despatch of the 24th ultimo a copy of Prince Gortschakoff's circular despatch of the 7–19th ultimo, announcing that the Emperor of Russia had given orders to his armies to cross the frontiers of Turkey.

“Her Majesty's Government have received this communication with deep regret. They cannot accept the statements and conclusions with which Prince Gortschakoff has accompanied it as justifying the resolution thus taken.

“The Protocol to which her Majesty's Government, at the instance of that of Russia, recently became parties, required from the Sultan no fresh guarantees for the reform of his administration. With a view of enabling Russia the better to abstain from isolated action, it affirmed the interest taken in common by the Powers in the condition of the Christian populations of Turkey. It went on to declare that the Powers would watch carefully the manner in which the promises of the Ottoman Government were carried into effect; and that should their hopes once more be disappointed, they reserved to themselves the right to consider in common the means which they might deem best fitted to secure the well-being of the Christian populations and the interests of the general peace.

“To these declarations of the intentions of the Powers the consent of the Porte was not asked or required. The Porte, no doubt, has thought fit—unfortunately, in the opinion of her Majesty's Government—to protest against the expressions in question as implying an encroachment on the Sultan's sovereignty and independence. But while so doing, and while declaring that they cannot consider the Protocol as having any binding character on Turkey, the Turkish Government have again affirmed their intention of carrying into execution the reforms already promised.

“Her Majesty's Government cannot, therefore, admit, as is contended by Prince Gortschakoff, that the answer of the Porte removed all hope of deference on its part to the wishes and advice of Europe, and all security for the application of the suggested reforms. Nor are they of opinion that the terms of the Note necessarily precluded the possibility of the conclusion of peace with Montenegro, or of the arrangement of mutual disarmament. Her Majesty's Government still believe that, with patience and moderation on both sides, these objects might not improbably have been attained.

“Prince Gortschakoff, however, asserts that all opening is now closed for attempts at conciliation; that the Emperor has resolved to undertake the task of obtaining by coercion that which the

unanimous efforts of all the Powers had failed to obtain from the Porte by persuasion; and he expresses his Imperial Majesty's conviction that this step is in accordance with the sentiments and the interests of Europe.

"It cannot be expected that her Majesty's Government should agree in this view. They have not concealed their feeling that the presence of large Russian forces on the frontiers of Turkey, menacing its safety, rendering disarmament impossible, and exciting a feeling of apprehension and fanaticism among the Mussulman population, constituted a material obstacle to internal pacification and reform. They cannot believe that the entrance of those armies on Turkish soil will alleviate the difficulty or improve the condition of the Christian population throughout the Sultan's dominions.

"But the course on which the Russian Government has entered involves graver and more serious considerations. It is in contravention of the stipulation of the Treaty of Paris of March 30, 1856, by which Russia and the other signatory Powers engaged each on its own part to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In the conferences of London of 1871, at the close of which the above stipulation with others was again confirmed, the Russian plenipotentiary, in common with those of the other Powers, signed a declaration affirming it to be 'an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting parties by means of an amicable arrangement.'

"In taking action against Turkey on his own part, and having recourse to arms without further consultation with his allies, the Emperor of Russia has separated himself from the European concert hitherto maintained, and has at the same time departed from the rule to which he himself had solemnly recorded his consent.

"It is impossible to foresee the consequences of such an act. Her Majesty's Government would willingly have refrained from making any observations in regard to it; but as Prince Gortschakoff seems to assume, in a declaration addressed to all the Governments of Europe, that Russia is acting in the interest of Great Britain and that of the other Powers, they feel bound to state, in a manner equally formal and public, that the decision of the

Russian Government is not one which can have their concurrence or approval.—I am, &c.,

"DERBY."

The despatch derived all the greater importance in the eyes of Europe generally from the fact that no other Government replied to Prince Gortschakoff's circular, while in England the chief notice it obtained was in the course of the memorable debate in the House of Commons upon the resolutions submitted by Mr. Gladstone. The substance of this debate is given in Chapter XX.; but it will be of interest here to recall the salient points of the debate upon the despatch in the House of Lords, this having been the occasion which, at an important crisis, elicited from the author of the despatch himself a further declaration of the motives and intentions of her Majesty's Government.

Great additional interest to the debate was lent by the fact that the Duke of Rutland, who undertook the criticism of the despatch, was a Conservative Peer, and usually therefore a supporter of the policy of the Government. The Duke observed that he should not have presumed to call attention to the despatch had any other noble lord shown himself desirous of bringing the subject under the notice of the House; but at the present moment he considered it a matter of vital importance, because the document in question contained language of a much stronger description than the noble Earl and the Government could have intended to use; and his fear was that it would be read by other countries, and more particularly by Turkey, as an abrogation of the Declaration of Neutrality. It was most important that this country, acting in concert with Europe, should maintain a strict and *bona fide* neutrality. He perceived in that morning's papers (8th May) indications of the ill effects that had already arisen from his noble friend's despatch. He saw that in St. Petersburg and in Paris it had caused the greatest consternation; and he had brought the matter forward in the hope that his noble friend might be able to calm and soothe the alarm that now prevailed on the Continent. He hoped nothing would fall from himself that would in any way embarrass her Majesty's Government. He felt deeply grateful to his noble friend and to the Government for their continuous, assiduous, and unremitting exertions to keep the peace of Europe. Unfortunately these exertions,

however strenuous, had failed. In the despatch his noble friend particularly inveighed against Russia for having broken the Treaty of 1856; but his noble friend himself the other day in this House declared that no treaty was irrevocable—an allusion to the reply of Lord Derby, already referred to, when criticized by Earl Grey on the 17th April. The Duke of Rutland proceeded to say that he thought he could show their Lordships that Russia had not broken that treaty. After the outbreak of the Servian War there were differences of opinion between several of the Powers, and an attempt was made by diplomacy to arrange the difficulties and differences. A Conference was proposed, but did not succeed in arranging them; a protocol was proposed, and again that failed of its intended object. And why did they all fail? He asked their Lordships whether Russia did not go to the utmost extent she could in meeting the demands of his noble friend and of the other Powers of Europe. She gave way on almost every point in controversy; whether it was the occupation of Bulgaria, or the granting of administrative autonomy to Bulgaria—in every way Russia did what she could to meet his noble friend, but Turkey refused to give way. She would do nothing; she would listen to nothing; she maintained that attitude at the Conference, and in that spirit she rejected the Protocol. After the Powers of Europe had been brought together, and endeavoured to settle these matters by peaceful means, and after their endeavours had failed, he thought Russia was justified in saying she had fulfilled her obligations under the Treaty of Paris, and that she was called upon to interfere in a more active way. The independence of Turkey was a thing of the past. Did any one mean to say that, after the blood and treasure we expended in the Crimean War, after twenty years of misgovernment in Turkey, increasing every year and every month, and culminating in the Bulgarian atrocities, we had no right to interfere? The noble Lord himself had interfered. What could be more direct interference than writing such a despatch to our representative at Constantinople as the noble Lord wrote on the 21st of September? in which he said—

“Your Excellency will, in the name of the Queen and her Majesty’s Government, call for reparation and justice, and urge that the rebuilding of the houses and churches should be begun at

once, and necessary assistance given for the restoration of the woollen and other industries, as well as provision made for the relief of those who have been reduced to poverty; and above all, you will point out that it is a matter of absolute necessity that the eighty women should be found and restored to their families.”

Could any one who read that despatch conceive of its being sent to an independent Power? But further, the noble Marquis (the Marquis of Salisbury), in his despatch to the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, dated Pera, the 4th of January last, said:—“The independence of the Ottoman Porte is a phrase which is, of course, capable of different interpretations. At the present time it must be interpreted so as to be consistent with the conjoint military and diplomatic action taken in recent years by the Powers who signed the Treaty of Paris. If the Porte had been independent in the sense in which the Guaranteeing Powers are independent, it would not have stood in need of a guarantee. The military sacrifices made by the two Western Powers twenty years ago to save it from destruction, and the Conference which is now being held to avert an analogous danger, would have been an unnecessary interference if Turkey had been a Power which did not depend on the protection of others for its existence.”

He asked their Lordships whether it was not something beyond all human belief that people could still talk of the independence of Turkey? It had struck him curiously that the head of the late Liberal Government (Mr. Gladstone) should be blamed for his participation in what was called the Autumn Crusade. The Government of this country must always be anxious to know what the real feelings of the people were, and if their Lordships doubted what the feeling was their doubt might be removed by a despatch of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, containing language which reflected the greatest honour upon him. On the 5th of September, 1876, the noble Lord wrote:—“It is my duty to inform you that any sympathy which was previously felt here towards that country has been completely destroyed by the recent lamentable occurrences in Bulgaria; the amount of outrages and excesses committed by the Turkish troops upon an unhappy, and for the most part unresisting population, has roused a universal feeling of indignation in all classes of English society, and to such a pitch has it risen that, in

the extreme case of Russia declaring war against Turkey, her Majesty's Government would find it practically impossible to interfere in defence of the Ottoman Empire." He repeated, therefore, that he thought every member of her Majesty's Government ought to thank Mr. Gladstone for being the means of making known the real feeling of the country on this question. He might be told it was useless going back, and that he was only wasting time by referring to these matters; but if they could learn a lesson from what had taken place as to what our future conduct should be, he did not think their time would be altogether wasted. He was one of those who were of opinion that, if the Government could have conscientiously signed the Berlin Memorandum, peace would have been secured; but, unfortunately, on that occasion they separated from the rest of Europe. He had an earnest and strong conviction that his noble friend was unable to sign it, but the consequence had been that we had lost the opportunity of securing the peace of Europe. His fear was that at present they were again on the verge of a similar catastrophe. He would ask his noble friend whether any other Power in Europe had written such a despatch to Russia as that on which he had been commenting. He would ask him further, whether the despatch of the 1st of May was submitted to the other Governments of Europe, and if so, whether they approved it. It was very important that they should not be agitated at the present moment. He was sure that they were all anxious to localize the war, and if possible procure peace; but he felt confident the only way to do so was for the Powers of Europe to hold together and maintain a strict neutrality. He could not sit down without referring to the words which the Emperor of Russia used to our Ambassador on the 2nd of November last. Such was the importance of these words at the present moment that he felt they ought to be known to every man, woman, and child in this country, and in all Europe. Lord Augustus Loftus, in a despatch dated November 2, 1876, wrote:—"His Majesty pledged his sacred word of honour in the most earnest and solemn manner, that he had no intention of acquiring Constantinople, and that, if necessity should oblige him to occupy a portion of Bulgaria, it would only be provisionally, and until peace and the safety of the Christian population were secured. His Majesty could not understand, when both countries had a

common object—namely, the maintenance of peace and the amelioration of the condition of the Christians—and when he had given proof that he had no desire for conquest or aggrandisement, why there should not be a perfect understanding between England and Russia; an understanding based on a policy of peace, which would be equally beneficial to their mutual interests and to those of Europe at large. 'Intentions,' said his Majesty, 'are attributed to Russia of a future conquest of India and of the possession of Constantinople. Can anything be more absurd? With regard to the former, it is a perfect impossibility; and as regards the latter, I repeat again the most solemn assurance that I entertain neither the wish nor the intention.' His Majesty deeply deplored the distrust of his policy which was manifested in England, and the evil effects it produced; and he earnestly requested me to do my utmost to dispel this cloud of suspicion and distrust of Russia, and charged me to convey to her Majesty's Government the solemn assurance he had repeated to me." No language (the noble Duke proceeded to say) could be stronger than this. There was the word of honour of the Emperor of Russia given to her Majesty's Government that he had no desire to acquire Constantinople, and that he did not seek to approach India. He could not believe that any one claiming the name of a gentleman, much more that of an Emperor, could falsify his word of honour given in such language. It seemed perfectly impossible; but suppose it were not so—suppose that Russia did wish or attempt to take Constantinople, to take the Suez Canal, and seize on Egypt—suppose all these impossibilities, what better security could there be against them than to unite with the rest of Europe in resisting such schemes of aggrandisement? If that time should ever arrive, he felt confident there was no man in England in whom the country could repose greater confidence than in his noble friend the noble Earl. He felt satisfied that the interests of England and her honour would be safe in his hands.

Replying to the remarks of the Duke, Lord Derby said, that after being so highly complimented, he might shrink from commenting upon the speech of his noble friend as he might otherwise be inclined to do. The compliments were, however, a little singular, for as, from the noble Duke's criticisms, he evidently thought the Government policy hitherto had been both unwise

and unsafe, he could scarcely feel confidence in the future which was so little justified in the past. That a despatch, too, which had not been in the hands of foreign Governments forty-eight hours, should already have produced consternation abroad, certainly seemed like a flight of imagination on the part of the noble Duke. The latter, however, here interposed by saying, amid much laughter from the Ministerial side and cheers from the Opposition, that he derived his information from the telegraphic despatches of the *Daily News*. Proceeding with his reply, Lord Derby observed, that it was a new and extraordinary doctrine that a British minister must, before sending a despatch, consult all the other Powers, so as to be quite sure that nobody would disagree with him. Declining to discuss the independence of Turkey, which in present circumstances was rather a retrospective historical question, Lord Derby said that the Duke had no right to charge the Government with inconsistency in maintaining the national independence of Turkey, because, when the despatch of 21st September was written they were dealing with the international affairs of Turkey, and things were in a peculiar position. The Government were engaged in the work of mediation, and were endeavouring to give all the moral support they could to the Porte to bring about a settlement of the quarrel. They were not interfering with the independence of Turkey because they said, "If you will do such and such things we can have nothing more to say to you; we cannot take up your cause." The Government were rather in the position of a lawyer at a trial, when the conduct of his client was of such an outrageous character that he is obliged to throw up his brief. The noble Duke had quoted the words uttered by the Emperor of Russia to Lord A. Loftus, and which had been for some months past before the public. Lord Derby said he might, however, point out something which was not less important in the fact that, at the same time, the Russian army was on the frontier; and that there was another declaration made at no great distance of time, viz., the speech at Moscow. Replying to the Duke of Rutland's assertion, that the language held in the despatch might be considered inconsistent with professions of entire neutrality, Lord Derby could not see what the two things had to do with one another. Did it follow that because we were neutral in the war any one

is bound to infer that the Government approved of the war; or did it follow that because important considerations of State withheld them from taking any part in the quarrel, they were therefore bound to abstain, when they were invited, from giving any expression of opinion as to the course that had been pursued? That had never been the course of this country. Lord Derby thought that if the Government had pursued it upon this occasion, they would very likely have regretted it, and would certainly not have escaped criticism. Referring to the constant questions being put to the Government just at this time, Lord Derby said, if there was one thing more than another which was likely to lead to hasty and irritable utterances, and perhaps to danger, it was the fact that those who represented the Government of England, either in that House or another place, should be called upon night after night, without any definite issue before them, to express opinions, which necessarily went forth to the whole of Europe, upon the most difficult and delicate questions.

The debate was continued by Lord Granville and the Lord Chancellor, and was chiefly remarkable for the adroitness with which the former vindicated the Duke of Rutland's quoting from the *Daily News*, and for the clever way in which he brought in the fact of this paper having been the one through which the country first heard of the Turkish massacres in Bulgaria. The noble Earl (said Lord Granville) raised a laugh against the noble Duke by asking him where he got his information as to the views of foreigners upon the subject of the despatch; and when the noble Duke replied that it came from the correspondents of the *Daily News*, there was a general laugh on the other side of the house, which the noble Earl probably thought disposed of the question. But he (Lord Granville) ventured to remind their Lordships that something of this kind took place last year. The intelligence of certain things was conveyed to the people of this country by the correspondents of the *Daily News*. Her Majesty's Government attempted to throw the greatest doubt and ridicule upon the statements made in the *Daily News*, but the Government instituted an inquiry, and after a very long time indeed they obtained information which not only did not justify the censure cast upon the *Daily News*, but the information they obtained entirely corroborated the intelligence it circulated; so that the mere fact that the noble

Duke obtained his information of the state of feeling caused abroad by the publication of this despatch from the telegraphic correspondence of the *Daily News*, did not appear of itself to be conclusive of its falsehood.

There being no motion before their Lordships, there was no occasion to take any vote on the matter, and the subject presently dropped—the principal interest being concentrated in the debate in the Lower House on the resolutions submitted by Mr. Gladstone, which had commenced on the previous evening.

The event proved that the information derived by the Duke from the *Daily News* was by no means a “flight of imagination.” If no actually alarming “consternation” was produced by Lord Derby’s despatch, it at all events created a most profound impression throughout Europe, and was keenly discussed by the entire European press. In Austro-Hungary it gave great satisfaction, and it was also exceedingly well received in Germany, where it was considered that the English Government deserved all the more credit for having given its voice on the side of right and justice, because the intentions of Germany were unknown; and at a time when everything appeared to depend on brute force, and justice was despised, it seemed to the generality of Germans a real treat to hear the firm judgment of a free nation which dared to glory in the happiness of independence. In Paris the publication of the despatch created a temporary panic on the Bourse; but its firm manly tone called forth expressions of approval and admiration.

It was of course by the two contending nations that it was regarded with the greatest interest. The appreciation of the Turkish Chamber of Deputies was shown by the voting of an address thanking the British Government for so clearly speaking its mind to the enemy of Islam; while the Sultan was so pleased as to order his Ministers to convey his thanks in a special manner to Mr. Layard as the British representative. The address of the Chamber of Deputies was presented to Mr. Layard by the two vice-presidents, Beha-ed-din Effendi, a Seyyid, or descendant of the Prophet, and member for Broussa, and Khodeda Verdi Effendi, an Armenian. The following are the most interesting passages:—“The acts of Russia and the calumnies of this unjust nation have only turned, thank God, to her own prejudice; she pretended to act in the name of Europe, and with-

out any respect for the usages of civilized nations, at the time of the declaration of war, she invaded the Ottoman territory under the guise of a brigand, without any preliminary warning, and it was not till after the blow was struck that she proceeded to the formality of the declaration of war. This proceeding for the second time gave a warning as to the conduct of Russia; nevertheless the non-Mussulman populations, who have acquired the title of Osmanlis, and the different Christian communities, who enjoy perfect liberty under the shadow of the Ottoman Empire, received only with horror and disgust the pretension of the enemy of wishing to protect the civilization and progress they enjoy, and they proclaimed this several times. The English Government, after making every effort to preserve peace, judged it right at the time to adopt a policy of neutrality, and consequently, as it was clear they could not approve of such *ruses* and intrigues, we have seen with joy that in their reply to the circular of Prince Gortschakoff they embraced, as is their wont, the cause of justice, and have judged with equity the conduct of the two parties. This decision of the English Government being the natural consequence of the sentiments of uprightness and equity which inspire them, and as the Ottoman nation only asks for justice from its friends, this decision, we say, has given us courage and satisfaction, so that the Representative Assembly, and all who sacrifice themselves for their country, must feel that they owe the above-named Government a great debt of gratitude for having done an act of justice at a moment of such difficulty and delicacy.”

Only one newspaper in Russia, the *Journal de St. Petersburg*, was permitted to print Lord Derby’s despatch; but the remarks with which it was accompanied were echoed by the various other Russian journals, and fairly interpreted the feeling of the nation. The fact was regarded with some satisfaction that none of the other European Cabinets gave their adhesion to the answer of the English Government; a reserve said to be fully justified by the gravity of the events, as controversy would not tend to promote a good understanding between the great Powers—an understanding still the desire of all. If the desire had remained fruitless the reason was that it had a false basis; and the Powers which seriously wished to re-establish the understanding and guarantee the general peace must seek a new basis more in conformity

with circumstances, without further dwelling on the mistakes of the past, the results of which were the best refutation of the English despatch.

With regard to the Treaty of 1871, appealed to in Lord Derby's despatch, it was asked by Russia whether the Porte was not the first to break the engagement of the preceding Treaty of 1856, by violating its promises as to ameliorating the condition of its Christian subjects. If the English Cabinet maintained that the Porte was not bound by it, then the treaty would only have served to guarantee to the Ottoman Government complete impunity with regard to the Christian populations. All the documents of the time of the treaty proved, on the contrary, that the Christian Powers which interfered in the disputes between Russia and Turkey never meant to defend a *régime* oppressive for the Christians. They simply decided against the exclusive protection of Russia, and substituted for it the common protection of Europe. The duty the Powers thus undertook they performed by dictating to the Porte the Hatti-Humayoun of 1856; and if they confined themselves to recording the high value they attached to it in the Treaty of the 30th March, it was that they might at the same time show their respect for the independence of the Sultan. These two principles were inseparable, and it followed that the violation of the one led to the invalidation of the other. If any proof were wanting, it might be found in the numerous collective interventions of Europe in the internal affairs of Turkey during the previous twenty years. How were the conferences held at Paris and London on the affairs of Servia, Moldo-Wallachia, Montenegro, Syria, and Crete to be otherwise explained? The control and the supervision of Europe had been unceasing, and the negotiations of the last two years, from the mission of the Consuls in Herzegovina to the despatch of Count Andrassy, the Berlin Memorandum, the Conference at Constantinople, and the London Protocol, had only been proofs of the rights of Europe, and of the interest it had in regulating the affairs of Turkey in conformity with the necessities of universal peace.

If it suited the views of the English Cabinet to prolong indefinitely these Platonic interventions which exhausted the patience of the Christians, exasperated the Turks, and had no other result than that of giving the latter time to quench the rebellions of their Christian subjects in blood, this

was an interpretation of the Treaty of 1856 which the Christian Powers of Europe would not readily admit, and which had indeed been repudiated by a great part of the English nation. It could not be accepted either by the Russian Government or the people.

The fact that the promises of reform contained in the Hatti-Humayoun of 1856 were the indispensable corollary of the admission of Turkey into the European concert; that the result of it had been that the great Powers had the right to control the acts of the Ottoman Government, and that they had exercised this right on many occasions; that twenty years' experience had shown the utter powerlessness of the Porte to accomplish the improvement required of it; and finally, that the Cabinets had unanimously declared the prolongation of this state of things incompatible with the interests of general peace—all these facts were indisputable. What was the conclusion? That, even in the interests of maintaining the Treaty of 1856, the common action and pressure of Europe should have been exerted, and the Imperial Russian Cabinet had not ceased to urge this upon the great Powers for two years. These efforts having proved unsuccessful, nothing remained for Russia but to execute alone the task which the Cabinets, agreeing with her in principle, hesitated to undertake. The Imperial Cabinet was, therefore, quite justified in affirming that by acting alone it acted in conformity with the sentiments and the interests of Europe. The English Cabinet could only escape from the logic of this dilemma by proclaiming aloud the principle laid down by Lord Palmerston twenty years before, namely, that England was the first Mahometan Power in the world, that consequently she insisted on maintaining the domination of the Turks over the Christians, even though it could only be established on the ruin and the extermination of the Christian populations of the East. But the English nation was, thank God, a Christian nation, and Russia esteemed it too highly to admit that it would ever sanction such a line of policy.

Such was the reply of Russia, so far as any reply was given, to Lord Derby's despatch, and with men of moderate views, who were averse from giving any active support to either belligerent, it had considerable weight, and served in no slight measure to calm the public mind of this country. Its effect, too, in Russia itself was

marked. The St. Petersburg Exchange had taken alarm at first, and there was a fall in the price of securities; but these recovered as it was found that the moderate views expressed in Russian organs were favourably received in England generally.

Beyond the statements of which we have given a summary, little further public notice of the despatch of Lord Derby was taken in Russia, it being felt that the time for discussion was really past, and that no useful purpose could be served by continuing it. Whether for good or evil, the fiat had gone forth for war, and the sincerity of Russia's motives, as regarded the Christian population of Turkey, was now to be shown by actions rather than words.

Probably the very moderate tone of British feeling under the circumstances was partly owing to the opportune publication of a blue book, which threw an unexpected light on the negotiations which led to the signing of the Protocol. From this it appeared that Russia had warned the British Government not merely once, but several times, that she would not disarm unless Turkey fulfilled the conditions specified in the Russian declaration attached to the Protocol. Russia had been greatly blamed for irritating the Porte by laying before it the offensive terms of that declaration; but the blue book showed that it was Lord Derby himself who communicated it to Musurus Pasha, in order that it might be telegraphed to Constantinople.

The *de facto* outbreak of war, although it had been to some extent anticipated in the United Kingdom, caused at first considerable perplexity and alarm, and gave rise to numerous, though vague, fears of changes prejudicial to the interests of England.

On the 30th April there appeared in an extraordinary edition of the *London Gazette* the following "Proclamation of Neutrality"—a document which marked the end of a long series of efforts made by the Government of the United Kingdom, but made unsuccessfully, to preserve peace:—

"BY THE QUEEN.—A PROCLAMATION.

"VICTORIA R.

"Whereas we are happily at peace with all Sovereigns, Powers, and States:

"And whereas, notwithstanding our utmost exertions to preserve peace between all Sovereigns,

Powers, and States, a state of war unhappily exists between his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias and his Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans, and between their respective subjects and others inhabiting within their countries, territories, or dominions:

"And whereas we are on terms of friendship and amicable intercourse with each of these Sovereigns, and with their several subjects and others inhabiting within their countries, territories, or dominions:

"And whereas great numbers of our loyal subjects reside and carry on commerce, and possess property and establishments, and enjoy various rights and privileges, within the dominions of each of the aforesaid Sovereigns, protected by the faith of treaties between us and each of the aforesaid Sovereigns:

"And whereas we, being desirous of preserving to our subjects the blessings of peace, which they now happily enjoy, are firmly purposed and determined to maintain a strict and impartial neutrality in the said state of war unhappily existing between the aforesaid Sovereigns:

"We, therefore, have thought fit, by and with the advice of our Privy Council, to issue this our Royal Proclamation:

"And we do hereby strictly charge and command all our loving subjects to govern themselves accordingly, and to observe a strict neutrality in and during the aforesaid war, and to abstain from violating or contravening either the laws and statutes of the realm in this behalf, or the law of nations in relation thereto, as they will answer to the contrary at their peril."

Compared with the proclamation of her Majesty at the outbreak of the Franco-German war, Clause 5 contained an important difference. On that occasion the reading was as follows—the words within brackets being omitted in the present Proclamation.

"And whereas we, being desirous of preserving to our subjects the blessings of peace, which they now happily enjoy, are firmly purposed and determined [to abstain altogether from taking any part, directly or indirectly, in the war now unhappily existing between the said Sovereigns, their subjects, and territories, and dominions, and] to maintain a strict and impartial neutrality in the said state of war unhappily existing between them: We therefore have thought fit," &c.

Other important differences in the formal wording of the Proclamation arose from the Act 33 and 34 Victoria, with regard to illegal enlistment and illegal shipbuilding and expeditions. It was now provided that "if any person, without the licence of her Majesty, being a British subject, within or without her Majesty's dominions, accepts or agrees to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any foreign State at war with any foreign State at peace with her Majesty, and in this Act referred to as a friendly State, or whether a British subject or not within her Majesty's dominions induces any other person to accept or agree to accept any commission or engagement in the military or naval service of any such foreign State as aforesaid, he shall be guilty of an offence against this Act, and shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such punishments, at the discretion of the Court before which the offender is convicted; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or without hard labour."

By subsequent clauses this penalty was extended to persons attempting illegally to enter foreign service or to induce others to do so; and to masters or owners of ships taking such persons on board, and one of the penalties was that such ships should be detained as security pending the legal proceedings.

With regard to illegal shipbuilding, it was provided that if any person within her Majesty's dominions, without the licence of her Majesty, does any of the following acts—that is to say: (1) "Builds or agrees to build, or causes to be built, any ship with intent or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the same shall or will be employed in the military or naval service of any foreign State at war with any friendly State; or (2) issues or delivers any commission for any ship with intent or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the same shall or will be employed in the military or naval service of any foreign State at war with any friendly State; or (3) equips any ship with intent or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the same shall or will be employed in the military or naval service of any foreign State at war with any friendly State; or (4) despatches, or causes or allows to be despatched, any ship with intent or knowledge, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the same shall or

will be employed in the military or naval service of any foreign State at war with any friendly State—such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence against this Act, and the following consequences shall ensue: (1) The offender shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of such punishments, at the discretion of the Court before which the offender is convicted; and imprisonment, if awarded, may be either with or without hard labour. (2) The ship in respect of which any such offence is committed, and her equipment, shall be forfeited to her Majesty."

Similar provisions applied to the preparing and fitting out of any naval or military expedition:—

"And whereas by the said Act it is further provided that ships built, commissioned, equipped, or despatched in contravention of the said Act may be condemned and forfeited by judgment of the Court of Admiralty; and that if the Secretary of State or Chief Executive Authority is satisfied that there is a reasonable and probable cause for believing that a ship within our dominions has been or is being built, commissioned, or equipped contrary to the said Act, and is about to be taken beyond the limits of such dominions, or that a ship is about to be despatched contrary to the Act—such Secretary of State or Chief Executive Authority shall have power to issue a warrant authorizing the seizure and search of such ship, and her detention until she has been either condemned or released by process of law."

Appended to the Proclamation was a letter from Lord Derby to the Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty, conveying her Majesty's commands "to prevent, as far as possible, the use of her Majesty's harbours, ports, coasts, and the waters within her Majesty's territorial jurisdiction, in aid of the warlike purposes of either belligerent."

The Russian decree concerning international intercourse during the war did not appear till the 26th May, the following being its chief provisions:—The subjects of the Porte residing in Russia were allowed to continue in the peaceful exercise of their professions, under the protection of the Russian laws. Turkish vessels might freely leave Russian ports within the time allowed for discharging their cargoes. In accordance with the Treaty of Paris privateering was abolished, and the delivering of letters of marque prohibited. The provisions of the Declaration of Paris with regard to the commerce of neutrals

were made applicable to all the Powers, without excepting the United States of America and Spain, who did not join the Declaration. During the continuance of military operations on the Danube and its banks the Commander of the Russian army was bound to adopt all measures in his power to leave the navigation and the lawful commerce of neutrals in the river as free as possible, and only to subject them to the temporary restrictions rendered necessary by the exigencies of war—these restrictions to be discontinued as soon as possible. The military commanders were bound by the Convention of Geneva, on condition of reciprocity. When the Turks, with the consent of Russia, should have adopted a distinctive mark instead of the Geneva Cross, measures would be adopted to secure for it the same inviolability as was enjoyed by the Red Cross. The use of explosive balls of less than 400 grammes weight was forbidden. The concluding paragraph stated that in order to diminish as much as possible the calamities of war, and to reconcile as much as possible the exigencies of warfare with those of humanity, the military authorities would act in conformity with the principles laid down by the Brussels Conference in 1874, in so far as they were applicable to Turkey, and agreed with the special object of the war.

By this proclamation, together with that of Turkey on the same subject, there was once more afforded the spectacle, as old as war itself, and as full of rebuke to human civilization, of two disturbers of the peace claiming rights over those who were at amity with each other and with all the world. Once again was heard the phrase “belligerent rights,” and its correlative “neutral duties;” and peaceful nations were cut off from intercourse with each other, to make a ring for two exasperated combatants at hand-grips with one another by land and sea. The English proclamation of neutrality clearly marked out our neutral duties, while, on the other hand, we were not long in getting a taste of the exercise of belligerent rights. While Russia closed the Danube, the Porte notified to the representatives of the Powers that it had declared a blockade of the whole Russian coast of the Black Sea. A delay of three days was granted to vessels wishing to enter, and of five days to those intending to leave the Black Sea; but in the meantime, when once this official notice had been given, the responsibility of making

it known to their traders rested upon the neutral Governments to whom it had been communicated. In a very brief time, therefore, any ship, of whatever nationality, attempting to enter or leave the Euxine, would become lawful prize of war to the Porte. The Turks, in this respect, were only acting within their strict rights, and belligerents and neutrals had nothing to do but submit. All that they had a right to stipulate for was the observance of the article of the Treaty of Paris, to which Turkey was a party, which abolished paper blockades. A blockade, by the provisions of that article, “to be binding” must be effectual—that is to say, it must be maintained by a force sufficient in reality to “prevent access to the enemy;” and of the fulfilment of this condition in the present case there could, of course, be no possible doubt. To maintain an effectual blockade of the whole Russian coast of the Black Sea it was only necessary to have sufficient to close the Bosphorus, and thus the blockade declared by the Porte was as effectual as could be wished. Henceforth, then, a neutral vessel which attempted to penetrate into the Black Sea would render itself liable to seizure, and to the confiscation not only of the ship, but of the cargo also, unless its owners could rebut the presumption that they were aware of the destination of the vessel.

The whole of the South Russian ports were thus practically closed to us; but the consequences were thus far less serious than they would have been five or six years before. Russia, it is true, was still the great granary of Europe; but within the period named her importance in this respect had been gradually declining as the grain trade of the United States had increased. We still, however, drew from her and from the Danubian Principalities, now also closed to us by sea, as much as one-fifth of our total imports of wheat; and the interception of this source of supply, combined with the prospect of a deficient American harvest, produced a rise of thirty-four per cent. in prices on the London wheat market. In other ways the closure of the Black Sea ports told to some extent on our commerce; and our carrying trade, of course, suffered from a war in which the privileges conferred upon neutral carriers by the Declaration of Paris were virtually limited by the action of Turkey to the trade with the Russian ports on the Baltic. Eventually, we may remark, the closing of the Black Sea and

Danubian grain ports proved a much more serious matter to Russia and Roumania than to the United Kingdom. Our requirements were in a comparatively short time so abundantly met by additional shipments from Egypt, Algeria, India, and even from Australia, that prices soon went down to the figure at which they stood before the war; on the other hand, there is the strong probability of these countries retaining their hold of British markets permanently, to the serious loss of Russia and the Danubian districts.

The proclamation of the neutrality of England was no small shock to the Turkish Government. The Turks had always believed that England was the one friend upon whom they could rely. In spite of all that had happened, of Lord Derby's famous despatch of the previous September, and of the statement in so many words that English sympathy had been alienated, they maintained their faith that we were not only willing to help them, but could not help doing so. In this faith they were no doubt somewhat encouraged by injudicious friends here. When they found themselves applauded for rejecting the proposals of the Conference, and for opposing Europe, it was only natural that they should hold to a belief so satisfactory to themselves. The statements of one or two members of the Government, as well as articles from some of the English newspapers altogether friendly to the Turks, had been carefully produced by the local journals, and probably also did much to mislead them. The result was, to say the least, a great surprise at a British declaration of neutrality.

Although strong partizanship was displayed on the side of Turkey in England, it must not be supposed that advocacy of a rather forcible kind was confined to the Turkish view. Much was written of an equally pungent character on the opposite side, and that, too, very often when the occasion for it was founded on the merest speculation. As a general rule, however, it was practically acknowledged that a crisis which might involve interests far more momentous than any that had been hazarded in Europe since the Crimean war, was sufficient to impress even the most light-hearted politician or writer with a sense of profound responsibility, especially as the future for many generations of the Christian populations in South-eastern Europe might depend upon the course taken by England.

We reproduce as a literary curiosity the following characteristic letter, addressed to the *Times* newspaper just at the crisis, by Thomas Carlyle, the eminent philosopher and historian:—

TO THE EDITOR OF THE "TIMES."

Sir,—A rumour everywhere prevails that our miraculous Premier, in spite of his Queen's Proclamation of Neutrality, intends, under cover of "care for British interests," to send the English fleet to the Baltic, or do some other feat which shall compel Russia to declare war against England. Latterly the rumour has shifted from the Baltic, and become still more sinister, on the Eastern side of the scene, where a feat is contemplated that will force not Russia only, but all Europe, to declare war against us. This latter I have come to know as an indisputable fact; in our present affairs and outlooks surely a grave one.

As to "British interests," there is none visible or conceivable to me, except taking strict charge of our route to India by Suez and Egypt; and, for the rest, resolutely steering altogether clear of any copartnery with the Turk in regard to this or any other "British interest" whatever. It should be felt by England as a real ignominy to be connected with such a Turk at all. Nay, if we still had, as, in fact, all ought to have, a wish to save him from perdition and annihilation in God's world, the one future for him that has any hope in it is even now that of being conquered by the Russians, and gradually schooled and drilled into a peaceable attempt at learning to be himself governed. The newspaper outcry against Russia is no more respectable to me than the howling of Bedlam, proceeding, as it does, from the deepest ignorance, egoism, and paltry national jealousy.

These things I write not on hearsay, but on accurate knowledge; and to all friends of their country will recommend immediate attention to them while there is yet time, lest in a few weeks the maddest and most criminal thing that a British Government could do should be done, and all Europe kindle in flames of war.—I am, &c.,

T. CARLYLE.

5 Cheyne-row, Chelsea, May 4.

This may also be a fitting place to give a brief notice of the circumstances under which Turkey,

during the war, obtained the services of an English naval officer of considerable skill and ability in his profession, as well as of high courage and enterprise, as Commander-in-chief of the Ottoman fleet. The Hon. Augustus Charles Hobart is a son of the Earl of Buckinghamshire, was born in 1822, and entered the Royal Navy, in which he attained the rank of captain. Having retired from active service on half-pay, he found employment during the American Civil War, from 1861 to 1865, in commanding a swift blockade-runner, the *Don*, along the coast of North Carolina, and keeping up maritime communications with the Southern States, in spite of the Federal blockading squadron. He published a narrative of these experiences, under the name of "Captain Roberts." In 1867, when the Cretan insurrection broke out, Captain Hobart entered the Turkish naval service, and was placed in command of the squadron which had to blockade the coasts of that island. The Greek Government then called the attention of her Majesty's Government to this fact, and the Admiralty, at the instance of the Foreign Office, struck his name off the British Navy List. In 1874 Hobart Pasha addressed a letter to Lord Derby, admitting that he committed a breach of naval discipline by accepting service under the Turkish Government without leave, but adding :—"During seven years that have elapsed since that time I have endeavoured to maintain the character of an Englishman for zeal, activity, and sagacity, and I have been fortunate enough to obtain a certain European reputation, of which I hope I may be justly proud. I prevented by my conduct during a very critical period at the end of the Cretan Revolution (while I was in command of a large Turkish fleet) much bloodshed, and many think a European war. I have organized the Turkish navy in a way which has led to high encomiums as to its state from all the Commanders-in-chief of the English fleet who have lately visited Constantinople. I have established naval schools, training, and gunnery ships (and here I have been ably assisted by English naval officers). While doing all this towards strengthening the navy of our ally, I naturally have made many enemies. . . . All that they can find to say (and it is bitter enough) is, he has been dismissed the English service, without, of course, explaining the cause. This is most painful to me, and is very detrimental to my already difficult

position." He therefore asked that his offence might be overlooked, and that he might be relieved from "the ban of disgrace." This application was supported by the Earl of Derby "as a matter of Imperial policy," considering it to be of material advantage that Hobart Pasha should occupy the position he held in Turkey. The Lords of the Admiralty in 1874 therefore consented to allow him to be reinstated in his former rank as a captain in the Royal Navy, placing him on the retired list, with the opportunity of rising by seniority to the position of a retired admiral, a rank to which he shortly afterwards attained.

But although no objection was raised by the British Government to Admiral Hobart continuing in the Turkish service while Turkey remained at peace, the case became entirely different when war was declared. One of the first duties of neutrality is to prohibit the enlistment of men or the supply of military materials to a belligerent ; and as we have shown, our Proclamation of Neutrality contained a warning, that if any British subjects took service in the war, they did so at their own risk. It was obviously inconsistent with these principles that any officer holding a commission under the Crown should serve in the army or navy of either Russia or Turkey ; and the conclusion that Hobart Pasha should be removed from the Navy List, if he resolved to continue in the service of the Sultan, was irresistible. Accordingly, on the 1st May, Lord Derby notified Hobart Pasha, through the British Embassy at Constantinople, that England being a neutral power, he must either leave the Turkish service or lose his commission in the English navy. The reply to this intimation was to be given within a week ; but a much longer time than this having elapsed without eliciting any reply, the name of Admiral Hobart was, for the second time, struck off the British Navy List.

In the meantime it became necessary for England to deal with another question incidental to the war, and which concerned us much more nearly than the service of Hobart Pasha, and more even than that of the blockade of the Euxine. A natural anxiety in regard to our highway to India gave rise to discussion as to the international status of the Suez Canal, and the respective rights of the two belligerents in regard to passage there-through. It was feared that the Russian squadron in the Indian Ocean would claim a right of way

through the Canal; and speculation was busy with the question as to what course of action the Khedive would adopt in such an event. It was said that the Canal had never been formally neutralized by treaty; the remark implying a suspicion that the Russian claim to transit would have to be admitted. There seemed to be some popular confusion on the subject of international rights, otherwise it would have been unnecessary to point out that on no conceivable view of the status of the Canal could such a claim be preferred. If its waters had been declared to be neutralized by international decree Russia could not, of course, have asserted a right to use them, except, indeed, as a belligerent, and in the same way as she might, if she had been strong enough, have forced an entrance into the channels of the Dardanelles. But inasmuch as its waters had not been neutralized, or declared international property by treaty, it appeared as if the Canal must remain a portion of the Ottoman Empire, subject, no doubt, to a right of way for the mercantile marine of all nations; but otherwise within the complete control of the Sultan through his feudatory, the Khedive, who must clearly therefore refuse passage to the ships of war of a nation engaged in hostilities with his Suzerain. Of this there seemed to be little doubt, that the Khedive could not allow Russian ships of war to pass from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, unless he were prepared to throw off his allegiance to the Porte altogether, and take the risks of an open alliance with its enemy. But whether he could or could not, there remained the contingency of danger to the Canal through the Khedive not being sufficiently strong to prevent the entrance of Russian war vessels, which, if opposed therein or within the approaches, might have created considerable dangers and complications to the navigation.

Under these circumstances, in deep anxiety for the safety of the great work he had taken so large and honourable a part in carrying out, M. de Lesseps called at the British Foreign Office on the 10th May, having come expressly from Paris to lay before the Queen's Government a proposal for regulating the passage of ships of war through the Suez Canal. M. de Lesseps had thrown his plan into the form of the draft of an agreement for a neutralization of the passage, in which the great Powers were to concur, and which, commencing with a recognition of the complete liberty to pass

through the Canal, which had been permitted to war ships, as well as to merchant vessels, since 1869—a liberty which was extended to the belligerents in the Franco-German war—pledged the Powers signing it to maintain the same liberty “for all ships, whether of war or of commerce, under whatever flag, and without exception.” M. de Lesseps saw Lord Derby in company with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and, after some conversation, was told that the question of the position of the Suez Canal under present circumstances was a difficult and delicate one, and that his project should have full consideration. A week afterwards Lord Derby informed Lord Lyons, the British ambassador at Paris, that her Majesty's Government had carefully considered the project, and had come to the conclusion that the scheme proposed in it for the neutralization of the Canal by an international convention was open to so many objections of a political and practical character, that they could not undertake to recommend it for the acceptance of the Porte and the Powers. A more important statement, however, was to follow; and Lord Derby proceeded to observe that the Queen's Government were deeply sensible of the importance to Great Britain and other neutral Powers of preventing the Canal being injured or blocked up by either of the belligerents in the present war, and had intimated to the Russian ambassador that “an attempt to blockade or otherwise to interfere with the Canal or its approaches would be regarded by her Majesty's Government as a menace to India, and as a grave injury to the commerce of the world.” He added, that on both those grounds “any such step—which her Majesty's Government hope and fully believe there is no intention on the part of either belligerent to take”—would be incompatible with the maintenance by her Majesty's Government of an attitude of passive neutrality.

The despatch of Lord Lyons was for the information of M. de Lesseps and the Canal Company. To Mr. Layard and Mr. Vivian copies of a similar despatch were sent, for the information of the Porte and of the Khedive respectively; each of these concluding with the statement that “her Majesty's Government expect that the Porte and the Khedive will on their side abstain from impeding the navigation of the Canal, or adopting any measures likely to injure the Canal or its approaches, and that her Majesty's Government are firmly

determined not to permit the Canal to be made the scene of any combat or other warlike operations."

The effect of the action of the British Government was evidently to neutralize the Canal to both Russia and Turkey, so far as the naval armament of the two Powers permitted. The public and private ships of Russia were certainly entitled to an "innocent passage" through the Canal itself. In other words, if a Russian ironclad were to enter the Canal, no Turkish force would be allowed to attack it so long as it was in the water-way between the two seas. That fact was made plain by the necessities of the case, for any warlike operations in the Canal might cause such destruction as to impede the passage. But while Russian ships would be in a kind of international sanctuary when they had passed into the Canal, it did not follow that they must be allowed to enter it. That would depend on the vigilance or the strength of the Turkish fleet. The Turks might send ships to the Red Sea to watch for the ironclads and the merchantmen of their enemy. If they should destroy the Russian ships at such a distance from the entrance as to subject the Canal itself to no danger, the result would rank merely among the general casualties of war. If the Russian ironclads should destroy the Turkish in the same circumstances, and thus reach the Canal, they could not be prevented from entering it, all combat between the two seas being prohibited by the general necessities of the case. But the victorious ships would quit the Canal at their own peril. They would have to face any Turkish squadron which might be lying off Port Said. They must run the risk of capture and destruction the moment they left "the approaches" to the Canal. Recognizing these conditions, the Khedive shortly afterwards intimated to the Porte that, if it was intended to refuse the Russian navy a right of passage, it must send some men-of-war to defend the entrance. Turkey therefore announced its intention of taking measures to avoid any conflict in the Canal, by leaving the navigation of it free to all vessels, except those carrying the Russian flag. But under the terms of Lord Derby's despatch she was not allowed to stop even those vessels except by the means we have specified. She had to stop them on the sea, or not at all.

M. de Lesseps had made the less stringent suggestion that national ships should, in passing through the Canal, be subject to such measures

as the territorial authority might adopt to prevent them from landing troops or munitions of war. But he was much better pleased by Lord Derby's emphatic statement, that the freedom of the Canal would be guarded with all the strength of the British Empire. The shareholders, on receiving this announcement at their annual general meeting, held just at this particular time, testified by their general applause that they were of the same opinion; and well they might have been, for Lord Derby had given a better guarantee than a score of international agreements. Had the ships of every belligerent been free to enter the Canal, the interests of the Company would have been at the mercy of such accidents as are the commonplaces of war. But the interests of the owners were identical with those of this country—three-fourths of the ships which used the passage being English, and 176,602 shares in the Company being held by our own Government. M. de Lesseps and his fellow-owners were therefore able to keep their minds as easy as if the Canal had been in Kent instead of Egypt.

The energy of Lord Derby's declaration tended to hide the fact that it recorded the tritest of diplomatic commonplaces. Everybody knew that England had a greater stake in the Suez Canal than all other States put together. The Power which held India must have an unimpeded road to the East; the nation which possessed the carrying trade of the world must keep open the shortest way between Asia and Europe. And that fact was as well known in all the Cabinets of the Continent as the number of ironclads in the British fleet. They might, no doubt, have suggested various ways of guarding the Canal, and among others they might have proposed to place it under an International Commission; but such a body would have been open to many objections. The mere existence of it would have been an assumption that in all matters relating to the navigation of the Canal the vote of a country like Spain, for example, should count for as much as the vote of England. Such a supposition, however, would flagrantly contradict the most obvious of commercial and political facts. It would be a diplomatic fiction; and if recent events had taught one lesson more forcibly than another, it was that diplomatic fictions did not stand the friction of competing interests. In case of war between the parties to an international agreement about the

neutrality of the Canal, it might be for the interests of one to keep the passage absolutely free, and of another to restrict the use of its facilities. All kinds of "accidents" would then be apt to stop the way. A merchant ship might sink at an inconvenient spot, or an ironclad might decline to move on, or it might feel bound by some mysterious necessity to land troops for the protection of its own interests. No International Commission could prevent mishaps which, as Lord Derby said, would do grave injury to the commerce of the whole world. The only effective system of police was clearly the guardianship of some Power which had interests in the Canal identical with those of the whole world. To seek such security from the nominal Sovereign of the territory would have been absurd. To demand it from any of the Continental Powers would have sounded like a sarcasm. But England could afford the requisite safety by virtue of her stake in India, of her commerce, her freedom from aggressive designs, and her maritime strength. Her own vital interests obliged her to keep the Canal open to the legitimate trade of the whole world, and to defend it against obstruction with the whole of her power. Other States had no need to be asked to admit that England had any paramount right of control in Egypt, and all she needed assert was an obvious geographical, commercial, and political fact. It was only necessary for her to say, that as she had a greater stake in the Suez Canal than the other countries combined, she must, in moments of emergency, put forth the whole of her strength to prevent that stake from being sacrificed, and it would seem that no State could be alarmed by so harmless a proposition.

One or two questions were asked in Parliament respecting the despatches on the subject of the Canal, and elicited answers which suggested the reflection that international law ought to be more perfect common sense than any other law, since there was no supreme power to enforce it, and its ever-varying problems could never be solved but by an appeal to the judgment or sentiment of the world. In the present instance the Queen's Government did not think it necessary to defend their determination by any technical reasoning based on any traditional theories of belligerency. Sir William Harcourt asked the Government whether it intended to debar Turkey as well as Russia from using the Canal for belli-

gerent purposes. The Chancellor of the Exchequer replied that the Cabinet had "no wish to prescribe the limitations which either belligerent Power shall place on its rights." It merely wished to "protect the Canal from injury or obstruction by either offensive or defensive measures on the part of either belligerent." Lord Derby, in reply to a corresponding inquiry, simply declared that the Government was firmly determined not to permit the Canal to be made the scene of any combat or other warlike operations; and this determination was quite justifiable, even admitting to the full the belligerent rights claimed by either party. A neutral Power has the right to interpose in defence of its own vital interests, assuming, of course, that it is ready to take the consequences. We considered the uninterrupted use of the Suez Canal as a vital interest, and we decided to interpose in defence of it, being ready to take the consequences of that interposition. Therefore, supposing for the sake of argument that Russia had the right to blockade the Canal, we interposed not because we contested that right, but because it could not be exercised without injuring us intolerably. We should not interpose because we were injured in our capacity of a neutral, but because we were injured as a Power holding India, and were willing to become a belligerent rather than submit.

Russia had certainly no right to complain of such an arrangement. If it prevented her from sending ships to the Mediterranean by the short way of Suez, it did so only because Turkey happened to possess the superiority of naval strength. The effects of the English declaration would have been altogether in favour of Russia if she could have diverted all the Ottoman ironclads from the entrances to the Canal, and thus got a passage for her own to the Mediterranean. As for Turkey, had she been an ordinary State, she might no doubt have refused to let any foreign Power dictate the purposes to which she might put a Canal running through a part of her territory. But the position of the Suez Canal showed that Turkey was unlike every other State, not merely because she possessed territorial points of commanding importance to the whole civilized world, but because she herself was unable to give an adequate guarantee that they would not become the prize of aggression.

There is a broader view of the matter, beyond

merely the interests of the two belligerent Powers, or even the especial interests of England herself as the chief maritime Power of the world; and regarded in this light, the action of the British Government was in the interest of the world at large. The rights of governments or nations can never be strictly predetermined; their condition is one of incessant change; every new interest, every new habit or aspiration of mankind, gives new rights and justifies the assertion of them. The construction of the Suez Canal added an important thoroughfare to the highway of nations in general, and it is as part of that highway that it must be regarded. The strip of ground over which it is carried was once actually, and still is in strict legality, a part of the Egyptian Province and of the Ottoman Empire. But when the Sultan Abdul Medjid and the Egyptian ruler Saïd Pasha gave their sanction to the enterprise of M. de Lesseps, knowing its import and the expectations with which it was undertaken, they parted, in fact, with their exclusive authority, and their successors would in vain attempt to reclaim it. They may be equitably held to have devoted this new sea passage to the service of the world, to have promised perpetual regard to the interests of those who made it and of those for whom it was made; to have, in truth, established a right of way through their territory, for the benefit of the two great masses of the earth's population—that of the European peninsula on the one side, and that of South-eastern Asia on the other. The rights of other nations, whether in peace or war, must be measured in accordance with these conditions. As Turkey and Egypt had ceded a part of their original authority, and this concession had become the property of the world, it was not within the rights of Russia, or any other nation, to consider the Canal and its approaches simply as part of an enemy's country. A government may close any port within its dominions, but we should not allow the Sultan or the Khedive to close Port Saïd or Suez. A government may blockade any port of its enemy, but we should not allow the Russian Government to blockade either of the ports mentioned.

It is unnecessary to take up the reader's time by reproducing here the text of the various despatches on the subject of the Suez Canal, more especially as we have below reprinted a very important communication, partly bearing on the same sub-

ject, which was made by Lord Derby to the Russian Government through Count Schouvaloff. This communication was the one in which the British Government declared its intentions with regard to the Canal; but the great maritime channel was by no means the only subject of the letter. Its general purpose was a response to the Czar's declarations made to Lord Augustus Loftus at Livadia at the beginning of the previous November. The Czar, going beyond the usages of autocrats, then gave our ambassador the most positive assurances of the limitations of his designs, should he be forced to wage war against the Porte. He pledged his word of honour that he had no intention of acquiring Constantinople, and that, if necessity should oblige him to occupy a portion of Bulgaria, it would only be provisionally, and until the peace and safety of the Christian population were assured. The aims of the Czar being thus precisely defined, Lord Derby seized the opportunity of Count Schouvaloff's return to Russia, on a short leave of absence, to communicate to him with equal frankness the views of her Majesty's Government—that they might be explained at length to the Czar. The letter is of a very important nature as regards the political course of events connected with the war, and as showing clearly and authoritatively how far British interests were concerned, and we therefore reproduce it in full, together with the reply of Prince Gortschakoff:—

“THE EARL OF DERBY TO COUNT SCHOUVALOFF.

“FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 6, 1877.*

“M. l'Ambassadeur, — I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 6th instant, in which you inform me that you are about to proceed to Russia on a short leave of absence.

“As your Excellency will then doubtless have an opportunity of personally conferring with your Government, I take this occasion of placing before them some considerations of importance to the future good understanding between Great Britain and Russia.

“Her Majesty's Government do not propose again to enter on the question of the justice or necessity of the present war; they have already expressed their views with regard to it, and further discussion would be unavailing. They have accepted

the obligations which a state of war imposed upon them, and have lost no time in issuing a proclamation of neutrality. They, from the first, warned the Porte that it must not look to them for assistance, and they are determined to carry impartially into effect the policy thus announced, so long as Turkish interests alone are involved.

"At the same time they think it right that there should be no misunderstanding as to their position and intentions. Should the war now in progress unfortunately spread, interests may be imperilled which they are equally bound and determined to defend; and it is desirable that they should make it clear, so far as at the outset of the war can be done, what the most prominent of those interests are.

"Foremost among them is the necessity of keeping open, uninjured and uninterrupted, the communication between Europe and the East by the Suez Canal. An attempt to blockade or otherwise to interfere with the Canal or its approaches would be regarded by them as a menace to India, and as a grave injury to the commerce of the world. On both these grounds any such step—which they hope and fully believe there is no intention on the part of either belligerent to take—would be inconsistent with the maintenance by them of an attitude of passive neutrality.

"The mercantile and financial interests of European nations are also so largely involved in Egypt that an attack on that country, or its occupation, even temporary, for purposes of war, could scarcely be regarded with unconcern by the neutral powers, certainly not by England.

"The vast importance of Constantinople, whether in a military, a political, or a commercial point of view, is too well understood to require explanation. It is, therefore, scarcely necessary to point out that her Majesty's Government are not prepared to witness with indifference the passing into other hands than those of its present possessors of a capital holding so peculiar and commanding a position.

"The existing arrangements made under European sanction which regulate the navigation of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles appear to them wise and salutary, and there would be, in their judgment, serious objections to their alteration in any material particular.

"Her Majesty's Government have thought it right thus frankly to indicate their views. The course of events might show that there were still

other interests, as, for instance, on the Persian Gulf, which it would be their duty to protect; but they do not doubt that they will have sufficiently pointed out to your Excellency the limits within which they hope that the war may be confined, or, at all events, those within which they themselves would be prepared, so far as present circumstances allow of an opinion being formed, to maintain a policy of abstention and neutrality.

"They feel confident that the Emperor of Russia will appreciate their desire to make their policy understood at the outset of the war, and thus to respond to the assurances given by his Imperial Majesty at Livadia, and published at your Excellency's request, when he pledged his word of honour that he had no intention of acquiring Constantinople, and that, if necessity should oblige him to occupy a portion of Bulgaria, it would only be provisionally, and until the peace and safety of the Christian population were secured.

"Her Majesty's Government cannot better show their confidence in these declarations of his Imperial Majesty than by requesting your Excellency to be so good as to convey to the Emperor and the Russian Government the frank explanations of British policy which I have had the honour of thus offering to you.—I have, &c.,

(Signed) "DERBY."

The Russian reply, consisting of a letter from Prince Gortschakoff, was delivered to Lord Derby by Count Schouvaloff on the 8th June, and was as follows :—

"PRINCE GORTSCHAKOFF TO COUNT SCHOUVALOFF.

"ST. PETERSBURG, *May* 18 (30), 1877.

"M. Le Comte,—Your Excellency has been intrusted by Lord Derby with a letter which develops the views of the English Cabinet as regards the questions which might be implicated in the present war, and would affect interests that England ought to defend.

"His Majesty the Emperor has perused it with deep interest, and appreciates the frankness of explanations, the object of which is to remove misunderstandings between the two governments.

"Our august master instructs me to respond with complete reciprocity, by putting you in a position to develop with equal frankness and equal clearness our own views, both on the points raised by Lord Derby, and on those that affect interests

which his Imperial Majesty is bound on his side to protect.

"The Imperial Cabinet will neither blockade, nor interrupt, nor in any way menace the navigation of the Suez Canal. They consider the Canal as an international work, in which the commerce of the world is interested, and which should be kept free from any attack.

"Egypt is a part of the Ottoman Empire, and its contingents figure in the Turkish army. Russia might, therefore, consider herself as at war with Egypt. Nevertheless, the Imperial Cabinet does not overlook either the European interests engaged in the country, or those of England in particular. They will not bring Egypt within the radius of their military operations.

"As far as concerns Constantinople, without being able to prejudge the course or issue of the war, the Imperial Cabinet repeats that the acquisition of that capital is excluded from the views of his Majesty the Emperor. They recognise that, in any case, the future of Constantinople is a question of common interest, which cannot be settled otherwise than by a general understanding, and that if the possession of that city were to be put in question, it could not be allowed to belong to any of the European Powers.

"As regards the Straits, although their two shores belong to the same Sovereign, they form the only outlet of two great seas in which all the world has interests. It is therefore important, in the interests of peace and of the general balance of power, that this question should be settled by a common agreement on equitable and efficiently guaranteed bases.

"Lord Derby has alluded to other British interests which might be affected by the eventual extension of the war, such as the Persian Gulf and the route to India. The Imperial Cabinet declares that it will not extend the war beyond what is required for the loudly and clearly declared object for which his Majesty the Emperor was obliged to take up arms. They will respect the British interests mentioned by Lord Derby as long as England remains neutral.

"They have a right to expect that the English Government will, on their side, in like manner take into fair consideration the particular interests which Russia has at stake in this war, and in view of which she has imposed such great sacrifices on herself.

"These consist in the absolute necessity of putting an end to the deplorable condition of the Christians under Turkish rule, and to the chronic state of disturbance provoked by it.

"This state of things, and the acts of violence resulting from it, excite in Russia an agitation caused by the Christian feeling so profound in the Russian people, and by the ties of faith and race which unite them to a great part of the Christian population of Turkey. The Imperial Government is the more obliged to take account of this since it reacts both on the internal and external situation of the Empire. At each of these crises the policy of Russia is suspected and accused, and her international relations, her commerce, her finances, and her credit are affected.

"His Majesty the Emperor cannot leave Russia indefinitely exposed to these disastrous accidents, which check her peaceful development, and cause her incalculable injury.

"It is in order to dry up their source that his Imperial Majesty has decided to impose upon his country the burden of the war.

"The object cannot be attained unless the Christian populations of Turkey are placed in a position in which their existence and security will be effectually guaranteed against the intolerable abuses of Turkish administration. This interest, which is a vital one for Russia, is not opposed to any of the interests of Europe, which suffers too on her side from the precarious state of the East.

"The Imperial Cabinet endeavoured to attain the desired end with the co-operation of the friendly and allied Powers.

"Forced now to pursue it alone, our august master is resolved not to lay down his arms without having completely, surely, and effectually guaranteed it.

"Be good enough to lay these views before Lord Derby, stating to him that the Imperial Cabinet has a right to hope that the Government of her Britannic Majesty will appreciate them with the same spirit of fairness that induces us to respect the interests of England, and that they will draw from them the same conclusions as ourselves, namely, that there is nothing in the views that have been exchanged with reciprocal frankness between the two Governments which cannot be reconciled, so as to maintain their amicable relations and the peace of the East and of Europe.—Receive, &c.,

(Signed) "GORTSCHAKOFF."

It will be seen in Chapter XVII., which treats of the debate in the House of Commons on the resolutions proposed by Mr. Gladstone, that Lord Derby's despatch was a condensed repetition of the Home Secretary's speech on that occasion. Our position was one of strict neutrality. We had told the Porte from the first not to look to us for assistance, and we should not depart from an attitude of the strictest neutrality so long as Turkish interests alone were involved. All claims on the part of Turkey were thus most distinctly and emphatically repudiated. But what were our own interests which we would not have attacked, because we should be forced to defend them? First and foremost, the Suez Canal. There was to be no interference with the Canal or its approaches. To this clear statement Prince Gortschakoff as clearly and completely replied, that the Imperial Cabinet would neither blockade nor interrupt, nor in any way menace, the navigation of the Suez Canal. Lord Derby's next point was that Egypt must not be attacked. The European nations were so largely interested in Egypt that an attack on it, or its occupation even temporarily for purposes of war, could scarcely be regarded with unconcern by the neutral Powers, certainly not by England. The Russian Chancellor replied, that though Egypt was a part of the Ottoman Empire, and contingents figured in the Turkish army, Russia would not bring Egypt within the sphere of military operations.

As regarded Constantinople, it could hardly be expected that Russia would very cordially agree in desiring that it might perpetually remain Turkish, though repudiating any idea of acquiring the place herself. Accordingly Prince Gortschakoff left the door open for some new and original government of it, arising out of the possible dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. What the re-settlement would eventually be in which we might find ourselves compelled to participate, it was impossible for any one at this time to foresee; but the announcement excluding all European Powers from the acquisition was a delicate hint that England must not expect unopposed to make Stamboul a second Gibraltar.

It was not at all difficult to see that there was a substantial connection between English interests and the navigation of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. At the commencement of the war the passage of these Straits, whether into the Black Sea or into

the Mediterranean, was absolutely forbidden to ships of war in time of peace, as well as in time of war, unless with the consent of the Sultan. Lord Derby wrote that the existing arrangements appeared wise and salutary, and that there would be serious objections to their alteration in any material particular. This was very moderate and cautious language. The arrangements "made under European sanction," which existed before 1871, were wise and salutary, and there were serious objections to their alteration; but they were altered with the concurrence of the great Powers, because it was seen that their continued maintenance was impossible. What had happened once might happen again. Lord Derby did not pretend to say that the existing arrangements were immutable. He approved them, and he saw serious objections to their alteration; but beyond this he did not go. Prince Gortschakoff, on the other hand, refused to commit himself to any opinion, whether on the merits or demerits of the existing arrangements, and contented himself with saying that the matter should be settled by a common agreement on equitable and efficiently guaranteed bases. He put forward, however, tentatively, and without committing his Government to any precise line of conduct thereafter, a view of the rights of ownership with respect to the Straits, which was in complete antagonism to that enunciated by Lord Derby. The mere circumstance that the Turkish Government owned both shores of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles ought not (in Prince Gortschakoff's view) to entitle them to be supreme over the only connection between two great seas, and the Russian Government indicated their desire to have the arrangements revised.

It is easy to see the antagonistic considerations which influenced the two Powers in viewing this delicate and difficult problem. Most English statesmen had always said that no Russian interests with which they could be expected to sympathize were injured by these impediments. All merchant vessels were freely permitted to pass the Straits; and if that way was barred to men-of-war, could we be asked to help in removing obstacles which virtually saved us the necessity of keeping in the Mediterranean a larger squadron than we did? Egypt might be beyond the possible circumference of the operations in the present war; but in some future struggle that might not be so, and if the Straits were open we should be

obliged to keep a fleet within easy distance of Alexandria.

All Englishmen are familiar with the reasons against any meddling with the then existing arrangements; but it was their duty, at least, to consider some of the arguments which the Russian Chancellor used, and which might at a Conference convince other Powers of the propriety of a revision. It is true that Turkey owned the adjacent shores; but international law did not recognize her as absolute owner of this highway between two seas, in the same manner in which every country is owner of rivers running solely through its territory. If various states have always declined to acknowledge the right to impede the navigation of a river which passes through, and is a channel of communication between, two countries—if the Congress of Vienna declared the navigation of such rivers free—Russian statesmen argued that they might well object to restrictions which had the effect of crippling their maritime strength, and of practically depriving them of the use of their home squadrons so long as the Baltic was frozen.

Looked at from another point of view, there seemed even graver reasons than this why, in discussing the regulations respecting the Straits, too much stress should not have been laid upon the ownership of their shores. What, indeed, would be the natural effect upon Russia of such a line of reasoning? Would it not prompt her statesmen to say that it supplied them with a new and cogent reason for aiming at Constantinople? Would not they inevitably contend, that if the owners of that capital must always be the custodians of the only channel by which for many months in the

year Russia can have maritime communication with the outer world, that was one reason why she should be the owner? It could not indeed be wondered at that the British Government should have been in no hurry to disturb the existing agreement, by which our interests at all events were not imperilled, and may in some degree have been protected. But it was obvious that before taking up a decided position, it was necessary for both countries to bear in mind and duly weigh considerations not mentioned in either of the despatches. To push to an extreme doctrines as to the sovereignty possessed by Turkey over the Straits arising from its ownership of the shores, might prove inconvenient to ourselves if urged with respect to Egypt.

The answer of Prince Gortschakoff was received with little regard in England; and the fact that it raised no special discussion either in or out of Parliament, was due to the general impression that before the Russian armies could actually threaten the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus, time would be allowed to England to take measures to guard from hostile occupation these, to her, most vital points in perhaps the whole world. For these points are of momentous importance to our country. It cannot be doubted that within a certain number of years a railway will be constructed down the Valley of the Euphrates, and will be the highway from Europe to India. This line must pass from Asia into Europe at either the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus, and any power which holds these places will be able to pour troops and supplies into India in less than half the time required for England to do so by way of the Suez Canal.

CHAPTER XV.

Italian opinion as to the War—Policy announced by Italy—Efforts of France for the maintenance of Peace—French declaration of Neutrality—Important speech of Count von Moltke in the German Parliament—French interest diverted thereby from the Eastern Question—Moderate views of the matter prevail in France—Debate in the German Parliament on the Eastern Question—Views of the Ultramontane and Liberal leaders thereon—Von Moltke's own interpretation of his speech—Opinions of the German Press—Important geographical position of Austro-Hungary with respect to the belligerent Powers—Apparent necessity of Russia being prepared for Austrian Intervention—Policy of Austria in previous Russo-Turkish Wars—Her significant inactivity in 1870—The "Slavonic Question"—Danger involved to Austria by the uprising of a purely Slavonic kingdom—Explanation of the course adopted by the Government at the outbreak of War—Austrian Ordinance of Neutrality—The Corvina Library presented by the Turks to Hungary—Magyar and Slavic demonstrations in Hungary—Enthusiasm of the Czechs—A delicate task before M. Tisza—His speech to the Diet at Pesth—Emphatic approval of the Emperor—Authoritative exposition of Austrian policy by Prince Auersperg—The highest duty of a statesman in few words—Interests of Austria on the Lower Danube—Effect of the Declaration of War in Roumania—Turkey, as Suzerain of the Principality, proposes to act as provided by the Treaty of Paris—Summoning of the Roumanian Chambers—Prince Charles protests his Neutrality—A Secret Convention made with Russia—Facilities given by the Convention for the Passage of the Russian Army—Position of Roumania explained to the Chambers—Agreement of the Chambers with the Convention—Surprise of the Porte—Its protest to the European Powers on the subject—Dismissal of the Roumanian Agent from Constantinople—Declaration of Roumanian Independence precipitated by Turkey—Roumania explains her position to the various Powers—Assertion of Independence ratified by both Senate and Deputies—Prince Charles inaugurates the eleventh anniversary of his reign with an important speech—Reticence of the several European Powers—Mutual understanding amongst them—Vigorous Despatch of Safvet Pasha, the Turkish Foreign Minister.

IN the preceding chapter we have shown the immediate effect of the outbreak of the war, so far as the United Kingdom and its several interests abroad were concerned. Pursuing the course announced in the early part of that chapter, we now propose to turn from our own country to see how the war in its commencement and early stages was regarded by the various continental nations whose interests might be supposed to have been in some degree affected by it, concluding with a view of its effect upon the semi-independent Principality which lay between the European confines of the two belligerent Powers.

Commencing with Italy, we may observe that the tone of the Italian press was almost universally one of condemnation for Turkey and goodwill towards Russia. That the sympathies of the Government, too, were with the Christian races of Turkey was also evident; but officially it was declared that Italy would observe the strictest neutrality, and would do her utmost to localize the war. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, replying to a question as to the policy that Italy would pursue, stated that the mission of Italy would be that of order and peace, and subordinate to the great principles of order and progress. Having nothing to fear from Turkey, the Government had believed it to be their duty to support the Turkish Empire, but without allowing themselves to be led by England or any other Power whatsoever.

Above all, it was necessary to preserve Italian independence. This line of conduct had gained for the Government the good wishes of all the European Cabinets. If Italy rejected the six months' armistice, it was because she thought the prolongation of the armistice would bring ruin to the Principalities who applied to her. The Minister also denied emphatically that the Government had made any engagement with the Powers who took part in the Constantinople Conference. Italy was free, and would remain free as long as her interests did not demand any other line of conduct.

Much the same policy was announced by France, our chief ally in the former war between Russia and Turkey. There was no special reason to believe that, had the hands of France been entirely free, she would have been at all anxious to enter again into the field on the side of Turkey; and in the peculiar circumstances of France there was every reason for her desiring to keep aloof from complications abroad, which would bring great expense and little glory. In a circular, therefore, addressed to the diplomatic agents of France, dated 25th April (the day after the declaration of war), the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, after expressing regret at the failure of the European negotiations, said:—Immediately after the Conference of Constantinople the Porte declared that she was in accord with all the European plenipotentiaries on all the points of their pro-

gramme, except two. In the circular of January 25 she flattered herself that so narrow a difference would not result in alienating from her the sympathies and goodwill of Europe; and she thus indirectly pointed out the opportunity for ulterior deliberations, which might remove the last obstacles to a complete understanding. The London Protocol appeared to tend to the realization of this desire; for the text to which we gave our assent reduced the substance of the demands and counsel of Europe to the declarations made by the delegates of Turkey at the Conference, and to the internal measures more recently decreed by the Sultan. Nevertheless, a contrary interpretation prevailed at Constantinople, and Turkey precipitated the extreme resolutions which have put a stop to diplomatic action in the direction in which it has been exerted for two years. After so many efforts to obviate this result, we have only to declare our decided desire to remain strangers to the complications which may arise from it. Will you therefore unmistakably declare that the policy of France is the most absolute neutrality, guaranteed by the most scrupulous abstention? The unanimous feeling of the country and of its representatives, our distance from the theatre of the contest, and the nature of our essential interests, all contribute to impose upon us such an attitude, and we shall modify it only when new circumstances may permit the common action of Europe to prepare and facilitate the return of peace.

A declaration of neutrality was also published the same day in the *Journal Officiel* in the following terms:—"The Government of the Republic, having resolved to observe a strict neutrality in the war which has just broken out between Russia and Turkey, thinks it right to remind Frenchmen residing in France or abroad that they should abstain from any act which, committed in violation of the French laws or of the law of nations, might be deemed an act hostile to one of the two parties, or contrary to a scrupulous neutrality. They are especially forbidden to enrol themselves or take service either in the army or on board the men-of-war of either of the belligerents, or to assist in the equipment or armament of a man-of-war. The Government declared, moreover, that no man-of-war of either of the belligerents would be allowed to enter and remain with prizes in the ports and waters of France or French colonies for more than twenty-four hours, except in cases of enforced

postponement or justified necessity. No sale of objects accruing from prizes could be held in the said ports or waters. Persons contravening the above-named prohibitions could not claim any protection from the Government or its agents against acts or measures which the belligerents might take or decree, and would be prosecuted if there were reason for it, conformably to the laws of the State."

Perhaps less public feeling was manifested in France on the outbreak of war, because on the very day that the Czar's troops crossed the Pruth a speech was delivered in the German Parliament by Count von Moltke, which attracted far more attention for the moment in both Germany and France than the Russian declaration of war. The speech was one which, coming from so great a military authority, would have been remarkable at any time; but made just at the moment of the commencement of hostilities by Russia, it was thought to portend a rupture of the peace of Europe in general, and caused very widespread alarm. Count von Moltke's speech was made in support of a proposal for 122 new captaincies, with the view of strengthening the German army in officers. The vote was opposed, and the Count insisted on the necessity of it, pointing out that Germany kept only 400,000 men under arms against the 487,000 maintained by France. The French military budget, moreover, exceeded the German by £6,000,000 a year, not including extras. He would not discuss the question whether France intended to bear this enormous burden for a prolonged period, or whether she was arming for a definite purpose only; but he must needs say that, much as he wished for peace, he did not believe in it. Those would be happy times when Governments would be no longer compelled to sacrifice the greater part of their revenue to insure the continued existence of the State, and when nations would comprehend that the most successful war was more expensive than peace. It was sinful—nay, it was unprofitable—to purchase wealth and land by the sacrifice of human lives. Unfortunately this was a period of mutual distrust, when danger was, so to say, *en permanence*. Germany was strong by community of race and interest, and would be pacific by the exigencies of her situation, even were she at all inclined to be bellicose. But some of their border districts had been recently made the subject of alarming declarations in that House, and if they looked at

the French journals they would find them full of spite and hatred against them. Remembering how often united France had invaded disunited Germany, the French apprehended the like treatment at their hands now that they were once more united. Hence the haste, the zeal, and the uncommon intelligence with which the colossal work of French military reorganisation had been completed; hence the locating of an excessively large portion of French troops, especially cavalry and artillery, in the departments between Paris and the German frontier—a measure which they would sooner or later have to reciprocate. In France the army was the pride of all political parties alike; its defeats were forgotten, and its future was regarded with confidence. It was somewhat different in this pacific country. He did not mean to say that the people had actually become oblivious of the achievements of their troops, but there was certainly a marked tendency to be niggardly towards them. If they wished the German army to be strong, they should not begrudge it the necessary outlay. France had the advantage over them in numbers and in maintaining her war cadres during peace; they relied upon the careful education of the individual soldier rather than upon excessive numerical strength. The fresh captaincies proposed were intended to prepare 122 important officers in peace for the work they would have to do in war; and depend upon it (said the Count), these 122 captains would have little spare time for amusement if it was consented to appoint them.

Of course, after such a speech from one so little in the habit of speech-making, and one, moreover, of so high authority as regarded the military necessities of his country, the vote was passed without further opposition.

If any one had chosen to challenge the Count's figures it would not have been difficult to show that, as a matter of fact, Germany was in a far more forward state of preparation than France. The peace effective of Germany was, indeed, little over 400,000 men, but the strength of the Imperial army on a war footing exceeded 1,200,000 men, and even this did not include the last reserve or the Landsturm. When all was told, Germany could place in the field at any time 2,500,000 armed men, without drawing upon the last reserves.

The real matter which vexed the soul of the great German warrior, and called forth such

unusually forcible remarks, was the idea that Parliament should manifest any niggardliness towards an army which had accomplished so much for the country; and had there been any serious reason for complaint on this head there would have been a real source of weakness for Germany. A little consideration, however, would have shown that the respective views of the French and the Germans were very rational in the different circumstances in which the two nations were placed. The French had to invent a military machinery which would restore them to their natural place among the great Powers. The invention of such a machinery was expensive, and it was not surprising that the French, while engaged in the process, should spend £6,000,000 a year more than Germany spent in keeping in good working order a machinery which she had perfected with all the resources of military science. It should also have been remembered that France was a richer country than Germany, and the richer the country the more its army will cost, as soldiers expect more to be done for them; and the extra expenses entailed by the possession of Algeria should also have been taken into account. In the same way, when Count von Moltke criticized the French system of keeping up numerous weak battalions, and assigned a superiority to the German system of keeping up fewer battalions at their full strength, it might have been replied that in Germany a national army had been formed, while in France it was only being formed; and that, while the object of a nation was to have men taught to be soldiers, numerous battalions, though weak, multiplied centres of instruction. The French, too, naturally took great interest in their army, for they saw in it the means of regaining their self-respect, and a great work that is being accomplished always awakens more sympathy than a great work that has been accomplished.

The excitement caused by Count von Moltke's speech was naturally greatest at Paris, and was aggravated at first by exaggerated rumours of what had been said. When the correct text was obtained the French had the good sense to recognize that they had no cause of complaint or suspicion, and disquietude gave place to a calmer and more accurate judgment. The transition was the more easy because the leading organs of public opinion concurred in perceiving nothing in Count von Moltke's words but a statement, free from any

bitterness, of the natural and legitimate efforts made by France to re-establish her military position. It was, indeed, fortunate that France felt disposed to look at the matter in this sensible light. The best interpretation to put upon Count von Moltke's speech was certainly to regard it as nothing more than the resolution of a strong man armed to hold his own in peace. War preparations, however, in critical times are only too apt to provoke counter preparations, and jealousy to excite jealousy, until the strife which nations would prevent is actually precipitated by their very anxiety to prevent it.

The general feeling of Germany was indicated by the remarks of one or two members of the German Parliament who, the day after war had been declared, took part in a debate upon the Eastern Question, and the bearing thereon of Count von Moltke's speech. Herr Joerg, a leader of the more moderate and statesman-like section of the Bavarian Ultramontanes, introduced the subject. He fully sympathized with the announced policy of the Russian Court, but he doubted the sincerity of a Government who were persecuting Roman Catholics with a furious rage anything but Christian. The infamous acts committed by the Russian Government against the Polish Christians, on the ground that they happened to be Catholics, made it exceedingly doubtful whether the protection of Christians was their sole aim and object in Turkey. Even pacific England was excited by the news of these terrible proceedings in Poland, and English statesmen, once so friendly to Russia, now spoke in a very different key. No doubt the case of Turkey was hopeless; she was unfit to live on in her present uncivilized state. But if Russia were to seize Turkey, universal conflagration must be the result. Austria would be imperilled, and Germany would have to interfere. Germany, and Bavaria more especially, were deeply interested in the future of Austria and in the safety of Danubian communications; nor could they afford to allow a vast and fertile region to remain uncivilized, upon the proper use of which the solution of the social problem in Germany depended. Prince Bismarck, a short time ago, had told them that he hoped to contribute towards localizing the war, and that were he to fail in this a very intricate situation would arise, the consequences of which it was impossible to predict. This momentous crisis had

now arrived. The only means of preventing a European war was the institution at Constantinople of a European dynasty of non-Russian extraction.

Herr Lasker, the well-known liberal leader, said his political friends were habitually reluctant to discuss foreign politics, because they did not think they were in possession of all the facts. He, however, concurred with Herr Joerg in regarding Turkey as obsolete, and Russia as a Power who should not be permitted to lord it over the rest of the world in that important portion of the globe. They had every reason to trust in the policy of the German Government. This policy was essentially pacific; and Field-marshal von Moltke, in his recent speech, had not said a single syllable that could be construed as a threat. When the French read the exact text of the speech, they were perfectly satisfied that nothing like a menace was intended. This was, indeed, a time when nations might shortly be called upon to protect their interests; but they knew that every endeavour would be made to keep this country at peace, and they had full confidence in the discretion of the Chancellor.

Herr Windhorst, the leader of the North German Ultramontanes, regretted that the House was so scantily informed by the Government about foreign politics. If, he said, there were persons who sympathized with Turkey, it was only because they preferred Turkey to Panslavism. He admitted, however, that the German policy was being conducted in a pacific sense, and that Field-marshal von Moltke, in his recent speech, had no intention to deviate from this course.

Field-marshal von Moltke, referring to the recent speech he had delivered, then said, that all he meant to convey was, that the French kept a disproportionately large section of their army on the German frontier, while the German regiments were equally distributed over the whole country. He did not know whether it would become necessary to reciprocate this peculiar disposition of the French troops; but should this ever be the case, German measures would be purely defensive. The policy of Germany was essentially pacific, without, of course, renouncing liberty of action in case of need.

A rather important part of the German press took an unfavourable view of the intentions of Russia, and characterized the Czar's manifesto as frivolous, unjust, contrary to the law of nations,

and a good copy of the hypocritical documents which in the last century used to accompany the march of Russian armies into Poland. There were naturally many papers which took a view more friendly to Russia, but those of a contrary opinion were in a decided majority.

Next to the contending nations themselves, however, the Power whose interests were most immediately concerned by the war was the Empire of Austro-Hungary; and to more clearly appreciate the importance of Austria's position, we invite the reader's attention to our map of Turkey in Europe. There it will be seen that, on the outbreak of war between Russia and Turkey, Austria really held the key of the situation, inasmuch as no Russian army could possibly reach Constantinople if Austria were to forbid. Austro-Hungary not only covered the whole northern frontier of Roumania, Servia, and Bosnia, but her Dalmatian province inclosed the western border of Turkey down to Montenegro. Russia, on the other hand, closed in the whole of the western and north-western frontier of Austria; and while any changes in Turkey and her tributary states could not but have an important influence on Hungary, a supreme interest would attach to changes which might result in extending throughout Turkey the influence of Austria's powerful westerly neighbour. Moreover, the main artery of Austria's commerce, the Danube, pursues its course between Turkey and the semi-independent Principalities to its outlet into the Black Sea; while the only outlet beyond this into the Mediterranean was through the virtually Turkish Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. It is easy to see, therefore, that for Russian influence to become paramount upon the southern as well as upon her western borders, might produce changes of vital consequence to the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

So critical, therefore, were the interests of Austria that were involved, and so easy would her all-powerful intervention be, that it would seem as if Russia, in resolving on a war with Turkey, would necessarily have to be prepared for a war with Austria also. It is a little singular to remark, however, that although no country has less reason to desire a Russian occupation of Constantinople, or greater cause to wish the Danube to remain free and neutralized, nevertheless, of all the interested Powers there is not one that has at various times lent herself with greater readiness to

Russian designs. Twice in the last century she allied herself against Turkey; and in only one of the eight wars in which, during the last 170 years, Russia and Turkey have been engaged, has Austria in any way assumed a hostile attitude to the Muscovite armies. That once—in the Crimean war—she took no active part in the contest, although, as clearly shown by Mr. Kinglake, she led the Western Powers on the ice, distinctly assuring them that she would support their ultimatum to the Emperor Nicholas, and drawing back at the last moment. In 1829, according to Von Moltke, she encouraged the Turks to continue the contest, hoping from the apparent exhaustion of the combatants that she might eventually step in as an umpire and dictate terms to both. In 1870, when Russia issued her celebrated Note, announcing that she could no longer be bound by the Treaty of Paris as to the Black Sea, Austria pursued her accustomed and traditional policy of masterly inactivity. It is true, at the time she was not supported. The English Ministry of the day did not attach vital importance to the clauses involved; the Sultan Abdul Aziz was too busy with his palaces and his harems to take much account of the doings of Infidels. France and Germany were engaged in mortal strife; Italy had only just got to Rome, and hoped to stay there; Austria alone could have said "No," and this "No" would probably have been decisive, but she failed to say it. Thus what was supposed to be one of the great safeguards against Russian aggression was swept away by the stroke of a pen; what had cost thousands of lives and millions of pounds to effect was abandoned without a blow or a struggle.

Then again there was the Slavonic question, which has of late years come into remarkable prominence, and a little consideration of which will show more clearly than anything else how all-important were the interests of Austria in this war. It is somewhat difficult to disentangle the actual truth from the web of falsehood and random assertion with which the "Slavonic Question" is involved. It would appear, however, from the writings of those who are both friendly and hostile to Russia, that for years past a most complicated and deep-seated intrigue has been proceeding, instituted and carried out by secret societies; according to some fostered, and certainly regarded by no means with disfavour, by the Russian Government. The object of this intrigue or con-

spiracy is nominally the freedom of the Slavonic races from the dominion of Turkey (where they constitute about half the population), and the creation of either a number of independent, or, as it is termed, "autonomous" States, or else of a single Slavonic kingdom under the protection of Russia. What this would ultimately result in it is unnecessary to point out. The protection of small independent states on the frontier of a great and aggressive Empire must result, as in the case of the Crimea, in the word protection being replaced by incorporation.

This scheme, if carried out, would be a double-edged weapon in the hands of Russia; it would tend towards the dismemberment, not only of the Ottoman, but also of the Austrian Empire. The Slave states that owe allegiance to the Court of Vienna would inevitably be attracted to a Slave kingdom, just as the minor states of Italy were attracted round Piedmont, and those of Germany round Prussia. Unfortunately the Austrian rule can scarcely be called assimilating, like that of her neighbours; the various races that own allegiance to the yellow and black flag still retain their individuality, and in a great degree their mutual hostilities. The Slave races, for instance, who constitute 49 per cent. of the Austrian population, and 16 per cent. of the Hungarian, regard with peculiarly jealous and bitter feelings their fellow countrymen the Magyars, who form the most important of the various Hungarian races. It is different in Germany; one of the great triumphs of comparatively free and constitutional governments may be witnessed in the success achieved by the new German Empire in reconciling the different and previously hostile Germanic kingdoms to her rule, and in imbuing them with a mutual regard and united patriotism. Undoubtedly the war of 1870 was in a great degree instrumental in bringing this about; nevertheless the complete success is not the less remarkable.

Austria, as we have already remarked, has never succeeded in infusing any such spirit of unity amongst the various nationalities, and the secession of her Slave provinces would, to all human appearance, be followed by an entire disruption of the Empire. Hungary would probably become an independent kingdom, the German provinces would go to Prussia, the Italian Tyrol and some other pickings to Italy. That such an end would be of enormous benefit to

Russia is unquestionable; the road to Constantinople would at once be open, and any danger of reconstitution of the Polish kingdom would be removed for ever.

Without hazarding any speculations as to the probability of so momentous a consummation as this, we have dwelt somewhat at length on the peculiar position in which Austria stood with respect to the belligerents in this war, because in the ultimate settlement of the Eastern question Austro-Hungary will be almost as much affected as Russia or Turkey; and at the outbreak of the war there was doubtless only the delicate relations of its varied nationalities which prevented her from taking a more decided position. Much interest consequently attached to the first ministerial utterance on the subject in the Austrian Reichsrath, where, on the 4th May, Baron Lasser von Zollheim, Minister of the Interior, announced that the attitude of the Monarchy in presence of the outbreak of war was the same as it had constantly observed throughout the Eastern complications. Its endeavours to procure a practical amelioration of the lot of the Christians in the East had been appreciated in every quarter. Its efforts had been at the same time devoted to the maintenance of peace, and when this became impossible, to localize the war. The Austro-Hungarian Government saw that it had now a double task to perform, namely, to do all in its power to prevent European complications; and, with regard to the result of the war, to exert under all circumstances its influence upon the eventual development of affairs in the East in a manner corresponding to the situation and interests of the Monarchy. Out of consideration for its own interests the Austro-Hungarian Government reserved to itself its freedom of action, even after the declaration of the neutrality of Austro-Hungary. The Government had hitherto succeeded in following the development of events without military preparations, and would remain true to the principle not to charge the public expenditure with a purposeless mobilization. At that moment it saw no motive for taking military steps. On the other hand, the Government was conscious that no other Power had interests more closely connected with Turkey in Europe than Austro-Hungary, and fully recognized its responsibility. Nevertheless the Government looked forward with confidence to the course of events. This confidence was founded on the

friendly relations of the monarchy to all the Powers, on the frankness and promptitude with which the aims of Austro-Hungarian policy had been declared, and on the conviction that the Emperor, in all cases where the interests of the monarchy were at stake, might surely rely on the devotion of his peoples, and the patriotism of their representatives. In this confidence, and in the feeling of strength which the possession of a military power, successfully developed by the foresight of the representative bodies, imparted, the Government saw itself, even at the crisis which then existed, in a position to insure due consideration for the voice of Austro-Hungary, without having resort to warlike measures.

The ordinance of neutrality, referred to by Baron Zollheim, was published a few days later, and was in all essentials identical with those issued by the Austrian and by the Hungarian Governments during the Franco-German war of 1870, with the sole difference that this time, in conformity with the necessities of the case, it included not only the sea, but also the river navigation. The first point forbade the transport of articles which, according to the general law of nations and the special enactments of the respective foreign Powers, were deemed to be contraband of war. Of these Austro-Hungarian ships were only allowed to have such quantities as they required for their own use or defence. They were forbidden to enter such ports or places as were besieged, or effectually blockaded by one of the belligerents, and those who contravened this order were not to rely on the protection of the Government. Secondly, with this exception, Austro-Hungarian vessels were not limited in their intercourse with the ports of the belligerents, and the same was the case with the merchant vessels of the belligerents as regarded Austro-Hungarian ports. With respect to men-of-war of the belligerents coming to Austro-Hungarian ports, the existing regulations were to remain in force. In the expectation that neutral trade would be respected by the belligerents, and that the latter, in the exercise of their power, would conform to the customary usages, the third point ordered the Austro-Hungarian vessels not to resist an eventual search; but to present the papers of the ship, and on no account to destroy such, or keep false, double, or secret ones on board.

Such a declaration of neutrality by the Power

son the most largely interested in the war, was regarded generally as giving fair promise that the conflict would be really localized to the two combatants. As regards the Austrian Government, the authority of the two Minister-presidents was given in Parliament, that Russia had not been left in ignorance where and when that Government would deem its interests affected. A continuance of the friendly relations between the two countries—which showed itself in many ways, especially in the readiness uniformly displayed by Russia to take into consideration every question which arose in the course of the war, and in which Austria was interested—seemed to leave little doubt that these confidential communications had had a satisfactory conclusion. The Russian Government gave the desired assurance, more especially concerning the Servian territory and the navigation of the Danube, and it was doubtless all this which led to the supposition that there was a complete agreement between Austria and Russia. Such an idea was utterly repugnant to the Hungarians, however acceptable it might have been to the Slaves. Party feeling soon ran high on the question; and the smallest action of the Government was criticized and condemned by one or the other, and ministers had to endure a storm of questions, and to deal with the remonstrances of their countrymen, so as not to increase the irritation around them. Efforts were not wanting on the part of the two belligerents to increase and direct the ferment according to their own particular leaning. The valuable Corvina Library at Constantinople, which the Hungarians had long desired to possess, and which they had often endeavoured, but unsuccessfully, to purchase, was all at once generously presented by the Sultan to the University of Buda-Pesth; Turkish deputations of high rank arrived in Hungary, and met with an enthusiastic reception, all the principal cities of the country sending representatives to join in the welcome. A series of public *fêtes* were given in honour of the Turks, and orators dwelt largely on the theme of the indissoluble friendship and fraternity between the Turks and the Hungarians.

All this was met by counter demonstrations of the Slaves, especially in Croatia, where the reigning Austrian house was especially popular. The Archduke Albert, happening to visit Croatia on military business, found an exuberant welcome,

which completely took him by surprise. The town of Agram was decorated by day, and illuminated by night; everybody was in the streets or at the windows; addresses were presented, a patriotic song of combative character was sung, the statue of Jellachich was crowned, and, most significant of all, the Russian Hymn was played persistently by the bands. One address, proceeding from the students, expressed such decided sentiments that the Archduke thought it best not to receive it. The meaning of all this was that Agram wished to make a pro-Slavonic and anti-Magyar demonstration. The inhabitants had been greatly scandalized that the Hungarians should compliment the Sultan and fraternize with Softas; they therefore desired to make it known that their own sympathies were with their oppressed brethren, and not with their Mahometan ruler. "It was natural that the Magyar should make common cause with the Turk, for he was wonderfully like him, and had always striven to play the part of a Turk in his dealings with other populations of the Empire. But this could no longer be permitted; the Emperor's Slave subjects must now be reckoned with, and the dual Empire reconstituted, so as to give due influence to one of the three great elements of the population which had hitherto been unjustly held in suspicion by the other two." These were the ideas prevalent throughout the south-west provinces of the Monarchy, and the excitement of the war had given them a new and sudden activity. At Prague the agitation was inspired by grander notions. While the Croatian aspirations tended to a sufficiently practical object, quite consistent with the unity of the Empire, the Czechs were enthusiastic for the Pan-Slavic cause. Their political parties united on this common ground; and their societies and their journals welcomed the advance of the Russian liberator, who was to unite all the branches of the Slavonic race, Poles included, in one great bond of national fraternity.

In this excited state of public feeling it was deemed desirable to make a public declaration of the actual guiding policy of the Austro-Hungarian Government; and on the 26th June M. Tisza, the President of the Hungarian Ministry, delivered a very memorable speech in the Lower House of the Diet at Pesth. M. Tisza had to do a difficult work; for he had to calm the suspicion of the Magyars that the Ministry was sacrificing the interests of Hungary to the military aspirations of

potent personages at the Court, and to pacify the clamours of the Slavonic party. A great part of his countrymen would gladly have taken the side of Turkey, to repay Russia for that intervention by which the Czar Nicholas crushed the Hungarian rebellion; while the Magyar youth expressed the most passionate sympathy for the Moslem Government which had befriended the exiles of their nation in its darkest hour. Nor could it be denied that to all appearance the interests of Hungary might be powerfully assailed in the course of the war. It might be necessary for Austria to occupy Bosnia, and she might be strongly tempted to keep that province. But the Austro-Hungarian Empire would then no longer be the same State. It would have begun to lean to the side of the Slavonic nationalities; and it would seem to be on the road to the fulfilment of the prediction that it must hew out the materials of its future in the loose materials of the Balkan Peninsula. But such a change would strain the loyalty of the Magyars, because it would signify that the Court must lean more and more on its Slavonic subjects. The Hungarian Ministry had therefore been strongly tempted to use all its influence in order to make the Imperial Government bar the way of Russia. But it had resisted, and M. Tisza's defence of his policy merited the attentive study of alarmists elsewhere. M. Tisza allowed no one to go away with the impression that he was indifferent to the interests of Hungary, but he pointed out that it would have been a criminal waste of money and life to set armies in the field for the defence of interests which were never attacked. Had the alarmists dictated the policy of the country (he argued), hundreds of thousands of men would have been taken from productive work; and if war had broken out after all, it would have been spread to the limits of Europe. But the Empire had allowed the troops of the reserve to remain quietly at home; it had plainly defined its territorial interests without indulging in the luxury of diplomatic bluster, and the consequence was that those interests were neither touched nor menaced. No doubt the conflict was injurious to the general interests of Austria, as well as those of all the other European States; but such was the consequence of all wars. No doubt, also, it might take such a turn that the Empire would be forced to intervene; but such possibilities accompany every war. It might have

been plausibly argued that, seven years before, Austria ought to have made common cause with France to prevent Prussia from becoming the dictator of Central Europe, and from some day annexing the German provinces of Francis Joseph. Indeed, great nations would scarcely ever be neutrals if they were to be guided by remote possibilities of danger. But the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy wisely kept out of the Franco-German war, and it was acting with equal wisdom now. It had not moved its army; it had occupied no province; at the latest of the Ministerial Councils nothing was even said about such a step, or about the details of mobilization. Austria would wait till she saw what course the war might take. She would do nothing if peace should be concluded before the Russians had penetrated far into the Balkan Peninsula; and if it should be necessary for her to occupy Bosnia, she could easily do so at the fitting time. She remained quiet for the sake of Europe, as well as of herself; because if she were to strike a rash blow on either side, the character of the war would from that moment undergo an essential change, and with terrible ease it might become the most destructive contest that Europe had seen since the French Revolution. Summing up, M. Tisza repeated that Austro-Hungary had with no one either an alliance or obligation respecting that which she should do for the protection of her own interests, but that her Government possessed to the fullest degree their freedom of decision. Being thus perfectly free to act in whatever direction they might deem necessary, and possessing an army fully sufficient in numbers and completeness of equipment, the Government had resolved that the sole leading idea, the sole guiding principle of their foreign policy, should be the interest of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, to the exclusion of all antipathies and sympathies. They would consider it their duty in the future, as far as and whenever possible, to spare the blood and treasure of the peoples of the Monarchy; and if the development of events should require such sacrifices, they would only claim them in the degree in which they might be required by the interests of the Monarchy. He asked the members of the House to consider that the constant mention of a danger which did not exist was no sign of manly courage, and might temporarily so shake the nerves of the people that, if the proceeding were frequently

repeated, then the nerves, when the time of action arrived, would be found relaxed. The continual mention of a danger was, moreover, not good; because if a people were constantly frightened out of its tranquility, and repeatedly discovered that it had been roused by a groundless chimera of imagination, it would finally not believe in danger when it really arose, and that would be a heavy blow for the Monarchy.

The declaration of M. Tisza elicited a most flattering telegram from the Austrian Emperor, who said that, having read his speech on Eastern affairs, he could not deny himself the pleasure of expressing his satisfaction at the patriotic and excellent words of the Minister President. The telegram produced no little sensation, containing as it did, on the part of his Majesty, such unqualified approval, it might almost be said endorsement, of the important political declaration of the Hungarian Minister President, and materially increased its effect both at home and abroad. The debate which ensued in the Hungarian Diet was nothing more than an almost unanimous vote of confidence in the policy enunciated. After the agitation which had been going on in Hungary in favour of a more decided line of conduct against Russia, its calmness was remarkable. Even those who gave expression to the feeling of uneasiness at the position taken up by Russia so close to the frontier of the Monarchy, did so with a moderation which was scarcely to be expected.

About the same time the interests of Austria received another authoritative exposition. In the Austrian Parliament the Minister President, Prince Auersperg, made them the theme of a speech which may be regarded as the Austrian counterpart of M. Tisza's statement—a statement which also drew forth an emphatic message of approval from the Emperor. The policy of the Government, the Prince said, was that of neutrality, and even now it found no reason to follow any other course. It saw no need for the mobilization of the defensive forces. Should events make it necessary to take special steps for the protection of Austrian interests, the Government would still keep itself within the bounds of neutrality. In other words, it would aid neither combatant, even if the movements of the Russian troops should oblige it to occupy Bosnia in self-defence. Hitherto it had been guided by the fact that military preparations were needless, and that it

could not afford to throw away money on useless parade; but such self-restraint, the Minister added, would give the nation a proof that, if the Government should adopt some new measures of precaution, it would have done neither more nor less than the occasion demanded.

The positive declaration that Austro-Hungary was not tied by any kind of engagement, and had reserved the fullest freedom of action, was of course the salient point in the speeches of both M. Tisza and Prince Auersperg, and it gave unalloyed satisfaction to those who had given credence to the numerous rumours of agreement between Austria and Russia. The declaration that the Government was well aware of the great interests at stake, and fully recognized its great responsibility, together with the confidence expressed in the efficient state of the army, was no doubt meant to remove any nervous apprehension excited by the memory of the past; lest Austria should, as often before, move once more too late—insinuating, as this did, that the Government clearly knew its own mind; and that, though it had refrained from indulging in costly military display, all preparations had been made to place the army in the shortest possible time on a war footing.

The declaration of Prince Auersperg presented nothing inconsistent with M. Tisza's statement, that the sole aim of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy was to preserve the interests of the Monarchy, "to the exclusion of all antipathies and sympathies." Nor, cynical as such a principle may seem when viewed hastily, need any statesman be ashamed to repeat it. To preserve the interests of a nation is the very highest of its duties. This is the very tritest of truisms. But it may be made the most misleading of fallacies by the assumption that the interests of any one country can be separated from those of all other States; that they mean merely material or immediate interests; that they must mean the interests of a distant and speculative future; or that even every real interest must be defended at the cost of war. In the case in question the wisdom of the decision contained in M. Tisza's statement can scarcely be questioned by one who reflects on the peculiar nature of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. There was no State whose interests were more directly affected by what was now going on at the Danube. The triumph of the Turks or the triumph of the Russians would exercise on the Slavonic subjects

of Francis Joseph an almost equally exciting influence. Yet any movement on the part of Austria would be attended by grave dangers. On the one hand, the sympathies of the Slaves were naturally with the people of their own race; on the other, those of the Hungarians were wholly with the Turks. The first attempt at departure from neutrality would therefore lead to a state of feeling which might endanger the very existence of the Empire. The Hungarians absolutely would not fight either directly or indirectly with Russia, and the Slaves, who furnished the bulk of the army, would as certainly refuse to aid the Porte. In such circumstances it would certainly seem that the most satisfactory statement which at the time could have been made was, that the Austrian Government had sufficient confidence in its own strength and the Russian assurances to watch the progress of the war with calmness, resolving only to interfere to maintain its especial interests at the proper moment. On the other hand, it could not possibly be to the interest of the composite Monarchy to see a strong and independent South Slavonic kingdom rise on its frontier, attracting all Slaves, and exciting incurable jealousy and bitterness among Magyars. Such a result would seem remarkably likely to result from a successful Russian campaign in Bulgaria; and putting these two considerations together—with the fact that the Emperor of Austria was in such a position that he could at any moment have thrown 400,000 men into Roumania, and by severing its communications have absolutely sealed the fate of the Russian army—it seems incredible that Russia could have entered upon the war without having come to some sort of practical understanding with its two powerful neighbours, and convinced them that their respective interests would not suffer.

M. Tisza made another statement in the Hungarian Diet, which, in view of the special and large interests of his country which were concerned in the matter, had considerable importance at the time of the outbreak of the war. A question was raised as to what steps the Austro-Hungarian Government meant to take in consequence of the order of the Russian commanders stopping the free navigation of the Lower Danube. In explaining the position of the Government in the matter, M. Tisza first of all thought it necessary to describe the Danube from the standpoint of international treaties. In the final Protocol of the Congress of

Vienna of 1815 the principle was communicated that the navigation of rivers forming the boundary between different States should be free. This principle was applied to the Danube in 1856, and in the London Protocol of 1871 it was stipulated that the offices and property of the International Commission of the Danube, as well as the persons attached to the Commission, should be deemed neutral; but, as regarded the river itself, that its neutrality was not a part of the international law of Europe. No neutral States, therefore, had the power to interfere in case of war between the two belligerents, nor had they the right to prevent the belligerents from taking such measures as were allowed in war by the law of nations. But, while declaring this, the Hungarian Government were sensible of the great interests the Monarchy had in the free navigation of the Danube, and of the rights and duties possessed by it as one of the Powers who had guaranteed the freedom of the Danube navigation. They had therefore thought fit to employ all means in their power in order that the impediments to the free navigation of the Danube should not be extended, as regarded either space or time, beyond what was inevitable, and to get guarantees that, as soon as this absolute necessity ceased, all impediments to the freedom of the river should be removed. The Government considered it, besides, as its task to see that nothing happened which might in any way prejudice the free navigation for the future, and which might make it in any way doubtful, or dangerous, or more limited.

We have seen in a previous chapter that Roumania has sprung into existence as a nation within the last twenty years. Previous to the Crimean war she existed as two separate and distinct provinces, with a common language and religion, it is true, but with no very pronounced feeling of nationality; with only such government as that offered by the despotic rule of Hospodars appointed by the Porte, no constitution, no legislative body, nor institutions of any kind. After the Crimean war, however, the Roumanians grew rapidly into a nation. First, they obtained a kind of representative Government by means of the provincial Divans, which were conceded by the Porte. Then the union of the two provinces under the name of Roumania was the first step towards their becoming a nation, and this was very soon followed by the formation of the National Assembly, a Senate, the

adoption of a Constitution, and universal suffrage. All that remained was for them to throw off the suzerainty of the Porte, and declare themselves independent—a step which, on a favourable opportunity arriving, they were not slow to take, as we shall presently have occasion to show.

The announcement of the declaration of war was to the Roumanians the foreboding of serious times. Bucharest, ordinarily so frivolous, experienced a new and unpleasant sensation of uncomfortable nervousness; and “A plague on both your houses” was the burden of its diatribe alike against Russians and Turks. And there was indeed small wonder at the disquietude of the Roumanian metropolis. Usually Bucharest is essentially a gay capital, and one in which a visitor easily may imagine himself in Paris or Vienna. The people appear to live in the streets, and well-equipped carriages dash gaily along in every direction, filled with finely-dressed ladies and officers in showy uniforms. A stranger would naturally conclude, after a day in Bucharest, that the Roumanian army consisted entirely of colonels and captains, or else that the Principality possessed a force of several millions of armed men, to give employment to all the officers to be seen in the streets of its capital. The pleasure-loving *flâneurs* of this Eastern Paris now found confronting them a dilemma from which there was no escape, and which became the more serious the more its conditions and contingencies were studied. They strenuously protested that Roumania had been neutral, was neutral, and would be neutral; but this protestation of neutrality, genuine although it probably was, did not in the least avail to save Roumania from the awkward consequences of its geographical position. Those terrible Turks, the Roumanian mournfully realized, might any morning come surging over the Danube, and carry the amenities of Turkish warfare into the wattled villages which studded the fertile plain of Little Wallachia. Giurgevo was all but abandoned in the apprehension of a Turkish raid, and a large proportion of the better-class population of Bucharest executed a strategical movement in the direction of the Carpathians. If the Turks did not come across the river, there still remained inevitably for Roumania the other horn of the dilemma, in the shape of the Russians; and it required no lengthened residence in the country to discover that its people had no love for the Russians, and no particular eagerness for the joy

of a military occupation of Roumania on the part of Russia. They had a shrewd apprehension of ultimate absorption as the outcome of the troublesome business; but that evil was remote in comparison with other evils which impended more nearly. It was all very plausible, they said, that Russia should merely take leave to march through Roumanian territory on her way to the fighting ground beyond the Danube. The unpleasant reality, they discerned disconsolately, was that Roumania must become virtually a province of Russia while the Russians were using it, not only as a thoroughfare, but also as a base.

Taking the straightforward and strictly legal view of the circumstances, and with the view also of learning what the attitude of Roumania would be during the impending war, the Turkish Grand Vizir telegraphed to Prince Charles on the 22nd April, pointing out to him that his territory was threatened with invasion by the Russians, and after referring to certain stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, requested the Prince to confer with the Turkish commander, Abdul Kerim Pasha, for the defence of the Principality. We say "strictly legal," for the treaty under which the provinces enjoyed a semi-independence, expressly stipulated that in case of attack the Porte was to agree with the Principalities as to measures of defence; and the Sultan was perfectly within his rights in choosing to regard the intended entry of the Russians across the Pruth as an attack upon one of his tributary states. For some reason or other Prince Charles did not reply until the 24th April, when he answered that he could not assume the responsibility of hazarding the independence of Roumania by thus violating the neutrality guaranteed to her by the great Powers. He would therefore consult the Chambers, and acquaint the Porte with their decision as soon as it was possible to do so. The Roumanian Chambers were, however, only summoned to meet for the 26th, so that the question was solved for them, in the meantime, by the entry of the Russians on the 24th.

On the day of the crossing of the Pruth, the Roumanian ministers, fearing, probably, that the Turks might carry out their oft-repeated threat of crossing the Danube, issued a manifesto declaring the intention of Roumania to remain perfectly neutral during the war. In his proclamation, also, convoking the Chambers in extraordinary session, Prince Charles declared that the Govern-

ment had made every effort to establish as a right that neutrality which the guaranteeing Powers demanded of Roumania as a duty. Since these had failed, it remained only to prevent the country from becoming the theatre of war. This must be effected at any risk or at any sacrifice. The Russians had entered Roumania without a protest from any Power, so far as his Government was aware. It would therefore hold an attitude of reserve until Parliament had spoken. The Prince exhorted the members to union and patriotism, and declared his readiness to put himself at the head of his army if such a step were needful. The Prince added that his one object was to raise Roumania to prosperity and accomplish her mission.

The Chambers met on the 26th April, and the Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs then communicated to the Deputies a Russo-Roumanian Convention, dated ten days before, which insured free passage to the Russian troops and friendly treatment, the Czar undertaking on his part to respect the integrity of Roumania in conformity with treaties. The Government explained that the object of the Convention was to secure the integrity of Roumania in conformity with the Treaty of Paris. It effected no change in the international relations of Roumania, nor did it bind Roumania to co-operate with the Russian army, its only object being to keep for Roumania what she had already. No similar convention had been concluded with Turkey, as the latter would then have transferred the seat of war to Roumania. Moreover, the Porte had systematically refused to recognize Roumania (that is, under that title), and to settle the questions with it which had been pending for years—an allusion to the discouragement offered by Turkey to the completion of Roumanian independence.

The first article of the Convention gave the Russians the right to use the railways, the rivers, roads, and the post and telegraph lines. The resources of the country, as regards provisions and other necessities, were placed at their disposal, and particulars were to be furnished to them about the capabilities of each district in this respect. The Roumanian Commissioners attached to the Russian army had the powers of the local authorities, and were to lend their assistance in the transport of baggage, war material, and ammunition. In all matters relating to the transport

of ambulances, the Russian army was to enjoy the same railway privileges as the Roumanian army. In the second article the Minister of Public Works laid down rules about the Russian military transport. After the Roumanian mail and military trains, the Russian military trains were to have precedence over all others. To further this arrangement, the number of passenger trains could be diminished and goods trains altogether stopped. To prevent unloading, the gauge of the Russian and Roumanian lines was to be assimilated. A special committee, consisting of delegates of the different railway companies, was to be formed under the care of the Minister of Public Works. The Russian military transports were to be in the hands of a Russian superintendent, with power to depose railway officials, the Minister of Public Works consenting. The Russians had the right to complete whatever lines they might deem necessary, and the ground necessary for this would be granted them. The third article contained a number of miscellaneous agreements. Russian telegraphic despatches were to have the preference over private ones. Apart from Bucharest, the Russians might march their forces anywhere and establish military stations. The Russian sick and wounded would be cared for in Russian hospitals, to be erected in the most populous towns, except in Bucharest. If need be, the Russian sick and wounded would be cared for, though not gratuitously, in Roumanian hospitals. Roumania was to procure for the Russians barges and other shipping materials. The cost of the Russian passage was to be paid in cash within two months. Articles for the Russian army were to be admitted duty free. The Roumanian authorities were to assist in arresting Russian deserters.

The document concluded with an explanatory note, in which the Roumanian ministers stated that Russia was co-operating with the other Powers to improve the position of the Christians in Turkey; that the excitement of the Mahometan population and the lethargy of the Turkish Government allowed no hope of any reform; that, in consequence of this, intervention became necessary; and that, as Russia was ready to guarantee the inviolability of Roumania, the Convention was concluded.

Ministers had some little difficulty in causing the Chambers fully to comprehend the necessity

of such a Convention, and how it could be reconciled with an attitude of neutrality towards both Russians and Turks. The policy pursued was, in truth, one of expediency rather than anything else. The country was between two fires. On the one hand, a colossal neighbour, determined on war, demanded peremptorily a passage for his army, and against such a demand argument would be useless and resistance impossible. On the other hand, Roumania was summoned by her Suzerain to take active measures with him to resist such passage. Yielding to the first demand, Roumania would inevitably be regarded as a traitor to her Suzerain; while its conceding the second would make it the battlefield of Turk and Russian, with the tolerable certainty of being herself regarded by Russia as an enemy, and conquered and annexed forthwith. The predicament was a most unenviable one. Austria, the only Power who could at once have solved the difficulty by forbidding the entry of either combatant, made no sign; and the other Powers signatories to the treaty under which Roumania enjoyed her semi-independent existence seemed equally indifferent. It would seem useless, therefore, to quarrel with the little State for yielding to obvious necessities and following equally obvious interests. Roumania made the best terms possible with Russia for the passage of its troops, and did this sufficiently long beforehand to enable the Russians to cross the country directly war was declared, and prevent the Turks from coming in.

The Russian document laid before the Roumanian Chambers on the 26th April contained positive assurances from the Emperor that he entertained no designs whatever against the territorial integrity of the Principality; that his troops would not be allowed to interfere in any way whatever with the internal affairs of the country; that they would merely pass through the province as friends, paying for everything they took; that he solemnly guaranteed the integrity of the Roumanian Principality as it was established by existing treaties; that the passage of his troops through the country was undertaken in the common cause of the Christians of the Turkish Empire, who had been pronounced by all Europe to be in urgent need of assistance; and that Russia, in undertaking her present task, was merely acting as the volunteer minister of Christian Europe.

The Senate then demanded the correspondence between the Government and the Porte. The communications from the latter to the Bucharest Cabinet were dictatorial in tone. They said nothing at all about guaranteeing the rights of the Principality during the approaching contest, and were somewhat similar to the orders sent by a Turkish Pasha to a subordinate official of a Sandjak in Bulgaria. The contrast between the tone assumed by the Government of St. Petersburg and Stamboul produced a very powerful effect upon the Chambers. The one promised them all their cherished rights and privileges, and even contained a slight hint at eventual independence; while the other treated them as inferiors belonging to the hated race of the "Giaour."

It was scarcely surprising that after this both Chambers should agree to the Convention. The jealousy, however, with which any apparent departure from a strict neutrality was regarded, was shown by the fact that the Convention was by no means unanimously approved being only adopted in the House of Deputies by seventy-nine votes against twenty-five; and in the Senate by forty-one against ten. The mass of the people, however, were passive, well content, doubtless, for their country not only to be spared the horrors of war, but to be placed in the possible position of netting whatever profit was to be made out of the side which could best afford to pay.

The Porte could not by this time have been unprepared for unwelcome contingencies, but the prompt conclusion of an elaborate agreement between its vassal and the Czar seemed to take it somewhat by surprise. The Turks, however, treated the business with a certain dignity, and professed to suppose that the Roumanian Government was not a free agent; and though protesting at what was done, attributed it primarily to the violence of the Czar. That the Porte, nevertheless, was deeply moved by conduct on the part of its vassal, by which the power and mobility of the invading force was immensely facilitated, may be gathered from the following analysis of a despatch addressed on the 2nd May to Ottoman representatives abroad:—

"The Sublime Porte considers Prince Charles' message, addressed on the 26th of April to the Bucharest Chamber, as also the acts of the Prince's Government which have been or may be the consequence of that message, not as emanating from

the free will of the authorities and population of the Principality, but as the direct result of foreign occupation. The Porte recalls the fact that it did not depend on it alone to recognize and make recognized by Europe the neutrality of the Principalities, and that it had itself no right to raise this question of neutrality, which was foreign to the programme of the Conference. Moreover, the provisions of the Treaty of Paris would have furnished the Principalities, if ever so little inclined, adequate means of making their territory respected. In view of the stipulation of the Treaty of Paris, it is impossible to admit the excuse of impotence, *de facto* or *de jure*, alleged by the Roumanian Government as to opposing the invasion of the Principalities. It is equally evident that Russia, by entering the Principalities, has violated international engagements. After the first refusal of the Prince's Government to concert with her in view of the military action necessitated by the circumstances, Turkey officially invited that Government to unite its efforts with her own to ward off the common danger; yet, in face of an imminent invasion, the Prince's reply merely sought to gain time. The Porte has scrupulously fulfilled its duty towards the United Principalities. It is now for the great Powers to judge whether the attitude of Prince Charles' Government has been in conformity with the obligations devolving on it. While the Porte was offering it the means of defending the country against a hostile invasion, the ministers were secretly treating with him, and concluding a Convention which places all the resources of the country at the invader's disposal. The publication of that Convention has revealed a situation which the Porte far from suspected, and which casts the heaviest responsibility on a Government which, forgetful of all its duties, did not hesitate to contract unavowedly engagements with the foreigner designed to facilitate the invasion of the Empire, betraying alike the interests of the country, the confidence of the Supreme Government, and the hopes all Europe had founded on the institution of the United Principalities. The judgment which must be passed on acts stained with such palpable disloyalty cannot be too severe. The Porte considers the Prince, as also the local authorities of the country, as being in the power of the enemy, and will deem the acts and decisions emanating from them during the Russian occupation

as having the character of an usurpation of the Sultan's legitimate authority."

The despatch was preceded by the dismissal of Prince Ghika, the Roumanian agent at Constantinople, he being informed by the Porte that, in consequence of the Convention between his country and the Russians, and the consequent interruption of friendly relations between vassal and Suzerain, there was no longer any reason for his remaining in Stamboul.

When it is remembered that the Roumanians had considered themselves compelled to arrange the Convention with Russia in sheer self-defence, and to prevent the war from being brought into their own country, it will be understood that the dismissal of Prince Ghika and the language of the Turkish despatch were little calculated to allay the prevailing excitement, or to prevent any further alienation of the Principality. Whether the Roumanians be held to have been disloyal or not, there was amongst them a large conservative peace party, who stoutly maintained that the Convention was a purely defensive measure, and not one of hostility to the Porte. The latter, however, was evidently determined to treat it as a repudiation of Ottoman sovereignty, and a defiance of Ottoman power—an incipient, if not completed, rebellion, and one which could hardly be made more complete by an open declaration of war. The Roumanian war party had no special objection to the Turks taking this view. They considered that their Government had nothing to lose by going further, while there were many temptations to a more decided policy. The favour of Russia would be secured by a more zealous co-operation, and if that Power had made any definite promises, it was only natural that the fulfilment of them would be dependent on the completeness and the full efficiency of the alliance. Thus, with a dogged defiance on the one side, and a feeling of high indignation on the other, events were bound to favour the policy of the Roumanian war party.

And the events were not long in coming. The Turks considered themselves justified a day or two afterwards in firing upon undefended Roumanian villages, in sending over parties to commit depredations on the peaceful districts opposite, in seizing and destroying Roumanian vessels, and in opening fire on the vassal fortress of Kalafat. The Roumanians considered themselves equally justified in meeting force by force, in taking prompt steps

to defend their country; and thus the slender link which bound the province to Turkey was snapped, and the hearts of Roumanian patriots burned to realize fully the long-cherished vision of complete disfranchisement from a hated union. A portion of the army was mobilized; Prince Charles, placing himself at the head of his troops, made a warlike speech, and while the Senate besought him to temper patriotism with discretion, both Senate and Deputies expressed themselves ready to defend the country if attacked. Kalafat, a strong strategic position, which the Turks might have crossed and taken possession of had they been less precipitate in showing their indignation, was at once re-occupied by 12,000 Roumanians, while garrisons were despatched to Oltenitza and other places that had been fired upon.

The position of affairs was, in fact, so extraordinary that the Government deemed it prudent to officially advise the various European Powers of how matters stood; and the Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the 14th May, transmitted to each Court a lengthy despatch with this purpose. After pointing out that representations to the great Powers had not resulted in any offers of assistance towards maintaining inviolable the neutrality of Roumania, he proceeded—"Left to ourselves without guidance and without support, it could not be long before we found ourselves called upon to deal with steps which an imminent war naturally foreshadowed, and which the attitude of indifference maintained by the great Powers must naturally sanction. Russia proposed to us loyally to treat with her concerning the passage of the Imperial armies through our territory. Her language was that of a Power which, having contributed to the construction of the Roumanian State, and having part in the guarantee of its political existence, did not intend to disavow her own work by violating its rights. Moreover, Russia appeared to us as the moral agent of the great Powers in the fulfilment of a mission which had been solemnly agreed upon and defined in public and collective resolutions. If we, despite our natural conservative feeling, and misjudging the high character of the overtures made to us, had met them with an ill-considered and imprudent refusal, Roumania would have found herself delivered over by her own hands to a dangerous violation of her territory, of her rights, and of her dearest interests. . . . Indeed, if in view of

an assuredly decisive and recognized situation Roumania believed it necessary, if not officially, at least tacitly, to accede to the propositions of the Imperial Russian Government, the Government of the Prince feels confident of having thereby not only saved Roumania the perils of a forced military occupation, but also of having assured respect for her individuality and her institutions, as well as a formal guarantee for the preservation of her territorial boundaries. However unpretending she may be, Roumania had at least the right to devote her attention to her own preservation when, by her geographical position, she found herself placed in some sort in the midst of a war which had become inevitable. . . .

After the preceding remarks, it appears to me superfluous to call attention to the ill-considered nature of certain statements, according to which the Roumanian troops were called upon to co-operate with the Turkish army against the Russians. A proposal of this nature bears in itself its own refusal, inasmuch as it was not made to us until the eve of the entry of the Russian armies into Roumania. Having thus explained our attitude, I do not hesitate to affirm here, in the name of the Government of his Serene Highness Prince Charles I., that our intentions have been in every point in conformity with our duty. If, on the one hand, we wished by means of the conventions to fortify ourselves in advance against the perils of a situation surrounded by unforeseen dangers, on the other hand it entered in nowise into our intentions to sever our connection with the Ottoman Empire, nor to seek to derive advantage from circumstances which might arise in our favour. Such were the principles of our line of conduct. From the outset we had taken the firm resolve to persevere in it, unless Roumania should be challenged by Turkey herself."

The despatch then pointed out that it was impossible to have concluded a Convention with Turkey, and thus treat both sides alike, inasmuch as this would immediately have exposed Roumania to those horrors of war which it was the design of the Convention with Russia to prevent; and repeated that there had been no intention whatever of constituting Roumania a belligerent party with Russia against the Ottoman Empire:—

"Unfortunately the continuance of devastating incursions against our inoffensive populations, and carried out on the largest scale; the capture of

more than 200 vessels with their cargoes, a capture effected in our ports, and even in the interior of our rivers, such as the Jiu, the Jalomitza, and the Celtu; the employment of petroleum for firing and destroying vessels which would not follow the Turkish monitors; and lastly, the bombardment by the latter and by the batteries on the right bank of the Danube of our towns and villages, which were not prepared either for defence or attack, and in which there was not a single Russian or Roumanian soldier; all these acts left us small hope of being able to maintain an attitude from which we had wished not to depart at any price. Two last circumstances came to dissipate this hope entirely, and to disturb our political security—the first was the insult which was offered to us by the suspension of the functions of our agent at Constantinople, as though the diplomatic agent of Roumania were a Turkish official, and did not enjoy the immunity accorded by international law to foreign representatives. Afterwards came the despatch which his Excellency Safvet Pasha addressed, on May 2, to the representatives of Turkey at the Courts of the guaranteeing Powers.

"The hostile disposition to our right manifested by the Sublime Porte in this despatch, the menaces in it regarding our country and its institutions, menaces followed by a general bombardment of the whole of our bank of the Danube, leave us no doubt as to our being at war with Turkey, or that that war has been declared by Turkey herself. In view of this attitude of the Ottoman Government with respect to ourselves, and of its acts of open hostility, which according to the principles of public law constitute a state of war, the Roumanian Government fulfils a duty in laying down clearly in the presence of the guaranteeing Powers and the public opinion of the whole of Europe, that it is the Sublime Porte itself who has torn asunder the ties existing between it and Roumania, and that consequently we can only throw back on Turkey the responsibility which it has attempted to cast on us by its despatch of May 2. In presence of all these facts, the gravity of which cannot have escaped the just and enlightened mind of the ——— Cabinet, the Government of his Highness Prince Charles I. cannot remain a passive spectator. We are forced to adopt from to-day such measures as the situation created by Turkey herself renders necessary.

in order to repulse by force of arms the acts of aggression to which Roumania is exposed from the Ottoman armies. Strong in our right and in the justice of our cause, and relying on the solicitude of the guaranteeing Powers in our behalf, we shall do all that our duty to the country imposes on us to defend our soil, to safeguard our institutions, and to assure our political existence."

Having recovered, according to her own view, her full liberty of action, Roumania was not disposed to wait long before exercising it. As we have already remarked, the Roumanians had seized upon every occasion for many years past to show their dislike of the tie which, by the Treaty of Paris, bound them to the Porte. The army of a great Power, now the open enemy and invader of Roumania's Suzerain, occupied the country; and any act of opposition which might weaken that Suzerain would probably be viewed with favour by Russia. The Principality had gone so far, that even if there were no need for it to go farther, it might do so with probable advantage to itself, and no more injury to the Suzerain Power. Indeed, to affect allegiance to a ruler while placing all the resources of the country and all the authority of the State at the disposal of his enemy, and, on the other hand, to pretend neutrality with respect to the invader, while abandoning to him railways and telegraphs, and concerting with him on the disposition of the Roumanian militia, constituted a policy unintelligible to all Europe, unless some further development were to be forthcoming. The moment seemed altogether propitious, and on the 21st May the Roumanian Chambers performed the crowning act to which a series of steps and events had tended for the past twenty years. On that day the Chamber of Deputies took note "that war is proclaimed between Roumania and Turkey," and declared the "connection between the two countries dissolved;" while the Senate agreed to the following resolutions:—"Satisfied with the explanations of the Government, this legislative body decides that the state of war existing between Turkey and Roumania, the rupture of all friendly relations between us and the Porte, and the absolute independence of Roumania, have received their official consecration, and, relying upon the justice of the guaranteeing Powers, passes to the order of the day."

The following day (May 22) was the eleventh anniversary of the accession of Prince Charles as Hospodar of the Principality; and in answer to congratulations of the Chambers and other public bodies, he made a speech, in which he said—"Only one cloud still rested on the years gone by, only one humiliation continued to exist for the Roumanians and their Prince—I mean the ill-defined and unwarranted ties styled Suzerainty at Constantinople, and vassalage at Bucharest. To get rid of these ties, so repugnant to our interests, and even to our *ab antiquo* rights, to supersede them by the relations which in the nineteenth century unite free states and peoples, has been the constant aim of two Roumanian generations, especially from 1857 till now; and I have a right to affirm that my election, my arrival, on your summons from the sources of the Danube to the mouths of that great river, lastly, the very mission of my reign, have had no other significance than the freeing of Roumania from those ties. Those ties the Sublime Porte has itself broken in the course of events neither desired nor provoked by us, and we shall not restore them. You will not, you bodies of State and the entire nation, who have declared and proclaimed that by the rupture of those bonds Roumania enters on its ancient independence as a free people, as a separate, individual State, as a useful, peaceful, and civilizing member of the great family of European States. It is now left to the energy and devotion of the sons of this country, to the political prudence of the bodies of the State, to me also, allow me to say—to my zeal, indefatigable activity, and constancy—that it appertains to pursue and attain a European consecration of the new political position of Roumania."

Prince Charles went on to express his confidence that this European acquiescence or "consecration" of Roumanian independence would not be withheld; but as time went on, and the various Powers made no sign, the Government felt somewhat uneasy, and appealed to the Powers to give at least an approbation of a preliminary character, such as might confirm them in the path they desired to follow. Above all, Roumania hoped to receive from its benevolent protectors the promise that in no case should the country be constrained by force to renew its former relations with the Porte. A communication of this kind, the Government pointed out, would circumscribe within a very

clearly defined limit their present activity, and preserve Roumania from the unfortunate consequences of a state of uncertainty, which, prolonged for too long a time, would be gravely prejudicial, by causing her to lose that confidence in the future which had hitherto guided her.

Neither appeal nor argument, however, appeared to have any great effect, as no official answer was vouchsafed from either of the great Powers. As a matter of fact, when it first became known that a declaration of Roumanian independence might any day be made, an exchange of ideas among the Powers concerning such a possible eventuality had begun, the result of which was that all of them adopted the principle that, as the position of Roumania had been settled by international agreement, any change would have to be similarly brought about. For the present, therefore, they merely took cognizance of the notification of Roumanian independence, without giving an opinion on it.

The only European Power which spoke out with no uncertain voice respecting Roumanian policy, was the only one from whom Roumania had refrained from inviting any opinion. The document in which this was done was one of the most forcible of Safvet Pasha's productions, and we give our readers the benefit of it. It was dated 6th June:—

"In a previous communication the Sublime Porte hastened to denounce to the signatory Powers of the Treaty of Paris, the Convention by which the Bucharest Government had facilitated the invasion of the United Principalities and the Empire by Russian arms. Since then the Moldo-Wallachian military forces have never ceased carrying on hostilities against the territory and arms of the Empire. At last the Sublime Porte has been informed that the Prince's Government has proclaimed its independence, and declared war against its Suzerain. The same men who, with signal disloyalty, have handed over the country to the enemy, and made the Prince's army a mere servile instrument in the hands of Russia, have had the rashness to try to burst the original ties which bound the Principalities with the rest of the Empire, and to openly violate the arrangement by which all Europe determined the conditions of the political existence of Moldo-Wallachia. Europe knows with what fidelity the Sublime Porte has always respected the privileges accorded to the Principalities, even during their most agitated

periods. Despite the pretension of the Moldo-Wallachian Government to treat as truths the erroneous ideas it has formed of the rights and duties springing from its relation with the Suzerain Court, no obstacle has been opposed to the exercise of legitimate liberties, which are the sources of all sincere and real progress, no impediment has been raised to the development of the institutions of the country; but unfortunately all this has been powerless to maintain the Prince's Government in the path which honour and the true interests of the country traced for it. Independence proclaimed at a time when the Principalities are invaded by the enemy will deceive neither Europe nor the Moldo-Wallachians themselves. History has sufficiently shown the intention of Russia to take her share sooner or later in such proclamation of independence, for the benefit of her own interests and ambition; but this time, in driving the Principalities to rebellion, the Russian Government has not confined itself to preparing the ruin of provinces to which treaties had insured for a number of years an enviable prosperity, it becomes the accomplice of revolution, and the inspirer of subversive principles against the Sublime Porte; it bids defiance to all Europe, in working at the destruction of the whole political edifice which, consecrated by time, was but a few years ago deemed as essential to the maintenance of the general equilibrium. The Sublime Porte protests in the most formal and energetic manner as much against the resolution of the Prince's Government, as against the ambitious enterprises of Russia. It protests against acts and schemes, which are both a manifest blow to the treaties, the conditions of the political existence of the Principalities, and to the most solemn engagements of Prince Charles towards his Suzerain. The Sublime Porte declares that, whatever the rebellious Government of Moldo-Wallachia may do and say, it means to make full use of its rights in regard to the Principalities. The Imperial Government begs the signatory Powers of the Treaty of Paris to take note of what has been done; it hopes to see Europe join with it in its protests; it is convinced that all the Powers interested in the maintenance of the public law of Europe will raise their voices in condemnation of acts as ill-considered as they are sinful, and prevent them from producing any political effect which might result in disastrous consequences for Europe."

CHAPTER XVI.

Extent and Population of the two Belligerent Countries—New Features in Modern Warfare—Difficulty in arriving at correct figures—Dual Military System of Russia—Arrangement of Forces up to 1874—Field, Reserve, and Sedentary Troops—Cossack Irregulars—Tribal Divisions—Don Cossacks—Cossacks of the Terek—Danger of trusting too implicitly to such Irregulars—Introduction of Universal Military Service into Russia—Numerous exemptions possible by reason of the large population—Duration of Military Service—Tabular view of Russian Forces—Their position at the outbreak of war—Administrative and Military Divisions of the Empire—Daily life of the soldier—His pay and rations—Powers of endurance—Disciplinary punishments—Military preparatory Schools—Officers' Training Schools—Higher professional Education of Officers—Pay of Russian Officers—Official salutes—The Grand-ducal element in the Army—Social condition of the Army—Instruction of Men by the Officers—System of tactics taught—Infantry and Cavalry Organization—Equipment—A singular saddle—Dragoons as Mounted Infantry—Cavalry Armament—Strength of Russian Artillery Force—Construction of Guns and Projectiles—Russian Siege Artillery Parks—The Scientific Corps—Russian resources of Horses—Hospitals and the Red Cross—Military Communications in Russia by Road and Rail—Review of Russian Naval Forces—The *Peter the Great*—Other Important Russian Ironclads—Baltic Turret-ships—The Circular ships, or "Popoffkas"—The Torpedo as an adjunct of modern warfare—Early attempts at Submarine Torpedoes—English discouragement of the System—Torpedoes and the Baltic Fleet in 1853-54—Russian Experiments in 1862—Effective use of Torpedoes in the American Civil War—Taken up at last by the British Government—Ontrigger Torpedoes—Captain Harvey's System—Interesting Experiments—Electric Torpedoes—Their success in the American Civil War—Ericsson's Torpedoes—Whitehead's Fish Torpedoes—New conditions of Naval Warfare—Possible Russian Allies—Roumanian Army, its Constitution and Strength—The Servian Regular Army and Militia—Extent to which Montenegro could assist an invader of Turkey—Greece, its Financial Position and Military Capacity.

BEFORE proceeding to narrate the various events of the war, it will assist the reader in obtaining a correct appreciation of them if we give a general review, derived from personal observation and from the most reliable sources, of the military strength of both Russia and Turkey. This is the more necessary, because of the widely-contrasted resources and capacities of the two countries. A mere glance at the map suggests at once a remarkable contrast between the "Colossus of the North" and its much smaller adversary; and the difference in the military conditions of the two countries is almost as great as in their relative geographical extent. The vast Empire of Russia comprises 8,444,766 square miles, or one-seventh of the entire territorial part of the globe, and its inhabitants number no less than 85,680,000. Turkey, in Europe, Asia, and Africa together, comprises 1,742,874 square miles, with only 28,165,000 inhabitants, and of these about 13,000,000 (the non-Mahometan population) not being allowed to use arms, were not, therefore, available for the defence of the country. It will be of some interest to trace what are the peculiar advantages, geographical, &c., as well as military, which contributed to render Turkey no mean adversary for Russia under circumstances apparently so disadvantageous.

Moreover, the present, although only the most recent of many conflicts between these two nations, is the first one which has occurred since the

introduction of most of those elements which have so materially altered all the conditions of modern warfare, viz., telegraphs, railways (Turkey had neither till 1860, and Russia but few), universal liability to military service, rifled ordnance, breech-loading rifled small-arms, ironclad navies, and torpedoes.

In the case of France and Germany, or indeed of any fully civilized country, it is not very difficult to obtain a tolerably clear idea of the national military strength, a careful census being taken at definite periods. But as regards both Russia and Turkey the case is altogether different. The populations are ascertained with very indifferent accuracy, that of Turkey being obtained by estimates only; and it is obvious how largely this will affect any calculation of the numerical strength of an army drawn from the whole population. Beyond this is the mystification produced by a characteristic inherent to both Russian and Turk—concealment, a feature varying from the actual and systematic falsification which prevails in Oriental countries, to the jealous and often most severe suppression of information respecting the army, which is practised in Russia. We have, however, spared no pains to arrive at a fairly accurate account of the military and naval resources of both belligerents.

As regards Russia, there are at present two different military systems in operation. The old one was in use up to 1874; the new one is not

yet (1877), and will not for some little time be in full working order. Both systems are complicated, and we must endeavour to avoid confusing the reader with too many details. Let us begin with the old system. Though we have marked the division between the two systems in force by the year 1874, the reform, or reorganization, was projected several years before, and to prepare for it many changes had been made. The Russian soldier was always a conscript; but before the reign of the present Emperor he was generally a conscript for the term of his working life. By degrees modifications were made. Service was reduced step by step as to its duration; therefore, to keep up the same number of men in the ranks more recruits had to be taken, in proportion to the reduction in length of service. At last, in 1870, under the administration of the very clever and liberal-minded Minister of War, General Milutine, the principle of general service prevailing in Germany was adopted, except for the Cossacks—a force more or less irregular, and very tenacious of its privileges. An attempt was afterwards made to apply the law to them, and out of the depths of the Czar's dominions came reports of resistance to the execution of the decree. To give a notion of what such a step means, we can only fancy the result of a general conscription of Sikhs and Ghoorkas in India, or of the Scotch Highlanders 200 years ago. The organization of the Cossacks will be described hereafter; for the present it must suffice to say, that they have always been considered as irregular troops, having their own officers, manners, and customs. The new law for recruiting may possibly have affected the strength of the army between 1870 and 1874; but to avoid confusion we will take as the old system that which prevailed up to 1870, and continued to be in force nominally until the new one was introduced.

Up to the beginning of the year 1874 the military forces of Russia were divided into three distinct parts:—1. The Regular Army; 2. The Irregular Army; 3. The Imperial Militia, or General Levy.

The Regular Army was further divided into—A. The Field Troops, or Active Army; B. The Reserve Troops; C. The Sedentary or Local Troops.

(A) The Field Troops, or Active Army, consisted of 188 regiments of infantry, thirty-

two battalions of rifles, and forty-eight frontier battalions, fifty-six regiments of cavalry, 310 batteries of artillery, three of which were mountain artillery, and forty-seven mitrailleuse batteries; eleven battalions of sappers, six half-battalions of pontoniers (or bridge equipage), six parks of military telegraphs, twenty-eight half-parks of field artillery (doubled in time of war), seven half-parks of horse artillery, two parks of siege artillery, and forty-seven divisional ambulances.

(B). The Reserve Troops we find variously estimated by different authorities; the latest gives one cadre per regiment of infantry, fifty-six squadrons of cavalry, seven batteries of artillery, and four battalions of sappers.

(C). The Sedentary, or Local Troops, consisted of fortress troops, including twenty-five battalions of infantry, fifty-nine companies of artillery, increased to ninety-one on a war footing: troops for interior duty, including seventy-two government battalions and about 600 district detachments charged with *etappen* duties and the maintenance of order; troops of instruction, including one battalion, one squadron, two batteries, and one company of electricians.

This is a sufficiently elaborate organization for the military forces of a nation which desires to be early in the field, and a few explanations are necessary before it can be understood. First, with regard to the Active Army. Some of the regiments consisted of three battalions, others of four. Each cavalry regiment had four squadrons, besides the one squadron counted in the Reserve. The frontier battalions garrisoned the military districts of Orenburg and Western and Eastern Siberia, constituting with the Cossacks the military force of those districts. Others, quartered in the Caucasus or Turkestan, garrisoned the fortresses, and, if called upon, had to take the field with the rest of the Active Army. Twenty-four were in the Caucasus, two in Orenburg, four in Western Siberia, six in Eastern Siberia, and twelve in Turkestan. They had four companies each, and one company of rifles. Each battery of field artillery had, in peace, four guns horsed, and in war eight guns. Horse artillery batteries had all their eight guns horsed in peace, but had only two waggons and reduced detachments. The battalions of sappers had each four companies, and consisted on a war footing of 900

rank and file per battalion. The pontoniers were for bridge-making, and each half battalion had 240 pontoniers on a war footing, made up to a total of 424 by officers and drivers. The half battalion carried twenty-six iron pontoons and twelve trestles, so that it could build a military bridge 700 feet in length. The organization of transport for the Intendance was left to be organized according to the circumstances of the case, and this was clearly a defect.

The Reserve Troops were employed to train recruits and horses, and supply the losses of the army in peace and war. They were distributed throughout the various military districts.

The Sedentary Troops were used for garrisons, and for keeping order in the districts. For the latter purpose the Government battalions, Circle detachments, and others, acted as police and guards.

Let us now glance at that extraordinary and peculiarly Russian force—the Cossacks, or irregular troops. These wild horsemen—for though there are some Cossack infantry, they are quite subordinate in importance to the great force of cavalry—possess certain privileges which they hold by tenure of military service. With the exception of an insignificant portion, they provide their own equipment for war. They have not been subjected to the ordinary military organization of the Empire, nor obliged to fight in other than their old wild way. They have even a different system of outpost duty from that of the regular troops. Their dress is different; they ride horses which would almost be called ponies in England, and are but little dependent on supplies carried by trains labouring in the rear of the army.

Unencumbered by baggage, unless it be the spoils taken from the enemy, they can march almost incredible distances, hang round the front, flanks, and rear of an enemy's army like flies buzzing about the head of a trotting horse. They can intercept convoys, and keep troops guarding the communications of an army always on the alert. The Cossacks are of various tribes, and cannot all be sent away from their homes even in war. Those of the Caucasus were used against the Circassians; and frequently mating themselves with stolen beauties, who seem equally at home in a Sultan's harem or a Cossack's hut, produced by far the handsomest race in Russia. Their horses are as intelligent as dogs. Their pace is the hand gallop, and they will go on for many miles over rough country

with noses lowered almost to the ground, picking their way like packs of hounds; will remain perfectly quiet while their masters stand erect on the saddle to survey the surrounding country, or will lie down at command under the scanty shelter of a few bushes, concealed with their riders, until danger may be past. If our heavy cavalry are called big men on big horses, the Cossacks are essentially little, but strong men, on little horses. But where the horse of a Scots Grey or Inniskilling would starve, the Cossack pony flourishes. Of little use for a charge, they are very useful as light cavalry, and obey orders with submission and alacrity—only they will execute the commands in their own way.

They are divided into several tribes—the Cossacks of the Don, who alone are liable to general service everywhere; the Kuban Cossacks, the Cossacks of the Terek, the Astrakan Cossacks, the Orenburg Cossacks, the Cossacks of the Ural and of Siberia, the Siemiryezensk and Transbaikal Cossacks, and the Cossacks of the Amur. The Cossacks of the Don, the Kuban Cossacks, the Ural Cossacks, and the Cossacks of the Terek furnish detachments for the Guard of the Czar, and have a certain proportion always ready for service in time of peace; the rest are only available in war, and then chiefly for local and frontier defence.

Among irregular troops must be included a militia of about 5000 men formed in the provinces of the Caucasus, who also furnish three squadrons for the Imperial Guard.

The Cossacks are all formed in *polks* or regiments, and each *polk* is divided into different numbers of *sotnias* or hundreds, usually either six or four. Since the greatest interest attaches to the Cossacks of the Don, we will pay particular attention to them.

The Cossacks of the Don include the regiment of Cossacks of the Guard and the Ataman Regiment of the Guard, which together number about 2320 men, and very nearly the same number of horses, and are each formed in six squadrons; the Hereditary Grand-duke Regiment, which has also six squadrons; besides sixty-four *polks* of Don Cossacks, each numbering 924 men, and 894 horses when mobilized, and an instruction *polk*. They have their own artillery, which consists of one horse battery of the Guard and thirteen field batteries, numbered from one to thirteen. The horse battery of the Guard has four guns

in peace ; but when ready for war has twelve guns, and is divided into two half batteries for the field, and one half battery for reserve. Nor are the ordinary field batteries of the Don Cossacks complete in peace. They have only two guns till they are called out for war, when they receive the rest of their guns and equipments from store at Kiev, and are made up to eight guns per battery, with their ammunition waggons and stores. But it must not be supposed that the whole of the Don Cossacks, or even the Guard, are continually in a state of readiness for war. About a third only are employed in Finland, and in the districts of Warsaw, Vilna, Odessa, and Kiev. At St. Petersburg there are only a division from each Guard regiment and one half battery of the Guard. The remainder are at home on furlough, ready to take their turn of duty. When war comes, the whole of the *polks* are called out and mobilized, and such men as are not required to fight in the ranks are yet armed and considered available at least for home defence, because every Don Cossack is liable to do military duty at any time. This seems a severe tax on their time and lives, yet they bear it cheerfully as an ancient custom, though somewhat objecting to the modern form of general service. Their dress is a tunic, loose baggy trousers, a cloak, and a sheepskin cap. Other Cossacks have fur caps. The arms of the Don Cossacks and several other tribes consist of pikes, Circassian swords, and rifled carbines. Curiously enough, only the Cossacks of the Guard wear spurs; but perhaps they would find it difficult to use them, for they have a peculiar seat on horseback, with their legs tucked up very high. The horse equipments consist of blanket, wooden saddle-tree, horse rug, *chabraque*, two leathern wallets, and a forage rope—the Ural Cossacks of the Guard indulging in the luxury of a valise. The usual regimental train of most nations is represented among the Cossacks by only one waggon per regiment; but a pack animal is allowed for every ten men in war, and the Cossacks are very much libelled, if it is not sometimes well laden with booty.

The Terek Cossacks, who also form part of the irregular cavalry engaged in the present war, are the descendants of Russian men who were banished to their present abode chiefly because their belief was not orthodox. Their women were not permitted to accompany them, so they began

to make raids on the Caucasus for wives. Hence came two effects. The beauty of the race was improved by the mixture of Circassian blood, and a desperate feud grew between the Terek Cossacks and the husbands or fathers of the stolen beauties, who did not, like the Sabine women, succeed in reconciling the antagonists. In camp the evenings are given by Cossacks to drinking, music, and dancing, when the Tereks distinguish themselves by the wildness of their revels; and whether the crossing of blood gives additional energy or not, the Tereks then evince the energy and manners of children with the strength of men. If a visit is to be paid to another camp a number of the Terek men go in a body with wild cries, and the noise of a whole fair, to which alone can the absolute *charivari* be at all compared. Nothing seems to tire them out or lower their spirits. In this respect, as in others, they are grown-up children. But how well grown up! Such chests and limbs as are seldom seen anywhere; broad shouldered, thin flanked, deep lunged, and showing by the brightness of their eyes, and the animation of their expression, that the body has been well nourished from infancy. In time of peace these Tereks produce five regiments, each 600 strong; in war time the number of regiments is doubled. They furnish their own horses, clothes, and arms, the Government provides only rations, and these are supplemented by the men themselves, for they are great at foraging. They roam about, and bring in huge bundles of grass for their clever little horses, and are paid only seven roubles each every four months. So that the Czar obtains this excellent Irregular Horse for the payment of less than £3 a year for each man, and the absolute necessities in war, not including arms or clothing. If a man loses his horse in battle he either gets another, or joins a company which fights on foot, for they are trained shots and good skirmishers.

It would hardly repay the trouble of the reader if we were to enter into a description of the other tribes of these wild feudal soldiers, especially because they do not appear in war, though their watch over the home country frees forces which would otherwise have to do duty in districts or garrisons. The main point to be remembered is, that on the outbreak of war Russia should be able to flood an enemy's country with almost savage horsemen, who have none of the mild traditions of civilized warfare, and would act,

to a very unpleasant extent, according to their untamed nature. They could never stand against moderately good regular cavalry; but they can move so far and so fast, galloping over slippery stony paths, appearing and disappearing without any sense of shame at retreating, that they would be as unmanageable by regular cavalry as little boys are by a policeman. If England were ever in collision with Russia, the best answer to the Cossacks would be given by bringing over some of the corresponding cavalry which exists under her hand or that of her great feudatories in India. The Turkomans, also from Central Asia, are horsemen of much the same character. What there is of Cossack infantry belongs to tribes which do not march with the field army in time of war, and they have no special reputation.

The extraordinary use made of Cossacks by the Russian commanders on almost every conceivable occasion in a time of war, constitutes a real danger to the efficiency of the Russian regular cavalry. At some of the most critical periods, after the passage of the Danube, these irregular cavalry were called upon to perform a thousand services demanding intelligence, and thus took from the hussars, dragoons, or lancers the opportunity of practising some of the most important duties of cavalry — duties which are in themselves an education. Was a reconnaissance to be made with a few men? It was always a party of Cossacks who were sent. Was a difficult road to be traversed where the direction was not easy to find? A couple of Cossacks were always sent in advance. At every post along the line of communication of the army there were Cossacks, and they accompanied as a sort of escort every officer who was to run the slightest risk. When the enemy had been beaten and scattered, Cossacks were sent out in all directions to sweep in the prisoners. Was forage wanted for the horses? It was the Cossack who knew where to find it. Every head-quarter staff had its Cossacks, and they were sent upon messages, and trusted to execute missions on which the staff officer might well have been employed. In fact, if war continued long enough it seemed as if the Cossacks of the Don would become not only the eyes and ears of the army, but also its brains, and not a few serious errors were actually committed by placing too implicit a faith in the news brought in by

roaming Cossacks who had been intrusted with duties altogether belonging to more thoroughly trained and disciplined cavalry.

Having thus spoken of the Cossacks and irregular troops, who have always played such a great part in Russian wars, we will turn to the regular army, and see how far the system on which it is raised coincides with that now adopted by other Continental Powers.

One of the results of the campaign of 1870 in France was to cause all European nations to re-organize their armies. Russia was no exception to this rule. Universal military service was at once introduced, and committees were appointed to draw up a law for regulating it. This law, known to be drawn up in 1873, and published everywhere in 1874, did not come into actual operation till January 1, 1875.

It was based upon the compulsion of every Russian subject to form part of the military system, without power to furnish a substitute for his personal service. What did this mean? The population of Russia is said to reach the enormous figure of 85,000,000 souls, of whom about 76,000,000 are in Europe. When the men suitable by their age for military service came to be reckoned, it was found that there were 700,000 of them. Estimating that one-third would have to be exempted on account of physical incapacity or other valid reasons, there still remained 400,000 sturdy men able to fight at the bidding of the Czar. But no country, least of all Russia, could face the expense of training so vast a body of soldiers, nor could they, in a land so thinly peopled as Russia, be taken from their homes without great pressure on the labour of the country; for, as will be seen in the next chapter, in which the military resources of the two belligerent countries are compared, although the Russian population is vast, it is really but thinly spread over the enormous area of the Empire. It was at once recognized, in fact, that to call the whole male population to arms would be to take a step that would ruin Russia financially, besides giving her an army of even greater strength than she required. Accordingly, an annual contingent of only about 25 per cent. of those attaining twenty-one years of age was yearly to be drawn, the remainder, who might escape conscription for the regular army, being organized into local militia, in

which they were to remain until their thirty-sixth year.

The new law of January, 1874, is that under which the Russian army is now formed; though, of course, the greater bulk of the troops actually serving at the opening of the present war were enlisted under the earlier condition of things. Under the new law the forces are divided into an active army, a reserve, and a militia or general levy. Finland alone of all the Russian provinces is excepted from the operation of the new law, this province being favoured with special terms of military service. The peace establishment of regular troops in Russia under the law of 1874 is no less than 830,770 men; and as the duration of service in the active army is for European Russia six years, and for Asia seven years, an annual contingent of about 150,000 should be sufficient, allowing for casualties, to keep up this strength. The contingent, however, varies according to circumstances. Every year some 700,000 attain the age of liability, and consequently only about twenty-five per cent. of this number is required by the conscription. There remains seventy-five per cent. of the number liable to service. Of these many would be disqualified from various causes; and, as we shall presently show, the state can well afford to grant more numerous exemptions than in some other countries. After making these allowances, however, there would still be a very large number of the seventy-five per cent. fully qualified to serve, and not entitled to exemption, and it must not be supposed that these entirely escape military service. They pass into the militia, where for the first four years they are embodied into district regiments, and are liable to augment the ranks of the standing army if necessary, and for the next sixteen years are to form part of the district militia force.

Military service in Russia presses less heavily than in many of the other great military nations of Europe. In France there is one man under arms for every 82 of the population; in Germany, one in 98; in Italy, one in 124; Russia has one in 127; and Austria, one in 150. Advantage is accordingly taken of the comparatively small proportion of those attaining the age for conscription which is required for the ranks, to grant exceptions from service to very large numbers of young men. In all countries an only son, who is the support of aged parents, is exempt from

service; but in Russia, when once the parents have attained the age of fifty-five, their only son is exempt, even though they have independent means of existence. Postponement of the time of entry to the army is also granted to those who are engaged in the study of professions, or in any occupation which is useful to the State. Clergy, medical students, chemists, veterinary surgeons, artists, schoolmasters, officers of the mercantile marine, and others, obtain either exemption or postponement; while, in order to encourage education, the term of service in the ranks is abridged by two years for the recruit possessing even the most elementary instruction, such as is given in the primary schools.

The twenty-five per cent. of the contingent taken for the field army have to give fifteen years of service, six of which are supposed to be passed with the colours, though in reality the men are on furlough during the fifth and sixth years. Up to the end of the eighth year they belong to the first reserve, and for the next four years to the second reserve, which is intended to form battalions ready to supply losses in the field, and thus feed the active army. The remaining three years of service are to be passed in a certain portion of the reserve liable to be used as circumstances may direct. The first reserve fills up the regiments when mobilization is ordered; the ordinary second reserve supplies losses in the field or hospital; the remainder (separate portion of second reserve) may either be similarly used, or form new divisions if required. When the fifteen years of active service in the army are passed, all the men of the contingent fall for the next five years into what would be termed in Germany the *Reichswehr*, which also includes all Russians not forming part of any of the annual contingents. These also owe service to the Czar from their twentieth to their fortieth year of age, only they are not to be called upon to take the field unless the crisis requires their services. The reserves, after their first training, may be called up twice to attend manœuvres. The *Reichswehr* cannot be called out at all in time of peace.

If the new organization were in full working order, which it cannot be for some years to come, and if all expectations were verified by facts, the Russian army would stand about as follows, including Cossacks:—

	Men.
Field Army,	755,000
First Reserve,	110,000
Second and last Reserve,	900,000
Cossacks,	180,000
Total,	1,945,000

The Reichswehr is expected to reach the figure of about 1,500,000 men (250,000 being old soldiers), which would bring the Russian military forces to a total of nearly three millions and a half of armed men, or nearly two millions more than were available for war according to the old

organization. If we count only the 250,000 old soldiers of the Reichswehr as being really effective, there would still remain the terrible incubus of nearly 2,200,000 strong men destined for war. The numbers, however, had not reached this enormous figure when war was declared in 1877; but that the war strength of the Russian army appeared even then sufficiently formidable may be judged from the following table, compiled from the most recent official returns accessible in 1877 :—

Description of Force.	Bat- talions.	Squa- drons.	Bat- teries.	Generals.	Officers.	Non-com- missioned Officers.	Musicians.	Effective Combatants.	Non-com- batants.	Total Number of Men.	
ACTIVE ARMY.											
Imperial Guard,	{ Infantry,	52	—	—	26	1,107	4,154	1,860	46,260	1,938	55,345
	{ Cavalry,	—	50	—	13	465	1,054	296	9,206	989	12,023
	{ Artillery,	—	—	22	6	165	559	159	4,929	772	6,590
	{ Engineers,	1	—	—	3	36	86	81	900	115	1,221
Total,	53	50	22	48	1,773	5,853	2,396	61,295	3,814	75,179	
Line and Grenadiers,	{ Infantry,	629	—	—	254	16,021	55,117	20,647	579,160	33,346	704,445
	{ Cavalry,	—	187	—	25	1,728	3,779	793	31,006	3,982	41,313
	{ Artillery,	—	—	296	37	2,386	8,836	1,490	78,587	12,334	103,670
	{ Engineers,	13	—	—	19	503	1,280	524	12,481	1,716	16,523
Total,	642	187	296	335	20,638	69,012	23,354	701,234	51,378	865,951	
Total of the Active Army,	695	237	318	383	22,411	75,765	25,750	762,529	55,192	942,030	
SEDENTARY ARMY.											
Garrison Infantry,	27	—	—	—	539	2,160	671	24,300	619	28,289	
Local Battalions,	103	—	—	93	3,703	13,718	2,588	147,577	10,326	178,005	
Gendarmes,	—	6	—	23	489	4,440	12	1,304	294	6,562	
Garrison Artillery,	—	—	—	3	602	3,570	180	33,650	1,557	39,562	
Reserve and Dépôt Troops,	8	46	4	8	565	3,178	400	12,354	2,800	19,305	
Other Local Troops,	—	—	—	18	1,047	3,418	60	41,739	28,980	75,262	
Total of the Sedentary Army,	138	52	4	145	6,945	30,484	3,911	260,924	44,576	346,985	
IRREGULAR FORCES.											
Infantry,	29	—	—	—	570	2,096	655	17,064	1,004	21,389	
Cavalry (Cossacks),	—	914	—	14	3,218	10,369	2,869	119,721	6,354	142,545	
Artillery,	—	—	29	2	203	693	116	6,673	1,029	8,716	
Total of Irregular Forces,	29	914	29	16	3,991	13,158	3,640	143,458	8,387	172,650	
Grand Total,	862	1,203	351	544	33,347	119,407	33,301	1,166,911	108,155	1,461,665	
RECAPITULATION.											
Infantry,	844	—	—	376	22,187	80,509	26,449	852,047	70,558	1,052,126	
Cavalry,	—	1,197	—	59	5,786	17,840	4,142	163,845	13,720	205,392	
Artillery,	—	—	351	63	3,902	14,616	2,011	131,147	20,492	172,231	
Engineers,	18	—	—	23	983	2,002	687	18,568	3,091	25,354	
Gendarmes,	—	6	—	23	489	4,440	12	1,304	294	6,562	
Guns, Number of,	—	—	2,784	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	

On a peace footing this 1,461,665 is reduced to 830,770; and although the development of the new system will largely increase the available war strength, the number given as the peace footing is not likely to be very much exceeded. After the failure of the Conference at Constan-

tinople, the mobilization and strategic disposition of the forces which, during the winter, had been concentrated on the north coast of the Black Sea and in Bessarabia, were effected very slowly, and the practical results remained far behind the figures expected from the mobilization plan. But it is to be remembered that this mobilization took place in the midst of the reorganization of the army. Universal compulsory service, moreover, had not yet been introduced throughout the Empire, and the formation of army corps on the Prussian model, instead of the former military districts and united divisions and brigades belonging to them, had begun only in the previous autumn. In addition to this were the difficulties caused by the great distances and the want of any means of communication. The Russian railways are, it is true, planned for strategic purposes, but chiefly with a view to a concentration of troops on the western frontier. By the middle of April the following was the state of the Russian military strength on the frontier:—In Trans-Caucasia, about 120,000 men were stationed, with 35 field batteries, 150 siege guns, and at least 50,000 reserves; and in the south-west of European Russia were 385,000 men, with 88 field batteries, and at least 350 siege guns; the reserves amounted to 120,000 men, and were posted between Kamienic-Podolski, Kieff, and Vladimir-Volynski.

For administrative purposes Russia is divided into governments, and these into circles. Each government has a military commander, each circle a circle commander. The latter officer is a member of the circle recruiting commission, to which is confided the levy, by lot, of the conscripts. The circle commander is responsible for their selection for the various arms. Men with special intelligence or education are assigned to the engineers or artillery; those well built for riding or with a knowledge of horses, to the cavalry. The Guard has a choice among all the recruits. The numerous exemptions above named would alone be sufficient to protect all those of a superior class or education from military service in the ranks; but there are additional methods by which regimental service as a soldier is avoided. If able to pass an educational test, any Russian may enlist as a volunteer, and according to the degree of his education, his service is limited to twenty-four, six, or three months. From these men are selected, after very short periods of service, non-

commissioned officers; and those who do not remain in the army pass into the reserve for nine years. There is also a system in existence very similar to that under which the German one-year volunteer enlists. Volunteers generally have the privilege of choosing their own regiment, and are allowed to live apart from the men, maintaining themselves at their own cost. This, of course, enables men of superior refinement to learn the training of a soldier, without being subjected to the coarse and disagreeable companionship which must necessarily be involved in life in a barrack-room or billets.

A hard life it is that the Russian soldier leads. For the first six months he is attached to a training battalion, squadron, or battery, where he is clothed and drilled almost to death. At the end of this time he is appointed to a regiment. If he happens to be selected for the Guard, he gets housed in wooden-hut barracks, where, closely packed though he may be with the seventy or eighty comrades in his hut, he at least has warmth and shelter; but if he fall to any other portion of the army, he is billeted on the town or village where his regiment happens to be quartered, and the quarters given to the troops are not always the best. The warm shelf over the stove which forms the peasant's bed in a Russian hut is not given to the soldier, and the winter cold must often be terribly trying. During the summer months the troops are all camped out, and go through a considerable amount of training. The daily pay of a full private in the Russian army is just one farthing; a lance-corporal gets a third of a penny, a senior non-commissioned officer a halfpenny, and a sergeant-major twopence halfpenny. In time of war, on the march, and during manœuvres, the men receive increased pay, equal to fifty per cent. more than the ordinary pay; and instead of the rations of fresh meat and brandy which formerly were issued to the men in peace as well as in war, a mess allowance is now given to the non-commissioned officers and men in time of peace, varying, according to the market prices in the towns where they are quartered, from one penny to three half-pence per man. Yet this gives a larger allowance than might be expected, for by the rules of the Greek Church 169 days of the year are fast days, on which the men may eat no meat; so that the whole of the 365 days' mess allowance is available to be spent on

the 196 days of the year on which the consumption of meat is permitted. In addition, the men receive certain rations in kind; the daily ration per man is about 2 lbs. of flour, a little peeled barley, and salt, which is supposed to make a ration of nearly $2\frac{3}{4}$ lbs. of bread. It is said, however, that the men save a large quantity of the flour in each mess and sell it to dealers, buying other and more savoury articles with the proceeds. They also earn money by hiring themselves out as labourers, part of the money so earned going to the mess fund. But for this addition they would scarcely have sufficient to keep body and soul together. The drink called *kvas*, or quass, is prepared from flour and leaven, is very sour, and non-intoxicating. Meagre and poor as his food may be, upon it the Russian soldier stands great hardships, and makes wonderful marches. He supports great heat and great cold better, perhaps, than the soldier of any other nation. Some of the marches made on the expedition to Khiva, and, even more notably, some of those made by the reserves called up after the battle of Plevna, showed that the men must have had marvellous powers of endurance. With a heavy knapsack and heavy rifle to carry, with ninety rounds of ammunition, and a short sword girt round his waist, in addition to the bayonet always fixed, the Russian soldier, with his feet swathed in linen cloths instead of socks, and with his trousers tucked into his long boots, steps out at such a pace that it is difficult for a good walker to keep up with him; his spirits and good humour, too, never flag; and in every company, squadron, or battery there is a musical troupe who sing and dance admirably. When marching at ease this troupe always goes in front, and enlivens the route by comic singing and curious antics, although they never lag or get in the way. The Russian soldier's amusements consist to a great extent of gymnastic exercises, every barrack room being furnished with a wooden horse and parallel bars, and every camp in summer having a complete apparatus for a gymnasium. His early peasant's training in his village, far from artizans and shops, has taught him to use the hatchet and other tools, to cook, and to sew. His clothing is made up and fitted in his own company, and a soldier of four years' service has no less than four suits of clothing. The first is only used for grand inspections and gala days, the second for regimental and town

parades, the third for rough work, and the fourth or oldest, for barrack wear. His little extravagance is *vodka*; but it is evident that the profits of the regimental canteen cannot be very great, when we remember that the whole pay which a soldier clears is only one farthing a day.

As regards the discipline of the troops, the scale of punishment in the Russian army would indicate that there is need for great severity. The disciplinary punishments that can be inflicted on the non-commissioned officers and men are as follows:—Reprimands; confinement to barracks; extra turns of fatigue and other duty; confinement to the guard-room, where no spirits or tobacco are allowed, and singing, and even conversation with comrades, is forbidden; solitary confinement on bread and water for a period limited to fourteen days, when for two days out of every three only bread, salt, and water are allowed, the ordinary ration being issued on the third day, and no candles being allowed after dark; and, lastly, solitary confinement in a dark cell, limited to eight days. Corporal punishment can only be inflicted on men already on the punishment list, and may not exceed fifty lashes. Each rank, beginning with the corporal, has power to award a certain amount of punishment: thus, a corporal may give twenty-four hours' confinement to barracks; a sergeant-major, forty-eight hours; a subaltern, eight days; a captain, two months; a battalion commander, three months. No one under the rank of a captain of a company can award corporal punishment; no non-commissioned officer can award solitary confinement.

There is no doubt that a very inferior state of education throughout the country generally has in past times made it most difficult to obtain a body of properly qualified officers for the Russian army. The sons of the smaller class of nobility were brought up on their father's estates very often without more than the rudest elements of primary education; but in proportion as roads have been improved and railways introduced, the facilities for repairing to educational establishments have increased; and education, generally speaking, has widened the field from which a superior class of men can be drawn. Moreover, the Government has taken the greatest possible pains to educate specially for the military service a very large body of youths. At the date of our last information on this subject there were ten elementary military

schools established by the Government, containing nearly 3000 pupils, sons of officers and of officials holding officer's rank. In these schools pupils are prepared for cadet schools, of which we shall presently speak. There were also twelve military schools, containing nearly 4000 pupils, also sons of the privileged classes, which train their scholars for admission to the war schools. The course of education comprises modern languages, mathematics up to a low standard, history and geography, the elementary principles of natural sciences, landscape and geometrical drawing, gymnastics, and drill. The pupils of the elementary military schools enter between the age of twelve and fifteen, and must pass a qualifying examination in religion, reading, writing, and arithmetic. Those for the military schools must either have passed through the elementary schools or undergo a rather higher entrance examination. The great object of these schools appears to be not so much to give a higher education, as to impress upon the young men a strong feeling of duty, a high military spirit, and a healthy patriotism. Great attention has been paid to training a body of men competent to act as instructors.

The above may be considered as preparatory schools. Next come the schools for the training of officers for the army. There are four war schools—the Paul's war school and the Constantine war school at St. Petersburg, the Alexander war school at Moscow, and the Nicholas war school at St. Petersburg. The first three are for the training of infantry, the fourth for the training of cavalry. Each of the infantry war schools contains 300 pupils, who are admitted between the ages of sixteen and twenty on producing a certificate from the preparatory military schools, or a civil upper-class school, or on passing an entrance examination. The object of these war schools is to train up a body of regimental officers. The pupils have the rank of cadet, and the course of education comprises the usual subjects taught in a military cadet college. The course is for two years, at the conclusion of which the students are appointed sub-lieutenants, ensigns, or cornets, or cadets, according to the degree of proficiency which they have attained. Finland has a special cadet school of its own at Helsingfors. The pupils must be natives of Finland, and must pass a preliminary entrance examination. After a similar course of instruction to that given in the

military and war schools, they enter the army on the same conditions as the students from the war schools. There are about 120 cadets. The most aristocratic school is the Imperial Corps of Pages, established at St. Petersburg for the education of 150 Court pages, who must all be sons either of the old nobility or of Court chamberlains. The course of instruction comprises the subjects taught in the military and war schools; and the pupils are appointed ensigns or sub-lieutenants in the Guard, or ensigns in the army, according to their qualifications. Each military district has also its own cadet school, resembling very much the cadet schools of Austria. Candidates for admission to these must have passed through an elementary military school, or must submit to an entrance examination. Non-commissioned officers of the army are allowed to enter these schools to qualify for commissions. The course of instruction lasts for two years, three months of each year being passed by the students with regiments of the army, in order to add a thoroughly practical acquaintance of the profession to the theoretical knowledge acquired at school. There are 3500 pupils in these schools. The Michael Artillery war school and the Nicholas Engineer war school at St. Petersburg train candidates for the artillery and engineers respectively. The course of instruction is for three years.

In addition to the above, which are exclusively devoted to training young men to become qualified for commissions in the army, there are schools for the higher professional education of officers. The Nicholas General Staff Academy is open to all officers of and below the rank of major in the army who have served for at least four years with their regiment, and passed a competitive examination. The usual course of instruction in a staff college is given here, and those officers who obtain special certificates receive, if below the rank of major, a step of promotion; if of the rank of major, one year's pay instead. The Michael Artillery Academy and Nicholas Engineer Academy train officers of artillery and engineers who have passed special examinations in the higher branches of their respective professions; and the Military Law Academy at St. Petersburg educates officers for the higher posts in the judicial departments. In addition to these, there are training schools for special branches, a military school-masters' seminary, technical and pyrotechnical schools, intended

to train a body of efficient foremen and foremen-instructors for the technical artillery; a military drawing school, for the education of the minor officials of the topographical corps; a topographical school, for training the officers of that corps; an elementary military school at Tiflis, which specially trains men for the various departments of the army in the Caucasus; a military law school, to train officials for the department of military law; schools for dressers, to train up surgeons, assistants, and apothecaries; a riding-masters' school, and a medical and surgical academy, which confers degrees and educates surgeons for the army—surgeons educated at the public expense being compelled to serve for thirteen years, those educated at their own expense for eight years, in the army. The greater portion of the expense in the whole of these various training establishments is borne by the Government. In them all a large portion of the pupils are on the foundation, and the payment made by others is comparatively small. The object of the Government is to educate, at no matter what cost, a superior body of officers and officials for all the various departments of the army.

When we learn that there are nearly 14,000 pupils in these military schools, and observe how great their number is as compared with those of any other nation, it would seem at the first glance that Russia should have the most highly educated body of officers of any country of the world; but in reality it is not so. The fact is, that in Russia there is so great a lack of elementary schools, and the educated middle class forms such a small fraction of the population, that it is necessary for the Government to take into its own hands and give a military direction to that general education which in other countries, possessing a higher degree of civilization, is attained at the ordinary schools and in the various training colleges for the civil professions. Moreover, with all these schools, the demand for officers for the huge Russian army is so great, and the competition of the civil professions with the army is so strong, that it is most difficult to keep the regiments supplied with the necessary number of regimental officers. In spite of all these military schools, it is the exception to find a Russian officer outside the Guard with a knowledge of any language besides his own. The Staff Academy at St. Petersburg languishes for want of candidates; and a considerable proportion

of the staff officers of the army is appointed direct from regiments without any special staff training. In actual practical regimental work the Russian officer appears to be fairly instructed, but as a body the staff is infinitely inferior to that of either Germany or Austria.

The pay of the Russian officers is very small; that of a captain of the line is under £65 a year, that of a lieutenant-colonel only £93 a year; a full general has £300 a year, a major-general £178 a year. The pay is manifestly insufficient to support the position of an officer. In war it is increased by about fifty per cent., and officers stationed in some of the more remote and expensive districts, or holding special appointments, receive the same increase as in war. Certain allowances also are given for lodgings, and officers holding commands receive an allowance for table money. Officers of the Guard have higher pay and the same advantage which, until recently, was given to our regiments of Guards, of an advance of brevet rank in each grade. An officer desiring to enter the Guard from the rest of the army is provisionally attached for six months, during which he is socially on probation. Promotion throughout the whole army is by seniority up to and including the rank of lieutenant-colonel. The Czar then selects for the higher ranks until the officer becomes a general, when seniority again comes into play. The rank of field-marshal is, as usual, reserved for those who have rendered the highest services at the head of armies in the field. The officers of the Old Guard count two grades higher than their comrades of the line. Officers of the other Guard regiments take rank with the staff—namely, one grade higher than regimental officers of the same standing. About six weeks' leave of absence is given every year. Before a Russian officer is allowed to marry he must deposit in the hands of Government 5000 roubles as a guarantee that he possesses sufficient means. Russian officers are never allowed to appear out of uniform. Every officer, from the subaltern drilling a squadron to the general inspecting a division on parade, or the Emperor himself at a review of an army, commences with a salutation to his troops, "Your good health, my children," to which the men reply, "We wish it also." On Imperial parades the shout, "We wish good health to your Imperial Majesty!" sounds very grand from the sonorous words of

which, in the Russian language, it is composed; but such salutations are sometimes more official than real, and in Russia it is probably as in France, that the soldiers who one day shout "Vive l'Empereur!" are just as ready on the next to shout "Vive le President!" and it is possible that the standing reply of the Russian troops when they receive an order, "We gladly obey," is sometimes mixed with words that have a very different meaning. The practice of bestowing the highest commands upon Grand-dukes and other members of the Imperial house is of very old standing, but it is one which has not unfrequently proved a source of danger, embarrassment, and even of disaster, to the Russian arms.

It is to be remarked, as regards the officers, that in the opinion of many the recent changes and increases of the army have tended to lower the position of the officer more than the attempt at higher education has raised it. Up to 1866 the position of officer in the army was an appanage of nobility; and unless the educational standard of the army generally, and of the officers especially, be considerably raised the change will naturally operate very unfavourably. The average Russian soldier never sees a great town, never learns what civilization and mental training really mean. Unfortunately, the same fate befalls too many of the officers, most of whom pass nearly the whole of their lives in barbarous regions, where society as we know it hardly exists, and where the cravings raised by a certain amount of education cannot be fed with their proper food, but strive to quench themselves in strong drink and gross forms of sensuality. We are far from saying that this is a universal picture, but all who know the Russian army insist that it is not uncommon. Intemperate and licentious conduct on the part of officers inevitably loosens in the end the high regard in which they stand in the estimation of the rank and file; and as the superstition with which nobility used to be regarded dies out in the nature of the Russian soldier, he is likely to become critical upon such so-called education as leaves his officer only better than himself in that he can afford a larger amount of sensual pleasures.

A peculiar system which prevails in the Russian army is the instruction of the men by their officers, though, perhaps, it is carried to an extent which is not good for either officers or

men. The Emperor, fully alive to the evil of want of education amongst the masses in Russia, desires to make of the army a great school of popular instruction; and so during the long winter months, when frosts and snows compel the troops to remain for the greater part of the day under shelter, the officers are employed as schoolmasters teaching their men. The ordinary instruction of the soldier comprises reading, writing, and arithmetic, and simple instruction in tactics. In every regiment of cavalry, battalion of infantry, battery of horse artillery, or brigade of field artillery, there exists a school for the training of non-commissioned officers under officers selected as instructors. Any soldier of two years' service who is likely from his physical qualities and character to make a good non-commissioned officer, who can read and write, and knows the simple rules of arithmetic, may enter the school, where he is taught some little history, geography, composition, and arithmetic, and in the cavalry and artillery the elements of veterinary knowledge; and subsequently, if he has proved himself an apt pupil, the elements of the military art, field fortification, tactics, and mathematics.

In summer field-works are constructed by the men; in winter models of works are made by them in sand. The pupils of these schools live apart from the rest of the men, rejoining their companies for the grand annual manœuvres. The system of tactics taught is now that of the German army, but many of the superior Russian generals deem the modern system of tactics, which dissolves attacking columns into squads, and relies upon the steady and enduring action of the individual, to be incompatible with the intellectual peculiarities of their men. It undoubtedly does need considerable training, intelligence, and self-confidence for fighting in any other formation than that of the column, whereby every man is supported in spirit by the comrades around him; and, so far as the present war is concerned, it might have been supposed that the Russians would derive considerable advantage, from the fact that in Turkish troops they met with foes who had adopted modern tactics to an even less extent than themselves. The experience, however, of the battles of Zewin and Plevna proved that, in the face of modern small-arms and artillery, charging in columns, even to a modified extent, led simply to wholesale slaughter, especially to the assailants of well-chosen fortified positions.

As regards organization, each division of infantry contains four regiments of three battalions. The regulated war strength of the battalion is 900 rank and file. The battalion consists of four companies and one rifle company. They are numbered successively throughout the regiment. The regulated war strength of the company is 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 sub-lieutenant, 1 ensign, 1 junker (a candidate for a commission), 4 senior sergeants, 12 junior non-commissioned officers, 20 lance-corporals, 148 privates, 1 pay-sergeant, 3 drummers, 3 buglers, 1 armourer-sergeant, 12 privates in reserve, 1 apothecary, 1 apothecary pupil, 4 officers' servants—in all, 215 non-commissioned officers and men. The rifle companies have an additional subaltern and officer's servant. The following is regarded as the field state of a regiment:—76 officers, 270 non-commissioned officers, 70 musicians, 2700 combatant rank and file, 5 clerks, 154 non-combatant rank and file, 41 waggons, 174 horses.

The infantry has two different kinds of breech-loaders, some corps being armed with the Kruka musket, but the majority have the best pattern of the Berdan rifle. Each man carries ninety rounds of ammunition, fifteen in a pouch on either side the clasp of the waist-belt, and sixty in the haversack; besides which forty rounds per man are conveyed in the company transport wagon. The officers and colour-sergeants carry a pistol in a black holster on the right hip. To the pistol is attached a line running round the neck, which is alike useful and ornamental. The belts are all black—pipe-clay being thus dispensed with. The knapsack is heavy and cumbrous, and, including three days' provisions, the soldier carries very nearly seventy pounds.

The line cavalry of the army consists of divisions, each composed of two brigades, or four regiments. A regiment consists of four squadrons, and its establishment is as follows:—33 officers, 64 non-commissioned officers, 17 trumpeters, 512 mounted combatants, 120 dismounted combatants, 5 clerks, 135 non-combatants, 13 waggons, 55 draught horses, 593 troop horses. The Cossack regiments, on the other hand, have 21 officers, 86 non-commissioned officers, 19 trumpeters, 685 combatants, 1 clerk, 41 non-combatants, 75 draught horses, 802 troop horses.

The most noteworthy feature in the cavalry equipment is the saddle. Heavy and rude though

it is, sore backs are exceedingly rare. Four separate folds of soft felt, each a quarter of an inch thick, support a wooden frame previously fitted to the horse's back. On the wooden frame is strapped the horse-rug, and the saddle is complete. The folds of felt being interchangeable, when one is wet or hardened by dried perspiration, it is turned round and placed on the top of the other, so that a perfectly clean soft material is always next to the horse's skin. It is equivalent to restuffing a saddle every day. Girth galls are likewise unknown. A single inch strap is sufficient to secure the wooden frame and the folds underneath. There are no martingales, cruppers, or other ornamental instruments of torture, though the bridles are needlessly heavy. Over the saddle and over the wallets on which the cloak is placed lies a grey or blue blanket, covering the whole, and serving also as a protection for the animal when unsaddled in cold weather. The wallets, besides carrying the usual articles needed by a horse soldier, contain two days' supply of biscuits—that is, black bread thoroughly dried. When soaked in water or in soup, if it can be obtained, this black biscuit is very palatable. Under the saddle and attached to it is a thick felt, covered outside with black leather, which supports two shoe pockets, so that each horse carries one fore and one hind shoe, with nails. Other shoes are carried in carts. Behind the saddle and supported by its horns is a cloth valise, which holds a second pair of pantaloons, a white canvas coat, a pair of boots, shirts, and so on. Each man carries a nosebag filled with corn, when it is procurable, and two hay nets. Each man also carries a wooden peg to fasten his head rope to in case of bivouac without stretched ropes, and every three men have a cooking-tin and a water-vessel between them. Six men distribute among them the materials for a tent. The horses certainly have the appearance of being over-loaded, but, as we have already observed, sore backs are not common, and the endurance of the animals is remarkable. The men ride well, and form a body of cavalry which may well be admired for its hardiness and general utility.

The dragoons are in reality mounted rifles. Alone of all the Powers in Europe the Russians have recognized the great utility of mounted infantry. The cavalry moving in threes, the centre file holds the horses of his comrade at either side when the order to act on foot is given. The

horse detachment remains under the command of the senior subaltern. He is directed to keep under cover, yet near at hand, that the word "To horse," may be immediately put into execution to charge disheartened infantry, to meet cavalry face to face, to seize a position, or to retire swiftly before superior numbers.

The armament of the cavalry is peculiar to Russia. In every corps, with the exception of the dragoons, the front rank are armed with lances, swords, and revolvers, the second rank have neither lance nor revolver, but a sword and a Berdan rifle. The dragoons alone have the Kruka musket. The men armed with rifles have twenty rounds of ball-cartridge, those armed with revolvers only eighteen rounds. The regular cavalry has magnificent horses, good arms, and better officers than the infantry. The irregular cavalry, especially the Cossacks, contrast with the regulars in many respects, and are far less capable of a combined attack. The Cossacks are armed with lances and *shaska* (crooked swords without guards); their dress is an imitation of the Circassian, the so-called *tscherkeska*, a long coat, which has on each side of the breast a row of receptacles for cartridges, and a fur cap.

One of the most striking measures adopted by the Emperor in view of the tactics in 1866 and 1870-71, was the increase of cavalry and field artillery; and there exists in Russia a school of tacticians who believe strongly in horsemen and guns playing a great part in modern wars. The following statement will give an *aperçu* of the artillery effectives, and will also show that this arm bears a high proportion to the other portions of the active army:—

	Batteries.		Guns.		Men.
Foot artillery,	290	...	2,391	...	140,000
Horse and Cossack artillery, . .	36	...	218	...	17,205
Sundry Cossack artillery, . .	25	...	175	...	15,026
Totals,	351	...	2,784	...	172,231

Of all the arms in the service of the Russian army, the field artillery is generally esteemed to be the most efficient. In many of the actions of the present war, so early, for instance, as during the bombardment which preceded the attack and capture of Ardahan, the Russian field artillery distinguished itself by its excellent work, and the valuable service it rendered. When, impressed by the astounding success gained by the rifled field-pieces of the French army in the campaign in Italy in 1859, every nation in Europe set about

the task of re-arming its artillery with rifled guns, the Russians in the first instance adopted the French muzzle-loading rifled field-piece as the weapon with which to replace the old smooth-bore guns of their batteries; but after a very short time they discarded the French ordnance, and introduced in its place a gun manufactured on the Prussian breech-loading system. The first pieces used by the Russians were of steel, and were obtained direct from the workshops of Herr Krupp; but subsequently experiments were made with bronze barrels, and the results of the trials proving satisfactory, this metal was adopted as the material of which all the guns of the Russian field artillery should be constructed. Consequently all the field batteries of the Russian army are armed with bronze guns, the steel field-pieces first procured being kept in reserve. The guns which are thus in use in the Russian forces engaged in the present campaign are of two calibres—namely, of 8·69 and 10·67 centimètres, or 3·22 inch and 4·2 inch, and are known as 4-pounder and 9-pounder guns respectively. The weight of the projectile thrown by the former is almost exactly twelve pounds, that of the 9-pounder being very nearly twenty-four pounds, and it was this heavy and capacious shell which wrought such damage upon the earthworks of Ardahan. It will be seen that both guns throw shells of nearly treble the nominal weight—according to the habit usual on the Continent, of naming a field gun by the weight of the projectile it would throw if it were a smooth bore, and the shell round instead of elongated. The total weight of the 4-pounder gun itself, including the breech-closing apparatus, is 674 pounds, or over 6 cwt.; that of the 9-pounder 1375 pounds, or about 12 cwt. The carriages of both the pieces are constructed to carry the men serving the gun. Shells with percussion fuzes, shrapnel with time fuzes, incendiary shell, and cases, are provided for each piece. Very few projectiles, however, are carried in the limber boxes of the gun itself, only eighteen with the 4-pounder and twelve with the 9-pounder; but in the batteries of the former each piece is accompanied by two ammunition waggons, and in the 9-pounder batteries by three. In time of war all the guns are dragged by six horses, but during peace only four horses are provided for each 4-pounder.

Besides the two guns already described, there is also a third pattern, a 3-pounder or mountain gun,

weighing only 2 cwts., and also of bronze. These are chiefly detailed for Asiatic service, but their special utility was apparent in the crossing of the Balkans, for they were the only pieces which could get through the narrow defile by which General Gourkha's corps first forced a passage. One gun is generally drawn by a single horse, which has shafts with a splinter bar, the latter being supported by straps which pass over the horse's hind quarters, so that it does not fall to the ground when the gun is unlimbered. When limbered up the trail is attached to the shafts, but the gun can also be carried on the horse's back if required; hence, wherever a horse can find room for his feet these little pieces can be carried.

The Russian battery in the field consists of eight guns, each accompanied by its ammunition waggons, two store waggons, one field forge, one implement waggon, and three general service waggons. Altogether the 4-pounder battery includes thirty-four, and the 9-pounder forty-three vehicles. But it must be noted that the waggons are not constructed to carry such heavy loads as are generally placed on the carriages accompanying batteries in all other European armies, and are drawn by three horses only, which are harnessed abreast. The length of a Russian battery in column of route, consequently, although its waggons are more numerous, does not very greatly exceed that of an English battery, being only 460 paces for a light, and 570 paces for a heavy battery. The *personnel* of a 9-pounder battery consists of a field officer as commander, five other officers, and 317 men, and it has a complement of 223 horses. A 4-pounder battery has the same number of officers, but only 256 men and 169 horses; while a horse artillery battery, which is also armed with the 4-pounder gun, has, with the same number of officers, 253 men and 241 horses.

All the batteries of the field artillery are organized in brigades; each brigade consisting of three heavy or 9-pounder, and three light or 4-pounder batteries, and comprising, therefore, altogether forty-eight guns. Only in the Turkestan and Siberian brigades the third light battery is replaced by a mountain, or 3-pounder battery. The number of brigades of artillery equals the number of divisions of infantry in the army, one of the former being attached to each of the latter. The

infantry division consists of four regiments of three battalions each, excepting in the divisions of the Guards and of the Caucasian troops, where the number of battalions is four, so that as a rule there are forty-eight guns to every 12,000 men.

Regarded simply as divisional artillery, the proportion of guns to men is undoubtedly extremely large; but it must be remembered that in the Russian army there is no army corps artillery. In the German army, for instance, there is, besides the four batteries attached to each of the two divisions of infantry of which an army corps is formed, a force of six field and one or two horse artillery batteries, forming the so-called corps artillery, acting immediately under the orders of the commander of the corps. And in every other European army the same arrangement prevails—a force of corps artillery being provided, also, at all events on paper, for each of the army corps in the mobilization scheme for the English army, although many arguments have been urged in favour of the Russian plan. The horse artillery of the Russian army is no longer organized, as it was formerly, in brigades. In time of peace it consists of five horse artillery batteries of the Guard, and twenty-one of the line, of one Guard and seven line Don Cossack batteries; altogether, therefore, of thirty-four batteries, being two for each of the seventeen cavalry divisions of the Russian army.

The artillery park conveys 70,000 rounds of ammunition for the 9-pounders, and 100,000 for the 4-pounders, besides a million and a half of cartridges, and 200,000 pistol bullets.

The whole siege artillery of the Russian army is divided into three siege parks, one of which is especially attached to the Army of the Caucasus. Each of the siege parks belonging to the European army has a normal establishment of 400 pieces of ordnance. Among these are sixty heavy 6-inch guns, rifled, and constructed of cast-steel; 140 light 6-inch (24-pounder) guns, and eighty 4-inch guns, both classes being constructed of bronze and rifled. There are also in each park forty 8-inch and forty 6-inch steel howitzer mortars (both classes again being rifled and breech-loading). The bronze 6-inch siege gun throws a common shell of 71 lbs. and a shrapnel of 89 lbs. with a velocity of about 1063 feet per second. The 6-inch steel guns throw the same projectiles with the greater velocity of 1550 feet per second. The heavy 8-inch mortar weighs nearly 4 tons, and

with an 11 lb. charge throws a shell of 200 lbs. or a shrapnel of 230 lbs. The park of 400 siege guns was, at the time war commenced, completed by forty 6-inch smooth-bore mortars.

Each of the European parks are subdivided into twelve and the Caucasian park into ten sections. Of these the first and second sections (or in the Caucasian park the first, second, third, and fourth, are composed of 4-inch guns only, and form the "park of investment"), which is intended to arrive before the fortress to be besieged at the same time as the investing force, and to begin the preliminary bombardment. The remaining section, with the exception of the last two in each park, form the "park of attack" proper, and consist of the ordnance for the armament of the siege batteries constructed in advance of the first parallel. Finally, the last two sections constitute the "reserve park," composed solely of ordnance and carriages, intended to replace such *matériel* as may become damaged in the batteries. With regard to ammunition, each of the pieces in the first ten sections is supplied with 1000 rounds, except the smaller rifled mortars, for each of which 700 rounds only are provided. The total weight of powder carried with the park amounts to 23,660 cwts., of which quantity nearly one-half is intended to be used in mining operations. The *personnel* of each park includes 1 general, 13 superior and 136 other officers, 2 surgeons, 600 non-commissioned officers, 48 trumpeters, 7200 gunners, and a few orderlies and artificers, making in all 8454 officers and men.

As in general organizations, so in armament, the war found the Russian army in a state of transition. The infantry, as we have remarked, were armed partly with the Berdan rifle and partly with the Kruka, neither of which is equal to the Peabody-Martini, with which American makers had armed the majority of the Turkish foot soldiers. The artillery was in the same case. A very few years, perhaps months, would have brought the guns to a level with those of other European Powers; but at the time the present campaign was entered upon Turkey had the decided advantage, not only in small-arms, but in the very fine array of Krupp field artillery it possessed. In one or two respects the Russian artillery had been well in advance—notably, as having been the first to cast away old traditions boldly, and substitute iron carriages for those of wood. The alteration was

fortunate, for no wooden carriages would have stood the fearful rough use involved by rapid movements over such uneven country as formed the theatre of war.

The new organization provided for a full supply of engineers' bridge equipage and train, eleven battalions of sappers and miners, six half battalions of pioneers, parks of field engineers, two parks siege engineers, nine telegraph parks, and four battalions of reserve sappers. Each telegraph park has in time of war 306 men, and each park is divided into three sections. The first section moves with the army of operation, taking with it thirteen carriages laden with materials for their work. The second section constitutes a reserve with ten carriages, and the third section has the duty of keeping up the communication between these active sections and the State telegraph lines. The total efficiency of the scientific corps is 14,340 men.

With regard to the resources of Russia other than those of actual troops, we may remark that of all European states Russia is the best supplied with horses. No less than 16,000,000 of one sort or another exist within the dominions of the Czar; and exportation being difficult, their price is low. They are for the most part small and rough in appearance, but extremely hardy, and capable of picking up a subsistence where many others would starve. There is no lack, however, of really magnificent horses—those of the Guard cavalry, and also of many of the field artillery batteries, being as fine as could be found in any army in Europe. The abundant supply of horses makes mobilization easier than it is among more civilized communities, and the same remark applies to almost all the necessities of an army.

For the hospitals the Russian Government expends in times of peace comparatively larger sums than any other state, and there are numerous charitable societies which come to their aid in a time of war. Properly qualified surgeons are not plentiful in the country, but this want is met by considerable engagements of medical men from other countries.

After the Franco-German war the Government vied with the people in spreading throughout the country the principle on which the Red Cross Society is founded. The result was the formation in every district of agencies and sub-agencies ramifying through Russia, like the telegraph

service or postal organization; and—as described in a previous chapter—at the commencement of the present struggle the zeal and enthusiasm everywhere displayed was almost beyond description.

Having thus presented to the reader some idea of the numbers and value of the military forces of Russia, it only remains to notice some essential points connected with the means she possesses for putting her vast forces into motion, and forwarding supplies and reinforcements—matters which in any modern campaign must not be overlooked.

The great defect and weakness of Russia is the absence of proper communications throughout her vast and, as a rule, sterile territories. It was hoped that railways would remedy these deficiencies, and they have hitherto always been regarded as the means by which the Muscovite Empire would attain a power and importance unequalled since the days of the Romans. But military despotism has made its influence visible in the matter of railways, as in many other affairs; and the result is, that in spite of strenuous efforts put forth in recent years for their improvement, the lines existing in Russia are still of the most inconvenient and unsatisfactory description. All those in the south and south-west, with the exception of the portion between Odessa and Razdelnaia, a distance of about forty miles, are only single lines, and have stations at great distances from each other. Thus the number of trains that can travel on them is necessarily most limited. Ten miles is the least distance between stations on the line from Khar-kow to Nikolaieff, eleven on the line from Kieff to Best and from Landvarovo-Romuy, twelve on the Loyovo-Sebastopol line, while the maximum distance sometimes attains fourteen miles. The inconvenience of these long distances is self-evident, more especially as there is but a small supply of rolling-stock; and it is calculated that it would be quite impossible to despatch more than ten trains per day, and this number only if all went well and worked without mistake or miscarriage. The general manner, moreover, in which the lines are laid out is most unfortunate; they frequently avoid large towns, as being difficult to protect, and pass through forests and steppes, which contain often neither water, food, nor shelter. The celebrated line from Moscow to St. Petersburg, and the line to the Crimea, may be cited as examples of this curious arrangement.

In addition, moreover, to mistaken designs in

the first instance, the railways themselves are badly laid down, and the curves are very sharp, so as to preclude the possibility of very long trains or a rapid rate of speed. Also, the entire system is now only partially developed; for instance, the whole region between the town of Kieff, Brest-Setowski, Minsk, and Kowoloff, a tract larger than Belgium and Holland combined, has not a single line through it. There is also another serious objection—the absence of a proper supply of water, which is indispensable for the supply of the locomotives and the use of passengers, whether human beings or animals. Aqueducts and reservoirs have been constructed, but these require to be kept perpetually full, and their failure at any point might cause an enormous amount of obstruction and delay. The stations, moreover, are of the most meagre description, and there are no sheds, accommodations, or shelter for troops, such as are required in the long journeys to be made through Russia in the event of a concentration on the southern frontier.

In concluding our next chapter on the Turkish Forces, we shall give a table showing the relative strength and efficiency of the navies of Russia and Turkey respectively. In the present chapter it is only necessary to enumerate the chief features of the effective Russian war fleet. At the head of that fleet stands the *Peter the Great*, which in its general characteristics resembles our own *Devastation* and *Dreadnought* types of ship, being a large two-turreted twin-screw mastless ship, with very thick armour, very heavy guns, and a high speed. This powerful ship is 330 feet long, sixty-four feet broad at the battery, and has a displacement of nearly 10,000 tons. She has also been supplied with engines and boilers intended to produce no less than 10,000 indicated horsepower, and to give to the vast ship a speed of fifteen knots. Her armour is fifteen inches thick, and each of her four guns weighs forty tons.

M. Dislere, in his book on *La Guerre d'Escadre*, says:—"At the epoch when the British Admiralty was led to construct ironclad ships with central batteries, and without masts or sails, carrying in turrets guns of the greatest calibre, the Russian marine authorities arrived at the same conclusion, and almost on the same day the *Devastation* was commenced at Portsmouth and the *Peter the Great* at St. Petersburg. Larger than the English ship, with a displacement a little greater, thanks also to a reduction in the coal supply, and conse-

quently in her steaming distance, the *Peter the Great* was able to receive armour plating of excessive thickness (500 millimètres—or nearly 20 inches) at the water-line, with a proportional increase in the other parts of her armour-plating. The draught of water, in view of the exigencies of navigation in the Baltic, was reduced to twenty-three feet, from which followed the necessity of increasing considerably the length of the ship, and of augmenting the power of its machinery. . . . To resume, the *Peter the Great* represents, for the time at which she was commenced, the maximum useful effect to be derived from a displacement of about 10,000 tons." However this may be, we clearly see in this ship an embodiment, at a very early period of the development of these large European monitors, of a well-studied effort to keep pace in Russia with the very latest progress made in England; and, in point of fact, a careful study of her design proves that, if the *Peter the Great* has any very considerable defects, they must be defects of workmanship rather than of principle or of plan.

In reviewing the remaining vessels of the Russian navy we shall find it impossible to follow both the order of size and the order of efficiency; for some of the large early ironclads are doubtless much inferior to some of the smaller but more recent vessels. It will perhaps be best, on the whole, to consider them approximately in the order of size; and we may therefore mention next the *Sevastopol* and the *Petropaulovski*, two wood-built frigates, of sea-going type, of 6200 tons displacement, and 300 feet in length. These ships, like our own early vessels, are plated with only $4\frac{1}{2}$ -inch armour, and carry armaments of $9\frac{1}{2}$ -ton guns. Of these there are eighteen in the *Sevastopol* and twenty in the other ship. Both ships are built as rams, the first named having a speed of fourteen knots, and the latter of twelve knots. The indicated horse-power is about 3000 horses in each case, but the slower ship is fifty-six feet in breadth and the faster only fifty feet ten inches. The *Prince Pojarsky* is an iron ship with a central battery, and she also is a ram. She is a smaller ship than the two former, being only 280 feet long, 49 feet broad, and has a displacement tonnage of 4500. Like them, she has but $4\frac{1}{2}$ -inch armour with 18-inch teak backing, and carries an armament

of ten guns of equal size with theirs. Her speed is eleven knots.

Next in order comes the *Minin*, a ship designed originally as a turret ship of the *Monarch* type, but smaller, being 289 feet in length, 49 feet in breadth, and of 5800 tons displacement. She was found to have been designed unsatisfactorily in some respects, and was afterwards converted into a broadside cruising ship, with 7-inch armour belt, and an upper-deck battery of six $12\frac{1}{2}$ -ton guns. Very similar in type, but built from original designs chiefly by Admiral Popoff (who conducted the conversion of *Minin*), are the *General Admiral* and *Duke of Edinburgh*, two iron-built ships, 285 feet long, 48 feet broad, and of 4500 tons displacement. Their armour is 6 inches thick, and they each carry four $12\frac{1}{2}$ -ton and two 7-ton guns *en barbette*. All three ships have engines of 6300 indicated horse power, and will steam at a speed of about thirteen knots. They are all intended to keep the sea, and to proceed to foreign stations; and they therefore carry not only a large coal supply, but also a large spread of canvas. Neither the *General Admiral*, the *Duke of Edinburgh*, nor the *Minin* were quite complete when war was declared.

We next come to four iron-built turret ships, which are all nearly alike in size, and which, when designed, were intended as a powerful squadron of cruising ships. They are known as the "Four Admirals," being named after four distinguished officers of that rank; and were modelled on the general type of low free-board rigged turret vessels, so much recommended a few years ago by the friends of the late Captain Cowper Coles. They were, in fact, ships of the *Captain* class, but of less size; and when that ill-fated vessel capsized, confidence was lost in these four vessels, in so far as their cruising capabilities were concerned. The result was that the intention to rig them as cruising ships was abandoned; but there is no good reason why, with an additional coal supply, they should not form part of a fighting squadron. They are all 260 feet long, $43\frac{1}{2}$ feet broad, and of about 3700 tons displacement; but they differ somewhat in armour and armament, as follows:—

	Thickness of Armour.	Armament.	No. of Turrets.
<i>Admiral Lazareff</i> ...	$5\frac{1}{2}$ -6 in.	6 of $15\frac{1}{2}$ tons,	3
<i>Admiral Greig</i>	$5\frac{1}{2}$ -6 in.	3 of 27 tons,	3
<i>Admiral Chichagoff</i> . .	6-in.	2 of 27 tons,	2
<i>Admiral Spiridoff</i> ...	6-in.	2 of 27 tons,	2

They are all furnished with engines of 400 nominal and 2000 indicated horse power, and each has twin screw-propellers. They cannot be considered fast vessels, as none of them exceeds eleven knots in speed.

Passing by for the moment the two circular ships, which we shall consider hereafter, we may next mention the three floating batteries—*Pervenetz*, *Kreml*, and *Netro-Menya*. These are mastless vessels of about 3300 tons displacement. Each is 230 feet long with 53 feet of beam; they are protected with $4\frac{1}{2}$ -inch armour, excepting the *Kreml*, which has some plates of 6-inch iron upon her sides. Their armaments consist chiefly in each case of $9\frac{1}{2}$ -ton guns, of which the *Pervenetz* carries fourteen, the *Netro-Menya* sixteen, and the *Kreml* twelve—the last-named ship having besides five guns of five tons each. The *Kreml's* greatest speed is nine knots, the *Pervenetz* being a little faster, and the other ship a little slower.

The Russian navy in the Baltic also comprises no less than thirteen turret ships of the American monitor type, of comparatively light draught—the draught of water of several of them being only $10\frac{1}{2}$ feet, and none exceeding 12 feet. Of these vessels three are two-turreted, and the remainder single-turreted monitors. The guns of all of them are $15\frac{1}{2}$ tons each in weight. The *Charodeyka* and the *Rusatka* each carry four guns, two in each of two turrets; the *Smertch* also has two turrets, but carries only one gun in each; and all the remaining ten vessels carry each two guns in a single turret. The speed of the three vessels first named is from eight and a half to nine knots; that of the other ten is from seven to eight knots. The armour in no case exceeds 5-inch, except in the turrets, where it is in most of them made up to 11-inch in thickness. The displacement tonnage of the *Charodeyka* and *Rusatka* is nearly 2000 tons in each case; that of the others about 1500 tons each.

The only other ironclads of Russia are the circular ships *Novgorod* and *Admiral Popoff*. They were intended to perform in the south of Russia the simple and specific duty of defending the mouths of the Dnieper and the coasts of the Sea of Azof, assisting, no doubt, in the latter case the fixed fortifications of Kertch. The *Novgorod*, the first built, is 101 feet in diameter and has 13 feet 2 inches draught of water. She is protected with 11-inch armour, and armed with two guns of

27 tons each, in a fixed circular turret at the centre of the ship. She is propelled by engines of 480 nominal and 2700 indicated horse power, by means of six screw-propellers, and steams seven knots. The second ship, named by the command of his Majesty the Emperor the *Admiral Popoff*, after her designer, is 121 feet in diameter, draws 14 feet of water, is protected with 18-inch of armour, and armed with two guns of 40 tons each, in a fixed turret situated as in the other ship. She is propelled by engines of 640 nominal and about 3500 indicated horse power, by means of four screw-propellers, and steams at nine knots. With regard to the armour of these vessels, respecting which there has been some controversy, it should be observed that behind the armour plates is an iron backing of channel rail of great strength, which so much exceeds in weight the ordinary amount of iron edge-plates, that it would be much more misleading to omit this from the weight of armour than to include it in it; and for this reason we have given the above thicknesses of plating, which are equivalent to the actual plating, increased by an amount due to the inner edge or channel armour, so to speak. If Russia had built a dozen of these vessels, she would have been well able to hold the Black Sea easily against the Turkish fleet. Having but two such vessels in the Black Sea, and not another ironclad of any kind there, she was unable to take the offensive in any naval operations there with vessels; but to make up for her deficiencies with respect to ships she had recourse to torpedoes, and they played an important part early in the war. As they are sure to command much public attention in the wars of the future, it may not be out of place here to glance briefly at their history and nature.

The torpedo, as a machine charged with explosive compounds, for the purpose of blowing up the ships of an enemy, takes its name from the fish endowed with the power of benumbing its victims by electric shocks. Of late years, by force of circumstances, it has emerged from comparative obscurity into considerable prominence, and from a rude and unskilful weapon it has been developed into a highly scientific and important adjunct of naval warfare and coast defence. All the requirements of modern science have been called into requisition to render it as sensitive and deadly as possible in its operation, and the skill of several of our military and naval officers has been

successfully exerted in bringing its powers under control, and rendering it as safe to friends as it is formidable to foes.

According to a work by Captain Barnes, of the United States navy, on "Submarine Warfare," the first man who conceived, or at all events who attempted to put into practice, the idea of attacking a ship by applying to its submerged parts a magazine of powder "which, when exploded by devices contrived for the purpose, should disable or destroy her," was a native of Connecticut, named Bushnell, who was born at Saybrook in 1742. Being a man of inventive genius, he not only designed but actually constructed a boat which could be made to sink at pleasure to any depth, and travel in any direction below the surface of the water. His first experiment was a failure; but nothing daunted, Bushnell continued to devote both his time and his means to the subject of submarine warfare; and on the 15th of August, 1777, an attempt was made by the Americans against the English man-of-war *Cerberus*, to bring a torpedo against the side of the vessel by a line, which was to be exploded by clockwork set in motion by the contact. The line, however, fouled a boat lying astern of the larger vessel; the torpedo was hauled on board by the men in the vessel, and exploded accidentally while they were curiously examining the strange contrivance which had come into their possession. Bushnell then abandoned the attempt to put his ideas into practice, being discouraged by the unfortunate issue of all his projects. Fulton, another American, seems to be the next who gave attention to the subject, and in 1801 succeeded in destroying a small vessel, the *Nautilus*, by placing under her a torpedo containing twenty pounds of powder.

Lacking means and encouragement on the other side of the Atlantic, Fulton repaired to England, where, under the patronage of Mr. Pitt, he prosecuted and developed his original plan for destroying vessels by bringing torpedoes, floated down by the tide, into contact with their bottoms, and by this means, on October 15, 1805, the *Dorothea* was blown up. The success attending the experiments made by Fulton alarmed the English naval authorities, Lord St. Vincent saying Pitt was the greatest fool that ever existed to encourage a mode of warfare "which they who commanded the seas did not want, and which, if successful, would deprive them of it:" and Fulton returned to his own

land, where, after some further attempts in using the torpedo, he reluctantly but finally abandoned his enterprise.

The early history of torpedoes may be said to have closed with Fulton's retirement, though the United States Government appointed a committee with directions to investigate the new discoveries; and a long series of trials ensued in order to fully test the practical value of the proposed plans. Nothing was reported, however, of greater value than the information already obtained by Bushnell and Fulton.

Scarcely anything more was heard of this feature in naval warfare from the time of Fulton till 1853-54, when, to protect themselves from the fleet of Sir Charles Napier, the Russians laid down in the Baltic a number of "infernal machines." Their mysterious and exaggerated powers of destruction had the moral effect of causing very great uneasiness amongst our fleet, though very little damage was done by them. Inventors and discoverers were extremely active about this time, and proposals of many a diabolical instrument were made to the English Admiralty, none of which appear to have received more than passing attention.

In 1862 the Russian general, Baron von Tischenhausen, was commissioned, after submitting his plans to the Admiral-general Grand-duke Constantine, to make some experiments at Cronstadt. A special commission was appointed to investigate the effect of the Baron's submarine mines against hostile vessels, and one of the conclusions arrived at was, that "it is decidedly advantageous to introduce such vessels into the navy as a new and powerful means of defence and attack."

The American Civil War, 1861-1865, was the next occasion when torpedoes took a prominent part in actual warfare, and we find that no fewer than seven ironclads and eleven wooden ships of war were totally destroyed by submerged torpedoes while actively engaged against the enemy's ports; in addition to which several other vessels, both ironclad and wooden, were temporarily disabled, while two ironclads were sunk and many more were damaged by torpedoes used offensively.

In 1866 the Austrians, in their brief war with Italy, used torpedoes, gun-cotton being the combustible material, fired by an electric current.

The importance of the torpedo as a new and subtle power in warfare was recognised by the

English Government some ten years ago, when a Torpedo School was established at Portsmouth for the purpose of training officers in the navy in both laying down torpedo mines, discharging torpedoes from vessels, firing them from the shore, and ascertaining the best methods for neutralizing, or rendering their destructive power inoperative. The importance of such training will be apparent if we notice the nature and operations of this double-edged weapon, for unless it is handled with the greatest care, accuracy, and precision, it is likely to prove equally disastrous to friend as foe.

The principal instruments which are now prominently before the world are five—Outrigger torpedoes, Captain Harvey's torpedo, Electric torpedoes, Captain Ericsson's torpedo, and the Whitehead, or fish, torpedo, and we will briefly describe them in the order in which they are mentioned.

Outrigger Torpedoes.—A small swift steamer has an outrigger or pole projecting twenty or twenty-five feet from one side; a torpedo case is fastened to the outer end of the pole, and a concussion fuse is fitted to it, or an electric wire extends along the pole. When the steamer has cautiously and silently brought the torpedo (which may be either a little above or a little below the water), under the bottom of an enemy's ship, the composition within it is fired by the fuse or current, and the explosion is left to do its destructive work. It is supposed, and intended, that the distance of twenty or twenty-five feet between the steamer and the torpedo will keep the former free from peril. The first successful torpedo operations which we shall have occasion to describe as having taken place during the present war, were those performed by the Russians with outrigger torpedoes on the Danube.

The Harvey Torpedo.—A much more simple, trustworthy, and effective torpedo for attack is that of Captain Harvey, R.N. This has been brought to a high state of perfection, as shown in numerous experiments carried out since 1872, and it has been adopted in the British naval service. This torpedo consists of a stout wooden casing, strengthened on the outside with iron straps, and containing a metal shell, which holds the powder charge. In plan it is a rhomboid, the ends being angled to give the torpedo, when towed, a divergence of about 45° from the vessel towing it.

The weapon is made in various sizes, the largest measuring 4 feet 6 inches in length, by 2 feet in depth, and 6 inches in width. The charge for this size is 76 lbs. gunpowder, or 100 lbs. of dynamite or lithofracteur. The torpedo is fired by being brought into hugging contact with an enemy's ship, when one or other of two projecting levers acts upon an exploding bolt, causing the ignition of the charge. The exploding apparatus consists of a tube containing a chemical agent and a bulb holding another; and their nature is such that when, by means of the exploding bolt, they are caused to combine, violent combustion ensues, which explodes the charge. The highly dangerous character of this torpedo demands that every precaution should be adopted to insure the safety of the operators. The inventor therefore devised a safety key, which is inserted through the stem of the firing bolt, and attached to a line coiled on board. When the weapon has been floated out clear of the operating vessel, the key can be withdrawn and hauled on board.

A small quick-speed vessel is used in operating the Harvey torpedo, and from it the weapon is launched, and the tow line paid out from a drum on board. The torpedo on being set afloat at once diverges at an angle of 45° from the ship, and is thus readily towed against an enemy's vessel. Its form and an arrangement of slings in connection with it enable the operator to cause the shell to diverge alongside the enemy's ship in meeting, passing, or crossing, whichever method of attack is adopted. Numerous experiments were made at Yarmouth upon vessels passing at from nine to ten knots; in every case with perfect success. The tow line was skilfully dipped under the vessels, and the torpedo brought into hugging contact with their bottoms amidships. A moderately rough sea was chosen, which afforded an opportunity for showing that the torpedo could be worked in bad weather.

A far more severe and searching trial of Captain Harvey's torpedo was made off Portsmouth in 1874, when the object of the experiments was to strike the ironclad *Monarch*, while the latter did her best to avoid being struck. The manœuvres of the *Monarch* were very skilfully executed, but it appeared impossible to elude the lively little craft with the torpedoes in tow. In more than a dozen trials every torpedo was planted against the ship, at depths varying from 1 foot to 16 feet

below the water line. The vessel was afterwards made, as was considered, almost impregnable against any attack by a strong crinoline framework of boom spars built up round, and supplemented by the ship's boats rowing guard round her within hailing distance. Notwithstanding these important advantages, and the knowledge, too, that at a certain time of the night a torpedo attack would be made, the torpedo burst through the *Monarch's* cordon of guard boats, got over the difficulty of the projecting crinoline spar defence, and struck the frigate with their dummy torpedoes. These results proved that any vessel lying at anchor at night must be fatally deficient in her defensive powers, while possessing no means of searching with lightning quickness and distinctness the surface of the water to a considerable distance around the ship. To supply this want effectually, Mr. W. Wilde, of Manchester, invented his electromagnetic induction machine, by which a beam of strong electric light may be thrown out sufficient to reveal the presence of the smallest boat within 2000 yards on a dark night. Experiments were made at Spithead with this light in 1874; and the torpedo boats being discovered at a distance of over a mile, their attack was considered to have failed.

The further experiments of 1875, however, tended to show that the Harvey system of locomotive torpedo warfare does not altogether depend upon stealthy tactics. Boats for towing torpedoes may be built of a very small size, and with capacity for great swiftness. They have then every opportunity of eluding a larger vessel, even though seen; while skilful seamanship would often enable them to plant the deadly machines against the enemy with terrible certainty, unless the latter should be able, by firing at it or otherwise, to destroy the torpedo.

Electric Torpedoes.—It will have been observed that Harvey's and some other torpedoes are self-explosive on touching an enemy's ship. Submerged torpedoes may be anchored at a certain depth below the water and thus exploded; but the same kind, not self-explosive, may be ignited from the shore. The torpedo is moored as in the former case, and an electric wire extends from it to a battery on shore. When an enemy's ship is seen to be passing just over the torpedo, a shock is sent from the shore, and the demon of mischief explodes. A self-exploding torpedo has the disad-

vantage of destroying one's own ships occasionally, by a mishap; while the difficulty with the others is that of exploding them just at the desired instant. That this may, however, be overcome with care was abundantly shown during the American Civil War, when the electric torpedo was in its infancy. The chief losses of the Federal fleet were, indeed, due to this most potent means of destruction. One remarkable occasion was when the important defence of the water approach to Richmond was intrusted to a single electric torpedo, sunk in the channel way of the James River. The mine was under the control of an officer, who, stationed on one of the river banks, watched from the sand-pit where he lay concealed the approach of the enemy. A single stake planted on the opposite bank served as a line of sight, to indicate the exact moment when an approaching vessel would be within the area of destruction. With the patience of a spider watching its victims, for thirteen months did this officer watch the opportunity to explode the mine with effect. At length the Federal fleet, under the command of Commodore Lee, entered the James River, the Commodore's vessel being third in the advancing rank. The foremost vessel, carrying seven guns, and manned by a picked crew of 127 men, was allowed to pass over the mine in safety, it being an arrangement held in reserve for the Commodore's ship: but an order having been passed from the deck of the next ship, audible from the shore, to return and drag for torpedo wires, the officer determined to explode his mine as she descended the stream. By the explosion the hull of the vessel was visibly lifted out of the water, her boilers exploded, the smoke-stacks were carried away, and the crew projected into the air with great velocity. Out of the crew of 127 men only three remained alive, the vessel itself being blown to atoms. The awfully sudden destruction of this ship saved Richmond for the time. Commodore Lee retired, sinking several of his ships to block up the channel.

Electric torpedoes are now so improved that after they are submerged the operators on shore retain the power of the submarine and land circuits without fear of explosion, and are even able to speak and telegraph information through the charge without risk. Every torpedo consists, in its complete form, of three parts—the ignitor, the charge, and the torpedo case or tank, together with the neces-

sary arrangements for electric connections, and conductors for giving the operator the entire control of the mine. The importance of accuracy and precision of ignition at sea will be easily understood by calculating the length of time the enemy remains in the line of vision. A vessel steaming at the rate of nine miles an hour will move through the water at the rate of thirteen feet per second; and supposing her to be 300 feet in length, she will remain in a position to receive the effects of a blow only twenty-three seconds.

The Ericsson Torpedo.—Rather more recently, Captain Ericsson's torpedo attracted the attention of the American Government. It had one feature of a remarkable character, a hempen cable utilized as a tube or pipe by making the centre hollow. The torpedo, a cylinder of light galvanized iron, was about 10 feet long by 19 inches in diameter, and was charged with nearly 400 lbs. of nitro-glycerine. It was towed by a steamer with a tubular cable or rope half a mile long. When brought into a desired position the torpedo was propelled swiftly in any direction by compressed air driven through the tubular rope. The torpedo could be wound in so as to be any less distance than half a mile from the steamer.

The Whitehead, or Fish Torpedo, appears to be a very elaborate contrivance. As early as 1862 a model of a fish torpedo was submitted to the Admiralty, but on trial no satisfactory results could be obtained with it. The first effective machinery of the kind was manufactured by Messrs. Whitehead & Co., at Fiume in Austria, in 1867, and is acknowledged to still remain superior to all competitors, the details of its construction having naturally been modified and improved from time to time. These details are at present kept carefully concealed, but the torpedo is described as being a cigar-shaped vessel, a sort of submarine rocket, varying from 14 to 19 feet in length, and from 14 to 16 inches in diameter. It is made of specially prepared steel, and is divided into three compartments. The head contains the gun-cotton which forms its charge, and the fuze for exploding it on coming into contact with a vessel. The central part contains the engines by which it is propelled, and which are worked by compressed air, a sufficient supply of which for driving the torpedo the required distance is stored in the third or tail department. The propeller is a small three-bladed screw, and it is stated that a fish torpedo of

the largest size can travel for a distance of 220 yards at a speed of twenty-four knots, or for 1000 yards at a slower rate. By means of a horizontal balance rudder the torpedo can be made to sink and to remain during its run at any required distance below the surface of the water, so that it may be discharged either from the deck of a ship or from a tube or ejector opening into the sea below the water-line. Finally, it is stated that such is the skill already acquired in the use of the Whitehead torpedo, that it would be almost impossible to miss an ironclad at the distance of 1000 yards, even when the ship from which it is fired is moving at the rate of from ten to twelve knots an hour. It is to be presumed, however, that such accurate practice could only be made when the vessel fired at is stationary, and when every attendant circumstance is in favour of the torpedo—a conjuncture which would probably rarely happen on actual service. A missile of great cost this must be, whether it hits the enemy or not; seeing that the whole of it is hurled to fragments if it explodes at all, and costing as it does from £400 to £500.

That a naval war in the future will be a very different matter to what it has been in the past will be clear to the least observant. It seems a ridiculous thing to have to place a cordon of iron network round an ironclad for its protection, thereby reducing the speed of its movements, or attaching to each man-of-war a couple or more satellites to protect the big craft from the subtle approach of its submerged enemy; if, indeed, any look-out would be sufficiently agile to detect the approach, say, of a Whitehead torpedo spinning towards the all but doomed ship at from seventeen to twenty knots an hour.

By the use of these new weapons in naval warfare it seems that the weaker Powers upon the seas may be placed upon a level of strength approaching, if not equal to, the strongest. The power of blockade is the chief weapon of a great navy; but the weaker naval Powers, assisted by these attendant mosquitoes of the seas, would be able to do far more than has hitherto been possible, in the way both of carrying on its operations, and of now and then inflicting a blow on the war-marine of its foe. To keep war *matériel* out of the enemy's ports, to cripple his trade, to raise enormously the price of provisions, to seal up his navy in its own ports, would all become impossible, if block-

ades once became impossible. Of course, only a considerable naval war can show how the new instruments will really work; but even if the end of it were to banish huge ironclads from the navies of the world as comparatively useless, it might still be said that money and pluck would tell as much as before, since for every naval leviathan dispensed with, a rich and enterprising Power might produce 100 of these naval hornets, whose buzz and whose sting might be heard and felt on every ocean and on every shore.

Very early after the commencement of the war Russia was joined by the important Turkish tributary state of Roumania, and as we have dealt with that subject in a previous chapter, it will here only be necessary to allude to the physical peculiarities of the kingdom, so far as they affect the military and political situation. On the whole, the country is tolerably favourable both for the passage and the maintenance of an army on the march from Bessarabia to the Danube. The railways are of the same gauge as those in Turkey, namely, four feet eight and a half inches. Russia, with a regard to strategic considerations, made a break of gauge on all her frontiers, so that in the event of invasion, by simply removing the rolling-stock, she might render her lines of rail useless to an invader. The gauge of the Russian railways is five feet. Moldavia possesses some good and well-planned roads, in most cases paved and admirable lines of communication; the bye-roads are as a rule unmetalled, but in hard weather are available for the use of waggons and artillery. Wallachia, although it possesses few if any metalled roads, is also fairly provided with means of communication.

As regards the means of supporting an army, there are few countries that contain such resources as Roumania. The soil is most fertile, the climate most favourable, and the population very industrious. There is a large number of cattle and sheep; pigs are also bred in large numbers. The country is well provided with country carts and vehicles; there is also an abundance of horses and draught animals.

Previously to 1831 the armed forces of Wallachia and Moldavia, which, united into one State in 1861, form the present Principality of Roumania, consisted only of small detachments of cavalry and infantry, which formed rather a body-guard for the ruling Hospodars than a national army. The frontiers of the Principalities were guarded by the

"Graniceri," or armed inhabitants of the border districts, while internal order was preserved by bodies of "Dorobanzi," or armed inhabitants performing police duties. In 1831—after Turkish influence in the provinces had been reduced materially by the terms of the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829—a thorough reorganization of the forces of the two Principalities was for the first time undertaken. The organization of the irregular forces was not altered. They continued to consist of Dorobanzi and Graniceri, the total strength of the two being fixed at 14,000, of whom 4737 were mounted Dorobanzi. On its new footing, the Roumanian army, in 1859, consisted of about 34,000 men and 7087 horses. On the 20th of April, 1866, Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was elected Prince of Roumania, in succession to Prince Couza, who had been forced to abdicate in February, and the new ruler again thought it necessary to yet further develop the military resources of his country. Accordingly, a new law of organization was laid before and voted by the Chambers in 1868, which materially increased the effective strength and completely changed the character of the army; and this law, modified by the statute of the 27th of March, 1872, and by the still more recent law of the 20th of March, 1876, forms the basis of the actual organization of the military forces of Roumania. The object of all these alterations of the previously existing system, has been to convert what was formerly simply a garrison army into a field force capable of being employed in offensive operations beyond the frontier. To this end everything was reorganized on a German model. The French element, which had been imported into the army by Prince Couza, was repressed; and the French officers who had co-operated in its organization, and who held commissions in it, shortly afterwards prayed for their recall to Paris—a request which was readily granted. In their place Prussian officers were brought in; and a number of native Roumanians were sent to Berlin to study Prussian institutions. As at present constituted, the military force of Roumania is divided into a standing army and reserve, a territorial army and reserve, a militia, and a national guard. The standing army is recruited by conscription, but voluntary enlistments and re-engagements are allowed. A man becomes liable to service on completing his twenty-first year; and, if drawn

in the conscription, serves for four years with the colours, and four in the reserve of the standing army. The territorial army is also maintained by compulsory service, those drawing the highest numbers in the annual conscription being incorporated in it. The total period of service in this latter force is the same as in the standing army; but of the eight years six are spent in active service and two in reserve. The militia comprises two classes. The first consists of all men between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-nine who are not serving in either the standing or territorial army; while the second class comprises all men from twenty-nine to thirty-seven years of age, whether they have served the previous eight years in the standing or territorial army, or in the first class of the militia. Each class is again divided into three levies. In the first are placed all single men, and widowers without children; in the second, all married men without children; in the third, all men with children. Finally, the national guard comprises all men from thirty-seven to forty-six years of age. Altogether, Roumania should, in time of war, according to the paper establishment of her armed forces, be able to place in the field 100,000 infantry, 18,000 cavalry, and 49 batteries, and of these 70,000 men of all arms should be available for active operations. It is to be observed, however, that the army is rather deficient in transport, and in those administrative services upon the proper working of which the efficiency of an army in modern warfare largely depends.

The field supply departments of the Roumanian army are—the powder-mills at Tarshorn, near Ploiesti, the cartridge and shell-filling and packing works at Bucharest, and the arsenal, also situated at the capital. The Roumanians can manufacture everything they require for their troops, with the exception of cannon and rifles. The ambulance, hospital, and Red Cross organizations are very complete, and there is an excellent medical school at Bucharest.

The infantry are armed with needle guns, and the riflemen with rifled breechloaders. The artillery consists, when on a war footing, of 2500 men, 2200 horses, and 124 guns, all rifled breechloaders. The engineer corps consists of 1100 men in time of peace, and 2000 in time of war.

There are at Bucharest and Jassy military schools for training the officers of the artillery,

engineers, and general staff. As a rule, however, the education of Roumanian officers is very superficial; those who possess a thorough knowledge of the military art have usually been trained at Berlin.

Of the other *possible* Russian allies—or States which might interfere more or less with the effective force that Turkey might use against her greater antagonist—there were Servia, Montenegro, and Greece. Of these the first is decidedly the most formidable, notwithstanding the drain upon Servian forces by the war with Turkey in 1876. Judging by the complete defeat they then suffered, it might be supposed that Servian assistance would not be worth much to Russia; and such was the general opinion until some time after Russia had declared war, when it gradually became known that the ranks had been refilled, and the deficiencies of armament had been suddenly and unaccountably supplied. The under estimate of the military strength can be only accounted for by the fact, that calculations had been based only on the regular army, and had left out of account the powerful Servian militia. The former was limited by treaty with the Porte to 8000 men; the latter was not mentioned at all, because it was never thought of. It had, however, been most carefully thought of subsequently, and the system matured to very near perfection. Servian regular troops consist of a small *corps d'armée* of 10,000 infantry, 800 cavalry, and 1400 artillery, with seventy guns; while the first reserve of the militia amounts in round numbers to about 90,000 men, the second to about 20,000, and the third reserve to about 12,000 men: the last never go into the field. Without these, however, Prince Milan could probably on a desperate emergency put into the field 120,000 men.

We next come to Montenegro. This province, although nominally an integral portion of the Ottoman Empire, has never really formed part of it, and has been a source of weakness rather than of strength. The area of the country only covers 1557 square miles, and the population only numbers about 130,000 Serbs, who are principally Greek Christians. In character they are warlike and turbulent; and as their country is mountainous and suited to guerilla warfare, they have from time to time given the Porte much trouble. In a Russo-Turkish war they were certain to be allied with the enemy, and as we shall see further on,

they occupied a large number of Turkish troops in the early part of the present war. There is no standing army in Montenegro, but the fighting men enrolled number about 25,000. These are of the most excellent quality, but are poorly armed, which is not surprising, considering that the revenue of the country is under £12,000 a year. Still, so admirable are their fighting qualities, and so great their aversion to the Turk, that if supplied with arms, money, and officers by Russia, Montenegro might furnish several thousand men, who doubtless would perform excellent service in the case of an invasion of Turkey; and from their geographical position, by uniting with the Servians, and advancing on the flank of an Ottoman army, either posted in front or in rear of the Balkans, they would seriously threaten its communications, and cause a formidable diversion.

We come lastly to Greece. This little state, which, it may be said, owes its existence to the classic traditions and sentimental philanthropy of Europe, has a population of about 1,457,894 souls, including the inhabitants of the islands. It has a nominal revenue of £1,217,964, and a rapidly increasing debt of £12,000,000. Financial difficulties have tended to render the Greek army a

force only dangerous in name, whose energies in peace time are fully occupied in keeping down the brigandage which it has been wholly unable entirely to eradicate. All the population are liable to military service between the ages of twenty and forty, and the annual contingent is set down at 2500. According to the official return, the effective force of the Greek army capable of taking the field is as follows:—

Infantry,	24,514
Artillery,	1,577
Cavalry,	575
Engineers,	715
Gendarmes,	2,346
Total,	<hr/> 29,697

In addition to the above there are volunteer corps, about 20,000 strong, and about 80,000 national guards, available in case of invasion. It cannot, however, be said that any part of this force is in the least formidable, and it would be extremely difficult effectively to mobilize it, from the want of stores, arms, and equipments. Nevertheless the diversion it could effect on the frontier of Thessaly would be by no means unimportant, if thereby it only succeeded in neutralizing 20,000 Turkish troops that would probably be required elsewhere.

CHAPTER XVII.

Bearing of Population Statistics on the Turkish Military System—How far Numbers carry Success—Absence of any Census in either Russia or Turkey—Imperfect character of Estimates—Extent of Russian Empire—Its Immensity a Source of Weakness—Comparative area modified—Relative Population Statistics—Delusive character of Area in figures shown—Russian Density of Population compared with that of Great Britain—An Army affected by Thinness of Population—Necessity for strong Home Garrisons—Varied and Conflicting Elements in Turkish Population—That of Russia shown to be more Homogeneous—M. Vladimir Jakschitz's Estimates—Relative numbers of Mahometans and Christians—Exemption of Non-Mahometans from Military Service—Limited Area from which to draw the Sultan's Army—Stations of the several Army Corps—Constitution of Standing Army—Its War and Peace Strength respectively—Reserve and Garrison Artillery—Military Workmen, Gendarmerie, and Zaptiehs—Medical Establishments and College—Reserves and Moustafiz—Auxiliary Forces—Undisciplined character of Irregular Troops—Summary of Total Available Turkish Forces—Inconvenience of System of Conscription—drawing—Arrangements for Purchasing Discharges—An Unexpected Influx to the Treasury—Numbers of Annual Contingent of Recruits—Military College of Artillery and Engineering—Pancaldi Military College—Constantinople Preparatory Cadet Schools—Administration of the Army—Grand Military Council—Councils of the Corps d'Armée—Special Commands in Disaffected Districts—Control, Commissariat, and Pay-master's Departments—Rations of Forage, and Pay of Officers and Men—Turkish Military Titles and British Equivalents—Differences between Facts and Theories as regards the Army—Orderly and obedient character of Turkish Troops—Devotion to their Officers—The Military Clothing System—Career of a Clothing Contract—Curious Fate of Indian Army Saddles—One respect in which Turkish Soldier is not Cheated—Novel Manner of Recruiting an Army—Turkish War Office Records—Fatalism amongst the Officers—Mutual Relations of the several Grades of Officers—Foreign Adventurers in the Turkish Army—Danger of Confounding them with some Foreign Officers of Exceptional Merit—New Turkish Parliament and the Soldier's Pay—Absence of Craftsmen and Artizans in the Ottoman Army—Uniform of Turkish Soldiers—Arms of the Infantry and Artillery—Foreign Turkish Contingents—Egyptian and Tunisian Forces—Relative Strength of Russian and Turkish Navies—Large Ironclad detained in England—Description of its Sister Ships—The *Mesoudiye* and H.M.S. *Sultan* compared—Various other Turkish Vessels of War described—Tabular Comparison of Turkish and Russian Ironclad Fleet.

HAVING given a sketch of the forces at the disposal of Russia, it now remains to see what was the military organization upon which Turkey had to count in meeting her adversary. As in most European countries, very great changes were made in the organization of the Turkish army after the events of 1870–71—the basis being, of course, the system of Germany. And if the reader will follow our summary of the Turkish organization, he will probably come to the conclusion that it is not a bad imitation, in theory, of the German system.

Before describing the Turkish military system there are, however, a few general considerations respecting the populations of Russia and Turkey which it is absolutely necessary to take into consideration, in order to rightly estimate the conditions under which the conflict was waged. Population is undoubtedly one of the most important elements of national strength. The Power that disposes of the greatest number of men is not, indeed, always certain of victory; for if this were so, China would be mistress of the world, and India would not form a portion of the British dominions. Yet superiority of numbers, other things being equal, is unquestionably decisive of success, provided, of course, that the Government

which has the advantage knows how, and is able, to make proper use of it.

There has never been a census taken either in Russia or in Turkey; and such a fact illustrates very strikingly the real barbarism of both countries, and the very imperfect premises on which their Governments have to rely in framing their policy. Both Governments have instituted inquiries on the subject, and both have published estimates; and as the Russian estimate was made after tolerably careful inquiry, with a view to the assessment of a poll-tax, perhaps the Russian numbers approach the nearer to accuracy; but, as a rule, how delusive such estimates necessarily are was seen when the census of 1872 was taken in Bengal. There is certainly no civil service in the world comparable to that of India, and none more likely to be well informed respecting the number of people subject to its administration; yet upon trial it was found that Bengal contained a population about two-fifths larger than had been supposed. At the very best, therefore, the figures we may quote, although derived from the best possible authorities, can be regarded only as approximations to the truth. With this preliminary warning, those figures may be profitably considered.

The Russian Empire, in its widest extent, is

stated to cover over 8,400,000 square miles, or, roughly speaking, one-seventh of the whole land surface of the globe. The Turkish Empire, on the contrary, excluding Roumania, Servia, and Montenegro, comprises about 1,750,000 square miles. Two of these provinces were early in the war actually in arms against their Suzerain, while the third was hardly restrained from taking the field. Russia, therefore, is nearly five times greater in extent than the whole of the dominions over which the Sultan claims any kind of sovereignty. But of course, Egypt, Tunis, and Tripoli are only nominally parts of Turkey, and if we deduct these we get about 800,000 square miles as the real area of the Ottoman Empire, or less than a ninth of the territories subject to the Czar. To bring home to our readers the real significance of these figures we may say, that Turkey is to Russia what Wales is to England and the greater part of Scotland. The very immensity of Russia, however, is one of the chief sources of its weakness. A vast extent of its surface is absolutely irreclaimable desert; a still greater part is little better than desert, being icebound during two-thirds of the year, and barren and inhospitable even during the brief summer; and another portion, though naturally fertile, is waste and desolate through the absence of trees, and the consequent scarcity of water. Vast territories, again, have been conquered but quite recently from Central Asian Khans and from the Chinese, and are held only by the strong hand. Another region, longer subdued, is not much better assimilated, as the rising in the Caucasus testified. Yet a third portion, the most highly civilized in the whole Empire, and historically the most interesting—the former kingdom of Poland—is a source of weakness rather than strength. When we have made all these abatements we shall find that the area which gives strength to the Empire does not much, if at all, exceed two and a quarter millions of square miles, or less than three times the extent of the *bonâ fide* Turkish Empire.

Passing from the area to the population, we find that according to the most generally accepted estimates Russia has nearly 86,000,000 inhabitants, and Turkey 28,200,000, or, excluding Egypt, Tunis, and Tripoli, only 24,400,000. Stated in this absolute form, it would seem that Russia has between three and four subjects for every one in

Turkey; but out of the eighty-six Russian millions about 7,000,000 are found in Asiatic Russia, the area of which is over 6,000,000 square miles. This fact shows the delusive character of the figures relating to area. Asiatic Russia comprises three-fourths of the whole Empire, yet it is supposed to contain little more than 7,000,000 of people, or barely more than one individual to every square mile. If the same density obtained in our own metropolitan area, instead of the most populous city the world has ever seen, London would contain about 130 men, women, and children, and in the whole island of Great Britain we should not have 100,000 souls. Even in European Russia there are only 34 people to the square mile, a rate which would give for England, Scotland, and Wales not quite 3,000,000—a much smaller population than is contained in London alone. The population of Russia, then, though immense absolutely, is remarkably small relatively to the area it occupies. The fact is of prime importance from a military point of view. The population, being wretchedly poor, and thinly scattered over a vast surface, cannot support a large proportion of its numbers in idleness. The attempt to do so would certainly break down. Moreover, the immensity of the frontier that has to be protected requires a large proportion of the military forces to be kept at home. The German frontier cannot safely be left exposed; still less can the Austrian; and although the consequences would in any event be less serious, it would yet be imprudent not to be prepared against eventualities on the borders of Sweden, of Persia, of Kashgaria, and of China. Lastly Poland, the Caucasus, and Central Asia need to be garrisoned. When we make allowance for all these demands, and for the poverty of the Empire, it will be clear that the disparity between Russia as an invader, and Turkey on the defensive, is very much less than at first sight appears—regarding only the accepted numbers of the two populations. But here comes in an entirely different class of considerations. If the population of Turkey were homogeneous, and well organized under a strong and enlightened Government, then the compactness and unsurpassed fertility of its territory, the valour of its troops, and its command of the sea, would probably enable it to triumph with ease over its enemy. Turkey, however, as we know, has not a strong Government, and its population is the very reverse of homogeneous.

We have already observed that the so-called statistics of population, as regards both Russia and Turkey, are not trustworthy. They are very much less so when we descend to the details of nationality, race, and creed. It is well known how angrily partisans have disputed as to the relative proportions of Bulgarians, Greeks, and Turks in Bulgaria, as well as with respect to the number of Christians and Mussulmans all over the Ottoman Empire. The dispute is made more confusing because of the interests involved. No one, therefore, who is not willing to be deceived will attach much weight to assertions which are not, and indeed cannot be supported by proof, as to the composition of the population of Turkey. It is stated that the Ottoman Turks do not constitute, after centuries of power, so much as one-third of the population of the Empire to which they have given a name. But whatever the proportion, and whether the Turk be intellectually inferior to the race he governs or not, it is proved by centuries of experience that, in the absence of foreign intervention, he is able to maintain his own authority. On the other hand, there is the pretty well ascertained fact that, reckoning the Russian Empire at 86,000,000, fully 50,000,000, or more than half, are pure Russians. There is no doubt, therefore, that Russia is much more homogeneous than Turkey, its population generally more obedient, more animated by the national spirit, and more ready to make sacrifices for the Empire.

Bearing in mind that, as we have observed, no figures can be given which are wholly deserving of credit, we may now pass to the consideration of the actual estimates of population as a guide to the available military strength of Turkey. Official statements of both area and population were published in 1844 and 1856, and according to these the population of Turkey in Europe numbered 15,500,000; but recent researches, notably those of M. Vladimir Jakschitj, director of the statistical department of Servia, seem to show that this estimate was greatly exaggerated, the population being barely 8,320,000 in Turkey proper. In Turkey in Asia the number, according to the most recent estimate, is about 16,000,000, and in Africa about 3,800,000—making, in round numbers, a total population of 28,000,000.

The Mahometans form the majority in Asia and Africa, but are in a minority in Europe—the population there being about 4,800,000 non-

Mahometans to 3,520,000 Mahometans. From the days of the Janissaries, who were sons of Christian parents kidnapped in early youth, and reared as Mahometans, the Turkish army was up to 1856 entirely recruited by Mahometans; when, the impolicy of such a system becoming daily evident to the Divan, the liability to military service was extended to all subjects of the Empire. This law, however, became an absolutely dead letter, and up to the outbreak of war in 1877 non-Mahometans not only had no share in military service (except in the Cossack Brigade), but were not considered liable to it; their liability being compromised by a military exemption tax, known as the *Bédel*, amounting to about 1s. 2d. per head of the population, and producing altogether about £580,000 per annum. Constantinople was totally exempt both from conscription and from the *Bédel*.

Basing his estimates upon the figures we have given, and upon trustworthy information privately obtained, it was calculated in 1876, by one who ought to be a good authority, Sir H. P. T. Barron, her Majesty's secretary of Legation at Constantinople, that of the 28,000,000 souls constituting the population of Turkey proper, that is, of the provinces under the immediate government of the Sultan, 16,000,000 might be set down as Mahometans. Of these, about 3,000,000 were nomad tribes not amenable to the conscription. Another million was to be deducted for the citizens of Constantinople and of other towns who managed to evade it. This left about 12,000,000 to bear the whole burden of the conscription for army and navy! In the case of war there were, of course, considerable numbers of irregular levies of non-Mahometan soldiers, or, to speak more accurately, of "men with muskets," gathered from the ranks of those who were disaffected towards Russia, or who entered the fray from mere adventure. It is also possible, in case of the country being menaced with great danger, to make military service compulsory upon non-Mahometans, and such a law indeed was made—and partially carried out—after the war began. Such extemporized aids as these, however, go but a small way to reduce the immense disparity between Russia and Turkey as regards their relative resources of fighting men. Subject, of course, to the qualifications we have pointed out, there remains the remarkable fact that while the one possesses a vast Empire of more than 85,000,000 souls, from the

whole of which the army is compulsorily recruited; the other country has a population of 28,000,000, less than half of whom furnish the army; those who remain being of alien creed and race, and ready to afford a welcome to the enemy who would deliver them from what they regard as the oppression of the existing sovereign power! It is obvious that, in estimating the military strength and capacity of the two principal opposing Powers, the considerations we have mentioned must be taken into account.

As we have already observed, the military system of Turkey is modelled on that of Prussia. The Empire is divided into seven army corps, which have their head-quarters at the following places:—

1st Corps (Guards),	Constantinople.
2nd Corps (Danube),	S umla.
3rd Corps (Roumelia),	Monastir.
4th Corps (Anatolia),	Erzeroum.
5th Corps (Syria),	Damascus.
6th Corps (Iraq),	Bagdad.
7th Corps (Arabia),	Yemen.

Each corps district furnishes a Nizam or active army, in which all those liable to service are supposed to spend four years for the infantry, and five years for the cavalry and artillery. They then pass to the Ihtiât, or first reserve, for two years in the case of infantry, and one year in the case of the cavalry and artillery soldier. Then the men are transferred to the Redif, or second reserve, for six years, three years in each class. Finally, they go into the Moustafiz, otherwise known as the territorial militia, or *levée en masse*, for eight years. Military service is thus supposed to extend over twenty years, and it was calculated in 1871, when the new system was introduced, that it would be in full working by the year 1878. It was expected that by that year there would be the numbers we shall presently give of efficient fighting men. The numbers were, however, considerably short of the maximum when the war broke out.

Before offering any remarks upon the general characteristics of Turkish military service, we will briefly enumerate the various items of organization which it has been possible to obtain from the Ottoman War Department.

The army corps, according to official returns and the latest reports obtainable, comprise the following troops of the Nizam (standing army) and special regular levies:—

FIRST CORPS (GUARDS, CONSTANTINOPLE).

<i>Infantry:—</i>	
Seven line regiments of three battalions,	21 battalions.
Seven rifle battalions,	7 “
<i>Cavalry:—</i>	
Five line regiments of six squadrons,	30 squadrons.
One Cossack brigade (two regiments of four squadrons),	8 “
<i>Artillery:—</i>	
One line regiment of nine field and three horse batteries,	12 batteries.
One reserve regiment (Ihtiât) of twelve field and one mountain battery,	13 “
<i>Engineers:—</i>	
One sapper company.	
One engineer brigade, of four battalions each, of two companies. Total, eight companies.	
One battalion of artificers.	
Total, exclusive of engineers,	{ 29 battalions. 38 squadrons. 25 batteries.

SECOND CORPS (DANUBE).

<i>Infantry:—</i>	
Six line regiments of three battalions,	18 battalions.
Six rifle battalions,	6 “
One frontier regiment on the Danube,	3 “
<i>Cavalry:—</i>	
Four line regiments of six squadrons,	24 squadrons.
<i>Artillery:—</i>	
One line regiment,	12 batteries.
<i>Engineers:—</i>	
One sapper company.	
Total,	{ 27 battalions. 24 squadrons. 12 batteries.

THIRD CORPS (ROUMELIA).

<i>Infantry:—</i>	
Seven line regiments,	21 battalions.
Seven rifle battalions,	7 “
Bosnian brigade, two regiments,	6 “
Frontier regiment on Greek border,	3 “
Frontier regiment on Bosnian border,	4 “
Frontier battalion (Niksich),	1 “
Austro-Herzegovinian battalion,	1 “
<i>Cavalry:—</i>	
Four line regiments,	24 squadrons.
<i>Artillery:—</i>	
One line regiment,	12 batteries.
Mountain batteries in Herzegovina,	3 “
<i>Engineers:—</i>	
One sapper company.	
Total,	{ 43 battalions. 24 squadrons. 15 batteries.

FOURTH CORPS (ANATOLIA).

<i>Infantry:—</i>	
Five line regiments of three battalions,	15 battalions.
One regiment of one battalion, the others being with the Ihnen division,	1 “
Six rifle battalions,	6 “
<i>Cavalry:—</i>	
Three line regiments of six squadrons,	18 squadrons.
<i>Artillery:—</i>	
One line regiment,	14 batteries.
<i>Engineers:—</i>	
One sapper company.	
Total,	{ 22 battalions. 18 squadrons. 14 batteries.

FIFTH CORPS (SYRIA).

<i>Infantry:—</i>	
Seven line regiments,	21 battalions.
Seven rifle battalions,	7 “
<i>Cavalry:—</i>	
Four line regiments,	24 squadrons.
One dromedary corps (to be established),	6 “
<i>Artillery:—</i>	
One line regiment,	12 batteries.
<i>Engineers:—</i>	
One sapper company.	
Total,	{ 28 battalions. 30 squadrons. 12 batteries.

SIXTH CORPS (BAGDAD).

<i>Infantry:—</i>	
Six line regiments,	18 battalions.
Six rifle battalions,	6 “
<i>Cavalry:—</i>	
Two line regiments,	12 squadrons.
<i>Artillery:—</i>	
One regiment (incomplete),	9 batteries.
Total,	{ 24 battalions. 12 squadrons. 9 batteries.

SEVENTH CORPS (YEMEN).

<i>Infantry:—</i>	
Five line regiments,	15 battalions.
Five battalions of Chasseurs,	5 “
<i>Cavalry:—</i>	
One squadron of Circassians,	1 squadron.
<i>Artillery:—</i>	
One regiment (incomplete),	6 batteries.
Total,	{ 20 battalions. 1 squadron. 6 batteries.

A regiment of infantry is composed of three battalions of eight companies. The complement of a battalion on a war footing is 800, and on a peace footing, as a rule, 450 rank and file.

A regiment of cavalry is composed of six squadrons, except those of the Cossacks, which have only four squadrons. The war state of a squadron is 140, and the peace state 90 horses.

A regiment of artillery is composed of four battalions of three batteries, one mountain battery, and battery of mitrailleuses, six guns to each battery. The guns of the horse artillery, and those of one battalion of field artillery, are Krupp steel guns, similar to those in the Prussian service.

The strength of a regiment of field artillery is—

	Men.	Horses.	Mules.
In war,	2,340	2,632	119
In peace,	1,400	600	—

The garrison artillery is not attached to any corps d'armée in particular, but is placed under the orders of the Minister of War. It is composed of two battalions of four companies each; and the war strength of a battalion is 564 men.

The war strength of the standing army was consequently intended to be—

	Men.	Horses.	Guns.
Infantry, 168 battalions, . . .	134,000	—	—
Cavalry, 158 squadrons, . . .	20,540	20,540	—
Artillery, 90 batteries, . . .	15,142	17,718	540
Engineers, 2 battalions, . . .	1,128	—	—
Total,	170,810	38,258	540

The peace strength:—

	Men.	Horses.	Guns.
Infantry, 168 battalions, . . .	75,000	—	—
Cavalry, 158 squadrons, . . .	14,200	14,200	—
Artillery, 90 batteries, . . .	9,000	3,900	540
Engineers, 2 battalions, . . .	900	—	—
Total,	99,100	18,100	540

In addition to the foregoing, there are artillery of reserve and the stationary troops and police, which may be comprised under the following headings:—

(a.) *Regiment of Artillery of Reserve*, which is organized like the field artillery. Its duties are to make experiments with new arms, and to furnish the necessary artillery to expeditionary corps, and to the troops of the reserve; it, in fact, supplements the artillery force of other corps when required.

(b.) *Stationary Garrison Artillery* comprises seven regiments of garrison artillery, of which one is at the Bosphorus, two at the Dardanelles, one on the Danube, and three scattered amongst the fortresses in various parts of the country. A regiment is composed of four battalions of three companies. The war strength of a regiment is 2040 men, and the peace strength half of that number.

In addition to this there are detached forces of garrison artillery, amounting altogether on a war strength to 7000 men, making a grand total of about 21,000 in the stationary garrison artillery.

(c.) *Corps of Military Workmen*, which is composed of two divisions of two battalions each. The total strength of this corps is about 3000 men, and it is stationed at Topana, in Constantinople.

(d.) *Gendarmerie of Constantinople*.—This corps is similar to that of our “Yeomen of the Guard,” and was organized in 1869. It is composed of distinguished non-commissioned officers.

(e.) *Zaptiehs, or Police of the Towns and Country*.—They have a military organization, and are variously estimated from 20,000 to 75,000 men, including infantry and cavalry.

(f.) *Medical Establishments*.—At Constantinople there are eight military hospitals, which can receive more than 2000 patients; and in every large town throughout the country (where there

are permanent garrisons) there is a military hospital, which receives its supplies from Constantinople.

There is a *Military College of Medicine, or Thibbiyeh*, situated at Constantinople, for the education of surgeons. In 1876 this college turned out thirty-three surgeons, and of late years the course of studies has been much improved. With the exception of the elementary schools at Ghul-Khaneh and Selansig, only Mussulman students are supposed to be admitted, but some exceptions are made in favour of Christians. Like many other Turkish institutions, the organization of these military colleges is excellent, but the results are not commensurate with it.

(g.) *The Reserves*.—They are divided into the first and second *Redifs*.

The first *Redifs* are composed of 120 battalions of infantry, of eight companies each. To each of the first five corps d'armée twenty-four battalions of the first *Redifs* are attached. Those of the sixth corps were not organized on the outbreak of war, and the seventh corps had no reserves. The men serve for three years (after leaving the *Ihtiat*), and then pass into the second *Redif*.

The *Redifs* should properly be called up for one month's drill in each year, but from motives of economy the law has been neglected in this respect.

The *Redifs* are composed only of infantry. The reserve of cavalry is supplied from the auxiliary forces, and the artillery from the artillery reserve.

According to regulation, the first *Redifs* should amount to 120 battalions, of 800 men each, giving a total of 96,000 men.

The second *Redifs* are organized in the same manner, and should give also 120 battalions, of 800 men each, but about sixty battalions were the most that at first could be mustered.

The "Levé en Masse" (Moustafiz).—The Minister of War estimated the number of men which could thus be obtained at 250,000, but there was no organization for them. Properly speaking, the *Moustafiz* are not legally liable to serve away from their own districts, except in cases of great emergency.

Auxiliary Forces.—These are of two kinds—the volunteers, or *Bashi-bazouks*, and the contingents from the different tribes and tributaries.

The *Bashi-bazouks* are organized like the *Nizam*, and are principally infantry, but they are, as a general rule, an undisciplined set of brigands.

The contingents from the tribes of Arabs and Kurds form a force of irregular cavalry, but are very lawless. They are commanded by their own chiefs.

During the Crimean War there were 30,000 *Bashi-bazouks* and 10,000 tribal irregular cavalry; a force even larger than this could be raised in the present day; and if the *Bashi-bazouks* were officered with Europeans, they might in the course of twelve months form a very valuable reserve. Although a wild set of men, they would seem to be amenable to some sort of discipline under proper officers. At the close of the Crimean War, when they were disbanded, each regiment was marched to its own part of the country, where it was dismissed; and each man received the arms he carried, together with an English sovereign. During these marches the discipline of the men was admirable.

The following, then, is a summary of the total forces available, on paper, to the Ottoman Government:—

	Men.	Horses.	Guns.
Infantry, standing army, 168 battalions, .	134,000	—	—
“ 1st class <i>Redifs</i> , 120 “ .	96,000	—	—
“ 2nd class <i>Redifs</i> , 120 “ .	96,000	—	—
<i>Moustafiz</i> , or <i>Levé en Masse</i> ,	250,000	—	—
Cavalry, standing army, 158 squadrons, .	20,540	20,540	—
“ auxiliary,	10,000	10,000	—
Artillery, horse and field, 90 batteries, .	15,142	17,718	540
“ reserve, 14 batteries,	2,340	2,751	84
“ garrison, 7 regiments,	14,280	—	—
“ detachments, 20 batteries, . . .	7,000	—	—
Engineers, 2 battalions,	1,128	—	—
<i>Zaptiehs</i> ,	20,000	—	—
Total,	666,430	51,009	624

This strength is of course apart from contingents which might be furnished by tributary states or by allies, but of these we will speak presently.

The men for the regular army are, by the decrees of 1869 and 1871, recruited from the Mussulman population by conscription. Their first drawing commences when they are twenty years of age; if they draw a blank they again come up the following year, and so on until twenty-six years of age, at which time, if they have drawn six blanks, they pass at once into the reserve.

This plan has great inconveniences, as it obliges men to travel sometimes long distances every year for their “drawing,” and keeps them in an unsettled state as to their future. Moreover, it passes men into the reserve who have not had a military training.

The exemptions are members of the legal profession and priests, and the only sons of families.

Exemption, and also *discharge*, could be *purchased*, according to arrangements in force before the outbreak of the war, for from £40 to £50 Turkish, equal to about £36 to £45 sterling. The price before 1869 was £73; and the Government received rather a startling proof of the dislike to military service, when the reduction in the price of discharge was made. In the third army corps no less than 4000 men applied for their discharge in 1869, while the average number in previous years before the reduction of cost of discharge was only 400!

The production of such a large sum of money represented by the discharge of 4000 men, £200,000 in one district—was so unexpected that inquiries were set on foot to discover how the money had been produced, and it was found that it had been obtained by the sale of landed property, in most cases to Christians.

The brigade of Cossacks is the only corps in which Christians were, previous to the war, admitted into the rank and file. It was recruited from volunteers. At first the Christians predominated, but now the reverse is the case.

By law the annual contingent of recruits was fixed at 37,500, but the real number did not exceed 25,000 men.

Recruiting was divided into districts corresponding with the headquarters of the corps d'armée. In each district the levy of recruits was made by a commission, nominated by the general of the corps d'armée, and composed of one superior officer, one doctor, one mollah, one secretary, and the members of the Medjlis or civil court.

There are several excellent military schools, both of an advanced and of a preparatory nature. At the head of these may be mentioned the College of Artillery and Engineering at Cumber-Khauch, in the "Sweet Waters" at Constantinople. This College is divided into four sections, of twenty-five students in each. The course of study extends over four years, and the whole organization is remarkably good. The students have the rank of sub-lieutenants, and receive pay at the rate of 180 piastres per month. The Imperial Military College at Pancaldi was founded by Sultan Mahmoud II. The instruction at this college is excellent; but it begins at the wrong end, and turns out captains instead of sub-lieutenants. The course of studies extends over five years, when the students are drafted into the army with the rank of captain, and thus lose the

practical experience of subalterns, which is of so much value in guiding the interior economy of a regiment. The College is commanded by a general of brigade, and in 1873 it turned out 103 students as captains. The supply of the students is drawn from the Military Preparatory Schools, which are eight in number—at Constantinople, Adrianople, Monastir, Bosna-Seraï, Broussa, Erzeroum, Damascus, and Bagdad. The course of instruction extends over four years, and the students are drafted at the age of sixteen into the Imperial Military College. The instruction consists of the Turkish, Arabic, and French languages, history, and geography, mathematics, and astronomy. Each school has six professors, and from eighty to a hundred students, with the exception of the one at Constantinople, which has 400 students, and a proportionate number of professors.

The Constantinople school is commanded by a general of brigade, and other schools by colonels.

The preparatory schools, or *idadiyeh*, are now supplied with students from elementary schools, or *ruchdiyeh*, which were established in 1875. As yet they are only eight in number, and are all at Constantinople. They are organized on the model of the *idadiyeh*, and teach languages, caligraphy, drawing, mathematics, and geography. The students can enter the preparatory from the elementary schools (by examination), for either the army, navy, or the military medical services; and they are also prepared as clerks for the civil service.

The officers do not all pass through a course of training. Some are raised from the ranks, and others appointed by favour; and so little pains is taken to teach them their duties after they enter the service, that those from the military colleges forget what they have learnt, and the knowledge of the others is infinitesimal.

The recruiting of horses, or *remounts*, came under the head of two systems. Agents were sent by the Minister of War to foreign countries (principally Hungary) to purchase horses, and purchases were made in the military districts by commissions nominated by the general of the corps d'armée, and sometimes by the colonel of regiments.

Administration of the Army.—The Sultan is the supreme head of all the forces by land and sea. Next to him comes the Grand Vizir. The Minister of War, or *Seraskier*, directs under his orders the various services.

The Ministry of War is divided as follows:—
 (1.) The Grand Military Council (Dari-Choura);
 (2.) Council of Topana.

Under the orders of the Minister of War were the following officers:—The generals in command of the seven corps d'armée; the generals of divisions and brigades which may be temporarily created; the Central Commission of reserves.

The Grand Military Council.—(1.) The Council Proper, composed of the Minister of War, a field-marshal (Mushir) as president, six generals of division, and one general of brigade.

(2.) The departments, which include the adjutant-general, quartermaster-general, paymaster-general, and general of the staff, or military secretary.

The Council of Topana, under the presidency of the chief of artillery, furnishes and controls the material of war, and all military manufacturing establishments.

The seven corps d'armée were each commanded by a field-marshal, who was assisted by the état major, the military council, and a sub-commission of Redifs.

The Etat Major was composed of the field-marshal and his staff of four generals of division (of which one was president of the military council); five generals of brigade, one of which was the chief of artillery, and another president of the sub-commission of Redifs; four colonels, or lieutenant-colonels; the senior officer of engineers; one surgeon-major; one officer of "intendance;" two of control; and one accountant. Through this staff the Commander-in-chief could put himself into communication with every part of the corps d'armée.

The Military Council was composed of a general of division (as president), some generals of brigade or colonels, an assistant adjutant-general, a surgeon-major, and a secretary. It was in communication with the military council at Constantinople, and directed the adjutant-general's department of the corps d'armée; but such a division of authority could not do otherwise than create confusion. Regiments or battalions which were on detached service were only responsible to the military council at Constantinople.

The Sub-commission of Redifs, presided over by a general of brigade, attended to the conscription, and to the calling up of the Ihtiat and Redifs. The main principle of this organization

was that all tactical movements should be under the direction of the commander-in-chief of the corps d'armée, while the administration was under the control of the military council at Constantinople.

Special commands were formed before the war in certain parts of the Empire where disaffection was anticipated. The troops which composed them were taken from the district corps d'armée, but the commandant reported direct to Constantinople. There were six of these commands:—

1. That on the frontier of Bosnia and Servia, which generally consisted of about 8000 men, and was drawn from the fifth corps d'armée.

2. The Brigade of Herzegovina, of about 5000 men, drawn from the third corps.

3. The Brigade of Thessaly, whose duty it was to keep down brigandage on the Greek frontier, composed of about 3000 men, also drawn from the third corps.

4. The Brigade of Tripoli and Barbary, composed of a regiment and a battalion of chasseurs from the first corps d'armée.

5. The Division of Candia, of about 6000 men, furnished by the first, second, and fifth corps.

6. The Division of Nedjed, of about 6000 men, furnished by the sixth corps.

The Central Commission of Redifs was at Constantinople, and directed and controlled the sub-commissioner.

The Control, Commissariat, and Paymaster's Departments were centralized at Constantinople, which was the chief dépôt for military stores, and was under the control of the Grand Military Council. The flour for the troops was not purchased, but made from the crops received from the Government tithes. The rations of the troops were good, and in peace generally regularly served out. They consisted of bread, 960 grammes; meat, 256 grammes; vegetables, 256 grammes; butter, 4 grammes; salt, 1 gramme. For each man the company receives 250 grammes of wood, and 3 grammes of oil.

The rations of forage are:—Barley, 3·840 kilogrammes; hay, 3·840; straw, 1·280. Officers received a certain number of rations according to their rank, and in most cases made money by selling them. The following is a list of pay and rations of officers and men:—

	Piastres, per month	Rations, per day.	Forage Rations, per day.
Field-marshal,	25,000	128	64
General of Division,	8,333	64	20
“ Brigade,	5,000	32	12
Colonel,	2,500	12	8
Lieutenant-colonel,	1,633	8	3
Major,	1,250	6	2
Adjutant,	625	4	1
Captain,	350	2	0
Lieutenant,	250	1	0
Sub-lieutenant, 1st class,	230	1	0
“ 2nd class,	210	1	0
Sergeant-major,	50	1	0
Sergeant,	35	1	0
Corporal,	30	1	0
Private,	25	1	0

The pay of the privates is generally in arrear, sometimes as much as two years!

Each army corps is commanded by a military pasha of the first class, called a “Mushir,” and considered equal in rank to a field marshal in other armies. The division is commanded by a “Ferick,” or military pasha of the second class, equal in rank to a general of division in the French service; and each brigade by a “Liva,” or military pasha of the third class, equal in rank to a brigadier-general. The regiments are commanded by a “Miri-alaj,” or colonel; besides which there is a “Kaimakan,” or lieutenant-colonel, with a “Bimbashee,” or major, at the head of each battalion, and an “Ushashee,” or captain, with two “Mulasims,” or lieutenants, in charge of each company. A sergeant-major is a Bash-tshaush; a sergeant, a Sira-tshaush; a corporal, an Onbashee; a quarter-master-sergeant, a Buljuk-emini.

As may be gathered from the official details we have been able to furnish, the Turkish army is in theory amongst the best and most simply organized in Europe; but in practice it leaves much to be desired. The organization was commenced by Riza Pasha in 1843, and carried on by Hussein Avni Pasha. The assassination of that general, by which his military knowledge was lost, was a great blow to the country in the midst of difficult circumstances, as he was certainly the man who, above every other, best understood the position of the army as affected by alterations introduced after 1871.

Of the men—the rank and file—of the Turkish army, it may truly be said that, considering all things, they are by far the most orderly and obedient troops in the world. Mutiny or revolt

amongst them is almost unknown. Occasionally, as when the late Sultan was deposed, they assist or take part in a popular movement, but such an event is invariably caused by orders from above. Never in any army, either of our own or any other time, were men more obedient than are the Turkish troops; and never were seen soldiers who would endure more hardships than they do without grumbling. The chief reason for this is that they are all of one creed—they are all Moslems, and consequently all fatalists. “What is written is written,” and no effort of man can alter it, is an axiom of their faith. When hardships have to be borne—when there is hardly any food to be had on a campaign, when the fate of war seems to be against them, when long, dusty, hot marches have to be made—there is no soldier equal to the Turk. He may give in from sheer physical exhaustion; he may drop down from want of nourishment, or want of water; he may lie down and die by the wayside; but he never complains, never grumbles. *Quod scriptum scriptum* is his faith, and he gallantly shows it to be so by the unflinching manner in which he bears all the fatigues and troubles of life. He is, in a word, perhaps the best passive soldier in the world. Not that he is by any means wanting in personal courage; but, generally speaking, he is not well enough commanded. He is in some respects not unlike a Northern German. He is utterly careless as to where he goes, or where he is ordered. He will submit to any amount of even personal punishment from an officer without resenting it. And he puts as much blind faith in every one that the Padisha, or Sultan, has created an authority in the army, as the Prussian does in all who bear the envied “Von” before their names.

Here, however, the simile must end. The German soldier is certainly the reverse of clean in his person; but outwardly he is polished and brushed up to the most wonderful extent. Not so the Turk. He makes no pretence of cleanliness, even on duty, and his officers and non-commissioned officers interfere very little, if at all, with him off parade. They look upon him as they do upon themselves, and not without reason, as a man who is wronged—as one with whom faith has not been kept, who is greatly in arrears of pay, and whose clothing is dealt out to him by fits and starts, and at uncertain seasons. Like everything else in Turkey, the military clothing system is one which robs with equal impartiality

the Government and its servants. When a corps d'armée requires new clothing the contract is advertised, and tenders are sent in for the different articles wanted. It is not the party who sends in the lowest tender, nor yet he who gives the best guarantee for the performance of his contract, that gets it. With all their religious apathy no people know better than the Turks how to make matters pleasant all round. In other words, "backsheesh," or bribery, goes a long way in the land—perhaps nearly as far as it did in our own country in the days of the Georges, and up to fifty years ago. But the evil does not end here. The individual who is fortunate enough to obtain the contract—and who is invariably a Jew or a Christian, often a European—no sooner gets what he wants than he puts it up for auction. Thus, let us say that the primary contract for 10,000 jackets, as many pairs of trousers, and the same number of boots, is "conceded" to the highly respectable firm of ———, located in Pera. Is it to be expected that these gentlemen, who are mighty dealers in Turkish bonds and in Ottoman bank shares, will trouble themselves about such a trifling affair as this? By no means. They put up the contract for sale. They will get, say, £50,000 from the Porte for providing the clothing. But they sell it to Agiman Bey, the great Armenian banker, at a profit of say £10,000; and the Bey parts with it to Jacobus, the influential Jew, for an additional £5000. Nor has the unfortunate contract finished its troubles. Jacobus turns an honest penny on it, and sells it for, perhaps, £3000 more than he gave for it; and so it passes through two or three hands more, always at a profit to the last seller. When the last purchaser has got it into his hands, and sees he cannot squeeze another drop out of it, he sets to work to make the clothing, or to get it made. But by this time, as an English tradesman would say, "there is no margin left for profit." The sufferer, of course, is the Turkish soldier. The suit of uniform, for which, perhaps, the treasury pays five pounds, will not have cost more than one pound, or one pound ten shillings, when it reaches him. It is made of mere rotten shoddy. It does not look well a week, and is in holes in a month. But the Turkish warrior knows nothing as to the cost, the material, or what time clothes ought to last. And as the clothing is accepted as a fate, "Allah is great," the men say; "the cloth is not good, but that is

the fault of some unbelieving dog of a Christian, who has taken the Padisha's money and cheated him. But it is our kismet—our fate. Allah is great. Long live the Sultan!" And here ends the whole affair.

As it is with the clothing, so it is with the arms, the saddlery, the horses, the guns, and all that pertains unto the army. Some years ago, when two or three regiments of English cavalry happened to return from India about the same time, and had all to be provided with saddles of a new pattern, their old saddles were sold by auction. They were very old, and in extremely bad condition; so that the authorities were glad to realize about 18s. 6d. upon them all round. It was afterwards discovered that they had been purchased for a Constantinople firm, and, after a little tinkering up, had been sold to the War Office in Stamboul for rather more than £7 sterling each! There were about 1500 of these saddles, so the contractor must have made something comfortable out of the business.

In one, and only one thing, the Turkish soldier is not cheated. He is well fed, and gets his full allowance of the rations allowed him. The reasons for this are—first, because the contractors for food are almost invariably Moslems, who, whatever their faults may be, do not prey upon the Government in the same manner as do the foreigners, the Jews, and the native Christians of Constantinople. The second reason is, that seeing he is kept months in arrear with his pay, and when he wants a little ready money has to borrow from the regimental "Svraff," or paymaster, at the rate of ten per cent. per month—the authorities take care that the line must be drawn somewhere; and they draw it at the food. Of this he gets his, or rather the Government's, money's worth. The contractors for it are nearly always provincials, and these are certainly more honest and honourable in their dealings than their fellow-countrymen on the Bosphorus. The Turkish soldiers, therefore, in ordinary times, are with few exceptions well fed. But to do the Turks justice, it must be said of them, that when by any chance—in a campaign, for instance—their food is not forthcoming, they neither growl nor grumble, but bear their misfortunes like men and soldiers.

We read from time to time in our magazines and newspapers, as to the best way of recruiting the ranks of an army. Many are in favour of conscription; others advocate the old English militia

system of balloting; while not a few hold to the old saying that "one volunteer is worth two pressed men." In Turkey the system of raising men in emergencies is simple in the extreme, although it would scarcely suit our insular notions, nor, indeed, those of either our German or French neighbours. We will suppose that a thousand men are wanted for, say, the corps d'armée in Syria. Orders are sent from Constantinople, not to Syria, but, perhaps, to the authorities in Asia Minor, that these men must be found by a certain date. The authorities look out for a few villages where young and able men are to be found. These villages are surrounded in the night by troops, and a raid made at daylight next morning upon all the houses; much in the same manner that a nest of hornets, or the favourite haunt of some well-known wild beast, would be attacked. The women, children, and old men are allowed to go free; but the young and able-bodied men are retained, made prisoners of, and marched away to serve for five years in some far off army corps, never in that which is stationed round their own homes. The whole process is so simple, and reminds one so strongly of what used to take place in England (until within the last fifty or sixty years), when men were wanted for the Royal Navy, that with a change of names and circumstances one might almost be reading a bygone, but not very old, history of the days when the press-gang and its merry men did their work so effectually. Whether any other people in the world—except, perhaps, in parts of Russia—would submit at the present day to be thus kidnapped, sent away from home, and made to soldier for five years in parts of the country which may be as distant from their homes as Naples is from the north of Scotland, must be more or less a matter of conjecture, more particularly when the probabilities are that if a soldier dies, or is killed, far away from home, his friends and relations will never hear a word more on the subject, one way or another. The records in the Turkish War Office are kept a good deal by the rule of thumb. Moreover, if a man is alive, he is pretty sure to turn up again, at some time or other; if he is dead, he will never trouble any one again, and so what is the use of troubling at all about the matter? Fatalism, if carried out to its full extent, in practice as in theory, must save a vast deal of worry, no end of returns, a host of clerks, and a large number of staff officers.

As regards the courage and bravery of the Turkish officers, they are, perhaps, second to none in the world. In this respect also, fatalism has its advantages. More particularly when their hearts are in the cause, they will show themselves almost reckless as to consequences. Amongst the colonels, lieutenant-colonels, and majors, are often to be found men of fair education and good military attainments. But in the lower ranks, among the captains and lieutenants, anything above mediocrity is rare indeed. The field-officers of regiments are generally, or at least very often, men who have received some military education at the college in Constantinople, have learnt French, perhaps a little English; and, after a few years service in the War Office, or on the staff of some pasha, have been promoted direct to their position without passing through the inferior commissioned ranks. But the captains and subalterns are of quite a different class. They seem rarely, if ever, to advance beyond their present rank. The subalterns are generally young men, very poor, and do much of the hard work which in our service falls to the sergeants or sergeant-majors. The captains are older. Like the subalterns, their education is of a moderate kind. They, too, are poor, and have generally a wife to support. The officers who have been promoted from the ranks look down on the war school officers as unpractical and inexperienced; the officers from the war school, in return, consider these ignorant and unfitted to share their society. The junior officers fall back for companionship upon their non-commissioned officers and men, while their general or colonel treats them as though they were menials.

Formerly the Turkish authorities were very easily imposed upon by any foreign adventurer who offered himself; and if he would only—without going through any religious ceremony, or without the form of going to prayers at the mosque—declare himself to be a Moslem, he was sure to obtain military rank, even if he had never served at all before. He had only to say that he had been in some high position in the army of some other country to be made the most of by the Turks. But this is now all changed. In fact, no foreigner's application to join the service is so much as entertained, unless strongly supported by the ambassador of his country at Constantinople; and even then it is extremely difficult for the

stranger to enter the army, unless he is content to begin at the lowest rank of officers. In this respect the Turkish Government has certainly shown its wisdom. No doubt there have been, and there are still, foreigners who have done good service to the state. The late Hungarian general Kmety, Hassein Pasha, as he was called by his Moslem masters, was one of these; but he joined the Turkish army as a "Liva," or pasha commanding a brigade. Colonel O'Reilly, Hassein Bey, was another; but he took service from the commencement as a lieutenant-colonel on the staff of the army. There are also some British and German officers of great merit now holding high rank in the army. But these are exceptions to the rule; and by far the greater number of foreigners who formerly entered the Turkish army — of course, not a word can be said against the English and Anglo-Indian officers who joined the service during the Crimean War—turned out to be mere adventurers of the very worst type.

That the Turkish army might be made one of the most effective in the whole world, no one who knows it can have any more doubt than that it is now rather the reverse of this. It has, and always has had, its own great misfortune, and its own great fault. The misfortune is that it is robbed by every one that has the handling of its pay; and its fault is, that it is at one and the same time too much, and yet too little, Europeanized. The first Turkish Parliament that ever sat in Constantinople took an interest in the question of the soldier's pay; and if it has an opportunity will doubtless effect some wholesome reforms in this and other respects in the Ottoman army.

The Turkish ordinary "Nefer," or private soldier, is by nature and tradition warlike. He believes in the destiny of the Ottoman race to conquer the world. He is easily stirred by an appeal to his religious fanaticism to undergo the greatest hardships in the sacred cause. Though strict laws against plunder have been introduced, a certain amount of pillage of the Giaour will ever be looked for by the Turkish soldier, as his recompense for the hardships of the military campaign. Being thus by heritage a warrior, the Turk leaves to the subject races all the cares of the craftsman and artizan. Whereas in other armies there are to be found in the ranks carpenters, smiths, tailors, and shoemakers—trades absolutely essential to the well-being of an army, in the Turkish none

such are to be found; and the want of men knowing anything of these pursuits seriously cripples an army engaged in active operations away from the resorts of tradesmen.

In the Turkish army, infantry, cavalry, and artillery soldiers alike wear a fez, a blue jacket and waistcoat trimmed with red, scarlet sash round the waist, trousers wide to the middle of the calf, and then tight as a gaiter, over which, in the cavalry, is drawn a boot of soft, untanned leather. The infantry wear gaiters and shoes, and in the field sandals of sheepskin laced over the feet. The infantry is armed with breech-loading rifles—a considerable number with Sniders, some with Martini-Henry, and others with Remingtons. The guns of the artillery are mostly of the Krupp make, and the cavalry, in addition to sabres, carry Winchester carbines.

To the forces which we have enumerated of the Ottoman Empire proper, may be added contingents from Egypt. Early in the present war that country contributed a most valuable auxiliary force. The Egyptian army numbers in its normal condition nearly 60,000 men, and the capabilities of its troops (if properly led) were fully proved in the campaigns of Ibrahim Pasha. The Egyptian officers, moreover, are vastly superior to the Turkish, and are properly trained and educated.

The armed strength of Tunis—which is nominally subject to Turkey—since the suppression of piracy has been by no means formidable, and at present would add but little to the resources of the State to which it is nominally subject. There is no means of obtaining any exact information, either, as to the forces which might be sent to Constantinople from Tunis; but it is stated on good authority that between 4000 and 5000 partially drilled men, half regulars and half irregulars, are all that could have been relied upon, even had not the Bey, shortly after the outbreak of war, declared his intention of remaining neutral. Some contributions, however, of cattle and money were sent to Constantinople as marks of popular sympathy with the Sultan.

Although it was evident from the commencement that the great events of the present war would turn upon military operations, it was quite possible for the navies of the two countries to have furnished many exciting and some instructive incidents, and both the order and the rapidity of hostilities might have been much influenced by the

respective naval conditions of the belligerents. And however viewed, whether broadly as fleets, or in more detail as ships, the Russian and Turkish navies are alike interesting. The interest is in each case almost exclusively confined to ironclad ships, as in neither navy, if we except certain imperial yachts of very high speed, do any remarkable vessels of unarmoured types exist, nor is the number of efficient vessels of this kind great in either navy.

In our review of the naval forces of the respective belligerents, both as regards that already given of the Russian and that of the Turkish fleet now to be described, we have to remind our readers that our descriptions are of the navies as they existed *at the opening of the war*, this being the fairest course to both sides, and the one best calculated to enable the reader to judge of the relative chances possessed by each power at the beginning of the conflict.

Comparing for a moment, therefore, the ironclad navies of the two countries, we observe, first, that the navy of Russia was of a much more composite and diversified nature than that of Turkey. While the latter consisted entirely of broadside ships (excepting the river boats), the Russians had adopted both broadsides and turrets, and both broadsides and turrets had been embodied in vessels of very different types. In the days of wooden ships the Russian navy was, no doubt, modelled in pretty close conformity with Western war-ships; and even since the introduction of armour-clads, the examples of England and France certainly had great influence with Russian designers; but there were other powerful influences also at work, and the American monitor type of vessel, and the English turret system of the late Captain Cowper Coles, obtained admirers and imitators in the Russian Admiralty. In the Turkish navy, on the contrary, British influence had been paramount in all essential respects, and the result was that the Turkish ironclads were of much less variable type, and almost free from the influence exerted in America by Mr. Ericsson and in England by Captain Coles.

Counting ironclads of all kinds and sizes, including gunboats, and ships in progress as well as finished ships, the Russian navy was the larger of the two, comprising twenty-nine vessels against the twenty-one of the Turkish navy, and an aggregate tonnage (displacement) of 92,178 against

79,722. To obtain a good idea, however, of the effective fleet of either country, considerable deductions should be made from both sides.

The largest ships of the Turkish navy were two very large frigates of 9000 tons each (more exactly 8994 tons by measurement displacement), both of which were built in England, and one, the *Hamidieh*, had not left our shores when the war commenced. As a vessel she was complete, though without either guns, shell, or powder on board, and hoisted the Turkish flag several days before war was declared by Russia. The Turkish Government, through its ambassador, claimed that the vessel, having become *bonâ fide* Turkish property before the outbreak of hostilities, was therefore free to depart like any other ship belonging to the Porte which at the time might have happened to be in British waters. This, however, not being at first very clearly established, the British Government detained the vessel, until it could be shown that her departure would not constitute any breach of the neutrality laws. Such a decision was certainly a misfortune for the Turkish Government, as the *Hamidieh* was one of the two most powerful ships they possessed.

Our description of the *Mesoudiye* will apply equally to the *Hamidieh*, the two being of identical construction. The former of these fine vessels was built by the Thames Ironworks Company, under the superintendence of officers of the British Admiralty. In general characteristics the *Mesoudiye* was like the British ironclad *Hercules*, but with the central battery very much lengthened, in order to carry twelve guns of 18 tons each, instead of the eight of the *Hercules*. The enormous battery of Armstrong guns at once stamped her as a ship of the very first class as regarded offensive powers, superior, in fact, in this respect to all the ships of the British Navy, excepting only the *Alexandra*. In order to carry her large number of guns, the ship was made somewhat larger than any modern ironclads of our own navy, and of a breadth equal to that of the broadest of our broadside ships. Practically speaking, however, she compared for size with our own *Sultan*, as the following figures will show:—

	Length. Feet.		Breadth. Feet.		Displacement. Tonnage.
<i>Sultan</i> ,	325	59	8899
<i>Mesoudiye</i> ,	332	59	8994

It should be stated that the *Sultan* has a small upper-deck battery, which the other ship had not,

and that there were other differences between the two ships, which accounted for the differences of armament, that need not here be dwelt upon. The armour of the *Mesoudiye* was in places twelve inches thick, with the usual taperings towards the ends, and in the strakes below and above the water-line; and one of the means by which the weight of armour was kept down to a reasonable amount, notwithstanding the great length of the battery, was by narrowing the belt of armour before and abaft the battery, and more particularly keeping the upper edge of the armour-belt down much nearer to the water-line than has been usual in the large ironclads of our own navy. The total weight of the armour of this ship, and of the teak timber backing which supported it, was 2000 tons. The height of her ports was ten feet above the water, and in order to keep the guns up to this height, and at the same time to keep the deck before and abaft the battery down near to the water's surface, a great "break," or change of level at the main deck occurred at the ends of the battery. As the upper deck was continuous, it resulted that the height between the decks outside of the battery was very much greater than that within the battery, the latter being only just sufficient, of course, to allow of the guns being freely and comfortably fought. This great loftiness between decks—which is also observable, and from the same cause, although in different degrees, in several of our British ironclads—struck the eye of visitors in a remarkable manner. It gave great space to the ward-room, and many of the officer's cabins, and made it difficult for any one seated in these apartments to realize the fact that they were on board an ironclad man-of-war. In point of fact, however, all these spacious apartments were outside of the armour protection, and all their splendid fittings and decorations would be exposed to speedy destruction in action. This great ship, the *Mesoudiye*, was rigged, and carried a fair proportion of canvas, and having engines (by Maudslay) of over 7000 indicated horse-power, was capable of steaming, when hard pressed, at the rate of $13\frac{3}{4}$ knots per hour. She was built with a formidable ram stern for running down an enemy, and with steam steering-gear, to give her great handiness when under steam. It will sufficiently complete her description to say that the guns at either end of her battery were so placed as to fire within a few degrees of the line of keel; that she

had three additional guns of $6\frac{1}{2}$ tons each on the upper-deck, to complete the bow and stern fire; and that, besides these, she had six 20-pounders, also on the upper-deck, for saluting and other subordinate purposes.

The Turkish navy next comprised four ships each, with one exception, of 56 feet beam, 293 feet in length, and of 6500 tons displacement tonnage. They were protected with $5\frac{1}{2}$ -inch armour on 10-inch wood backing, the hulls being of iron. They all had engines of 4500 indicated horse-power, and steamed, when in good condition and doing their best, at twelve knots. They were each armed with fifteen guns of $6\frac{1}{2}$ tons each, and one of $12\frac{1}{2}$ tons. They were all built in this country several years ago, and were rigged vessels. These ships are named *Azizieh*, *Orkanieh*, *Mahmoudieh*, and *Osmanieh* respectively. The *Osmanieh* was a ram, armour-plated from stem to stern, 309 feet long, 56 feet broad, and of a burden of 4200 tons (old measurement). The stem of the vessel projected about four feet beyond the upper deck at the water-line.

The next ship in point of importance in the Turkish fleet was the *Ather Terfik* (originally built in France for the Khedive of Egypt under the name of the *Ibraiehmiéh*), which was 275 feet long, 50 feet broad, and had a displacement tonnage of 5000 tons. She was defended with 8-inch armour, and carried eight guns of $12\frac{1}{2}$ tons. Her engines were of 3500 indicated horse-power, and her speed about twelve knots.

The Turks also possessed two vessels of still smaller size, but of a modern type, and well adapted by their armour, guns, and handiness for modern naval warfare. These were the *Fethi Bulend* and the *Mukadamme Kies*, sister ships. The former of these was built in England by the Thames Ironworks Company, Blackwall; and the latter was as nearly as possible an exact reproduction of her, built in the Imperial Dockyard at Constantinople, and mainly by Turkish workmen. These small vessels, which are of only 2760 tons displacement, on a length of 235 feet, by a breadth of 42 feet, had engines of 3000 indicated horse-power, and had a speed of nearly fourteen knots, which was enormous for vessels so small. They each carried 9-inch armour, with a battery of four $12\frac{1}{2}$ -ton guns, each gun being placed at the angle of the battery, so as to obtain with the four guns fire in all directions, or very nearly so. It is

difficult to put a full value upon small fast armour-clad vessels of this type under the conditions of modern warfare.

We come next to a couple of somewhat smaller vessels, not altogether unlike the *Fethi Bulend* in their general type, but inferior to her in the essential elements of armour, engine power, and speed. We refer to the *Arni Allah*, built in 1869 by the Thames Company, and the *Muni Zafer*, built at the same time by Samuda Brothers. These vessels were 230 feet long, 36 feet broad, and had a displacement of 2320 tons. They each carried four 12½ ton guns, with devices (differing from those of the *Fethi Bulend*) for securing great horizontal scope of fire; but their thickest armour was 7-inch, their engine power 2000 indicated, and their speed twelve knots.

All the foregoing ships, with one exception, were built for the Turkish Government. We now come to some vessels of earlier and inferior types, several of which were originally constructed for the Egyptian Government, and afterwards handed over by the Khedive to the Sultan. These were three corvettes, almost alike, named *Athar Shefket*, *Neghin Shefket*, and *Idjla Lieh*, all of about 210 feet long, 40 feet broad, and of 2300 tons displacement. They each carried four 150-pounders (of about 6½ tons), and one 12½-ton gun, and were protected with 4¼-inch armour. They had engines of 2000 indicated horse-power, and steamed from eleven to twelve knots. Besides these three vessels, there were at the commencement of the war two others—the *Luftigellil* and the *Hazi Rahman*, carrying 4½-inch armour and four guns (two of 6½ tons and two smaller). They were of light draught (9 feet), and had low-powered engines (being intended for the Danube). Both were destroyed early in the war, as we shall see in the next chapter.

The only Turkish ironclad which we have left unmentioned is a ship called the *Noosretieh*, which was constructed at Constantinople, and may be considered as of a similar type to the *Mesoudiye* and *Hamidieh*, but much smaller, being of 6900 tons displacement. This ship was included in some lists as completed, and as taking a part in the war. She carried ten guns of 12½ tons in a central battery, with angular fire at the corners within fifteen degrees of the line of keel, and the bow and stern chasers consisted of one 6½ ton unpro-

tected gun on the upper deck. Her thickest armour was 9-inch. Besides her ironclads, Turkey possessed unarmoured ships as follows—viz., three or four ships of the line, five frigates, and several corvettes, with numerous despatch and gun boats of various descriptions, amounting probably to fifty. There were likewise three Imperial yachts of high speed, which could be made available for despatch and transport purposes.

The Russian navy having been described in the previous chapter, the reader will now have seen how each fleet was composed, in so far as the size, offensive and defensive powers, and speed was concerned; but for the sake of easy comprehension we annex a table showing the most interesting particulars with regard to the ironclad fleet of each country at one view:—

TURKISH IRONCLADS.

	Displacement Tonnage.	Principal Armament.	Thickest Armour.
			Inches.
Mesoudiye, . . .	8994	12 guns of 18 tons.	12
Noosretieh, . . .	6900	10 guns of 12½ tons.	9
Azizieh,	6500	{ 15 guns of 6½ tons. }	5½
Orkanieh,	6500	{ 1 gun of 12½ tons. }	5½
Osmanieh,	6500	" "	5½
Mahmoudieh, . . .	6500	" "	5½
Ather Terfik, . . .	5000	8 guns of 12½ tons.	8
Fethi Bulend, . . .	2760	4 guns of 12½ tons.	9
Mukadamme Kies, .	2760	" "	9
Arni Allah,	2320	" "	7
Muni Zafer,	2320	" "	7
Athar Shefket, . . .	2300	{ 1 gun of 12½ tons. }	4½
Neghin Shefket, . . .	2300	{ 4 guns of 6½ tons. }	4½
Idjla Lieh,	2300	" "	4½
* Luftigellil,	2300	" "	4½
* Hazi Rahman, . . .	2300	2 guns of 6½ tons.	4½
* And 5 river vessels.		" "	4½

RUSSIAN IRONCLADS.

Omitting thirteen monitors and three incomplete cruising ironclads.

	Displacement Tonnage.	Principal Armament.	Thickest Armour.
			Inches.
Peter the Great, . .	9660	4 guns of 40 tons.	15
Sebastopol,	6275	18 guns of 9½ tons.	4½
Petropaulovski, . .	6175	20 guns of 9½ tons.	4½
Prince Pojarsky, . .	4500	10 guns of 9½ tons.	4½
Admiral Lazareff, . .	3750	6 guns of 15½ tons.	6
Admiral Greig, . . .	3580	3 guns of 27 tons.	6
Admiral Chichagoff, .	3700	2 guns of 27 tons.	6
Admiral Spiridoff, . .	3750	2 guns of 27 tons.	6
Pervenetz,	3300	14 guns of 9½ tons.	4½
Netro-Menya,	"	16 guns of 9½ tons.	4½
Kreml,	"	{ 12 guns of 9½ tons, }	6
		{ 5 guns of 5 tons. }	
Novgorod (Popoffka),	2500	2 guns of 27 tons.	11
Admiral Popoff, . . .	3550	2 guns of 40 tons.	18

* Light draught gun boats.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Russian Frontier in Europe—First object aimed at by the Russian Commanders—Routes taken by the Invading Armies—Rapidity of the Russian Advance—Occupation of Galatz and Brahilov—Description of Brahilov—Its protracted Siege in 1827—Importance to the Russians of their Occupation of Galatz—Turkish Neglect in not destroying the Barboschi Bridge—Hobart Pasha at Galatz—Panic in the Town—Peremptory Order to Vessels to Leave Galatz and Brahilov—The Turkish Flotilla divided by Torpedoes—Impediments to the Russian Advance caused by the Rain and Floods—Defects of the Russian Railway Communication leading to the Turkish Frontier and of the line to Jassy—Difficulties of Transport in consequence of the difference in Gauge—Construction of a new line—What the Turks might have done to delay the Russian Advance—The Roumanian Railway Officials placed under Military Authorities—Exemplary Conduct of the Russians in their March through Roumania—Total absence of Drunkenness—Health of the Army—Condition of Roumania during May—General appearance of the Troops—Their Rations, Dress, and Equipment—Load carried by the Russian Private—Heat in June—Suitable Summer Dress—Night Marches—System of the Russian Advance—Roumanian Assistance—Secrecy of the Russian Intentions as to Crossing the Danube—The Campaign of 1854 contrasted with that of 1877—The Crossing of the Danube in 1828—Composition of the Russian Army at the European Seat of War—Sketches of the Commander-in-Chief and Generals—Composition and Strength of a Russian Army Corps—Medical Arrangements in the Russian Army—The Red Cross Society—Russian Ladies as Nurses—Dispatch of Reinforcements and Levy of fresh Troops ordered early in June—Field Guns replaced by Heavier Ordnance—Disadvantage to Russia of the Turkish Naval Superiority on the Black Sea—Proclamation of the Roumanian Government to Persons Residing on the Banks of the Danube—Scene at Giurgevo—Commencement of Hostilities—The Grand-duke Nicholas shelled at Brahilov—Attack on Beket—Exasperation of the Roumanians at the bombardment of open towns—The British Flag to be treated with absolute respect—Destruction of the Monastery of Theraponte by the Turks—Attack on the Turkish Monitors—Monitors Imprisoned—Roumanians as Active Belligerents—Artillery Combat between Widdin and Kalafat—Description of the Works at Widdin—Engagement at Oltenitza and Turtukai—Description of Oltenitza—Explosion on board a Turkish Turret Ship—Russian Enthusiasm—Minor Operations on the Danube—Destruction of a Turkish Monitor by Torpedoes—Description of the Attack and its Results—Exciting Incidents—An unsuccessful Torpedo Attack—Hobart Pasha's Method of Defence—Turkish Fears of Torpedoes Lessened—Departure of the Czar for the Seat of War—Scene at Brahilov—Arrival at the Russian Headquarters at Ploiesti—The Emperor's Suite—Bulgarian Songs—Feeling of the Bulgarian People—Attentions shown to the Bulgarians—Visit of the Czar to Bucharest—Scene in the City—The Bulgarian Legion—A New National Slave Banner—Interesting Ceremony on its Presentation to the Bulgarian Legion.

THE Russian frontier in Europe, as fixed by the Treaty of Paris, extends from Ungheni southward to Bolgrad, and then, making a sharp turn, continues eastward to the Black Sea, south of Akerman, the whole distance being about 220 to 240 English miles in length. Of this long line the last portion, from Bolgrad eastward, is the most important in an advance towards Turkey, as it is only from twenty to thirty miles from the Danube; so that on the tolerably good roads which remained from the time when the country belonged to the Russians, a considerable force could be thrown in a day or two into Galatz, Reni, Ismail, and Kilia, covering the passage of the Danube from Galatz downwards. This was one of the first objects aimed at by the Russian commander, and was speedily attained. The route has always formed a main line of the Russians whilst operating against the Lower Danube. The other great point of passage is at Ungheni, on the Pruth, where the Russian and Roumanian railways join. Between the two points—Ungheni and Bolgrad—there are only two points on the Pruth which can be made more or less available for the passage of infantry and cavalry. They are opposite the Moldavian

towns of Husch and Faltsi respectively, and they were both taken advantage of. From this line of advance the left wing of the Russian army, which crossed at Bolgrad, in the south, and took up its position on the Danube from Galatz downwards, formed the pivot on which the rest of the army from the north wheeled, changing its position, which had been along the Moldavian frontier to the east, down to the Danube—that is, southward. Two roads were available for this through Moldavia, the first coming down from Jassy, by Vaslui and Birlat, where it branches off on one side to Galatz, and the other to Foktchany, Rimnik, Buseo, and Bucharest. The troops who passed at Husch and Faltsi, forming the centre, used this route, which had been partially, at least, made into a high road. The right wing of the army, and almost all the lighter war material, went from Jassy westward to the valley of the Sereth, along which, besides the railway, a good high road runs down to Foktchany. The rapidity with which their troops pushed forward into Roumania seemed to show that the staff of the Grand-duke Nicholas had not only studied with care the lessons taught by the war between Germany and France, but had

energetically devoted the months during which the army had been mobilized in Bessarabia, to preparing with discernment and foresight for an energetic and rapid offensive strategy.

On April 24, the day on which war was declared, the leading troops of the Russian army reached Jassy, Leova, Galatz, and the bridge over the Sereth at Barboschi, and on the following day strong detachments occupied Galatz, Brahilov, and the bridge at Barboschi. On the 26th the Russian movement was continued, and on the 27th the eleventh corps, under Prince Schachowskoi, occupied Galatz and Brahilov, while the thirty-sixth division, belonging to the seventh corps, reached Ismail and Kilia. The thirty-sixth division did not form a portion of the force of the Grand-duke Nicholas, but was a detachment of the army which was intended to guard the northern shores of the Black Sea against an attack by the Turks.

Braila, or more correctly Brahilov, as given in our map, is a historic place, although before the Russians threw up their earthworks on its flanks on the present occasion the visitor might have searched in vain around its precincts for so much as the relic of a bastion or a curtain. But Brahilov was once one of the principal Turkish fortresses on the north bank of the Danube, and around it in 1827 a whole Russian army corps, 24,000 strong, stood, and dug, and mined, and fought from May 11 to June 18; and the garrison then only capitulated on condition of being allowed to retire unmolested to Silistria. Its siege then cost the Russians nearly 5000 men, and of the slaughter among their predecessors in the ranks of the army of the Czar, the Russian soldiers on the present occasion were reminded by the huge monument over the great grave in the environs of the town, near which the Russians in 1877 had their camp. Brahilov is a much handsomer town than its neighbour Galatz, which is a large river port of 80,000 inhabitants, and has an extensive trade in the export of corn.

The importance to the Russians of their occupation of Galatz was vital in the extreme. Within five miles of the town the railway from Jassy to Galatz forms its junction with the line from Galatz to Bucharest; and they knew that it was on this line they would have to depend to a great extent for the transport of supplies of ammunition—that it must, in fact, form the main line of their communications. A few miles from Galatz this line crosses the navigable river Sereth

by the Barboschi Bridge, and immediately on the threat of active hostilities that bridge should undoubtedly have been destroyed by the Turks. With a fatal apathy, however, this precaution was neglected till too late; for though a gunboat afterwards went up the Sereth, the Barboschi Bridge had then been surrounded with intrenchments, bristling with guns, and was protected by four regiments, or twelve battalions, of Russian infantry and 2000 Cossacks, and was thus secure from destruction. Being situate but a few hours' march from the Turkish frontier, the bridge might easily have been seized and blown up by Ottoman troops. While the Russian flying column performed considerably over 100 miles to seize it, the Turks from Matchin, or some other point on the Danube, might have reached Barboschi in eight hours. The *coup de main* which, in a few hours after the beginning of the campaign, made the Russians masters of this bridge, was a stroke worthy of the conception and genius of Moltke. It was executed by General Skobeleff, father of the well-known commander of Russo-Asiatic irregulars in Turkestan.

The march of the Russians from the frontier, near Bolgrad, to Galatz was also a wonderful performance. The whole distance was made on foot, with scarcely a halt. Waggons only were provided to carry the knapsacks and arms. The artillery, cavalry, and baggage trains all arrived together, as it was expected that the detachment would go into battle instantly upon arriving, for the Turks had only to cross the river and seize the railway.

On the previous Saturday (April 21) Hobart Pasha arrived at the town with a portion of his fleet. His attention had been called to some batteries the Roumanians had begun to throw up on the bluff at this place; and on the arrival of Hobart with his ironclads, a panic ensued. It was asserted that the Turkish fleet intended to bombard the city, and destroy the whole neighbourhood. Mr. Sanderson, the English consul, went on board the flag-ship of the Turkish squadron to ascertain the real intentions of Hobart Pasha, and to quiet, if possible, the apprehensions of the citizens. He was, however, immediately accused of going on board to give the Turkish admiral full details of all the new batteries erected near the city; and his accusers were not even satisfied that his motives were perfectly neutral, when he

returned and informed them that the Turkish gunboats would not molest them in any way whatever. It is difficult to understand how the Russians were thus allowed to occupy important strategical points within easy range of naval ordnance—to which the field guns in the train of the Russian army could offer no effective answer—without any molestation whatever. A sharp naval attack in the Danube might have been of great practical importance, as it would have forced the Russian columns back from the stream, and considerably hindered their preparations.

Very soon after its occupation by the Russians, all the foreign merchant ships were ordered to quit Galatz and Brahilov at a few hours' notice. The consuls introduced to the Russian general in command a deputation of merchants, to urge that the notice was unduly short; but the courteous and firm reply of the general was that his instructions were imperative. The reason of this is not far to seek. When Russia declared war she suffered under the disadvantage of having to cross the Pruth near where it joins the Danube, or send her troops by a circuitous route by the north. At the same time that the mouth of the Pruth was in danger from monitors, Galatz was in an equally unsafe condition. But there came a moment when one of the monitors had gone up the Danube beyond Brahilov, and the other down below Reni. The moment was seized. The Russians declared the navigation closed, with scant time for merchant vessels to clear out; and immediately set rows of torpedoes, or, at least, proclaimed that they were set, and thus divided the Turkish flotilla by a portion of river which was secured against the gunboats.

After obtaining the advantages we have described, in the way of lines of communication, the movements of the Russian troops were seriously impeded by the wet weather, and the railway communication between Jassy and Galatz was interrupted by the floods.

A glance at a map will show that in South-eastern Russia the "ruler" engineering of the Emperor Nicholas, which, however defective from a commercial point of view, is admirable from the military stand-point, by no means prevailed in the conception of the lines leading to the Turkish frontier. The lines from Kieff and Kharkoff each wind in a south-westerly direction to Kischeneff, and then branch off to the north-west to Jassy.

Infinitely better would it have been if direct communication had existed between the Kieff-Odessa and Kharkoff-Odessa junction at Balta and Kischeneff. But this there was, of course, no altering; and all supplies—men, food, and clothing from Kieff and Moscow, and horses from the cavalry depôts at Kharkoff—had to travel two sides of an equilateral triangle, instead of along the base. The railway leading to Jassy consisted of but a single line, with siding stations rather far apart, and so indifferently laid, and on such treacherous, shifting soil, that the greatest caution had to be exercised, and the speed not suffered to exceed a mean of fifteen miles an hour. A second line was commenced immediately after the declaration of war; but by reason of the interruptions to which this work was exposed by passing trains, it could not advance very expeditiously. The moving material was also found to be very insufficient. Comparatively little could be spared from Russia, as the gradual advance of the reserves and the general movement of the whole army south and west almost exhausted the rolling stock. Another great difficulty was experienced from the fact that at Ungheni the gauge narrowed. It was at first proposed to alter the distance between the wheels of the Russian carriages, but difficulties of balance and proper distribution of weight came in the way. It was therefore decided to lay down an additional rail on the Roumanian lines, in the same manner as the Great Western Company in England narrowed their gauge. Until the new line could be laid down, it was of course necessary to unload everything brought from Russia for transport on the Roumanian line, and the delay thus occasioned can be easily imagined. It was only with great difficulty that five trains per day could be despatched. It was from military considerations that the broad gauge was chosen for the Russian lines, but the Russians were now made to feel that it was by no means an unmixed advantage. Even before the war broke out they applied, through third persons, to the various Austrian companies for engines and rolling stock, suitable for the Roumanian lines, but were not very successful.

From Jassy to Tekutch the line makes a considerable detour by Pashkane, and from Tekutch runs to Barboschi and Brahilov, and thence to Ploiesti—the first Russian head-quarters in Roumania. To avoid this round, no less than

to diminish the risk of attack from the Danube, the Russians resolved to construct a line from Tekutch to Buseo, by Rimnik. The high road between these places was soon considerably impaired by the unwonted use to which it was put.

It will be thus seen that the communications of the Russian army to the Danube were very difficult from natural conditions—and it was fortunate for them that they were not also exposed to hostile attacks. One short week would have enabled the Turks to carry out the purely defensive measure of tearing up every rail and sleeper in the Roumanian single line, throughout its whole course parallel to the Danube. The rails might have been twisted or broken, the sleepers laid in piles and burnt. A few charges of gunpowder or gun-cotton would have destroyed all the bridges, and left the swollen streams impassable. Thus the simple military precautions taught to every Sandhurst cadet would have delayed the enemy for many weeks, and rendered his task doubly difficult. The bridges continued to stand, the rails remained firm as ever, and the moral influence on Europe of a first success was neglected by the Osmanli.

The difficulties of the Russians as to their means of communication were at first increased from the fact that at several places along the line of railway, Baken, Adjud, and Tekutch, bridges and culverts were carried away by the floods produced by almost incessant rain over Central Europe. Thousands of workmen were sent to repair the damage, and in a short time communication was re-established; but the interruption in so complicated an affair as the advance of a large army necessarily exerted a retarding influence in various directions.

Several casualties occurred on the railway during May, and early in June both Legislative Chambers of Roumania approved of a resolution passed by the Council of Ministers, placing the country in a state of siege, and providing that all offences against the army or military operations should be tried by military tribunals. By the proclamation of this decree all railway officials were brought under subjection to the military authorities, who had hitherto been powerless to enforce requisitions and orders.

In consequence of the insufficiency of the railway accommodation most of the Russian troops marched through Roumania to the Danube, and

were not unnecessarily fatigued, as there was no use in placing them on the shore of the river before they were actually required to cross. The conduct of the troops during their march was praiseworthy in the highest degree. To quote the words of a special military correspondent of a journal which certainly did not err on the side of being too favourable to Russia—"Not a single reprehensible act can be charged against them. To all they are courteous and obliging. Individuals, no less than the administration, pay for all they consume. Parents and friends have liberally provided the officers with money. Five-rouble gold pieces, struck this year, yet, curiously enough, bearing the monogram of the Emperor Nicholas, "N. I." and worth 20f. 40c., pour in on the delighted Roumanians. But the lavish expenditure is not on drink or riotous living. Sundry Marseilles houses, mindful of the enormous consumption of champagne during the Crimean War, sent their last bottle to Odessa. It may be drunk, and find a ready sale; I care not. But this is clear and positive—I have not seen a single officer or a single man the least degree the worse for liquor; not one having an altercation with an inhabitant. Note this, you who tell strange fables of the drinking condition of the forces. I was astounded. Five years ago, certainly, the officers drank like fish, as they say. A friend of mine was attached for some weeks to a cavalry regiment, and he learnt but one word, "Vipem" (Let us drink). Moderation is the order of the day; sobriety and civility. Seventy thousand men were the other day encamped within a mile of the centre of the town of Galatz. The camp was the picture of cleanliness—the white *tentes d'abri*, each holding six men, were regularly pitched. Galatz is not more deficient than other ports in the pleasures which welcome a sailor from the sea. But at ten o'clock at night there was nothing to be heard but the policeman's whistle. I walked in from the camp. Now and then an officer or soldier passed me. Three captains I saw turn in to a chemist's for a glass of lemonade; but the restaurants and *cafés* were deserted. I saw the Prussian advance into Saxony eleven years ago, and I really think that there is less confusion, less annoyance to the inhabitants, less interruption of ordinary concerns, than in the procedure of even those accomplished invaders. The Roumanian disorganization is simply remedied by Russian

organization. At the post and telegraph offices is a Russian official, who, to say the least of it, is as well-informed as his Roumanian coadjutor. It will be inferred herefrom that the discipline of the Russian army in Roumania leaves little or nothing to be desired. This is exactly the inference I am desirous to create. The discipline is absolutely perfect, and fully on a par with its military training."

One reason of the marked sobriety of the officers probably was that at the outbreak of the war a large number of them formed themselves into a temperance league, and swore neither to drink, smoke, nor gamble during the campaign.

The health of the army was remarkably good, better, the doctors said, than during peace manœuvres in their own country. This was the more extraordinary, as during nearly the whole of May the country was as unfit to campaign in as could well be conceived. In consequence of the exceptionally wet weather which prevailed all over Central and Eastern Europe, the whole basin of the Lower Danube was flooded, and the Roumanian rivers rose much beyond their normal height. The streams which usually wind through the flat meadows rushed along in turbid currents, and by the road and in the fields stood pools of water so deep that men could fish in them with hand nets. Broken banks and inundations were frequent, and the aspect of the scene was often that of marshy flats with rank herbage. Notwithstanding these hardships and the daily marches, the average of sick men in the regiments—each regiment numbering close on 3000 soldiers—was not above fifty men. The three chief causes of inefficiency were fevers—not infectious, but of an aguish type—sore eyes, and foot soreness. Only the fever cases, and of these only the most severe, were left behind; the other cases went on with their respective regiments in the ambulance waggons, of which two, each conveying twelve men, were attached to each battalion. The men of all arms looked well and strong, with plenty of flesh on their bones, though little fat. They were in excellent working condition, and carried weights which would break down any but strong constitutions, including biscuits for three days (which formed part of the kit, packed in the knapsack), and bread, which they managed to carry in a bag on their shoulders. The Russian private in a marching regiment carries no less than seventy-

two pounds English. In his own country he receives daily three pounds of bread, and seven and a half copecks for all else; but in Roumania his copecks would not buy him the meat he wanted, so the Government gave him half a pound of meat and two and a half copecks, instead of the full money he received before. They also supplied him with beans or rice for the making of the soup, of which the Russian soldiers partake twice a day, several of them eating out of the same big camp kettle. He had also served out to him a small ration of spirits, to counteract the deadly damps of the river. Time was when the commissariat of the Russian service was defective to a terrible extent. The stories of robbery and misappropriation during the Crimean war had only too much existence in fact. Not so long since the colonel received a sum for the provisioning of his men, and sorry stuff indeed they had. This is, however, now much altered, and it would be hazardous for any one to tamper with the provisions of the army.

The greatcoat of the Russian soldier is long and heavy, and he carries it in the shape of a horse collar, or, as it is termed, *en banderole*, round his left shoulder. Round the coat is wrapped one man's share of the tent, a square piece of canvas furnished with eyelet-holes and a string. Four of such pieces are bound together, and form a sort of rough gipsy tent, the ends of which are carried by two other men; the seventh carries the sticks which form upright and ridge poles. Thus seven men carry the tent under which they can sleep; but it is small, hot, and stuffy by day, while a heavy shower of rain penetrates easily through the eyelet-holes, the ill-closed apertures, and even through the canvas itself. Probably the protection is not worth the extra weight to be carried. The Germans carry nothing; the English soldiers have their tents carried for them, and if tents are to be carried at all, the English plan appears to be the best. Were it not that the Russian soldier carried his enormous load every day with seeming ease, arrived in good condition at the end of a long march, and frequently sang to beguile the way and refresh the jaded nerves, we might at once condemn the practice of so loading the infantry, which ought to arrive as fresh as possible in presence of the enemy. The kit contains much the same articles as those of the English private; but one pair of long boots is carried outside, and wrapped round

with a strap under the flap of the knapsack, so that the feet of the boots are visible on either side. Some of the soldiers were magnificent men, with limbs which might be models for a Hercules; others were of less size and power; but, on the whole, their average height was equal or superior to that of an English marching regiment, and their muscular development particularly good. They were not well set up, and did not show that curious flat-backed, stiff position so dear to the drill-sergeant. On the contrary, there were big, humpy muscles on their shoulder-blades, and the Cossacks especially were splendidly made for strength. Those who presumed that the Russian soldier of 1877 was a half-starved, ill-treated creature, who has to be primed to fight, were grievously mistaken.

The constant rain which caused so much inconvenience to the Russian army in the first weeks of the campaign ceased early in June, and the sun then poured down his rays with such intense ardour that the thermometer often stood at over eighty degrees in the shade. The army then became a white army—white to the last shred, save facings and boots. Officers and men wore a loose canvas blouse, which was the perfection of a campaigning garment for warm weather. The white of it was not so pronounced as to dazzle in the sunshine, nor did the dust of the road and the stains of the bivouac foul it into absolute dinginess. It could be washed and dried in an hour; and it was loose enough to allow thick under-clothing to be worn under it, when the burning heat turned suddenly into searching chilliness, as was sometimes the case. It allowed the freest ventilation, and withal was becoming, when once the conventional idea of military clothing was got rid of.

And here it may be as well to state that the Russian soldier, contrary to received opinion, is very cleanly as regards bathing. He takes to the water like a duck. Sooner than not bathe at all, he will bathe in uninviting water. At the baths in Galatz there was constantly a long *queue* of Russian common soldiers waiting patiently for their turn to rid themselves of the dirt of the march and bivouac. In the river hundreds of naked men were often to be seen splashing among the weeds and the frogs. Naked Cossacks were swimming about on their ponies, diving under them, hanging on by the tail, lying face upwards

on their backs, and going through a series of antics that proved their aquatic expertness.

After the hot weather set in the marching of the Russians was done as much as possible in the early mornings and late evenings, and frequently, indeed, in the dead of night. Marching heavy laden at the rate of four miles an hour did not seem to afford them sufficient vent for their energies; they must needs caper as they went marching at ease, and when they halted there was almost always a dance. Often, too, the men started one of their wild martial songs, which they sang in chorus with a precision that would not discredit the chorus of an opera troupe. Altogether they had the appearance of men who would hammer away at an object until it was worn down by sheer friction; while, at the same time, the energy with which they joined in their war songs proved that there was latent fire under the dogged exterior which showed apparent indifference to surrounding circumstances. The horses and equipments of the men did not show any evidence of the "bankruptcy" which Russia was said to be suffering from; and whatever might have been the financial condition of the Muscovite Empire, there had evidently been no lack of expenditure upon the outfit of its army.

It is scarcely possible for Englishmen to understand how real was the antagonism of races in the present struggle; how desperate the determination to settle, once for all, the standing quarrel of centuries. If England were to go to war with a continental nation the army would fight as a matter of duty to the country and honourable pride in the profession of arms; but it would be ready to shake hands both before and after the combat. Those who remember the close of the Crimean war will not forget how true and generous was the feeling of sympathy with an adversary who had fought so bravely and held his own so long. There was nothing of the sort amongst the Russians marching to the Danube; but instead, a spirit of vengeance and a fierce longing to destroy and utterly break up the Power which they felt had so long oppressed people of kindred race.

The Russian advance was conducted on a rather peculiar but sensible system; the points occupied at first by one corps being ceded to another as it marched up, when the first corps continued its march to its real destination. One corps was thus relieved by the other, and the men spared the

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